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THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS HILL GREEN, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE
TO THE RELATIONS BETWEEN ETHICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.
Introduction Page
Purpose and standpoint of the inquiry '
Plan of procedure X
I. Green's life and personality
1. Biographical data H
a. Early life and education ^
b. Professional career at Oxford $
c. Experience as educational Investigator ^
d. Civic activities ^
e. Works and influence 7
2. Personal characteristics &
a. Ethical characteristics ^
(1) Strong sense of duty ^
(2) Its conflict with his dislike for work and
for official position
(3) Effect on his philosophy 10
b. Religious characteristics / o
(1) His consciousness of the divine immanence /
/
(2) Attitude toward orthodoxy and ecclesiasticism ' '
(3) Effect on his philosophy 1
c. Intellectual characteristics IX
(1) Mental independence and intensity IX.
(2) Attitude toward art, science, and philosophy '3

d. Social charact ?r i Bt ics
(1) Relations «iih associates
(2) Scciai sympathies
(3) Influence cn his ~crk
II. Surmary of Green's philosophical principles '
1. Metaphysical principles
a* Relation to Kant and He^el
t. His epistenclc^y
c. The theory of relations
d. The relation of the finite self to the infinite
(1) Pantheistic elements
(2) Theistic elements H
e. Attitude toward general metaphysical problems
(1) Unity and plurality
(2) Change and causality
(3) Physical nature
2. Ethical principles
a. The possibility »f ethics
(1) The "spiritual principle" in nan
(2) Green's conception of freedom
b. The mor.ir. ideal
(1) The nature of the ideal
(2) Its relation to moral prc~»*oss U
c. Green's criticism of hedonism
d. Relation cf his ethical to political theory 2JF
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3. Religious principles ^
a. Relation of religious to metaphysical principles ^
(1) The finite self U
(2) The infinite self 47
b. Faith and the moral life J
7
c. Green's attitude toward dogma 2$
(1) Faith and historical criticism ^5
(2) The natural and the supernatural ^
(3) The meaning of the incarnation 2.1
d. Religious mysticism SO
III. Reviev/s of works on Green 3*2.
A. Works mainly biographical 3 3
1. Nettleship, R.L.: Memoir 33
332. Ward, Mrs. Humphrey: Robert Elsmere
3. Bryce, James: Studies in Contemporary Biography
4. Minor bigraphical articles
A
B. Works mainly expository ^
1. Fairbrother, W.H.: The Philosoph.y of Thomas Hill Green 3C
2. Caird, Edward: "Professor Green's Last Work" ^7
.
Preface to fifth edition of Prolegomena 37
Preface to Essays in Philosophical 3y
Criticism
3. Dewey, John: "The Philosophy of Thomas Hill Green" 37
4. Alexander, S. : "Works of Thomas Hill Green" 3f
5. Expository articles In the histories of philosophy

4-
C, Works mainly metaphysical
1-2. Seth, Andrew: Kegel&anism and Personality <</-/
Balfour, A.J.: "Green's Metaphysics of Knowledge" i
I
Fairbrother, W.H. : The Philosophy of Thomas Hill Green V
'
a i Summary of Seth's views
(1) On Green
(2) On Hegelian! sis in general fx
b. Summary of Balfour's views
c. Fairbrother' s defense of Green against Seth and Balfour^
d. Contested questions 1H
(1) Was Green a pantheist? ^4
(2) Did he transform Kant's epistemology into
a ready-made ontology?
(3) Is his system complete and consistent?
4. Pringle-Pattison, A. Seth: The Idea of God f7
a. Relation of Green to Berkeley H7
5 . Townsend , K . G . : The Principle of Individuality in „
g
T. H. Green
a. General characteristics ^
b. Points defended V?
(1) Green's disjunction of psychology and metaphysics f<)
(2) His objective mode of approach HQ
(3) The individuality of the object ^b
(4) The theory of relations &*°
(5) The concrete universal J 'l
(6) Green's epistemology '
(7) The individuality of the ohject Si
c. Townsend* s interpretation of consciousness J>3
tl
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6. Laurie, S.S.: "The Metaphysics of T.H.Green" 3-3
a. General attitude S$
b. Points of attack *f
(1) Inadequacy of Green's distinction between reality f4
and illusion
(2) The theory of relations
(a) Failure to combine unity with plurality s£
(b) Destruction of the nature of thought ^
(c) Elimination of substance SU
(3) Green's monistic pantheism SU
7. Knox, Howard V.: "Green's Refutation of Empiricism" SI
a. General attitude & 1
b. points of attack SI
(1) Dual nature of consciousness ^7
(2) Destructive effect on psychology S&
(3) Destructive effect on epistemology £"t
(4) Destructive effect on metaphysics JT9
8-9. Sidgwick, Henry: "Green's Metaphysics"
"The Philosophy of T. H. Green"
a. General characteristics
b. Sidgwick's objections to Green *
(1) Lack of coherence between his "spiritualism" (a
and his "idealism"
(2) Dual nature of finite consciousness (oi
(3) Non-ethical character of God ^'
(4) Metaphysical inadequacy of God ^
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10. Sturt
,
Henry: I do la Theatri
^2
a. General characteristics
b. His objections to Green's position ^%
(1) Green 1 static intellectual ism prevents a
satisfactory account
(a) Of God as intelligent and moral ^3
(b) Of the world as a sphere of moral action ^3
(c) of man
(i) As felated to the Infinite io%
(ii) As capable of change
(iii) As stimulatedto mor: 1 action
(iv) As free
(2)Green's subjectivism leads to
(a) Solipsism
(b) An unwarranted assumption of the "spiritual
Principle" in nature
(c) Ethical fallacies £,7
(i) Self-realization really self-regarding ^7
(ii) The moral nature of God also self-regarding 6 7
11. Haldar, Hiralal: "Green and his Critics" £7
a. Haldar' s Hegelian standpoint It <f
b. Attack on Kantian elements in Green ^7
(1) The possibility of knowledge not explained k> ?
(2) Feelings confused with felt things 10
11
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12. Calderwood, H. : "Another view of Green's Last Work" 7/
a. Calderwood s Scottish realism 7/
b. Attack on Hegelain elements in Green 71
(1) Unification a false goal 7/
(2) Green's accont of freedom inadequate 72
(3) Green's conception of motive inadequate 73
It
1H
13. Hodgson, Richard: "Green as a Critic"
,
a. The case of Green versus Spencer
(1) Regarding Berkeleianism ^
(2) Regarding a priori arguments for realism 7S
14. Spencer, Herbert: "professor Green's Explanations" ^
a. Green's reply to Hodgson %
b. Contested points discussed by Spencer 7^
(1) Evolution as destructive of idealism %
(2) The relation of organism to environment 77
c. Sources of the difficulty 77
15. Johnson, R.B.C.: The Metaphysics of Knowledge $
a. General characteristics 7E
b. principal points discussed 7%
(1) relation of Green to Spencer U
(2) Relation of Green to common sense realism 71
(3) Defense of Green against the charge of solipsism 79
(4) Defense of Green against the charge of hypostasizing
Kant's epistemology
(5) The self as real and personal
* 1
-e-
i
16. Brett, G.S.: Art. on Green in Hastings Encyclopedia c f
Religion and Ethics 3 2
a. General characteristics &J
h. Principal points discussed %
X
(1) Relation of Green to Mill Si
(2) Relation of Green's metaphysics to religion and ethics fe2
(3) His theory of the self 83
(4) His religious philosophy $tf
(5) His politicil philosophy Si
17. Rogers, A.H.: English and American Philosophy Since 1600 .
a. Rogers' estimate of cpe en's influence
b. Green's confusion of logical with metaphysical unity &k
c. Inadequacy o£ his conception of the moral ideal &k
(1) As a stimulus to : oral activity &k
(2) As a guide to conduct " <-
D. Works mainly ethical
1. Sidgwick, Henry: The Ethics of Green. Sflencer and Martineau 8£
a. Relation Ic Sidgwick 's metaphysical articles
b. Sidgwick 's objections to Green's ethics ^
(1) Ethic&l inadequacy of the eternal consciousness £&
(2) Deterministic elements in Green's view of freedom bi
(3) Hedonistic elements in the moral ideal
(4) Inadequacy of Green's conception of immorttility '
&
(5) Conflict between self-realization and self-cacrif i ce JO
c. Refutation of Green's objections to Sidgwick's hedonism il
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2. Rasfidall, Hastings: The Theory of Good and Evil M
a. Charges raised against Green
(1) Failure to refute the hedonistic calculus <^
(2) Egoistic and hedonistic implications of self-realization?,?
(3) Possibility of attaining pleasure by its pursuit i*f
(4) Logical hiatus between the temporal and thcjtimeles- self 14
3. Taylor, A.E.: The Problem of Conduct? 74f
a. His general position if
b. His objections to Green
(1) Ethics is an empirical science needing no metaphysics, for
(a) There is no real difference between empirical and %
normative sciences
(b) Ethics has an evolutionary, not metaphysical, basis 9k>
(c) Moral progress requires no uitimate standard
(2) The Eternal Self is unnecessary and unmeaning, for *?7
(a) Empirical psychology is valid without it ^7
(b) The self we know is not timeless or permanent 17
(c) The subject-object relation is not universal
(d) A timeless Eternal Self would be ethically useless
4. Dewey, John: "Green's Theory of the Moral Motive". 99
a. Dewey's objections to Green
(1) His theory not practical nor truly metaphysical
(2) An impossible dualism between the ideal and the actual loo
(3) Green's conception toe negative to be valuable /»/
(4) Inadequacy of attempts to give content to the ideal iot
(a) Through the categorical imperative
(b) Through moral progress /OZ,
(8) Through the existence of permanent institutions /62-
•
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5. Dewey, John: " Self-Realization as the Moral Ideal" 102
a. Possible conceptions of the self '
(1) A fixed or presupposed schema (Green) > 62
(2) Concrete specific activity (Dewey) 1 °^
b. Dewey's objections to Green '' °$
(1) The eternal self a rigid framework it>2
(2) The "actual" self not a filling for the "possible" /<*V
(3) The fixed self essentially selfish 1 °*
(4) The dual self an hypostasized abstraction l°S
U T-
6. .Hobhouse^: The Rational Good /etc
a. Harmony as the rational good /04
b. Its relation to Utilitarianism and to self-realization /
^
c. Poihts of disagreement with Green J 67
(1) Pleasure as an integral element of the good I
(2) Relation between self-realization and self-sacrifice /&7
*t-The metaphysical basis of ethics from the standpoint t Oi
of harmony
7. Ay res, Clarence E. : The Nature of the Relation between /Q-f
Ethics and Economics
a. Objections to Green / 01
(1) That he is not sufficiently pragmatic i 0$
(2) That he reasons In a circle
8. Mackenzie, J.S.: Manual of Ethics i/a
a. General characteristics
l / $
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b. Rfcferenses to Green's views I/O
(1) The relation Of pleasure to objects //0
(2) The rational element In self-rea lixation //fl
(3) The Greek conception of virtue
9 . Mackenz ie, J . 5 . : Introduction to Social Philosophy 1
1
3l
a. peferences to Green's views MX
(1) The will as both means and end '1.2.
(2) The limitations of civil law UA.
10. Barbour, G.F.: "Green and Sidgwick on the Community of
the Good" J '3
a. Historical review of the question
b. The good as social and non-competitive U-2>
c. Rpply to Sidgwick's objections
d. Bearing of opposing views on the nature of ethics lit
11. Dewey and Tufts: Ethics \\£
a. References to Green //^
(1) Green 1 refutation of psychological hedonism I
M
(2) His recognition of the practical value of Utilitarianism
12. Everett, W.G.: Moral Values
a. References to Green "J
(1) Green's metaphysical method "J
(2) Hi refutation of uwnotived willing '
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E. Works mainly political //7
1. MacCumn, John: Six Radical Thinkers //7
a. General characteristics //7
b. Problems discussed \i%
(1) Metaphysical and religious basis of Green's //|
political theory
(2) Political aspects of the objectivity of values //<?
(a) in the problem of evil 1/1'
(b) In the reality of ideals
(3) fixation of Green to Utilitarian radicals m
(a) Regarding contemporary political problems /jj
(b) Regarding the nature of institut ions /jj
(c) Regarding the nature of society HI
(4) Relation of Green to Kant Ixi
(aJ jn his theory of democracy ijl
(b) In his conception of rights and duties /Jj
(5) Green's attitude tov/ard state interference 1^2
2. Ritchie,D.G. : Principles of State Interferenc e
a. General characteristics
b. Problems discussed
(1) The nature and function of the ideal
(2) The ethical basis of state interference s
(3) Relation of English philosophy to politics IXu
(4) The self as the basis of ethical theory >i7
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S. Muirhead, J.H.: The Servi ce of the State 111
a. General characteristics ill
b. Problems discussed /ij
(1) Green's philosophical purpose and influence H$
(2) His relation to pragmatism W
(3) Pragmatism and evolution
(4) The good as personal and social ^Jt
(5) Green's organic theory of the State 120
(a) The community of the good 'Jd
(b) Applications of the theory '31
(c) The basis of rights 131
(d) The basis of property M
c. Comparisoh of Green with Mill regarding democracy t&
/J3
4. Lelanai Abby P.: The Educational Th eory and Practice of T.H. Green
a. General characteristics W
b. Points discussed »f
(1) Self-realization as the basis of educational theory w
(2) Green as pragmatist and humanist
(3) The moral ideal in relation to conduct tJfc
(4) The organic nature of society I3le
(5) The origin of moral ideas and institutions b]
{%) The function of institutions J37
(7) Green's attitude toward current educationa 1 problems 13%
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F. Works mainly religious
,3<f
1. Chubb, Percival: "The Significance of T.H.Green's Philos- '3?
ophical and Religious Teachings"
a. General characteristics
b. Problems discussed 140
(1) The influence of sensationalism on religion
(2) Green's conception of sim
(3) His attitude toward miracle and the historicity of 14-2.
Jesus
(4) His attitude toward Christianity as compared with '
^
other religions
(5) The union of morality with religion ^
2. Upton, C.B.: "Theological Aspects of the Philosophy of T.H.Green"
a. His distorted view of Green's Hegelianism '^V
b. His objections to Green \44
(1) The eternal consciousness has only a logical function 144
(2) Green's pantheism weakeno moral responsibility 1 4i
(3) Freedom requires a "transcendent " self lis
(4) Green denies personal immortality Mb
3. Lilly,!. S.: "The Works of T.H.Green" 14]
a. Its Catholic standpoint 14")
b. His objections to Green /y
7
(1) Beeen makes consciousness too abstract for religious
purposes
(2) He denies the historicity of Jesus
4. Porter, Noah: "The Late Professor Green of Oxford" lM
a. general characteristics 1 49
b. Green 1 s attitude toward dogmatic theology and the historicity
of Jesus
(
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IV. Critical analysis ol Green's metaphysics, ethics and philosophy
of religion. (So
1. Metaphysical problems tSd
a. Epistemology 160
(1) General characteristics of Green's epistemology 160
(a) Relation to Kant 151
(b) The activity of the self in knowledge 9Si
(2) Green' g refutation of empiricism iSl
(a) His criticism of Locke, Berkeley ard Hume
(b) Spencer and the subject-object relation 'SX
(3) Idealistic implications of the possibility of
knowledge t5J
(4) Green's criterion of truth
(a) " Unalterableness" as a criterion fS4
(b) Unalterablenesc vs coherence tSt
(5) Inadequate aspects o^ Green
'
s
epistemology I5S
(a) Confusion with metaphysics ISA
(b) Unwarranted assumption if the Universal Self 15k
(c) Confusion of epi steir.ological monism and dualism
(d) Inaccurate criterion of truth
b. The theory cf relations ifq
(1) Statement of the theory iSl
(2) Merits of the theory fSf
(a) Emphasis on the unity of the system ISi
(b) Emphasis cn the function of consciousness 1 * 3
. (3) Objections to the theory <<*°
(a) Inconsistency of its main doctrines ) k>0
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(b) Unsatisfactory conception of the self /
(c) Similarity to neo-realism 'ki
(d) Elimination of substance '
(4) Evaluation of other objection? commonljr raised
(a) That it allows the self no creativity ll»2>
(b) That it allows God no ethical character 1 l*X
(5) Sources of Green's difficulty / u>
3
(a) Confusion of epistemology with metaphysics '^-3
(b) Confusion of descriptive with constitutive 'W
character of relations
(6) Means of reconciling its discrepancies I l*f
c. The self— finite and infinite '6/
(1) The finite self /£/
(a) Ae an epistemological necessity litS
(b) As a metaphysical necessity I to
(c) As an ethical necessity '**
(d) As a religi us necessity
(2) The infinite self \k%
(a) The divine existence He7
(i) Epistemological arguments I b%
(ii) Metaphysical arguments 1"%
(iii) Ethical arguments I (*1
tiv) Religious arguments l'7i
(b) The diwine nature 1 70
(i) Outstanding attributes 170
(ii) A principle or a person? ill
(iii) Real or potential? / 7J
€
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(3) Relation of finite and infinite px
(a) Pantheistic elements in Green' G thought ill
^i) Confusion of unifying principle with
unitary self '
(ii) Dual nature of finite consciousness /7-3
Uii)" Man's identity with God lit
(b) Theistic elements in Green's thought I7S
vi) His rejection of pantheism in Hegel \lS
(ii) His affirmation of the basie nature of / lie
personality
^iii) Emphasis on man's free ethical activity lib
(c) causes of the discrepancy 171
(i) Failure to use terms with fixed meanings /77
^ii) Undue emphasis on the divine immanence 111
Freedom . I7f>
\\) Statement of Green's view of freedom /70
(2) Discussion of its main propositions (7?>
(a) The non-natural character of consciousness ^7?
(b) '^n as a free cause
(i) The source of free eausality I 79
(ii) Relation to the animal organism / 7f
(c) Fthicai activity as determined by motive / 8<3
(i) Relation to animal wants
(ii) Relation to past choices and determining
circumstances i%l
(iii) Relation to the strongest desire ISI
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(d) The meaning of true freedom f 6 ^
(i) The possibility of self-realiza$ion I %l
(ii) Triumph over opposing circumstances 'fci-
(3) Evaluation of objections to Green's view of freedom l%X
^a) Pantheistic implications opposed to-freedoni
(b) Inadequate treatment of the mind-body problem
^c) Determinism in the formation of motives ' ^
The objectivity value
(1) Green's conception cf vslue and origin
^a) Distinction between phenomenal and metaphysical
origin
/g¥
(b) The bearing of evolution on consciousness t&&
^i) Inadequacy of physiological psychology to
explain the nature of consciousness
(ii) Possibility of its development from
animal origins
(c) Development of social institutions I ok
v l) From crude early forms /%(,
(ii) As the realization of an objective ideal / $7
(2) The moral ideal /fj
(a) Arguments for the reality of the ideal / $7
v
i) Coherence of moral demands l%t
(ii) Teleological character of human progress l%$
(iii) Finite limitations / 8$
(b) The nature of the ideal f%1
(i) Personal
(ii) Social 1 1
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(c) Criticism of Green's conception l90
(i) Its relation to the ontological argument / 9 /
^ii) Merits of his theory Ml
(iii. ) Limitations of his theory ^
The problem of evil /?/
*
(a) Relation to the objectivity of value 1^1
lb) The force of opposing circumstances J9£
(i) Their purpose tfl
(ii) Their influence 11%
(c) The "overruling" of evil for good ' 9.3
^i) Its possibility tfi
(ii) Its metaphysical basis /J4
(d) Evaluation of Green's treatment US
i i ) Its merits I9jf
(a 1 ) Consistency with the moral ideal t^o
(b') Objectivity of the good
(ii) Its limitations /*/
(a 1 .) Confusion of mornl and physical evil
(b') Unclearness regarding metaphysical - „
origin of evil
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Ethical problems
, an
t
" /
a. The nature of ethics H 7
(1) Significance of the problem
7
(2) Questions raised
(a) Is ethics a descriptive or normative science? i<i%
(i) The distinction between ethics and the physical
sciences
< ?5
Evaluation of Green's position
(b) Does ethics presuppose a metaphysical basis? <2.<rt>
(i-' Green's metaphysical method JLo-o
(ii) Evaluation of Green's position SlO\
\q) Is the aim of ethics theoretical or practical? xox-
(i) Green's conception of its aim xo*
Cii) Evaluation of Green's position
b. The relatior of efchics to epistemology HO*'
(1) Green's attitude toward English empiricism i.oS
(2) Hedonistic implications of empiricism £o(p
(a) The primacy of pleasurable feelings J-° Sc
(b) Psychological hedonism the necessary result of a. 7
Home's elimination of the self
(3) Deterministic implications of empiricism
(a) Destruction of moral distinctions
(b^ Destruction of moral motives
(4) Egoistic tmplioationdof empiricism ^ "
(a) Inadequacy of pleasurable sensations aa a 2.11
ba.il.' for altruism
(Z) Ethical superiority cf Green's epistemology
I1
i
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c. The relation of ethics to metaphysics
(1) The nature of the self x,3>
(a) Its relation to moral responsibility
(b> Evaluation of charges raised against Green's conception
^.m
of the self
(i) An hypostasized abstraction
(ii) A static entity 2,<"
(iiiJ An impossible dualism of temporal and timeless elements
(iv) A presupposed framework without empirical content H Z
(2) The moral ideal
ft) The negative character of Green's conception z u
(bJ The ethical importance of ^
(i) Its objective reality
(ii) The possibility of its attainment ^-^
(iii) Its- relation to moral progress
(iv) Its relation to existing institutions 2ii
(c y The ethical significance of freedom
(d) The ethical demand for immortality
d. The relation of self-realization to formalism XxH
(1) Green's theory of the good will
(a) As the means of sell-realization
(b) As the end of self-realization
(c) As the basi3 of altruism
(2) Evaluation of charges raised against Green's theory of the will
(a) That he reasons in a circle
(b) That the theory lacks content
r<
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(3) The relation of the will 3i £
(a) To desire 113
(b) To intellect ijlh
(4) The relation of Green's ethics to Kant's *-«3'
(a) Points of agreement JL3I
The categorical imperative 2,3/
(ii) The postulates of God, freedom and immortality x2>^
(iii) The worth and dignity of humanity
(iv) The relation of rights to duties IBS
(b^ Points ofl difference J^3 3
(i) The emphasis on consequences £ 3
y
(ii) The possibility of proving the postulates z.$J?
(iii) The relation of theism to moral autonomy X 3 (p
e. The relation of self-realization to hedonism ~L3 7
(l) Green's refutation of psychological hedonism
(a) The activity of the self ^ 3
7
(b) The relation of desire to pleasure and to its object A 3 7
(c) The possibility o p moral distinctions 239>
(d) Sources of confusion Z3 1
^2) Green's refutation of ethical hedonism 2.*o
(a) The need of an abiding satisfaction of an abiding self SL^ 6
(b) The impossibility of calculating a sum of pleasures 2-*°
(c) Inadequacy of a sum of pleasures as the summum bonum
(i) Failure of hedonism to provide permanent satisfaction
(ii) Hedonistic implication c of self-realixation A***-
1<
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(d) The sum of pleasures an unattahable goal Z**3
(i) Green's charges against hedonism on this basis J- V3
(iiJ Counter-charges raised against s&f-realization
(e) Failure of hedonism to provide a basis for virtue and altruismi^
(i) Green's arguments m$
(ii) Evaluation of his position £4(*>
(3) The conflict between self-realization and self-sacrifice %tf(fi
(a) The problem
(i^ Is the development of virtue egoistic? 2 ^7
(ii)- Is the development of intellectual and aesthetic values
egoistic? AV7
(b^ The solution
(i) Virtue as a catholic value
(ii) Green's neglect of the second problem H7
(iii) Suggested solutions based on
(a*) The organic nature of society
(b') The supremacy of the good will
(c 1 ) The nature of the object for which development la
sought 1 V?
(4) The relation of Green to Mill 3*$0
(a) Points of agreement
(i^ The practical value of Utilitarianism
(ii) Persons as ends rather than means
(iii) Qualitative differences in pleasures
(b) Points of difference
(i) The nature of the summum bomum
(ii) The nature of society LSI
(iii) The nature of freedom
(iv) The relation of religion to ethics $.S3
1r
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3. Religious problems JLS^
a* Metaphysics and religion 3. si
(1) Fundamental conceptions common to bith a-S*t
(a) The self and God
(b) God as the "possible " self xSS
(2) Analogy between t. li j»
(a) Faith and knowledge
„ r
(b) Faith and the artistic ideal
(3) Relation of science and religion
(a) Their common basis XS7
(b) Unwarranted claims of each s.£$
b» Mysticism and religious experience x.S$
(1) Green's personal attitude toward mysticism <ljf?
(2) The meaning of religious experience
4a) Mysticism and genius £
(b) Mysticism and religious forms X<eO
(c) Mysticism and moral activity 2.*/
(3) Green's conception of prayer X 4>x
(a) Its nature
(b) Limitations of his conception x^>X
(c) Merits of his conception 2<»J
c» Dogma and authority x<ef
(li General characteristics of Green's attitude 2^
(2) His attitude toward historical criticism zu, r
(a) His service to liberal Christianity
(b) Religious experience as the true source of authority 9 " fe
i
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(3) Green's conception of dogma x t>k
(a) The origin and development of dogma <2-&k
(b) The value and misuse of creeds ^ *° 7
(c) Evaluation of Green's position l<o%
(4) Green's attitude toward ecclesiastical authority
(5) Green's attitude toward miracle
(a) Metaphysical objections to miracle %'U
(b^ Religious objections to miracle 2.75-
(c' Miracle and faith {L*/J
d» The incarnation £7 t
(1) Green's "modified Unitarianism" £ 7
y
(2) His attitude toward the historicity of Jesus ^7f
(a) Our lack of historical knowledge 5-7i"
(b) The true grounds of faith 17
(3) His view of the Pafcline conception of Jesus A- lie
(a) Relation of Paul to the historical Jesus t77
{t J Relation of Paul to dogmatic theology & 17
(c) Relation of Paul to the origin of Christianity 27$
(d) Criticism of Green's interpretation 2 7$
(4) His view of the Johannine conception of Jesus 1'/
7
(a) The purpose of the fourth gospel
(b) The merits of its conception of Christ's divinity
(c ; its limitations
(5) Evaluation of Green's conception of the person of Christ jt / 1<
(a) Its merits 2 8 3
(b) Its limitations
1 5 3
;
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Sin and salvation
U) The nature of sin
^a^ Sin as incompleteness IKS
(b) Sin as thwarting the divine will 1 3L>
(c) Sin as selfishness SL 37
(d) Sin as pleasure-seeking 2 $ 7
(2) Relation of religious tb ethical aspects of the problem
(a) Willful choice of evil in the moral motive
(b) Freedom as a factor in sin I %%
(3) The nature of salvation
(a) The possibility of overcoming sinful tendencies SL SJ
(b) Relation of sin and salvation to a common metaphysical
(c) Salvation and the atonement lie
(4) Evaluation of Green's position X 1 /
(a ; Merits 1 1
1
(b^ Limitations 4 9 J
Immortality 114
(1) Elements in Green's conception of immortality n i
(a) Transition to a higher stage of development
(b) Emancipation of spirit from fleshly limitations US
(c) A personal existence in an ideal society xi 6
(d^ Absorption in the Infinite a? 7
(2) Relation of Green's conception of immortality to his metaphysics
(3) Relation to his ethics # g
(
V. The relations between ethics and the philosophy of religion J60
1. Their common metaphysical basis 3 0\
a. General considerations 3 Ol
(1) Green'g general conception of the relation of
^ 0\
religion to morality
(a) Their unity 3 I
(b) Their difference 3
(2) Postulates common to both 30tL
(3) The need for a metaphysical basis 5 o3
(a) For ethics 303
(b) For religion 3 °*t
(4j TJae need for a common basis 3 OS
b. Green s conception of the self
3 o (c
(1) Epistemological functions of the delf
(a) In relation to morality o
(b) In relation to religion $ ic
(2) The need of a unitary and abiding self 30
7
(a) Evaluation of Green's conception 3 J
(b) The need of a unitary self 30 7
(i) For moral freedom and responsibility 3 6 7
(ii) For religious cooperation and communion 30$
(c) The need of an abiding self 3D 8
(i) For moral development 30?
(ii) For religious growth Jo9

-28-
(d) Comparison of Green's conception with sensationalism
(i) Deterministic and hedonistic implication;
of sensationalism
(ii) Deist ic and atheistic Influences of
sensationalism
Green's conception of God
(iii) To afford a source of progressive
religious revelation
S°1
3 I
(iii) Green's relation to the problem 3/o
(3) The primacy of the "spiritual principle" In knowledge,
morality and religion 3 //
312
(1) The existence of God
(a) General nature of Green's proofs of the
divine existence
3/3
313
(b) The need of God as the basis of morality
(i) tO explain man's moral nature
(ii) To provide an objective basis for morality
(iii) To provide for teleology and moral 3/3'
progress
(iv) To cooperate with man in his moral effort
(c) The need of God as the basis of religion 5/ 7
(i) Tb explain the religious consciousness 3l1
(ii) To provide an objective basis for religious
exxjerience
(iv) To cooperate with man in religious endeavor -3-3f
id) Summary of common elements in the moral
and religious demand for God -~ :,t

-29-
(2) The nature of God
(a) The mor«l and religious demand for a God who is
(i) Personal 3^1
(ii) Ethically perfect J>Z.Z>
(iii) Infinite in power 3Z,%
(iv) Completely rational 3z3
(v) Eternal 3 *- 3
(3) Summary of Green's conception of God 3 2-4
(4) Evaluation of his conception 3^i>"
d. Green' s conception of freedom
(1) The need of freedom 3 2
(a) As the basis of moral choice 32^
(b) As the basis of religious experience 3 3*i
(2) The possibility of freedom 33.7
(a) In personal! am ^^7
(b) In materialism 3^7
(c) In pantheism ^^
(3) The nature of freedom
(a) Ethical and religious aspects of freedom as ~
self-realization and service
>
(b) Religious significance of freedom of thought ^ 3J1
(4) Summary of Green's conception
.1
-30-
Green's conception of the moral ideal 331
(1) Its relation to the actual 3 3 '
(a) The end as the true reality ^3'
(b) The ideal as a moral and religious dynamic 3 31
(c^ The ideal as a moral and religious goal 3 3 &
K 2) jts characteristics 3 3 2^
(a) The moral and religions demand for an ideal that is
(ij Personal 33 ^
(ii) Social 3 3 ?>
(iii) Teleological 333
(iv) Both changing and permanent 3 3^
(3) Summary of Green's conception 3 3$
a a if"
Green's conception of the problem of evil oco
(1) Distinction between moral and physical evil 3 3^>
(2) Moral evil
(a) Moral and religious aspects of sin 3 3^
(b) The function of religion in overcoming moral evll33k
(3) Physical evil 336
(a^ The reciprocal relation between sin and 3 3 (r
suffering
(b) The moral and religious stinalue to seek the 331
removal of suffering
(c) Suffering as an obstacle to theistic faith 33 7
(d) The function of religion in triumphing over 337
unavoidable suffering
™

-31-
2 2 a
Religious Implications of Green. .5 ethics
.
a. Elements common to self-realization and Qhristianity 33 s)
(1) Reasons for paucity of specific religious references 33^
in Green's ethics
(2) Common elements relating to the self
(a) The self must be developed
' (i) For the increase of individual values 3 3i
(ii) For the increase of sociol values 3
(b) It must seek to reproduce God
(i) Through developing the divine element in manj?V
C i i ) Through using the divine perfection as 3^1
a standard
(c) It must secure a real, though not hedonistic, 3 H-
1
satisfaction
\±J Permanent satisfaction secured through 3+1
immortality
(ii) Enjoyment as a by-product 3 + 1
(3) Common elements relating to the moral motive 3HX
^a> Both ethics and religion demand freedom to act $ +
X
(b) Both recognize the influence of evil tendencies 3 fX
inherent in the organism
(c) Both recognize the transmuting power of ^ *3
consciousness
(d) Both recognize a divine element in human motivation3 ¥
3

-32-
b. Religious problems discussed in the Pro legomena 3yV
(1) Comparison o:r Greek and Christian ethics 3*ti
^a) Their identity and difference 3 v i
(b) gelation of Christianity to self-sacrifice 3 H
S
(c) Superiority of the Christian over the Greek 3 HS
attitude
(d) Impossibility of justifying self-sacrifice
^
^
on a hedonistic basis
(2) The relation between the "moral reformer" and the
"self-questioning saint" 3*t /
(a) The religious impulse to moral living 8 4 X
(b) Religion as an intrinsic value 3*t%
(c) The religious spirit identical in kind with the
moral but more basic
(d) Summary of Green's conception of the uniqueness nu-Q
of religious values
(e) Evaluation of Green's conception 3^0
(3) Moral duties as commands of God 35 I
(a) Religious ideals the chief moral stimulus 35/
(b) Religion as truth expressed In imaginative form 3 5 2
^c) "Commands of God" a legitimate metaphor
(d) The practical function of philosophy In cer:teattirg
scepticism 35-3
^e) Evaluation of Green's conception 3 5"V"
c. The relation of religion to problems of practical ethics 355"
(1) green's treatment of practical problems
(2) The relation of religion to politics 3 SS

33-
(a) Political and social institutions as a
_
spiritual revelation 3> 5 1>
(i) Identity between the political and social
impulse and the religious impulse 3 55"
(ii) The theistic basis of society 35(*
lb) Religion as a direct factor in civic reform 357
(c) Relation between political and religious liberty 357
(i) The true basis of authority in each 35$
(ii) The practical need of caution in their 35%
exercise
(3) The relation of religion to Green's educational theory 358
(a) The spiritual basis of education 358
(b) Green's views on religious education in the
public schools 35f
(i) The Birmingham plar of week-day religious
instruction by the churches 3S9
(ii) The need of trained religious educators 36
(4) The relation of religion to science 3(tl
(a) Their underlying unity . v/
ib) The need ofjooherence
(c) The physical world as a manifestation of God 3&2-
(d) The relation between religion and naturalistic
philosophy 3k> X,
(5) The relation of religion to art 3(oX
(a) The objective basis of both 3 t> 3
(b^ Art as a stimulus to morality and faith 3L3>

-34-
Ethical implications of Green's philosophy of religion 3 (oS
a. Religious experience and moral activity 3k&'
(1) Religion as a stimulus to morality 3 <pJ>
(a) The moral influence of religious mysticism 3 IPS'
(b) Religious ideals and the "possible" self 3 1*> ^
^c) The moral value of a consistent theistic
philosophy
(2) Morality as a stimulus to religion 3d>8
(a) The evidence of God in man's moral nature 3t>3
(b ; The life of Christian love as a support to faith 3(>?
(c) The service of God through the service of man 37Q
b. Moral aspects of the incarnation ^
^
1
(1) The nature of the incarnation ^7'
(a) Religion as truth presented to the imagination ^
(b) The incarnation an aid to the religious imagination
(2) The moral power of Christ 3 7^
^a) As a moral teacher 3 7 2-
jb) As a perfect example of moral living 3 73
(cj As an immanent manifestation of God 313
(3) The moral value of Christianity as compared with
that of other religions 374

-35
c. The moral aspects of dogma and religious authority 3 7k
(1) The moral attitude toward creed3 37 6>
(a^ The moral -need of adapting faith to reason 3 7<>
(b^ The moral need of spiritual vitality amid theolog-
ical controversy 377
(c) The moral need of cooperation in Christian
activity with those of other creeds
(2) The moral aspects of historical criticism 37*5
^r) Conscience as the final ground of authority 3 7%
(3) The moral significance of religious institutions 3*19
(a) The need of preserving our religious heritage 3*19
(b) The relation of the moral ideal to the Christian
church 319
[c) Tne moral demand for the use of Christian 3 so
ordinances
d. Moral and religious aspects of immortality 3SJ.
(1) The moral and religious demand for immortality 3 83.
(aJ To secure "the abiding satisfaction of an abiding
self"
(b; To secureA rossibility of continued development 38 x
(c) To secure the just distribution of rewards 3 33
(2) The nature of immortality 3?>f
(a ; The hedonistic vs the perfectionist conception 3%H
(bJ The Buddhistic vs. the Christian ideal 3S5'
f
-36-
VI. Summary and conclusion 3$d>
1. General evaluation of Green's thought 3% 6
a. Most valuable elements of Green's philosophy 3 8 (c
(1) In his metaphysics 3 &(*
(2) In his ethics 3 Si
(3) In his philosophy of religion 3 $8
b. Inadequate aspects of Green's thought 310
(1) In hi? metaphysics 3^0
(2) In his ethics 3<?>
(3) In his philosophy c r religion 3 1
3
2. The relations between Green's ethical theory and religious thought3 «T
a. Their common metaphysical basis S^H
b. Religious implications of Green's ethics 3°l(c
c. Ethical implications of Green's philosophy of religion 3 9 7

INTRODUCTION
Thomas Hill Green lived and did his work at Oxford
approximately fifty years ago; yet hie influence still abides
and has spread far beyond the confines of Oxford, and of England.
Among the master minds which England produced in the nineteenth
century, we find many men more famous, but few who ha^e rendered
a higher service. When the claims of naturalism seemed about to
monopolize philosophy, and in engulfing idealism to destroy all
philosophic foundation for faith in God and duty, Green was one
of the few clear-thinking men of the times who could meet the
challenge and supply a rational basis for faith. In his some-
what secluded life as a college professor, he influenced thous-
ands through his teaching and his works, and established ethics
and religion upon an idealistic foundation which could command
the respect of thinking people.
The study of the relations between Green's ethics and
his philosophy of religion is of timely interest, for most of
the problems which confronted Green are with us still. The same
philosophic tendencies which threatened fifty years ago to destroy
idealism are today making their attacks in new forms and with re-
newed vigor. As it was Green's task to point out that ethics,
religion, and science all rest upon an underlying unity of life
which precludes the possibility of contradiction, so it must be oura

in the present day to counteract the claims both of an obstinate
dogmatism which scoffs at reason and a oresurrntuous materialism
which scoffs at faith.
In examining Green's philosophy we shall attempt neither
to defend nor to attack his views, but to evaluate and criticize
them with the hope of finding in them suggestions for the better
guidance of our own thinking. Green himself states admirably the
true a»4 function and spirit of criticism at the beginning of his
Introduction to Hume where he says, "A process which looks like
pulling a great philosopher to pieces, may be the true way of
showing reverence for his greatness. It is a pharisaic way of
building the sepulchre of philosophers to profess their doctrine
or extol their genius without making their spirit our own... We
best do reverence to their genius, we most truly appropriate their
spirit, in so exploring the difficulties to which their enquiry
led, as to find in them a suggestion of a theory which may help
us to walk firmly where they stumbled and fell". It is in this
spirit that we shall attempt to make a critical analysis of Green's
philosophy.
In examining Green's thought we shall first attempt by
a sketch of his life and personal characteristics to become acquain
ted with the man himself. We shall then briefly summarize his main
philosophical urinciples to serve as a basis for further discussion
An examination will next be made of the principal works which have
t
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3been written about Green, in order to see what results have been
obtained by previous investigators and what place he occupies in
philosophic literature. We shall then examine in detail Green's
metaphysical , ethical and religious principles; and in evaluating
and criticizing these principles we shall also try to r>ass judg-
ment in some measure upon the views advanced by others regarding
his philosophy. Finally the deductions which can be drawn from
Green's thought regarding the inter-relations of ethics and the
philosophy of religion will be brought together and evaluated.
In examining these relations it will be necessary to consider
the common metaphysical basis of ethics and religion as well as
the direct bearing of the one upon the other. In conclusion, we
shall summarize the outstanding merits and limitations of Green's
philosophy and state his essential contributions to the r>roblem
of the relation between ethical theory and religious thought.

I. Green 's Life and P ersonality .
1. Biographica l data.
Before attempting to examine the work of oreen, the
philosopher, we must first become acquainted with Green, the
Christian gentleman. In philosophy, as in personal contacts,
we can best appreciate what one says when we know the personality
that lies back of the words. But x with its lists of names and
dates, is of value only in so far as it helps us to a more
intimate knowledge and sympathetic understanding of the man himself.
Therefore we shall merely touch upon the main events of Green's
life, and then shall pass to a more detailed study of his personal
characteristics
.
Thomas Hill Green was born April 7, 1836 at Birkin, a
village of Yorkshire, England. His father, who was the rector of
the village church, was obliged to assume the entire charge of
Green's childhood training on account of the early death of the
boy's mother, and many of Green's later religious and intellectual
interests may be attributed to the influence of his preacher
father. At fourteen Green was sent to Rugby, where he failed to
distinguish himself and was generally regarded as rather dull, lazy
and peculiar. He asserted a good deal of mental independence
but was never brilliant and had few intimate friends. At nineteen
he entered Balliol College, Oxford, and after principally

idling away his time the first two years, it was through the
influence of his college tutor, Benjamin Jowett, that he awoke
from the mental lethargy which had characterized him. It was
Jowett 's influence, joined with a natural aptitude for indepen-
dent and serious thinking, which established him upon his philo-
soohical career. The essays which have been preserved from his
college days indicate unusual maturity, especially in his grasp
on political and religious theories*
Upon graduation in 1860, Green was honored with an
invitation to remain at Balliol as lecturer in history, and was
elected a fellow in the college. As his taste lay in the field
of philosophy rather than history, he supplemented his income by
taking private pupils in philosophy. His college work was later
transferred from history to philosophy, yet he seems still to
have been dissatisfied with it and oppressed by the feeling that
he was not accomolishing anything. During this period his
translations of Baur's G-eschichte der christlichen Kirche and
Aristotle's Nichonachean ethics
,
though never completed, added
materially to his mental growth and satisfaction. The vacations
of 1862 and 1863 were snent in Switzerland and Germany. He
took considerable interest in "^Juropean politics as well as in
the Civil ^ar in America, in which he ardently favored the cause
of the northern states.

iIn 1864 he accepted a royal commission to assist in an
investigation of the endowed grammar schools of England and Wales.
This investigation formed the basis of his educational theory and
he became deeply interested in the subject because of its practical
importance, but he seems not to have enjoyed the wo rk of investi-
gation. He says of it at the time that he is constantly haunted
by the feeling that he ought to be finding out something that he
is not finding out, and that he will go back to Oxford with more
/
contentment from having tried other work and found it wanting.
On his return to Oxford in 1866 he was given a respons-
ible position on the faculty as a college tutor, and when Jowett
was made master in 1870, Green was obliged to assume what he
characterizes as "practically the whole subordinate management
2
of the nolleare". ^ile he always chafed against unnecessary
work, the duties of his office were performed with painstaking
accuracy of detail.
In 1871, he married Miss Charlotte Symonds, with the
result that from this t irae on his life was brighter and more
settled. Though he was later afflicted with ill health, the
stimulus and encouragement of his vife made him more social in
his nature and better satisfied with his achievements.
While continuing his work at Balliol with increasing
success, and producing in 1874 hi 3 Introduction to Hume's Treatise
of Human Hature, he also took a prominent part in current political
i
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issues. The subjects of social reform which chiefly attracted
him were education, temperance, and the parliamentary elections;
and in each of these he labored vigorously for better legis-
lation. He might perhaps have been elected to Parliament had
he been willing to relinquish teaching.
In 1878 he was elevated to the chair of byte's pro-
fessor of moral philosophy at Oxford, a position which he held
until the time of his death four years later. In this capacity
he was enabled to develop his principles, and especially his
ethical theory, more systematically than formerly. His best
known work^ the Prolegomena to Ethics , and also the Principles
of Political Obligation , are taken almost wholly from lectures
prepared in connection with this work.
Green's death occurred on March 26, 1882 after a brief
illness. .The Prolegomena to Ethics was left incomplete, and the
religious addresses on The Witness of God and Faith unpublished,
at the time of his death. Had his life been spared longer, his
thought would doubtless have attained much greater perfection
of form, for his best works were written in his last years. But
the main ideas of his later works are all foreshadowed in the
earlier, and it is doubtful whether he would have been able to
give the world any essentially new contributions which are not

found in the works which he has left. His death, however, was
deeply felt at Oxford, for it cut short a successful teaching
career in which he was exerting a far-reaching and thoroughly
wholesome influence.
2. Personal characteristics ,
a. ethical characteristics .
Having traced the principal stages of Green's compara-
tively uneventful life, we shall now give further attention to
certain definite oersonal traits at which we have already hinted.
Nettle ship in his ITemoir (p. £9) says that the strongest elements
in Green's nature were "the sense of public duty and the sense
of religious dependence". If to these we add the mental inde-
pendence which made him a profound thinker, we may readily see
why his attention was drawn so largely toward ethics and religion,
and why he endeavored to establish a sound metaphysical basis on
which both could rest.
T7e have noted the sense of dissatisfaction which attended
most of his earlier efforts. This was doubtless due to the
presence of two opposing tendencies in his nature, an unusually
strong sense of duty and a constitutional dislike for work. YThile
his conscience drove him to his tasks and made him perform them
Works, vol. iii, p. xxix.

punctiliously, he wa3 unable to feel the zest from his labors
which comes to one who thoroughly loves his work. It was this
conflict of tendencies which made him, as a monitor at Rugby, a
staunch upholder of discipline while the exercise of authority
was extremely distasteful to him; and later when tutor of Balliol
it made him feel heavily the burden of his 'responsibilities. In
his orofessional work he was constantly reproaching himself with
his ignorance of philosophical literature, yet he never overcame
his natural repugnance to wide reading.
The same opposing tendency is found between his interest
in civic reform and his dislike for official position. Tie have
noted that his personal dissatisfaction with the work as investi-
gator in the School Inquiry Commission was joined with a profound
interest in the subject of investigation, a sound educational
theory, and zealous efforts to promote reform. In the field of
politics likewise he was doubtless more successful as a lecturer
upon political theory and its problems than he would have been as
a Member of Parliament. This does not indicate that he was not
practical, but rather that his function was that of the practical
thinker instead of the practical administrator. The charge, so
frequently raised against philosophers, that they do not serve
society, receives an excellent rebuttal in Green's case, for he
served society far more as a thinher than he could have done in

any official capacity.
But in spite of his dislike for unnecessary work and
for the annoyances of official position, his sense of duty was
predominant. This was evident in his childhood, when he played
foot-ball, not because he liked it but because he thought he
ought to; and later in his professorial work his intellectual
intensity was joined with a most patient and careful attention
to small college duties. In his lectures he was accurate with
regard to details of fact, and in sifting out his own theories
he waa never satisfied to accept a principle until he had vin-
dicated it from every angle by exhaustive reflection.
This predominance of his sense of duty had several
significant effects upon his philosophy; (1) it turned his
attention especially to ethics, with a predisposition against
hedonism, (2) it aroused his interest in the oroblems of prac-
tical ethics, (3) it ensured maturity and accuracy- in the
product of his thought. These effects we shall later observe
in more detail.
b . Religious cha ra cteristics .
Of Green's intense religious interest little need be
Said. He made no parade of his religion ; 'yet his conviction of
the reality and indwelling presence of God was the dominant

factor both of his philosophy and his personal life. In the idea
of an eternal spirit revealing itself in all the better life of
man he found a bond of union between the human and the divine;
and on the unifying force of this idea he based his interpretation
of the problems of politics, morality , and theology.
Oreen was by no means orthodox in his religious viev/s.
In fact, some have speculated (unnecessarily, it seems) as to
whether or not he should be called a Christian. He had little
patience with religious dogma and rejected the belief in miracles.
But it is difficult to conceive how one ean reed, his religious
addresses, especially those on The rritness of God and Faith
.
without feeling the intensity of his personal religious con-
victions.
Green's attitude toward the established church was one
of tolerant disapproval. He dislilred its ecclesiast icism, dis-
agreed with a good many of its tenets, and expressed considerable
sympathy with the non-conformists; yet he never deemed it advis-
able to withdraw from the church. Me felt that instead of being
deserted, it should be reformed by being made more democratic and
liberal. rie seens in his youth to have given some consideration
to entering the ministry, but he refrained from doing so partly
because of his democratic antipathy to ecclesiastical privilege
and partly because of a feeling of natural inaptitude for the
work.

The relation of Green's religious convictions to hi-fl
philosophy was so intimate as to he almost i n separable . ^ile,
as we shall see, he wavered between theism and pantheism, he
had little patience with anti-theist ic views. He seems in his
personal life to have been almost wholly untouched by the pain
of religious doubt. while many of his utterances savor strongly
of mysticism, religion made its appeal to his intellectual and
practical rather than to his emotional nature. He recognized
religion as a fundaments. 1 fact of the universe, and worked out
his philosophy to accord with it
.
c . Intelle ctual characteristics .
Green from his earliest years displayed a love of mental
independence which remained with hin through life and made him
the profound thinker that he was. At Rugby, we find him rebelling
against the ordinary routine of studies and saying, "If I cram
myself with the ideas of ot Tiers, my own all vanish". While he
was usually behind in his work and won few prizes either at Rugby
or Oxford, he displayed an unusual maturity and independence of
judgment on matters outside the range of ordinary school interests.
I!any of his later views on politics, ethics and theology may be
found in embryo in the utterances o"f his college days.
TThile Green was neither quick nor brilliant in the
Works, vol. iii, p. xiii.

superficial sense, he made up in intensity for what he lacked
in alertness. This is nowhere better illustrated than in his
teaching method, for while his lectures were seldom enlivened
by illustrations, they were carefully thought through and writ-
ten out, with every problem sifted to the bottom. The aversion
to wide reading previously noted was due not simply to his dis-
like for work, but in large measure to hie love for grappling
with knotty problems himself instead of accepting second-hand
conclusi ons
.
Green's attitude toward art is indicative of the un-
adorned intensity of his mental grasp. While he ascribed to
the arts their due place in the unity of life, the only ones in
which he felt a personal interest were those of language. These
he liked because of their appeal to his intellectual nature
rather than because of their aesthetic charm.
Green's attitude toward science is typical of the
fairness of his mental outlook. While he felt keenly the dangers
arising from a slavish deference to science in the naturalistic
philosophies, he never set himself in opposition to the scien-
tific view-point. His conception of the fundamental unity of
life ascribed to science a harmonious yet not dominating place
in his philosophy.
Of his attitude toward philosophy we shall later have

much more to say. But it may be pointed out in this connection
that it whs through philosophic speculation that Green attained
the strength and repose of soul which cones to men of more emo-
tional temperament through religious mysticism or artistic
imagination. Thinking not only was his chief joy; it also meant
t
to him a form of spiritual communion with the divine.
d . Social characteristics.
Green in his social contacts had many friends but few
satellites. An habitual reserve made it difficult to become
acquainted with him, and he lacked the magnetic qualities which
charm and dazzle. But while he did not make many intimate friends,
his associates invariably liked him for his sympathetic human in-
terests, and admired and respected him for his solid worth. Even
in his school days, his presence was sufficient to uplift the
moral tone of his surroundings. As a teacher, he exerted a quiet
but powerful influence, for although a rigid upholder of disci-
pline he seldom failed to secure the confidence and good-will of
his pupils. His conversation, which was dignified and seldom
devoted to trivial subjects, was enlivened by a keen though quiet
sense of humor. The impression which he gave to his associates
was that of remarkable strength and steadfastness of character.
Works, vol. iii, p. lxvi.

Green's social interests were charact eriBed by a pro-
found sympathy for the poor and unfortunate. He was himself
plebtian in his tastes, and revolted against everything which
savored of aristocracy. It was this sympathy for the middle and
lower classes which impelled him to work so zealously for politi-
cal and educational reform by which to secure for them greater
opportunities.
The quiet strength and kindly sympathy of Green'
s
character have left their impress upon his writings. In his
utterances upon ethical questions, especially upon the problems
of oractical ethics, there is beneath the theory an undergirding
of personal conviction which gives added solidity to his doctrines.
Nettleship quotes the testimony of an Oxford colleague who says
of him, "His strength lay in a rare combination of deliberative,
analytic, and systematizing power, and of all with force and
steadfastness of character His individuality sought and fcind
expression in a congenial philosophy, and was intensified by so
doin<? and strengthened for the work of life." As we proceed, we
shall attempt to see in what respects his philosophy was typical
of the quiet strength which characterized his personality.
Works, vol. iii, p. Ixiii.
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II. Summary of Green's Philosophical Principles.
Before attempting to discuss in any detail Green's phil-
osophy, it will be advisable "briefly to survey the general prin-
ciples which are characteristic of his thought, *7e shall consider
in turn the outstanding concepts of his metaphysics , his ethics,
and his Philosophy of religion.
1. Metaphysical principles .
Green may be styled a personalistic neo-Kantian and
neo-Hegelian. Thile he is more commonly considered a disciple
of Hegel than of Kant, both strains are so blended in his thought
as to be inseparable. He effects a synthesis of the outstanding
contributions of both without adopting the views of either in en-
tirety. He agrees v/ith Kant in emphasizing the activity of the
mind in knowledge, but he rejects the "thing in itself". Again,
he agrees v/ith Hegel in regarding the world as a unitary whole,
but he does not make it consist merely of an absolute system of
thought
.
Both of these elements are evident in his epistemology.
He rejects the sensationalism of Locke and Hume, and devotes much
attention in his earlier works to pointing out the fallacies in

rt
their associati onal psychology. He does this principally on a
Kantian basis by showing that empiricism in leaving out the
"synthetic unity of apperception" affords no bond of union by
which to bring together theiarious elements of our conscious ex-
perience. But he «lso follows Hegel in his conception of the
world as a system of universal relat ionsjwhich are knowable be-
.
cause of the relation of each part to the unity of the whole.
His criterion of truth is Hegelian, for he believes that it is
possible to distinguish between truth and error, not by vividness
of "feelings" (i.e. sensations) but by the coherence of elements
within an "unalterable all-inclusive system of relations".
The major motif of Green's metaphysics lies in his doc-
trine that "all reality lies in relations" md that "only for a
thinking consciousness do relations exist". This statement, re-
peated with endless variations, expresses his conviction of the
fundamental unity and self-conscious basis of the universe. The
Hegelian side of this doctrine appears in his belief that the
"spiritual principle" which extends through man and nature is but
another phase of the "eternal consciousness" ?hich establishes this
all-embracing system of relations. However, Kantian element? pre
evident in his treatment of the relation of the categories to the
system. For Instance, time has no meaning except as a series of
/
/9
successive relations, but these relations do not exist except for
a thinking subject who has the power to grasp the idea of succes-
sive events in a unified whole. Again, space implies certain re-
lations of outsideness and separateness , but two objects could not
be recognized as separate save for an underlying unity which is
found only in consciousness,
[The element if Green's metaphysics which is most pertin-
ent to the present study is his conception of the relation of the
finite self to the infinite. We find that throughout his works
he wavers between theism and pantheism. The pantheistic element
is found in his theory of the cosmos as a single eternal activity
or energy, communicating itself to ian and making possible the
oart ic ipation of man in the larger life of the universe. Neither
knowledge nor goodness would be attainable by man, were it not
for the life of God which reveals itself, though never conroletely,
in nature and in human consciousness. This partial participation
of man in the life of God makes our experience a continual self-
contradiction between what we are and what we may become, and it
is through the overcoming of this contradiction that man rises
toward nerfection. Thus in moral endeavor, as in the quest for
truth, man seeks to manifest the "possible" self by realizing
his divine potentialities. This reproduction of the eternal con-
sciousness in the life of man is possible because the finite self

nis not merely temporal, but has a timeless element. The eternal
consciousness uses man's animal organism as its "vehicle".
However, this is not the onl$ side of Green's philosophy.
He repeatedly assumes the metaphysical separateness off finite selves
in his theory of man as a " self-ob j ectifying" and "self-distinguishing"
consciousness. By this he means that man has the power of consciously
formulating ends for himself (without being merely a passive element
in the whole) and that he is able to perceive and maintain his sep-
arateness from nature and from other selves. Green is more clearly
personalistic in his conception of the relation of finite centers
to each other than in their relation to the infinite; for while he
devotes much space to an epistemological demonstration of the divine
existence, he speaks largely in negatives of the divine nature.
Yet, as we shall see, much of his philosophy proceeds on the
assumption that God is not a mere unifying principle, but that he is
a self-conscious person, analogous to finite persons but with
completeness of perfection, who not only unifies but sustains the
universe of relations and who affords an objective ground for the
realization of moral values by finite persons. The divine immanence
occupies a very important place in Green's thought, and in his conception
of God as an indwelling spirit theism merges with pantheism.
This union of personalistic theism with pantheism colors Green's
whole metaphysical system. His attitude toward the problems of
unity and plurality, and of identity and difference, centers about
his basic conception of an all-embracing consciousness of which
man and nature are related elements. Just as the state could not

exist without both identity and separateness of interests, so the
universe must be regarded as a system in which the diversity of
the parts is overcome by the unity of the whole. But this systen
must be c onscious
.
for an ultimate unconscious unit would require
a further conscious unit to correlate with the rest of the system,
and in consciousness alone do we find "a manifold which is united
t
without ceasing to be a manifold".
Green's explanations of the problems of change and of
causality take a similar turn. A changing thing "takes its char-
acter from relation to the thing or system of things of which it
is an altered appearance, but which in itself is always the same"/
Causality likewise is more than a mere uniformity of antecedence
and consequence; it is determined by a corrrplex of relations in a
self-conscious universe which though changing in its manifestations
is unchanging in its essence..
In regard to physical nature, Green like other idealists
maintains th ; ;t it exists only for and in relation to a thinking
subject. He regards nature as both finite and infinite, for while
it is determined not by the finite but by the infinite conscious-
ness, this infinite consciousness is itself reproduced in man; and
it is through this unity of man with God that we are able to ap-
prehend God's manifestation of himself in nature. ITatrre could not
exist, nor could we have knowledge of it, were not the universe a
system of intelligible relations of which God is the source.
i
Works, vol. ii, p. 16. .
^Works, vol. i, p. 127.

2. Ethical principles .
It is in Green's best-known work, The Prolegomena to
St hi cs , that we find the most completely developed statement of
his ethical theory. In summarizing his ethical principles we
shall attempt to reproduce, though not always in order, the main
tenets laid down in the Prolegomena .
The first book of the Prolegomena entitled "The .Meta-
physics of Knowledge" appears at first glance to be a treatise
on metaphysics rather than ethics. Its purpose, however, is to
establish the possibility of ethics. In it Green shows that
ethics can not be a natural science because man himself is not
a natural (i.e. material) product of physical forces, but is on
the contrary a spiritual being endowed by the eternal conscious-
ness with the pov/er of free moral activity. The "spiritual
principle in man, fahich means the power of conscious activity in
doing as well as knowing) is made the ground-work of Green's
theory. Lian possesses a "self-ob ject ifying" consciousness; i.e.,
he is able by virtue of the spiritual principle with which he is
endowed to place before himself conscious ends and to identify
himself with these ends in ethical activity. Accordingly, man
looks forward to a moral ideal (not backward to natural changes),
and in his conduct expresses a motive consisting of an ideal of
personal good. The ground of assurance for the realization of

the ideal lies in the fact that the eternal consciousness repro-
duces itself in man and makes moral progress possible by estab-
lishing an objective end or goal toward which man is developing.
In the second book entitled "The Will" Green gives a
more detailed discussion of freedom, ne develops the idea that
man may be said to be free in two senses: (1) as a spiritual
being unexplainable by natural forces, and (2) as a free cause.
It is on this basis that he builds up his idea of action as
determined by motive , in which he is opposed both to determinism
(necessitarianism) and to voluntarism (arbitrary freewill).
The motive he defines as "that object "Tith which the man iden-
tifies himself as his good or satisfaction". Among various
"solicitations" (arising perhaps from natural wants) one desire
is chosen which determines conduct. But this motive is not
itself a natural phenomenon, though it may have a natural origin,
because the choice lies in the man himself. The motive, being
self-det ermined . is free because the man is free. "The will is
simply the man, and any act of will is the expression of the man
as he at the time is."
The third book, which deals with the moral ideal, brings
out clearly the relation between Green's theory of self-realization
and the objectivity of values. The motive which actuates conduct,
he says, implies an end or ideal which exists for us as a
'prolegomena, p. 173.

possibility but which exists as a reality in the eternal con-
sciousness. This moral ideal* muet always consist in a state of
person; 1 ! well-being, i.e., must aim at the d rr-elopment of Jruaan
character toward its highest and best. Jfhile "the abiding sat-
isfaction of an abiding Belf" is involved in this ideal, it is
impossible to regard either mere pleasure, or absorption in the
infinite, as the true end of moral conduct. If it be chrged
that this conception of the moral ideal as personal well-being
crives us no definite clue to its nature, it must be answered
that the facts of experience give content to onr ideal of per-
sonal ,,-c"r4:'u . -he struggle for the better shows us the direction
of the best
.
Closely interwoven with Green's cr.ioeption of the moral
idc'-'l is his theory of moral progress. I.Ioral goodness he says
consists in conscious self-direction toward a aro^ressively-
unfoldin?- moral ideal. In this theory of the end of moral en-
deavor he draa; U r st 1 act i on between bio own position and that
of both Kant and Llill. Green maintains that the distinction
bet'.veen good and bad will lies in the end sought while Kant
makes goodness of will depend uuon its formal char? :.cter and Mill
rests it upon the pleasurable effects urocuced. The explanation
of all development, Green says, lies in the end toward which

the development is directedj and this must be an ideal of personal
worth realized in and for the eternal mind. This conception reouires
belief in -personal immortality for its completion; and since the
ideal is not only personal but social, it implies development
toward an ideal society (a whole, not an aggregate) in which per-
fection of human capabilities may be realized according to the
divine plan.
The latter oart of the Prolegomena
, in which Green com-
pares the Greek conception of virtue with his own, and discusses
the practical aspects of the moral ideal, does little more than to
emphasize the position already established. He ends with a tren-
chant criticism of hedonism, in which he admits the practical
value of utilitarianism but shows that pleasure forms no valid si
criterion of the good unless it is interpreted to me --an "the well-
being of the self" and is thus virtually translated into a form
of self-realization. His conclusion is that the ultimate good,
or perfection, of man will be a desirable conscious life, pleasant
but not pursued as pleasure.
Green's political theory raay be regarded as a corollary
to his ethical principles. This is most fully stated in his
Principles of Political Obligation and will later oe discussed in
more detail. 3ut it may here oe noted that it has its basis in
his theory of the moral ideal. Green holds tnat the life of "the

fgood neighbor and the honest citizen" depends upon the effort of
the individual and of society to develop human capabilities to
their fullest and most harmonious realization. He makes a good
deal of the importance of the "removal of obstructions" to the
free development of personality, and for this reason he favors
state interference in so far as this is necessary to ensure to
every individual the oossioility of self-realization to which he
is entitled. However, he regards duties as more fundamental than
rights, and holds that the Dasic human rights must be preserved,
•
not for the sake of enjoyment, but for the sake of enabling man
to serve the common good. His conception of civil liberty is
very closely related, for he holds that true freedom consists in
self-realization and service rather than in the enjoyment of
privileges. He carries his oelief in the ODjeet-ivity of values
into his political theory by regarding the eternal consciousness
as the true source of social institutions. In treating the po-
litical life of man a progressive spiritual revelation, he
rests his theory of progress upon a basis which is both ethical
and religious.
Works, vol. i, p. 371.
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3. Religious -principles .
Green wrote comparatively little upon subjects distinctly
religious or theological. He has left no great work upon the prob-
lems of religion, as he has in the field of ethics; and most of
his religious utterances are confined to miscellaneous articles
and addresses. These include the fragment on Immortal ity; his
e nsay on Christ ian Dogma; extracts from 3iblical lectures dealing
with the Conversion of Paul , Justifi cation by Faith , and the
Incarns ti
o
n; a fragment on the text, "The word is nigh thee"; and
two Oxford chapel addresses entitled "Jhe Witness of Gocj and jfa ith.
The last two give the fullest statement of his own religious ex-
perience and convictions, which he seems seldom to have discussed
from natural reticence and an over-conscientious scruple lest his
practice should not square with his words. Jut while Green is
not primarily a philosonher of religion, his whole metaphysical
and ethical theory is undergirded with religious postulates.
The connecting link between his metaphysics and his re-
ligion lies in his conception of self-consciousness . Conscious-
ness reaches its highest forms in intelligence and love; and as
the self reaches out, from a metaphysical stand -point, to grasp
a unified view of the world through the understanding, so the
religious nature seeks through Love to establish a unity of spirit

with the object which it lores. As the self, metaphysically,
harmonizes unity with plurality and identity with change; so the
self, religiously, finds in lo^e the force v:hich unites self-
satisfaction with self-surrender . While this harmony, in the
best of us, is but oartial , we may conceive of God as a completed
self-consciousness, a beinfr of perfect understanding anc1 oerfect
love, whose life is an eternal act of self-realization through
self-sncr ifi ce
.
Green's conception of the eternal consciousness which
reproduces itself in man and is the basis of his intellectual and
moral life, is likewise fundamental to his conception of religion.
The key-note of Green's religious belief is found in the text,
"The word is nigh thee". The God whom we worship is not far off,
but is th: immanent God who lives in our moral life, whom we serve
in serving brethren, anc in communion with whom we triumph over
sin and suffering and have assurance of eternal life.
The connection between faith and the moral life, in
Green's view, is as intimate as tlE connection between religion
and metaphysics. The final justification for the belief in God,
he says, is found in the moral nature of man . .tis the cesire to
understand is an evidence of a real world t o be understood, so
the desire to be better is an evidence of an absolute oest ; and
this best or "riossioie" self is God. If it be charged that
Works, vol. iii, p. 221.

according to this conception God d oe a not actually exist but is
merely the name for an empty ideal, we must remember that in any
development the result which is oeing developed is the true re-
ality, and that an all-perfect God is more real than our martial
and incomplete selves. And if it be charged that this conception
identifies God with man, it may be said in reply that in self-
consciousness we have ic entity joined with difference, for we may
conceive of God as present in the highest life of man yet mainr-
taining his own di--ine existence. Just as goodness increases with
the effort of man to identify his life with the "completer self"
which is the life of God; so sin consists in the willful limita-
tion of one's interests and activities to his ^resent fragmentary
self.
Green's attitude toward historical criticism is not
surprising in view of the foregoing. Since true religion consists
of the life of God in the soul of man, no amount of Biolical or
historical criticism can shake its sure foundations. Green was
strongly influenced by the work of 3aur (whose Geschichte der
christliche Kirche he translated) and he made no hesitation in
rejecting 3iblical evidence which did not seem to him to souare
with the claims of science, philosophy or true religion. He
rejected the belief in miracle, anc maintained that the essence
of Christianity does not depend, as commonly held, upon the mir-
aculous birth, death or resurrection of Jesus. The essence of

Christianity to Green was "a Christ within us, a continuous
resurrection". Thereby we find the true basis of religion; not
in historical evidence, but in our own potential unity with God
and our efforts to realize this unity in our lives.
Green's attitude toward the supernatural can not oe stated
without a definition of the term. A supernatural event, as some-
thing contradicting the order of nature, he believed to be impos-
siole; for the reason that the world, t o oe knowable at all, must
he regarded as one continuous system in which everything that
happens is an element of the system. 3ut if the term supernatural
he interpreted to mean "transcending physical forces", then Green's
whole system rests on a suoernatural foundation. He points out
that our knowledge of nature, like our knowl edge of God, rests
ultimately on an act of faith, for we "know in part" but have
faith that our partial knowledge reaches out toward the reality
of a complete whole. Thus if a belief in the .supernatural means
that the full explanation of any natural event can not oe given
by any human intellect, the belief is true; but if it means that
God "uncreates himself" by annulling the natural order in which
he reveals himself, the idea must be rejected as self-contradictory.
To this false antithesis between God and nature, Green
attributed the growth of most of the dogmas regarding the oerson
of Christ, To him the incarnation meant, not a past miraculous

event, but an eternal process oy which God reveals himself and
embodies himself in the heart of every truly religious person.
This eternal spirit he believed to be manifested in an excep-
tional way in the life of Jesus of Nazareth; out while he did not
himself reject the historicity of Jesus, he held that oelief in
the historical Jesus is not essential t o an acceptance of the
Christ of faith, he oelieved the true message of Christianity
to rest uoon an immanent and "glorified" Christ such as is pre-
sented to the religious imagination by the Pauline epistles and
the fourth Gospel, rather than upon the historical Christ of the
synoptics. While somewhat unclear in his statement of the person
of the historical Jesus, he alludes to his view as a "modified
unitarianism"
.
Prom the intensity of Green's emphasis upon the divine
immanence, it is easy to conceive of him as a religious mystic.
Whether this term may be correctly applied to him depends again
uoon its definition. Certainly he was no Visionary dreamer, nor
was he given to religious ecstasies. Religion to him took the
form of uractical service and. philosophic speculation rather than
emotional experiences. Yet there was in all his work a pervading
religious consciousness which in a true sense may oe termed mys-
tical. '2o him religion was not something ecstatic or stormy or
mysterious, but something which reaches to the very foundations

of man's beings While he had little patience with creeds, he re
garded all creeds as worthy of respect e nc reverence. Prayer to
him was "incipient action"; and in communion with the indwelling
God he found the pathway to the truest service of mankind.
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III. Reviews of TTorks on Green .
Before attempting to evaluate the merits and limitations
of Green's philosophy, it will first be profitable to examine
what his critics have said about him. T7hile, as we shall :-ee,
a good many articles and some books he*\ e been written about
Green, the literature dealing with his thought is probably less
extensive than in the case of any outstanding thinker of the
oast century. His critics have centered their attention very
largely upon his Prolegomena to BthloB, and by far the greater
part of the adverse criticism is directed against his metaphysics
as stated in the first hundred pages of the Prolegomena . Had he
left this section unwritten, it is probable that his works would
have received comparatively little comment.
In reviewing the works that have been written on Green and
his philosophy, we shall for the sake of convenience group them
as being mainly biographical, expository, metaphysical, ethical,
political or religious. As a detailed discussion of the merits
and limitations of the various aspects of Green's thought will be
introduced in a later section, criticism of the specific problems
raised in these articles will bo largely postooned until they can
be brought together and evaluated in the light of Green's entire
system. It is the purpose of this section to state (as briefly
as is consistent with thoroughness) what others have thought and
written regarding Green.

As the material found in the biographical works dealing
with Green has been largely included in the sketch which we
have given of his life and personality, we shall here attempt
to indicate only the general characteristics of these works.
They are on the whole very interesting, for Green was himself
one of the most interesting men of his times.
The best known and most comprehensive work dealing with
Green's life is H. S. llettleship' s Memoir
,
published in the
third volume of Green's works, llettleship gives an intimate
and apparently accurate account of -reen's personal and pro-
fessional life. This is made more vivid by numerous excerpt;
from the testimony of friends who- knew Green personally at
various stages of his career. While the work is mainly bio-
graphical, it also contains an excellent exposition of Green's
views on metaphysics, religion, ethics, politics, and education,
llettleship, in his treatment both of Green's life and his Phil-
osophy^ is thoroughly sympathetic and appreciative without being
blind to Green's faults. The Memoir justly holds first rank
among all the works which have been produced dealing with Green.
.another biographical work dealing with Green, which thirty-
five years ago created a furor which is still commonly remembered
even by people of unphilosophi^al interests, is TIrs. Humphrey
7/ard ' s Robert Elsmore
,
(Hurray, London, 1888). It is somewhat

unusual to find a philosopher figuring in a novel, but in
this story T. H. Green arrears as Henry Grey, "the Oxford
professor who exerted a uowerful influence over the life of
Robert Elsmere. It is to Green that the book is dedicated.
It presents an admirable picture of the beginnings of the con-
flict between the traditional and modern views of theology,
for it oortrays Robert Elsmere, a young clergyman of deen con-
secration and much intellectual acumen, as being forced by his
conscience to leave 1,he church because he can not accent its
traditional theological tenets. Thile Professor Grey is a
minor character, the reader is given a clear view of Green's
insistence upon the rationality of religion, of his friendly
interest in his students, and especially of the influence of
his lay sermons. Numerous quotations apnear which obviously
are taken from The Witness of God and Faith.
A third source of biographical information regarding
Green is James Bryce's Studies in Contemporary Biography (Hac-
millart, London, 1903). This work deals with the most distin-
guished Englishmen of the nineteenth cen"ury, and the chapter
on Green is especially interesting in vi«w of the fact that it
is written from the stand ooint of a fellow student who was
intimately acquainted with Green in his undergraduate days as
well as in his later career. Bryce indicates that while Green
was far from orthodox in his own religious views he exerted over

his students a strong and inspiring religious influence.
Other biographical articles of less importance may oe
briefly mentioned. Several appeared as obituaries at the
time of Green's death in 1882. Among these we may note one
by llettleship entitled "Professor P. H. Green, 'In #emoriam"
which was published in the ^ontem-o orary Periew (41) 188£; an
anonymous article in Phe Spectator 55) 188£ or. "Phe Late
Professor Green"; and an article by IToah Porter in Jhe Jew
Englander and Yale Bevieg (50) 1889 entitled " Phe hate Profes -
sor Green of Oxford ". We find also in llaomillan ' a (40) 188Z
some anonymous verses on T. H. Creen, apparently written by
one of his students. Phe only other biographical article
of any importance (aside from those found in the encyclopedias)
is one entitled 'Phomas Hill &reen 1T
,
by John '. Chadwick in
Phe Unitarian Review (31) 1889, ich appeared on the
publication of the third volume of Green's works.

3. '..'orkf, Malnlg Expository .
In discussing the expository works dealing1 with Green's
thought, we Bhall as in the case of the biographical treat-
ments restrict our consideration to the main Cij.'"racteristics
of each. We find these works considerably more numerous than
those of the preceding group.
With the exception of ITettleship 1 s Ilemoir
,
probably the
best known work dealing exclusively with Green is The i'hilrcc -
of Thomas Hill Green by W« H. Fairbrother (Metkuon 2b Co.,
London, 1896). The book is written, the author says, "to set
forth a simple plain exposition of the philosophic teaching of
It H. Green", for the reason that Green's own thorough and ex-
haustive treatment, joined with his somewhat labored style,
makes his works difficult reading. Prom the standpoint of
clearness Fairbrcther succeeds in his task, but the book fails
to give an adequate and comprehensive account of Green's Xjnil-
osophy. ?he author apparently knows nothing outside of the
Prolegomena
,
for there is scarcely any i - bion of Green's other
works. We Pind in Fairbrother not only the expositor but the
evident devotee, for he strongly champions Green* a views regard-
less of their merits. 7e shall examine the work further in
evaluating the charges of Sath and Balfour against Green which
Fairbrother attempts tc refute.
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Three works by Edward Caird afford a commendable ex-
position of Green's philosophy. The first of these is an
article entitled "Professor Green's last Work" in Llind (6)
1806, which consists of a review of the Prolegomena and gives
an excellent summary of this work. While on the whole Caird
is in sympatic with Green's position, he points out the fact
that Green grea'Ji'" weakened his system by failure to give a
positive and constructive statement of the nature of the self
and of the moral ideal. Another summary of Green's philosophy
by the same author is found in Caird 's preface to the fifth
edition of the Pr ole^omena (Clarendon Press
,
Oxford, l lJ06).
The chief point of interest here is Caird 'c comparison of
Green with Kant in which he shows that though differing in
regard to the possibility of proving the divine existence,
they are in agreement regarding the moral postulates of theistic
faith. A third d iscusr. i on of Creen by Caird is found in his
preface to the Assays in Philosophical Criticism edited by feth
and Ealdane. This volume, representing various currents of
idealistic thought in England, is dedicated to Green as being
typical of the original yet synthetic ricirit of the followers
of Kant and He^el.
Another expository article of considerable value is one
by John Dewey on "The Philosophy of Thomas Hill Green" in the

3*
nd over Teller for April, 1889. This is almost entirelj
free from the hostile criticism found In Dewey's other art-
icles-dealing with Green's philosophy (to be discussed in the
section on ethical works)* Here Dewey (quoting Caird ) com-
mends Green for the distinctness with which he lived by con-
viction rather than impulse, and he calls him one of the
leading prophets of the last half -century
.
We find also among the expository articles dealing with
Green two "by S. Alexander entitled '' r,'orks of Thomas Hill Green"
(Vol. I and Vol. Ill) which appeared in The ^oademy in 1865 and
1889. 'These, as the title suggests, consist of reviews of
ITettleship ' s editions of Green's published works. The first
article, aside from its distinctly expository content, presents
a criticism of Green's psychology, in which Alexander thinks
Green has erred in excluding neural processes from states of
consciousness. In the second article, Alexander charges. Green
with having confused psychology with metaphysics, and also
makes the observation that Green was guilty of the fallacy of
language. He thinks that from studying Kant and Hj^el so ex-
tensively, Cvon laid an undue emphasis on the self aspect of
"Selbst bemisstsein"
.
Irief expositions of Greens thought are found also in
some of the histories of philosophy and in other general works*
{
3 1
Of these the most Important re the article by 6 . 3. Brett
in Eastings' Encycl opedia of Religion and Jthics
,
and the
section devoted to Green in a. Z. P.ogers' Anglic h p.a\ Am -
erican Philosophy Since 1600 (llacmillan, New York, 1922).
2hese will he considered later in connection with the meta-
physical works. Aside from these, none of the general works
devote more than a very few pages to Green.
Among the histories of philosophy, we find that Windel-
band compares Green with Spencer and mentions him as the
chief modern opponent of a naturalistic theory of etrics.
Falckenberg makes a brief mention of Green, noting especially
the social aspects of self-realisation. Thilly brings out
the synthetic character of Green's philosophy by referring
to it as "an attempt to do justice to the opposing tendencies
of his time--to rationalism and empiricism, religion and
science, pantheism and theism, Creek culture and Christianity,
the theory of perfection and Utilitarianism, li uerturiunisn
and univercalism''
. ~.'eber and. Cushman do not include Green
at all.
If we examine the more specialized histories of philosophy
covering the period in which Green lived, we find that he
usually receives some attention although not so much as his

importance merits. James Seth in English Philosophers and schools
of Philosophy (J. M.Dent ft Sons, London, 1912) gives a concise
summary of Green's thought. A more constructive statement is given
in W.R.Sorley*s History of English Philosophy (Cambridge University
press, London, 1920). He comments upon the fact that Green's appeal
to" Englishmen under twenty-five" to close their Mill and Spencer and
open their Kant and Hegel marks an epoch in English thought. Sidgwick
in his History of Ethics (Macmillan, London, 1902) devotes about a page
to Green's ethics. G.S.Fullerton in A Handbook of Ethica l Theory
(Henry Holt and Co., $ew York, 1922) makes numerous references to
Green. J.T. Merz in his History o f European Thought in the 19th
Century (Blackwood & Sons, London, 1914) draws an interesting
comparison between Green and Lotze, showing that they agree in
regarding reality aB a system of relations and the world of ideals
as a real factor in the universe. Merz believes that Green was not
influenced in his theory by LOtzej but he overlooks the fact that
i
Green translated a considerable part of Lptze s j.ogic , as well as
Book I and Book II, chapter 3 of Lotze's Metaphysics . These translations
were left incomplete because of Green's death. Bosanquet in his editorial
preface to the Logic (Oxford, Clarendon Pres3, 1888) makes the
-j.
statement: " Professor Green, who first definitely proposed it, not
only executed an important part of the translation, but intended to
take upon himself the task of revising and editing the whole, which
was not entrusted to the present editor until after Professor Green's
death". Thus it is evident that the connection between Green and
Lotze is mtiich more direct than Merz assumes.
Works, vol. i, p. 371.
z Lotze jfr. Logic , vol.
-i, p. v.

0. "forks ITainly Iletaphysical .
1. Seth, Andrew: Segelianism and Personality
T -laclOTOod & Sons, London, 1887)
2. Balfour, A.J.: Green ' s Mgtaghj si cs o f knowledge
(SI5I 79} 18847
3.. Fairbrother, w.H. : The Philosophy of Thomas Hill Green
(Methuen & Company, London 1896
)
These three works will he discussed together for the
reason that Seth and Balfour in their criticisms of Green's meta-
physics cover substantially the same ground, and Fairbrother in
connection with his exposition of Green's philosophy takes up the
charges raised by both and refutes them jointly. T.7e shall attempt
to compare these opposing views.
Seth classifies Green as a neo-Xantian, and discusses
him as typical of the English movement to combine the philosophy
of Kant with that of Hegel. Green's refutation of the emxJiricism
of Locke and Hume Seth regards as "victorious and conclusive", but in
Green' sown system, which centers in the assertion of a Self or
Spiritual Principle as necessary to the existence of knowledge and
morality, almost everything is left vague. Only in the Prologomena
is any definite indication given that this principle is to be inter-
preted as a universal or divine Self, and the nature and possibility
of the relation existing between the human and divine is nowhere
explained. This ambiguity, Seth says, is due to its source in the
faegelianism and Personality, p. 4.

iKantian philosophy read in the light of the Hegelian system,
Seth then proceeds to show that the Kantian theory,
taking- the fact ox Knowledge as it finds it without inquiring into
its genesis, can only yield a theory of knowledge and not a meta-
physic of the universe. Green's fundamental error, Seth thinks,
is that he transforms a legitimate theory of knowledge into an
unwarranted ontology. That is, he takes the "consciousness in
general" which Kant intended only as a pure abstraction, and con-
verts it into a "universal consciousness" having metaphysical
existence. Logical identity of type is transformed into numerical
identity of existence; and the unity of the form of knowledge he-
comes One Subject who is the real Knower in all finite intelligences,
thus hypbstasizing £m abstraction, neo-Kantianism goes back to the
method of Scholastic Realism.**"
The outcome of this doctrine Seth discusses in his con-
cluding chapter, though in it he deals merely with Hegeliamism and
neo-Kantianism in general without specific reference to Green, he
shows that the unification of consciousness in a single sslf destroys
the reality of both God and man. While it is true, he says, that
each self has a universal aspect in that it is an element in an all-
inclusive system, it is nevertheless a mistake to infer "that it is
one universal Self which thinks in all so-called thinkerft* a for
each self is "a unique existence which is perfectly impervious to
Hegelianlsm and Personality, p. 5.
^Ibid.
, pp 29 , 30.
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other selves." Though the self is, in knowledge, a principle of
unification, it is in existence, or metaphysically, a principle of
i
isolation,
Y/hile this theory deprives man of his selfhood "by re-
ducing him to an object of a universal Thinker, it also leaves the
universal Thinker without any true personality. For it makes him
simply an abstraction; and "if we arte to keep the name of God at
all, subjectivity — an existence of God for himself, analogous to
it
our own personal existence though transcending-- is an essential
2.
element in the conception.
Furthermore, the question of man's immortality is left
as ambiguous as that of the parsonality of God, since the 3«lf about
which assertions are made in this theory is not a real but a log-
ical self. If it is only the Absolute Self which is to survive,
such immortality can be of little direct concern to us. religion
itself, which is the self-surrender of the human will to the divine,
demands that finite selves be more than a mode or efflux of the
divine
•
Balfour in Mind, January 1884, makes charges against
Green which are so similar to those of Seth that Fairbrother re-
futes them together. He calls Green's metaphysics a "simplified
Kantianism purged of things-in-themselves" ; says that it establishes
only a formal unity "in which it is at; correct to say that the world
Hegelianism and Personality, pp. 215-217.
^Ibid., p. 222_
*Ibid.
, pp 224,227.
''ibid., pp. 217 7218.

created God as that God created the world"; and charges Green with
giving us theological mysteries instead of philosophical conclusions
because he has failed to explaiii the supposed relation existing be-
tween the human self and God.
]?airbrother in his defense of Green against the Seth-
Balfour attack maintains that most of the arguments they use against
Green are in reality reproductions of his doctrine and would have
been cordially indorsed bv him. He charges Seth in particular with
misrepresentation of Green's position; but apparently he has read
Seth "with a chip on his shoulder" and too little attention to what
Seth actually says, for numerous statements made by Seth about
Hegelianism in general are misconstrued as specific charges against
Green.
The first point at issue between them centers about the
question as to whether or not Green was a pantheist. Both sides
agree that pantheism is an undesirable doctrine, but disagree re-
garding Green's position. Seth and Balfour find in Green, as in
Hegel, certain pantheistic tendencies which obscure the individual-
ity of finite selfhood. Fairbrother, however, warmly resents the
implication, and quotes a passage from the Prolo^ omena which seems,
as clearly as Seth's own words, to demand the reality and separate-
ness of finite selves. He speaks of a "curious misunderstanding
common to all the metaphysical (at least ) criticism of Green's
'Prolegomena, p* 208.

teaching, viz., that he is pantheistic*, and says that Seth in his
criticism reproduces the very doctrine the Prolegomena was written
to teach us. The critic, he says, must have turned plagiarist.
But Fairbrother misquotes Seth in order to refute him.
He represents Seth as saying that Green's philosophy is a "thorough-
x
going pantheism", This statement, if made, could net be maintained,
for Green's personalistic bent makes him far from being a consistent
or thoroughgoing pantheist. Eut as a matter of fact, Seth nowhere
makes this statement, What he does say is that Green's philosophy
.is a type of neo -Kantianism, that the latter has affinities with
Scholastic Realism, and that "the ultimate goal of Realism is a
thoroughgoing pantheism". But that Green himself reaches this point
is nowhere stated, and he even admits that much of Green's theory
H
of the universe may be substantially true.
Furthermore, Seth's concluding chapter, in which he shows
*
that Hegelianism leads to a denial of the personality of God ai r
individual immortality, is interpreted by Fairbrother as belli
leveled directly against Green. But Green's name is nowhere men-
tioned in this chapter. Seth may have meant to imply that Green's
system would lead to these conclusions, but he does not say so; and
Fairbrother appears unduly sensitive in leaping to Green's defense
where no attack has been made.
.Another major bone of contention between Seth and
J
The Philosophy of Thomas Hill Green, p. 162.
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^Hegelianism and Personality, p. 218.
^Ibid. p. 30.

Faii-brother lies in the question as to whether Green took over the
Kantian theory of knowledge and converted it into a ready-made on-
tology. Seth says that he did, and regards the illegitimate trans-
fer from "consciousness in general" to "universal consciousness"
as "being his fundamental error. Fairbrother
,
however, says "the
a.
phrase neo-Kantian is in the highest degree unfortunate", for
Green 1 s doctrine is not borrowed from Kant but is the result of
independent investigation. The self from which Greezi starts, he
says, is neither logical nor ontological, but simply "his own self",
and in order to explain it and its attributes he is "driven step
by step with irresistiole cogency to the cosmos, and from that to
God". Thus the universal Ilnower of which Seth complains is not
Green 1 s starting-point but his conclusion.
A third point over which Fairbrother disagrees with Seth
and Balfour is the question as to whether Green gives an adequate and
treatment of the relation between the divine and human selves.
Fairbrother says it is unwarranted to charge a philosopher with
lack or omniscience, provided he is correct as far as he goes; and
he challenges his opponents to find any gap or inconsistency in
Green 1 s position. In fact, Fairbrother makes the astciiishirg state-
ment that Green T s is the only modern philosophy which is complete
in the sense of covering all the ground, and cor^sistent with itself
throughout
•
Hegelianism and Personality, p. 21.
The Philosophy of Thomas Hill Green, p. 168
Ibid., p. 169.
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4. Pringle-Pattison, A. Seth: The Idee, of God (Oxford University
Press, New York, 1917")
This author in this work devotes to Green several pages
of the chapter entitled "Idealism and I.-entalisin" • His standpoint
here is practically the same as that indicated in his book on
Hegelianism and Personality and need not here be repeated in de-
tail. There is, however, a point of special interest in the fact
that in this chapter he considers Green in comparison with Berkeley.
He regards both as advocates of "mentalism" . The epistemological
basis from which each proceeds leads only to the establishment of
"the empty form of the Ego", which is of no metaphysical value.
Green 1 s theory of relations, Pringle-Pattison maintains, gives no
real explanation of the world of nature, for it is simply a hypos-
tasized form of Kant's "synthetic unity of apperception", i/hile
Berkeley regards nature as the effect in finite centers of an ab-
stract will, Green dissolves nature into an abstract system of thought
relations. Pringle-Pattison objects to both conceptions, and agrees
with Bradley in protesting against the dissolution of the world into
"some spectral woof of impalpable abstractions, or unearthly ballet
of bloodless categories". Pringle-Pattison' s criticism is interesting
in view of the fact that Berkeley's empiricism and Green's attack upon
empiricism lead eventually, in his opinion", to the same formal uen-
talistic conclusion.
'The Idea of God, p. 199.
J Ibid.
, p. 203.
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5. Towns end, H.(J., : The Principle of Individuality in the Philosophy
of T.H. Green tj Cornell Studies in Philosophy, No. 10 (Longmans,
Green & Co. New Yoric, 1914).
Townsend's examination of Green's philosophy is limited
wholly to his metaphysics. He approaches the problem from this
angle for the reason that Green's ethics can not properly he under-
stood without first grasping the metaphysical foundation on which
his ethical theory rests. In order tc clear up misconceptions v/hich
have distorted man3^ interpretations of Green's ethics, Townsend (in
his doctor's dissertation written at Cornell) attempts to analyze
and elucidate Green's metaphysics.
The treatise is written from a neo-Hegelian stand-point,
and its phraseology and method savor strongly of Bosanquet. His
position is, however, more personalistic than that of Bosaniiuet. His
work appears to he done with great accuracy and thoroughness; and
forms a penetrating (though not entirely lucid) exposition of Green's
system. Its chief weakness seems to me to he found in an over-
zealous acceptance of Green's theories, for while he does not treat
Green with such adulation as Fairbrother , he fails to ijoint out an^
flaws in his system. His own views are stated as being so nearly
identical with those of Green that in the following discussion we
may treat them jointly,
Townsend in his opening chapter discusses the problem
and method of Grin's imetaphysics. He maintains that Green's

starting-point was identical with that of Kant (though with some
disparity (Sf result) in asking the question, "How is knowledge pos-
sible?" He "shows that Creen sharply distinguished "between metaphysics
and psychology, and that many errors in interpreting him have arisen
from reading into his system psychological connotations which do not
"belong there. Green, he says, regarded psychology merely as an em-
pirical science like biology or physics, and as such accepted its
data without question. But instead of raising the psychological
question, "What are the facts?" he raised the metaphysical question,
"What do we mean "by a fact?" Thus he is not concerned with the in-
dividual processes of ^nowing, but rather with what is implied in
the fact of our knowing at ail, or in trie fact of thane. Toeing a world
..
. f
for us to know.
This conception of his problem leads Green, Townsend says,
to revolt against a subjective method, and to begin with a study
of the object of knowledge, Experience Green defines as "matters
of fact recognized as such", and he departs from Hegel in beginning
with the object known rather than the knower. But it must be noted
that he regards this object as the object of thought
,
(not a hypo-
thetical object independent of thougnti, and he thus from the outset
commits himself to an idealistic stand-point. In asking, "How is
experience possible?" he means signifi cant experience, i.e. conscious
The Principle of Individuality in T. H. Green, p. 6 f.
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or intelligent experience, and since all knowledge professes to
be knowledge or reality, all inquiry into the object of knowledge
will be equivalent to an inquiry into the nature of reality as
apprehended by thought.
Since Green be;- ins with the object, rather than the sub-
ject of knowledge, Townsend follows the same method, and discusses
next the individuality of the object. He sa^s (in typically Hegelian
language) that the true end of philosophy is to determine the con-
crete universal
,
i.e., the i. dividual as an organic union of the
f
universal and the particular. This he says Green found at the end
of his philosophy in the individual person , but reached this con-
clusion only after an exhaustive consideration of individuality
per se . This, it may be noted, is in direct opposition tc
Fairbrother" s statement that Green's starting point was the facts
of his own individual consciousness, from which he worked out his
conception of the world and God.
Townsend discusses and vigorously defends Green's con-
ception of reality as a system of internal relations. To the ob-
jection commonly raised, that before we can have relations there
must be something to relate, he replies that the "end terms" or
things which are related, turn out upon examination to be them-
selves made up of relations, and so on ad infinitum . Thus exis-
tence itself becomes a relation, and Green is justifieu in adopting
'The Principle of Individuality in T. H. Green, 18.

tAristotltffl view that "the indeterminate is the same as non-Toeing".
The object of knowledge is real because it is capable of definition;
i.e., it is determinate and related. Everything is real which has
dualities and relations of its own, and the unrelated does not exist.
Townsend applies the theory of relations to the "concrete
universal". He shows that av\ object (i.e. the object of knowledge)
is individual in so far as its relations distinguish it from other
objects; yet it is universal because constituted by a universal
series of relations which give it its intelligible properties. iin
object becomes more individualized in proportion as its relations
become more determinate; and this process takes place, not by its
being named or placed in a class as is done by the formal logiciaiB"
,
but by having its implicit relations i:ade more explicit through
added meaning.
In the chapter on the implications of objectivity,
Townsend brings the theory of relations a step nearer to selfhood.
He shows that since the objective world is made up of relations,
relation implies meaning (i.e. the recognition of these relations)
and all meanings must be meanings for somebody, or judgments. The
self, thus introduced as an epistemological necessity, is from this
point on more prominent in Townsend 1 s discussion.
Townsend in reproducing Green's epistemology gives an
excellent discussion of the nature of the judgment. His main
„
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propositions are fl) that judgment is the simplest component of
knowledge; (2) that judgment is a process of individualization in
which the olject of knowledge becomes more determinate; and (5)
judgment is the germ of all iinowledge, and though never complete is
capable of infinite development toward an ultimate system of know-
ledge. In this last proposition he agrees with Bosanquet that we
must distinguish between relativity and relativism in laiowledge,
for while all judgments are hypothetical (incomplete and finite),
they rest on a categorical ( complete* and infinite) basis of reality.
Townsend then takes up the discussion of a "spiritual
principle" which he has previously kept in the background, although
Green himself introduces it much earlier. In order to have any
judgment or meaning at all with regard to the related objects of
knov/ledge, it is necessary to postulate a unified and timeless self
which grasps them together as a whole. Consciousness is not a fact
nor a sum of facts, but a principle through which all facts derive
their meaning. Green's statement is given succintly in the words,
"Ho one and no number of a series of related events can be the
consciousness of the series is related'.'
In the chapter on the individuality of the subject,
Townsend develops quite explicitly his own (and Green's) theory
f
of consciousness. Objectivity requires a principle of organization
which is not itself one c t tlh ' cts but is that through which
objects are possible, furthermore, this inseparable element is a
I
Prolegomena, p. 21.

non-spatial, non-temporal self which combines unity with plurality
and is therefore the true "individual".
In demonstrating the non-spatial and non-temporal char-
acter of consciousness Townsand 1 a accounting is satisfactory, hut
he seems to misinterpret Green in regarding consciousness also as
non-causal. He quotes Green as Baying that the source of the cat-
egories can not he brought under the categories, and that accord-
ingly we can not apply the categories of substance or causality
to consciousness. Green, though he rejects the possibility of
any miraculous breaking of the oasis of natural causation, cer-
tainly does not deny to the self the power of free causality in
initiating action.* However, Townsend's main point in the discus-
sion of causality is a commendable one, for he apparently intends
principally to show that consciousness is not simply non-causal
but non-caused; i.e., that it is not itself merely a link in the
chain of natural causation and therefore can not be explained in
mechanical terms.
o. Laurie, . 3.3, : The Metaphysics f T.H. Green_" Philosophical
Review ( ) 1897
.
This article has for its task the demolition of Green 1 s
metaphysics, and especially his theory of relations. It haa
scarcely a c ood word to say for Green, and yet, rather strangely^
The Principle of Individuality in T. H. Green, p. 61.
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after rejecting all of Green 1 s metaphysics the author says at the
end that he accepts Green 1 s ethics. (The latter however is not
discussed.) The flaws which Laurie points out in Green's meta-
physics are in most cases real difficulties, "but he is much stronger
in destructive than in constructive criticism, for after pointing
out the errors in Green's position he seldom has a more satisfactory
solution to offer.
He opens his attack "by reference to Green's rather un-
fortunate statement, "The very question, 'V/hat is the real?' is
misleading "because it implies that there is something else from
which the real can he distinguished," Green is apparently trying
to show that "the work of the mind" is real (though it may not
have objective reality), hut it sounds as if he were trying to
break dcwi\ the distinction between reality and illusion, Laurie
says, and I think justly, that if we can not legitimately ask the
question "What is the real?"
, neither do we have a right to ask
"Is there a system?"
Laurie's main attack however is upon the theory of
relations. Green's fundamental fallacy, he says, lies in con-
fusing a related series o.f events with a series of events as re -
lated . Experience gives re a series of events in relation to
each other, but does not give them to us, as Green assumes, with
Prolegomena, p. 26.

their relations constituting their nature. Green is self-contradic-
tory in maintaining that the "singleness and severalty" of things
are the very condition of there being a relation, and at the same
time claiming that wit; out relations there would he nothing left.
Laurie denies the possibility of harmonizing unity with plurality
on this basis; for, he says, the qualities of an acorn are either
separate or fused; and if separate, no relations are possible to
make it an object, while if fused, no singleness of parts is pos-
sible. The solution of the difficulty is hinted at, though not
developed, by Laurie in his statement that unity with manifold is
possible only through a relating act of finite intelligence, but
he does not give Green due credit for the significance of this
solution as it appears in his philosophy.
He attacks Green 1 s conception of thought as it appears
in the relational theory. Quoting Green's statement that "thought -
is the active unifying energy of a self-distinguishing subject",
Laurie says that Green practically abolishes thought by reducing
it to "unifying principle of relations" , since this unifying ac-
tivity is found, not as thought, but as a simple reflex in th«
iower animals, Laurie tries to show that a unifying principle of
relations need not be self-conscicus , since a dog, though conscious
of objects, is not a ' "self-dist inguishii:g subject". But it seems
r
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to me that he misses the point of Green's definition, which ex-
cludes animal reflexes by limiting thought to self-conscious activ-
ity. It is furthermore questionable to base an t , argument upon
animal psychology.
Laurie points out what seems to me the most serious
difficulty in Green's relational theory in showing that it abol-
ishes the category of substance. Both the. finite self and God,
Laurie says, would be "simply a complex whorl of knots tied without
/
a string" if it were possible to have relations without any elements
to be related. It may readily be admitted that relations are
necessary in a world which exists either for Cod or man, but these
must be relations of something which has a real existence of its
own.
In discussing Green's conception of God, Laurie stresses
the errors in his monistic pantheism, but overlooks his personal-
istic elements. If due consideration had been given to this aspect
of Green's thought, most of the objections noted would have been
met. But Green's view is criticised on the score that it maizes
God simply an abstract unifying principle of relations. Ee is the
finite self universalized and deprived of all real character,
Laurie's objections to Green's moijistic pantheism may be summarized
as follows: (1) It is only an hypothesis based on an argument from
analogy. (2) The analogy itsoir rests on a faulty analysis of
/
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finite minds. (3) Green's idea of God does not meet the demands
of reason or emotion. (4) Finite selves are affirmed but a system
of relations with a monistic center can not yield free finite
selfhood.
7. Knox, Howard V. : Green's Refutat io n of Empiricism .
Mind (25) 1900
This article, like Laurie's, is decidedly antagonistic
to Green. Its attack is directed both against his epistemology
.
and his metaphysics. While at some points it overlaps Laurie's
discussion, its particular noint of attack is the dualism in
Green's conception of conciousness.
Knox objects to the idealistic identification of thought
and reality, and says that Green in his effort to overcome the
dualism of thought and reality, falls into a worse predicament;
namely, "an irremediable dualism of two aspects of thouerht"/ 3y
this he means Green's conception of consciousness as being both
a temporally conditioned function of the animal organism and also
a non-temporal communication of the eternal consciousness which
makes the animal org^nis^ its vehicle. V/hile Green defends him-
self against the charge that this gives us a double consciousness
by saying that it is really one consciousness looked at from two
different points of view, like a shield having two sides, Knox
'Green's Refutation of Empiricism, Mind,. (25) 1900.
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refuses to accept his defense. He maintains that Green reoeatedly
contradicts himself as to whether the consciousness he is talking
about is in time or out of time. He fives as an example Green's
assertion (previously quoted) that there can be no unreal in the
work of the mind, in which he evidently means "thought in time"
and yet bases the force of his assertations on his concent ion of
thought as non-temporal. Such confusion, Knox says, not only
obliterates the distinction between thought and reality, but also
between reality and illusion, and so between truth and error.
The outcome of this duality, Knox claims, is to make
psychology impossible by eviscerating consciousness of its content.
He upholds this position by reference to Green's statement, "A
transition from one state of consciousness to another may prooerly
be called a phenomenon, but not so the consciousness itself of
relations or related facts." Tn this nassasre Green is emphasizing
the fact of an abiding self wh ic h. binds together the transient
states of consciousness, but Knox attacks the admission of the
phenomenal character of the states and says that if this be true,
we have a transition from nothing to nothing, and therefore no
consci ousness
.
Knox claims also that this duality makes knowledge of
nature impossible. He seeks to establish this view by attacking
Green's distinction between a "series of related events" and a
"consciousness of series as related". Knox says that this estab-
Prole^omena, p. 26.
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lishes an absolute difference between thought and its object (when.
the object is a series of events) and so is contradictory to the
rest of Green's theory.
Knox's conclusion is that this contusion of the temporal
and non-temooral aspects of consciousness involves a hysteron
nroteron far more serious than that with which Green charges empir-
icism. "For, he says, Green makes the e?o necessary only for es-
tablishing the co nti nuity of consciousness and so considers only
the temporal aspect of thought. Yet in order to find a metaphysical
justification for the eternal consciousness, he turns around and
makes thought itself non- tempo re. 1, The root of the difficulty Knox
says, lies in the substitution of eternity of thought for continuity
of consciousness. By making consciousness unmeaning and rendering
psycholo.^ and knowledge of nature impossible, he thus makes phil-
osophy itself impossible.
8-9. Sidgwick, Henry: Green's Metaphysics
,
(Mind (9) 1884)
The Philosophy of T.H.Green
,
( Mi nd (25) 1900
)
These articles cover substantially the s^. me fround, but
as the latter is the more complete we shall follow the order pre-
sented there in reviewing them. This article consists of a lecture
delivered by Professor Sidprwick shortly before his death, and vas
the distinction of beinp- his last public utterance. It coitains
Prolegomena, p. 37.

some pleasing personal re ml niscences which; -show that the t wo men,
though opposed to each ot>-er in philosophy, were nevertheless on
terms of personal friendship. One item of some philosophical in-
terest is the fact that Sidgwi ok was told by Green shortly before
his death that he ha! gotten away from Hegel in his later years,
and that Hegel then seemed to him "like a strange ffirrwarr ".
Of Green's philosophy, Sidgwi ck say s he finds in it a
fundamental lack of coherence between his Spiritualism and his
Idealism. These terms, being interoreted, apparently refer to
Green's personalism and his absolute idealism. Sidgwiek mentions
Berkeley as a type of the former; Hegel of the latter: and says
that according* to spiritualism, "reality is conscious beings",
while according to idealism, "reality is thought or thinking acti-
vity .
"
In stating Green's philosophy Sidgwick says t^at in his
earlier works Green regards nature as a "single, unalterable,
all-inclusive system of relations", i.e. he advocates Hegelian
idealism. But in the Prolegomena this system of thought relations
"implies something other than itself as a condition of being what
it is". That is, it presupposes the activity of a thinking con-
sciousness not itself conditioned by the system of relations, and
thus his philosophy becomes spiritualism. This combination of
idealism and spiritualism Sidgwiok says is not thinkable, and he

maintains that Green himself does not succeed in thinking it.
As an outgrowth of this disparity of conceptions, he
finds Green regarding man as a dualism (not of mind and matter)
but of the finite and eternal consciousness. This leads to a
confusion in the idea of God which is fatal to Green's ethical
system. For Green says man is a "reproduction or realisation of
the Divine I.Iind". Sidgwick says that these terms, apparently used
as synonyms, are in reality vastly different in significance. Par
if man is seeking to realize God, then God is only potential and
man is the true reality; while if man is seeking to reproduce God
(as implied in Green's ethics) then God is an ideal already com-
pletely realized.
Sidgwick, like Laurie, attacks Green for makine* God
simply, a unifying principle having no character. His me tanhysics,
he says, give God no function except to synthesize the manifold
of nature; while his ethics call for a God having a "preferential
will" realized in man's choice of virtue. But if God's function
is simply to unify the manifold of nature he does this for sinners
as well as saints. Thus God is deprived of ethical value.
Furthermore if God has no character except to
.
unify the
manifold of nature, he not only has no ethical value, but he lacks
metaphysical value also; for ve becomes merely a hypostasized
logical element. Sidgwick says also that it is not necessary to

posit a unity to combine the manifold, for according to Green
himself, we can not conceive the manifold out of its relations.
Sidgwick gives no consideration to the argument that the very-
impossibility of conceiving the manifold out of its relations, f
from an eois temologica 1 standpoint, makes it necessary to find a
metaphysical basis for the manifold.
10. Sturt, Henry: Idola Theatri f Macmillan, London, 1906)
The subtitle of this book is "A criticism of Oxford
thought anc! thinkers from the standpoint of Personal Idealism".
This indicates in a general way the character of the book, although
the author's owi system is not advanced very prominently. The
three idola theatri which he thinks have played havoc with Oxford
thought are Intellectualism, Absolutism, and Subjectivism. After
a critical, examinati on of German idealism he rlevotes a chapter
each to Green, F.H.Bradley, and Bosanouet to show in what respects
they have erred by following Kant and Hegel too closely.
In the fifty pages which he devotes to Groen, he has
scarcely a good word to sayfor him, in spite of the fact that both
Sturt and Green may be classed as personal idealists. He marshals
more evidence against Green than has been brought together by any
other wjriter who has analyzed Green's philosophy.
Prolegomena, p, 77.
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The first charge which he raises Is that in making God
merely a universal relative consciousness, he has failed to -nake
him intelligent or moral. Thus he has not established Christian
theism. Any relation to be valuable must be teleogical, anri Green 1 s
Eternal Consciousness, as simoly a unifying orinciole based on
feeling anrl perceiving, is not teleogical.
i
His second criticism is that Green has not shown the
world to be adapted for a sphere of moral action. This he biases
on Green's assertion that "whatever anything is really it is un-
alterably" and shows that on this assumption nature must be static,
oL.
and a static nature is no sphere for moral endeavor. Green was
inconsistent, he says, in insisting both on the reality of nature
and the unreality of time or change.
Sturt next attacks Green's conception of the self on
several different grounds. First, he says Green has failed to
make man a son of God. "A static Deity, a changeless consciousness
whose function it is to be the sustainer of changeless relations,
can not be imagined to reproduce itself in finite consciousness!' ^
Furthermore it is impossible to give any intelligible meaning to
the self that is reproduced. "If it is only the 'synthetic unity
of apperception' then that has no significance for mors. Is: if it
is the empirical self, there is an unbridgeable chasm between the
reoroducer and the renroduces: for one is timeless and the other
a creature of time".
' Prolegomena, p. 30.
2 Idola Theatri, p. 236.
Ibid.
,
p. 238.
H Ibid.
,
p. 238.

Next Start raises the charge that in making God and
nature static, he has made man static also. That is, if the es-
sential element in man is not the empirical but the timeless self,
he has created an "epistemological monstrosity". Following; Kant's
influence he has separated the synthetic consciousness form the
empirical stream, and made the former changeless or out of time
enti rely/
The next charge is directed against Green's -view of the
motives impelling men to action. In allowing the influence of
"animal wants" in determining motive, Sturt says he makes a con-
cesion to naturalism for which his theory has no consistent place
Again he is inconsistent with the doctrine of the change lessness
of the self, in making self-satisfaction, which reouires chancre,
the summum bonum .
Green's treatment of freedom next comes in for criticism
He gives, according to Sturt, a purely formal freedom, based on
the view that the human consciousness, as a reproduction of the
Eternal, is a source of relations and therefore not subject to
them, i.e., it stands outside the causal seauence of phenomena.
X
But Sturt says, "There is nothing satisfactory in such static-
epis temological formulae as that man is free 'in virtue of his
i ^
character as knowing', or as self-distinguishing, or as self-
5"
objectifying". He admits of course that Green believed in a free
Idola Theatri, p. ?A0 .
Ibid. p. 244.
Prolegomena, p. 85
Ibid.
, p. 92 f
.
Ibid.
,
p' 125.
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will, just as he did in theism, but mainta ins that he never found
an adeouate philosophic formula for it.
The arguments above noted constitute the body of Sturt's
objections to Green's intellectual ism, and are summarized by the
author as follows: The static intellectual ism of this metaphysic
prevents Green from giving a satisfactory account (a) of God as
intelligent and holy, (b) of the world as a sphere of moral action,
arid (c) of man fi) as son of God, (ii) as creature of change,
(iii) as stimulated to action, and (iv) as free.
However, this is not all that he has to say against
Green. The last fifteen pages of the chapter are devoted to ac-
cusations of subjectivism
,
with the evils ^hich follow from it.
He admits that Green in his ethics is not entirely sub jectivist ic,
but regards this element as inconsistent with the imoersonal sub-
jectivism of his metaphysics which he acouired from Hegel.
His first charge, in this new attack, is that Green is
strongly solipsistic in his treatment of perception. This he bases
upon Green's assertion that the object of thought has no existence
independent of consciousness. "He seems to pass from the proposi-
tion that objects can only exist f or consciousness to the Drooosi-
tion that objects can only exist in the consciousness.
The impersonal element also appears, according to Sturt,
in his doctrine of the Spiritual Principle in nature , • vfc Ich he
Prolegomena, pp. 66-76.
Idola Theatrl, pp. 246.

derived from Hegel with some modifications. "For Hegel nature is
real because part of God's mind; for Green nature is real because
present to God's mind".
The Spiritual Principle itself next comes in for criti-
cism. According to Sturt it does not establish either the objec-
tive reality of nature, or the s oiri tuality of nature. It does
not establish objective reality, he says, because the reality of
nature must be personally verified by each individual and by others
within his "universe of discourse", and "if Green had wished to
maintain that relations are, by reason of their presence to God's
mind, real for men, he should have proved that God can enter the
human universe of conversation: God must talk to and act upon
men after the .manner of the Old Testament".
Of Green's conception of the spirituality of nature,
Sturt says (with some justice) that to say that nature is consti-
tuted by spirit is not equivalent to saying that nature itself is
spirit. In this he regards Green's position as superior to Hegel's
for he (Green) did not try to make every object a part of God's
mind. But Amaking finite persons the reproductions of the eternal
consciousness, Green lacks the consistency of the Hegelian posi-
tion which regards the universe as homogenously spiritual through-
out. Green, he says, does nothing* more than re-establish the
old-fashioned "argument from design"; and he renders no assistance
'idola Theatri, p. 250.

to theism by a parallelism of finite and infinite which detracts
from the incomprehensible superiority of the world co nsciousne ss„
'
But Green's subjectivism is not confined to his meta-
physics; it appears likewise in his ethics. For moral action in
general is directed toward the attainment of some personal good,
the vicious man differing from the virtuous only "in supposing
that his good lies in such conduct as from man's nature cannot
n
possible lead, to the good". Sturt regards self-realization,
equally with egoistic hedonism, as beinfr a form of self-reerardi ng
ethic s.
Sturt' s final criticism deals even more specifically
with Green's self-realization, or self-satisfaction, theory as
he calls it. He maintains that this is inconsistent with Green's
own emphasis on objective interest, as it appears in his doctrine
of the common good. The third book of his ethics, though superior
to the theory on which it rests, Sturt regards as never being
fully reconciled with the subjectivist doctrine to which Green
adheres in form throughout.
Again, Sturt considers Green's insight superior to his
system in what he says of the moral nature of God. In arguing
that the moral relation of man to God is exactly parallel to the
intellectual relation. Green implies that the moral attributes of
God must be reproduced in, or at least parallel with, the moral
/
Idola Theatr i., p. 252.
A Ibid., p. 255.
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attributes of men. But if all moral activity is regarded as a
ouest for self-satisfaction, the element of love is there only
by accident. "If the divine virtue consists in perfect self-
satisfaction it cannot act as a stimulant to the moral aspiration
in man.
"
A final thrust is found in the charge that if the eter-
nal consciousness is reproduced in man, the divine self-satisfac-
tion must "be reproduced too, and this is impossible because
experience shows enjoyment to be the most incommunicable thing
in t he v;o rid,
Whether Sturt's article is to be considered a very
clever piece of sophistry or a discriminating detection of flaws
commonly overlooked depends largely on the point of view from which
we interpret Green's thought. Most of Sturt's charges, I feel,
are unjust to Green's intention and cannot be sustained with re-
ference to a synoptic view. Yet Green undoubtedly makes many
statements, inconsistent with his real intention, which afford a
basis for this severe arraignment.
Idola Theatri, p. 257.
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11. Haldar, Hiralal: "Green and his Critics". ^Mlosonhical Review
(3) 1894.
We have here a somewhat novel source of criticism, for
the author writes from Berhampur College, Bengal, and both the
name and the place indicate that he repre sents
A
Oriental view-
point. His main contention is the same as that of Seth and nu-
merous others, i.e. that Green has made a metaph7/sic out of Kant's
epistemology . But his solution differs somewhat in that he writes
from a Hegelian standpoint and claims that Green erred "by not fol-
lowing Hegel closely enough.
He noints out, first, that Green and the neo-Hegel ians
have done a real service to philosophy by showing the difference
between psychology and epist emology ; i.e. they have shown that
while psychology deals with the fact of knowledge and its growth
in the individual mind, epist emology deals with the possibility
of knowledge. The latter was Green's starting-point, as it was
Kant ' s
.
However, Haldar maintains that Kant's method of deter-
mining how experience is possible has only a negative value, for
while he has shown that the categories are necessary in inter-
pert ing the raw materials of sense, he has not shown "how two
such dissimilar elements as sense and understanding can combine
in order to produce knowledge". He asks "what mysterious power

is there in the understanding to transform the dark chaos of
sense into the beautiful cosmos of the world of our exoerience?"
Haldar charges against Green and the neo-Heg-elians in
general that they have failed to answer this ouestion. He says
that xvhile Green says in the Prolegomena that there is no hard
and fast distinction between sense and understanding, he never-
theless speaks re pea telly of fee li ngg being converted into felt
th i ngs by the relating activity of the self without anywhere
explaining how this is oossible.
Haldar's own answer to the c uestion is found in the
Hegelian ontology. He says, "If Idealism is to be a tenable theory
at all, it must endeavor to show that Reason underlies the objec-
tive world, not by imagining the self to direct its relating ac-
tivity upon a hypothetical manifold of sense, but by demonstrating
the fundamental laws of nature to be nothing but thought-forms
and categories of the mind". So Haldar thinks that if Green had
held to the Hegelian dialectic instead of regarding it as an aber-
ration (as stated in his review of Caird's Introduction to Phil -
z.
osophy to Religion ) he would have strengthened his position and
would have escaped the charge of subjectivism.
Green and his Critics, Phil. Rev. (3) 1894, p. 172.
lWorks, vol. iii, p. 143.
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12. Caldervaood, H. : "Another View of Green's Last fork? Mind (10) 1885
Professor Calderirood's article forms a seouel to the
series of articles in Mind by Caird ,Balfour, and Sidgwick, called
forth by the publication of the Pre le g-omena . He criticized it
from the standpoint of the Scottish philosophy and objects par-
ticularly to its Hegelian elements. In this respect, the stand-
point is quite the reverse of t he precedinr paper. It seems to
have been Green's fate to have satisfied neither the friends nor
the enemies of Hegel.
Calderwood makes the rather interest ins* observation
that while Green draws so largely upon Hegel in the Prolegomena
he does not once mention his name. The reason which CalderTOOd
ascribes is that Hegelian philosophy was falling into such dis-
repute that Green felt it would add no support to his system to
claim affinities with Hege lianism.
The main charge ^ich Oalderwood brings against Green
is that in attempting the unification of all things, he has
overlooked the demands of the moral life in order to favor an
intelle ctualistic conception. It is seldom that a philosopher
ventures to express an objection to "unification", for most of
them are ready to "unify" if they can do it in their o*m way.
But Calderwood says, "there is no escape from the duplex-aspect
I
of existence: dualism asserts itself: and Hegelianism is unable
to support its claims as a theory of existence". He bases this
argument, rather strangely, on the very same ground as that which
Haldar urges against Green in faro r of Hegelianism, i.e. the
disparate character of sense ant? understanding on the Xantian
hyDothesis. Calderwood syas, "All being said that can be said
concerning the josmos and the eternal spiritual principle which
'makes the world 1 , the sera rateness of the sensitive life and the
self-distinguishing life remains". Assuredly, in philosophy one
man's meat is another man's t>oisonJ
Calderwood continues his objections to unification in
his discussion of "the freedom of man as intelligence". Green
says, "In virtue of his character as knowing, man is a free cause 1
Calderwood maintains tha'„ this gives an inadeouate account of
man's relation both to nature and to God. For the mind which
knows is not the author of nature, any more than it is the author
of its own being; and furthermore unification with that Intel-
ligence which is above us, is no more possible than unification
with Nature which is beneath". At this point he expresses his
objections to the thoery of the reproduction of an eternal con-
sciousness on the ground that it is an attemnt "to make imperfec-
tion an expression of perfection; or in a not he r a sr>e ct , to in-
volve the Absolute in a struggle to express itself through
Another view of Green's Last Work, Mind tlO) 1885, p. 78.
^Ibld., p. 78.
'prolegomena, p. 90.
^Another View og Green's Last Work, Mlnu (10) 1685, p. 80.
1t
imperfect media".
But Cald erwood ' s most serious objection, from an ethical
standpoint, is directed against Green's account of freedom of the
will and obligation to do the right. Calderwood says that under
acdoctrine of t he unification of all things it is impossible to
reach a theory of moral obligation, for an injunction to conform
to the moral law is as unmeaning if man is a "reproduction of an
eternal consciousness", as it is if he is "simply a result of
natural forces"
Calderwood raises several objections to Green' s concep-
tion of motive. Briefly summarized, they are as follows: (1) In
defining motive as an end which a self-conscious being presents
to himself, moral distinctions are untouched, i.e. it is an ideal
without content. (2) To define motive as an ideal of personal
good is to confound self-real izine; with self-seekinr , and reduce
morality to self-interest. (3) Self-realization is not inclusive-
enough, for it overlooks the obvious fact that men do_ act from
motive other than their owi good. (4) Green fails to do justice
to the distinctive character of moral action by tending to iden-
tify it with intelligent action. Calderwood does little more
than to state these objections, and therefore leaves us largely
to imagine the grounds on which he would defend them.
^Another View of Green's Last Work, Mind (10) 1885, p. 80.

13. Hodgson, Richard: "Green as A Critic"; Contemporary P.eview
(38) 1880.
This is one of a series of polemic articles between
Green and Spencer, the author in this case defending Spencer
against Green's criticism of him as expressed in The Contemporary
Review , December 1877 and March 1878. He claims that Green's
criticism is vitiated both by ignorance of the contents of
Spencer's work (Principles of Psychology) and also by gross mis-
interpretation of it. Hodgson attempts with more vigor than
clearness to defend Spencer.
The point about which the argument centers is the real-
ity of the external world. Green says that Spencer "ascribes to
the object, which is in truth nothing without the subject, an
independent reality, and then supposes it gradually to produce
certain dualities in the subject, of which the existence is in
truth necessary to the oossibil ity . of those qualities in the
object which are supposed to produce them". This Hode-son says
is a misrenresentat ion of Spencer's Transfigured Realism, and
appears to class him wi th Berkeley, to whose position Spencer
was strenuously opposed. Hodgson says in defence of Spencer, "I
venture to say that by no writer has the existence of an external
reality apart from perception been insisted on with greater rigour
than by Mr. Spencer". This is exactly what Green says Spencer has
Green as a Critic, Contemporary Review (36) 1880, p 4 901.
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done, and objects to his having done. "But so scornful is Hodgson
of Green's position, that he says he is "trying to clamber from
the earth to the moon unon not hing" land them having arrived there
has "dragged the earth out of existence with a roper
This is typical of Hodgson's criticisms, which do mot
seem to me to be worth considering in detail. One other ooint
however is of seme i-nportance. He says Spencer "repeatedly noints
out how different is the ground of onr belief in the external
world from an account of the genesis of that belief; but this
difference Professor Green has been unable to see, and his whole
a.
discussion from this aspect is therefore futile". In this there
is a point of some validity, for Green undoubtedly confuses meta-
physics with epist emology , and gives an undue emphasis to origins.
However, Hodgson's defense of Spencer is not a great improvement
over Green's view, for he argues for realism on the basis of
Spencer's statement that realism "is established as a datum long
before reasoning begins, and immeasurably transcends reasoning in
certainty". On such a basis, any deliverance of the spontaneous
consciousness would necessarily be true.
Hodgson poi its out in co nclusion that "a very large por-
tion of Professor Green's second article consists in the assertion,
against Mr. Spencer, c: doctrines which Mr. Spencer has himself
elaborated at length" and on this basis he assumes that Green must
have criticized without having read.
f 3reen as a Critic, Contemporary Review (38) 1880, p. 902.
*Ibid., p. 907.

14. Spencer, Herbert: "Professor Green's Explanations",
Contemporary Review (39) 1881.
When Hodgson's article vras published, Green was con-
siderably disturbed by it, and though he rarely resorted to
polemic in his own defense he did so on this occasion. The sub-
stance of his challenge to Spencer is expressed in the words, "I
call in Question Mr. Spencer's whole theory of the origin of in-
telligent consciousness as arising ultimately from the operation
of the object, unknown in itself, unon a subject to which it stands
in this relation of independence and externality". Green denies
the a priori necessity of holding to realism, arr< with regard to
Berkeleianism in Spencer, Green says that if he really thought
Spencer held Berkeley's position the whole point of his charge
would be P-one. But he practically admits the charge of having
criticized Spencer without having read his works thoroughly, for
he says, "To trace this inconsistency soon became a wearisome
task".
The final word in the controversy appears when Spencer
himself decides to take a hand and straighten matters out. He,
like Hodgson, maintains that Green has grossly misrepresented him.
He proceeds however on a somewhat different strain by
bringing in the problem of evolution, which he regards as destruc-
tive of idealism. He says that since the^e must have been matter

on the planet prior to conscious life, the proposition that
matter is a form of consciousness is overthrown, and with it
Professor Green's idea that the object can exi srt only by corre-
lation with the subject.
Spencer ouotes what he considers another fundamental
misconception in Green, "We should be sorry to believe that Mr.
Spencer and Mr, Lewes regard the relation between consciousness
and the vrorld as corresponding to that between two bodies, of
which one is inside the other". This, Spencer says, is precisely
what he does believe, and he thinks Green could not have read
him very intelligently without finding out that he believed it.
He says Parts II- IV of his "Principles of Psychology" are occu-
pied with tracing out mental evolution "as a result of converse
between organism and environment", and Part V "presupposes from
moment to moment a surrounding world and an included organism",
so that it is strange Green should think he had abandoned this
position in his conclusions.
I shall not attempt to he the arbiter in the ouarrel,
for both Green and Spencer seem to be using: the term "origin of
consciousness" in an ambiguous sense. It is used sometimes to
refer to the causal origin of our conscious states from some
external stimulus, and sometimes to the temporal orip-in of human
consciousness in the evolutionary development of primitive man.

Green fin these articles) seeks chiefly to refute the former,
while Spencer tries to answer him on the "basis of the latter.
Both have confused a "biological with an er>ist emolosrical nroblem,
and then in turn have confused enist emolop-y with metaphysics.
15. Johnson, R.3.C.: The Metaphysics of Knowledge , An Examination
of Green ' s The cry of Reality. (Princeton
Gontritutions to Philosophy, Vol.1 No. 3, 1900)
Johnson, in this treatise which was written as his
doctor's dissertation at Princeton, makes a very thorough study
of Green's epistemolosy and its relation to his metaohysics. Un-
like most of Green's critics, he shows a thorough familiarity with
the epistemological and metaphysical material in Green's entire
works, as well as that in the Pro legomena .
Johnson gives an excellent discussion of Spencer's phil-
osophy in its relation to that of Green. He sfeows that Spencer's
chief error lies in the fact that he assumes an order of nature,
and then by "hereditary transmission" thinks he has accounted for
it. Thus he falls into a fatal confusion between subject and
object (an epistemological consideration), and mind and matter
(a metaohysical consideration). Green, according to Johnson's
intemre tation, avoids this d ifficulty by nointinf? out that mind
and matter are not eruivalent to subject and object, for subject
and object are correlative factors of everything as known/
'Works, vol. ii, Pp. 181-182.
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Spencer ascribes to the object an indeoendent reality and then
supposes it to produce the subject, but idealism, since the time
of Kant, has regarded them as correlated aspects of the knowing
process, so that matter as known involves the s ubject ^object
relation but matter itself does not.
Johnson likewise discusses and defends Green's attitude
toward the ordinary common sense assumption of a world external
to consciousness, which at bottom does not differ from Soencer's
"transfigured realism". While no philosopher ouestions the reality
of the external world (as some have charged Green with doing),
there is a vast difference of oninion as to how we shall interpret
it. Confusion commonly arises from thinking the relation of thought
to its object the same as the relation of the externality of one
material thing to another in the world of snace. It is assumed
that space relations exist independent of consciousness, when con-
sciousness is itself the very condition of there being any such
relation as space. To the objection {raised by Spencer) that
Green's idealism is opposed to the scientific fact of the world's
existence before the appearance of thinking beings, Johnson re-
plies that since reason did not begin with our sentient human
life, the objection is not valid/
He assumes also the objedtion, raised by "Balfour, that
Green's theory is solipsistic. He says that there is no solipsism
'works, vol i, pp. 387, 388.
x Ibid., p 376.
3 Prolegomena
,
p 38.

in Green "because he does not make experience consist of relations
to an isolated subject. The very incompleteness of our finite
experience (as in error and illusion) drives us t o an ideal of
a wider experience in which contradictions are harmonized. Since
even our srroup experience is fragmentary and niecemeal, the only
unity is in God. Since it is meaningless to oredicate the exis-
tence of the world except as the object of thought, we can find
in our limited finite consciousness an argument for the existence
of a complete, eternal consciousness; and when we say "In Him we
live and move and have our being", we are not uttering pious
mysticism but a presupposition of life itself.
Johnson attempts to answer also the objection raised
by Seth that Green has given a hypostasized abstraction of Xant T s
synthetic unity of apperception. Johnson maintains that Green
has improved upon Kant by transforming his abstract formal unity
into something metaphysically real,, i.e. the absolute self. He
shows with considerable cogency, that this is not only Dossible
but logically necessary, if there is no "ding art sich". As
Hoyce maintains, Kant's distinction between mere subjective
personality and the ob jektivEinhoi t des ^ ewus stse ins
pointed logically to "the further universalizing of this human
self-hood Into the world-self of objective idealism - the highest
tl 3
and deepest result of all modern nh.ilosonhy".
In his last chapter, Johnson develops at considerable
' Supra, p. '
o-Works, vol ii, pp. 23,24.
3 i-he Spirit of Modern philosoyhy, p. 487.

length this idea that if we reject the "dinf? an sich" we must
believe that the ultimate reality is personal and spiritual.
Otherwise, he says, the assertion of the unity of the world of
our experience only transfers that world to a larger chaos. V/ith-
out the "ding an sich", we no longer have the distinction between
the self as a formal unity and as an ont oloerical reality, and if
any unity persists, it must be metaphysical and personal. But
the conditions of the real world all Imply some synthetic action
of consciousness, establishing relations and giving unity. The
world is an inter-related, whole because related throughout to a
single subject. The "ding ai\ sich" leads to scepticism, but if
we give this up, the next sten is t o assert the existence of a
(
Universal Thinker as the only absolute reality.
Johnson's treatment on the whole is thorough and con-
clusive, The chief objection to be brought against it is that
he tends to minimize the extent to which Green confused eoistem-
ology with metaphysics. While he admits that the incomnleteness
of Green's account of thought relations is his chief weakness,
he does not regard this as a serious error. He ouotes passages
to show that Green did not put all relations on the same level
(as has been charged) but distinguished between the relations of
objects to each other, and their relation to consciousness. while
such distinctions can undoubtedly be found, Johnson attributes to
Green a greater consistency than is characteristic of the latter's
writings.
f
Works, vol.U) P» 32.
u Prole3omena, pp 30, 54-56.
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16. Brett, S.S., Article on Green in Hastings' jngj^clogedia of
Religion and ethics (Scribners, New York, 1914)
This article by "Brett is very fair and very thorough
in its presentation of the points of strength and weakness in
Green's Dosition. He is one of the very few who have evaluated
Green's work without undue hostility or adulation.
"Brett introduces an excellent cornoarison of Green and
Mill. He regards Mill as typical of English, Green of German
thought, and says that from this German influence arose Green's
hostility to the English empiricism which Mill adopted. They
differed also, "Brett says, in the fact that Green's central
position was religious while Mill's was not. Green w s more
academic and studious, while Mill appealed more to those inter-
ested in social progress. But the antagonism between Mill and
Green has often been exaggerated, he says, because Mill incorpor-
ated a large element of Kantian morality in his system, and Green
on the other hand defended largely on Utilitarianism to supnly
the content for his theory of absolute ends.
Of the relation of Green's metaohysics to the rest of
his philosophy, Brett says that Green like Xant was seeking a
metanhj- si ca.1 basis for God freedom and. immortality, and accord-
ingly his metaphysics Frew out of the demands of reliFion and
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ethics. The general relation of. his metaphysics to his ethics
is found . in the fact that if there is no self capable of origin-
ating action, there is no rosponsihilit y and no morality, his-
torically, the influence of Locke and Hume gave rise to Deism
and infidelity, for man refuses to regard himself as the creature
of circumstances, and either rises above or sinks below this view.
There is accordingly a real relation bet'-een ethics and epistem-
ology, for if sensations that are pleasing, tempting, etc. come
wholly from without and are not the work of the mind, man is a
victim of circumstances; but if pleasures and pains can be taken
into t he s elf , there is then a chance for self-determination and
self-realization.
Brett classifies Green's theory of the self under three
heads: 1) The self must be unitary, since reason and desire, if
so related as to be di stingui shed , . must be contained in a higher
unity which is their real identity. 2) The self must be contin-
uous in ti &e yet not static; therefore evolution is not a seouence
of disconnected stated resulting from changes in environment,
but an evolution of spirit deoendinr on the activity of a self-
determining apent . 3) Green tries to prove that this soiritual
evolution, or personal self-realization, necessarily imnlies a
similar universal evolution; so that the develooment of the moral
ideal means a process in which humanity as a whole realizes its

universal "self". Brett objects to this last point on the score
that while Green gave a spiritual view of the individual and
society, he had no adeouate basis for claiming that there is
beyond the unity of the individual self "a universe of rational
bei.ip-s which also becomes one in a higher unity". Accordingly,
he thinks Green falls into a mysticism and nantheism hostile to
ethical theory, for if man is the vehicle of the Divine Conscious
ness his self-realization is not nersonal, while if his oersonal
nature is emphasized the will to be evil is a contradiction of
the Divine Will*
Brett is fair enough, however, to recognize the value
of this theory. He says Green reinterDreted and combined the
Platonic and Hegelian views, showing that man is not an isolated
being but that personalities ar? like nuclei in a network of re-
lations. Both in man and society, the whole comes before the
parts. So the will of God is above all, yet realized only in
individual wills, and this makes the essence of religion consist
of cooperation with God.
Regarding Green's religious philosophy per se
,
Brett
stresses the idea that men has in himself a witness to God, for
the life of thought gives a perpetual revelation of infinite
possibilities. Faith then means an immediate consciousness of
potential unity with God, i.e. an inner exnerience. not an

acceptance of proofs or arguments.
Brett regards Green's political philosophy as the most
concrete part of his thought, hecau.se here he comes closest to
the daily life of people. His mysticism here, Brett says, is not
so abstruse as in his religious philosophy, and he holds to
personality more consistently here than in his metaphysics. We
have ae-ain the suggestion of a "universal self" embodied in
society, for (according to Brett) Green reverenced institutions
because they represent the social consciousness and so have uni-
versal significance. Brett somewhat misconstrues Green's meaning,
I think, in identifying the Universal Consciousness with the
social will, but his evaluation on the whole is excel]© nt.
17. Rogers, A. K. : Engl ish and American Philosophy Since 1800
(Macmillan, London, 1922).
This work, like the preceding, consists of an exposition
of Green's philesophy combined with a good deal of penetrating
analysis. The author calls Green's work "the most powerful
single influence in securing to Absolute Idealism the position,
which it continued to hold until into the twentieth century, of
an almost official philosophy in England and America" . Yet on
the whole Rogers himself is unfavorable to Green's position and
direct., a good deal of adverse criticism against it.
English and American Philesophy Since 1800, p. 220

acceptance of proofs o r a rgument s.
Brett regards Green's political philosophy as the most
concrete part of his thought, because here he cones closest to
the daily life of oeople. His mrsticism here, Brett says, is not
so abstruse as in his religious philosophy, and he holds to
personality more consistently here than in his metaphysics. We
have ae-ain the suggestion of a "universal self" embodied in
society, for (according to Brett) Green reverenced institutions
because they represent the social consciousness and so have uni-
versal significance. Brett somewhat misconstrues Green's meaning,
I think, in identifying the Universal Consciousness with the
social will, but his evaluation on the whole is excellent.
17. Rogers, A. K. : English and American Philosophy Since 1600
(Macmillan, London, 1922).
This work, like the preceding, consists of an exposition
of Green's philosophy combined with a good deal of penetrating
analysis. The author calls Green's work "the most powerful
single influence in securing to Absolute Idealism the position,
which it continued to hold mntil into the twentieth century, of
an almost official philosophy in England and America" . Yet on
the whole Rogers himself is unfavorable to Green's position and
directs a jood deal of adverse criticism a^ain„t it.
English and American Philosophy Since 1800, p. 220

His main, objection, whicn we have already frequently met, is that
Green confuses a logical with a metaphysical unity. He says
Green fails to distinguish between reality as inte lligence
. or a
rational self, and reality as intelligible , or rational, and then
attempts to proceed from the latter to the former by an ambiguous
shifting of terms.' Accordingly, while Green attempts to use the
unity of the empirical self as a mediating term between the chaos
of mere feelings and the timeless unity of pure knowledge, the
apparent validity of hio argument depends on Lis refusal to see
any distinction between the experienced unity of hura^n life and
the logical unity ofl a system of thought.
While Rogers devoted most of his attention to metaphysical
difficulties similar to those previously discussed, he also enters
some protests against Green s ethics. He says that Green s conception
of moral goodness as an all-embrscing end either leads to inertia
or affords a challenge to activity. But while the latter accords
with Green's intention, the moral ideal
,
Rogers says, loses
its power as an actual stimulus through its unattainableness
and its vagueness. Its tends to take attention away from the
realization of concrete values, and becomes "sentimentalized .
Rogers objects further that enen if the moral ideal be
conceded to offer motivation, it does not constitute an actual
sourcs of guidance. No empirical principle is given except the
accepte- teachings and practice of the past, and thus conduct
English and American Philosophy Since 1800,- p. 227.
2 Ibid., p. 244.

8 7
instead of looking forward to an ideal is actually made dependent
on the principles of conventional morality. If we appeal to
individual insight in the interpretation of these principles,
we have a method no more objective than in a»\ appeal to the
Scriptures where the right of private judgment is exercised in
t
their interpretation. Rogers tend to minimize the significance
of Green's view that the experiences of actual life and the application
of reason to each concrete situation will largely supply the
guidance which is needed.
English and American Philosophy Since 1800, pp, 246, 247.
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D. Works Liainly Ethical .
1, Sidgwick, Henry: Lectures on the Ethics of Green
.
Spencer and liartineau . (Macmillan, London, 1902).
This work consists of a posthumous collection of lectures
and gives a penetrating analysis of the views of the philosophers
mentioned in the title. Sidgwick's position here is not materially
different from that expressed in his metaphysical art: jles which
t
we have previously discussed, "but he endeavors here to point out
the flaws in Green's system from a more distinctly ethical stand-
point.
Sidgwick's first objection deals with Green's metaphysics.
He maintains that Green's idea of a spiritual principle which binds
together nature in an "all-inclusive, unalterable system of rela-
tions" and reproduces itself in man, is not properly proven because
Green passes from analogy with human consciousness to affirmation
of identical quality in the divine. Passing over the objection
that the unity of human consciousness is destroyed by being divi-
ded between a Divine Eternal Mind out of time and an animal organ-
ism in time, he grants that such an eternal consciousness may
exist. But even so, he says, it is ethically barren, for it is a
purely intellectual conception and can not furnish an Ideal of
holiness" or of an "infinitely and perfectly good will".
^Supra, p. ? fa
Ethics of Green, Spencer and Martineau, pp. 8-14.
»
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Sidgwick' s next objection is directed against Green's
idea of freedom, which he says is really only thinly disguised
determinism, for Green, like other libertarians, tries to "run
With the hare and hunt with the hounds". He seizes upon Green's
admission that the choice of the motive which constitutes one's
idea of personal good is affected by his character, which in turn
depends upon his past experience and is therefore, according to
Sidgwick, determined solely by natural causation. While Green
explains that determinism is avoided by the fact that both present
and past choices depend upon the free action of a self-conscious
subject who thus builds his own character* Sidgwick rives no cre-
dence to this explanation. He also charges Green with ignoring
willful choice of evil in making "the idea of personal good" the
x,
motive of action.
The next point of attack is the unsatisfactoriness of
Green's conception of the moral Ideal. From the fact that human
desires originate (at least in part) from animal wants, Sidgwick
thinks that the latter should not be disregarded in the ideal;
but on the contrary Green states that the true good is complete
self-realization, or the abiding staisfaction of an abiding self.
This, Sidgwick says, is either equivalent to hedonism (with an
emphasis on permanent pleasures) or else it is inconsistent and
ambiguous. For complete self-satisfcction is never attainable
'Ethics of Green, Spencer and Martineau, pp. 17-20.
'Ibid. p. 24.

even by the most virtuous, and partial self-satisfaction may "be
found in vicious as '.veil as in virtuous action.
Closely allied with this point is Sidgwick' s objection
to Green's treatment of personal immortality, or, as he puts it,
the use of "theological notions" as the basis of a philosophy of
practice. According to Green's theory the ideal of perfection or
complete self-realization of capabilities, with an abiding satis-
faction in such attainment, is possible only on condition of
personal existence after death. Sidgwick objects to this postu-
late, and maintains furthermore that Green's theory gives no
adequate basis for such a belief. He says Green's statements
point only to the view, (1) that the personal self-con3cious
being which comes from God is forever continued in God ; or else
(2) that it is continued in a society which carries forward the
a.
movement toward perfection.
This brings us to another objection, i.e., that Green
confuses the good of self with the good of society. Sidgwick main-
tains that the 'essential sociality of man" furnishes no reason why
one man should sacrifice his own good for the good of others, and
he challenges Green 's statement that "egoism and self-sacrifice
3
will be when duly enlightened two roads to the same goal.
In this connection we must note that Sidgwick charges
Green with having confused two incompatible conceptions of human
good: (1) moral activity directed toward complete self-iBalizat ion
/
Ethics of Green, Spencer and nartineau, pp. 37-42.
''"Ibid, pp 40-56.
3 Ibid, pp: 56-59.

even by the most virtuous, and partial self-satisfaction may be
found in vicious as well as in virtuous action.
Closely allied with this point is Sidgwick's objection
to Green 1 s treatment of personal immortality, or, as he puts it,
the use of "theological notions" as the basis of a philosophy of
practice. According to Green's theory the ideal of perfection or
complete self-realization of capabilities, with an abiding satis-
faction in such attainment, is possible only on condition of
personal existence after death. Sidgwick object* to this postu-
late, and maintains furthermore that Green's theory gives no
adecuate basis for such a belief. He says Green's statements
point only to the view, (1) that the personal self-conscious
being which comes from God is forever continued in God ; or else
(2) that it is continued in a society which carries forward the
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movement toward perfection.
This brings us to another objection, i.e., that Green
confuses the good of self with the good of society. Sidgwick main
tains that the 'fessential sociality of man" furnishes no reason why
one man should sacrifice his own good for the good of others, and
he challenges Green 's statement that "egoism and self-sacrifice
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will be when duly enlightened two roads to the same goal"*
In this connection we must note that Sidgwick charges
Green with having confused two incompatible conceptions of human
good: (1) moral activity directed toward complete, self-asalizat ion
/
Ethics of Green, Spencer and nartineau, pp. 37-42.
''"Ibid, pp 40-56.
3 Ibid, pp: 56-59.

or perfection, including artistic and scientific development; and
(2) moral activity as limited to virtue proper. This confusion,
he says, makes it unclear whether the true good is competitive or
non-competitive, whether egoistic or social.
In the chapters on Green's treatment of hedonism,
Sidgwick attempts to answer numerous charges brought by Green
against his own theories. Some, he says, are due to a serious
misunderstanding of his distinction between the desirable and the
desired. To* Green's charge that "the greatest possible sum of plea-
sures is intrinsically umixe^n ing'' , he answers that the lack of a
definite standard of measurement is no objection to hedonism, for
it is always possible to judge a pleasure as : ere or less than another
under given circumstances. To the objection that utilitarianism is
not conducive to virtue, Sidgwick replies that Green has not proved
perfectionism to be any more so.
Sidgwick 1 s conclusion is that Green's ethical theory
affords no practical basis on which a system of auties can be worked
out. He grants that the Prolegomena contains much instructive des-
cription and discussion of the general attitude to be taken toward
practical problems, but affords no cogently-reasoned solution of any
of these problems.
Ethics of Green, Spencer and Martineau, pp. 65-71.
Ibid.
, pi , 110-113.
i
2. Rashdall, Hastings: Trie Theory of Good and Evil . (Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1907).
Rashdall at various intervals gives quite an extensive
discussion of Green's ethics, most of which consists of adverse
criticism. This is the more surprising in view of the fact that
Rashdall 's own view, in its general outlines, does not differ very
widely from that of Green. But while Rashdall claims, t iiL.t he does
not himself hold to psychological hedonism or hedonistic utilitari-
anism, he tal.es considerable pains to show that Green has not
properly refuted either.
The most serious charges which he brings against Green
are as follows: (1) Green's contention that "the greatest possible
sum of pleasures" is meaningless, is a mistaken view: (2) Green's
self-realization theory is not altruistic, but egoistic: (3) Green
is wrong in maintaining that pleasure can not be attained by the
pursuit of pleasure: (4) Gr ten's theory of the "timeless self" pro-
vides no proper connection with the self in time with which ethics
is concerned.
Rashdall' s own view makes the summum bonum "the greatest
/
quantity of good cn the whole for all mankind", and this good is
defined not as virtue alone, ncr as pleasure alone, but as a com-
bination of both. Thus while not a hedonist per 3e , he defends the
hedonistic calculus, and maintains that both virtue and pleasure
The Theory of Good and Evil, vol ii, p. 1.

are capable of quantitative comparison. His chief object of attack
upon Green is directed against Green's statement that the suirimum
bonum can not be a greatest possible sum of pleasures, since the
latter is intrinsically unmeaning,
Rashdall answers this objection by showing that, as Green
himself admits, pleasures are capable of being measured in the sense
that one pleasure is preferred to another because of its greater
intensity or greater duration. Even though these quantities of
pleasure may not be reduced to numerical terms, they are neve rthe
-
/
I068 "summed" (and Rashdall believes that they can be measured numer-
ically). In regard to Green's argument that pleasure is an inad-
equate end because it is an ever-receding goal, Rashdall interprets
Green to mean simply that the summum bonum nan no 4- be something
which can not be enjoyed all at once. He says that this objection
could be urged with equal force against virtue, for neither can the
virtues be practiced all at once.
Rashdall' s second charge is a still more serious one, for
he claims that self-realization is in reality both egoistic and he-
3
donistic. He calls it an "ambiguous mysterious term" which acts as
a cloak for a refined hedoin ... His particular point of attack is
Green* s use of the term "common good". He regards Green's view of
the compatibility between good for self and good for others as
being •ithar fallacious or unmeaning, nor there are plenty of cases,
The Theory of Good and Evil, vol. ii. d. 5.
Ibid.
, p. 15.
J Ibid.
,
p. 69.

even among the higher -~oods, in which one man's enjoyment of the
good involves another man's loss. But if on the other hand we
attempt to reconcile self-realization and self-sacrifice by making
the pood will the only good, (as Green tends to do) then the same
objection may be raised which Green raised against Kant, i.e., that
the good will is robbed of its content.
A third objection, to which Rashdall does not devote
much attention, is directed against the view of Green and most anti-
hedonists, that the pursuit of pleasure does not lead to pleasure.
Rashdall admits that this is true in some instances, but says that
since it is not universally or even commonly true, it can not be
urged as a valid objection against hedonism. Most people who plan on
having a good time succeed in getting it, and the pleasures for which
we work hardest are those we enjoy most.
A fourth (and more valid) objection, is based on meta-
physical grounds. Rashdall tays that there is a logical hiatus
between Green's ethical system and the metaphysical system with
which he sought to connect it. If the temporal self which is active
in morality is identical with the "spiritual principle not in time"
which is implied by all our knowledge, and if this in turn is iden-
tified with a Universal Consciousness, the self loses the power of
free causalty which ethics demands. If it is the Universal Self
which acts in man, either his actions must all be good or we must
The Theory of Good and Evil, vol. ii, p. 204.

impute evil to the Infinite. Green's view is termed by Hashdall
"a vague but stimulating mysticism".
5. Taylor, A*E • : The Problem of Conduct (Macmillan, London, 1901).
The grohlfin ci" Conduct whose subtitle is "A Stud-: in
the Phenomenology of Ethics", was originally written in competition
for the prize in Moral Philosophy established "by Green at Oxford.
This is significant in view of the fact that Taylor devotes an entire
chapter to demolishing the metaphysical structure on which Green
rests his ethics. Taylor professes to have great admiration for
Green's account of moral institutions as found in the latter part
of the Prolegomena, but thinks he is rendering a real service to
Green's memory in dissociating this section from its untenable meta-
x
physical assumptions.
a
Taylor's main contention is that ethics is not ^normative
but an empirical science. He maintains that Green has reversed the
correct order in making metaphysics the beginning of his ethics, fox
the relation "between them ( if there be any) is rather that ethics
furnishes important empirical data regarding one aspect of experience
which metaphysics must interpret. Accordingly he rejects Booh I of
the Prolegomena and attempts at some length to show (1) that there
is no such thing as the Eternal Self, in Green's use of the term;
and (z) that if there were such an Eternal Self it would have no
The Theory of Good and Evil, vol ii, p. 205.
The Problem of conduct, pp 12, 59.

ethical value.
In defei se of the empirical character of ethics he
maintains , first of all, that there is no essential difference except
in degree between the so-called normative sciences and the physical
sciences, for the former must rest upon a scientific inquiry into
facts and the latter contain also a normative element. "If ethics
tells us how we ought to act, and aesthetics what we ought to admire,
and logic how we ought to reason, histology, for instance, tells us
what we ought to see under the microscope." On the other hand, no
science can say what ought to he without a previous investigation
3
.
into what is
.
Turning more specifically to Green's ethics, he quotes
Green' s. statement "It is ohvious that to a "being who is simply a
result of natural forces, an. in j unet ion to conform to their laws
is unmeaning". Taylor maintains that "this is not onlj not ohvious,
but is untrue, since a growth of man's aspirations from animal or-
igins does not interfere with their reality or significance. "The
primary question for ethics is after all not how we came by our
ideals, but what they are".
Taylor attacks also Green's argument from the possibility
of moral progress in which he maintains that we can t^-C^e no state
to be "better" than another except by reference to an ideal "best".
He says that here again Green reverses the real order of thought,
for in our everyday conduct when we are not reflecting on problems
The Problem of Conduct, p. 65.
^Ibid., p. 54.
3 Ibid. p. 56.
'.Prolegomena
, p. 9.
^The Problem of Conduct, p. 61.

of philosophy "we are not ordinarily haunted by the idea oi an ul-
timate best" but we sinrplj choose the course which seems preferable
_.::iong several alternatives. So it is in reality the empirical
"better" rather than the metaphysical "best" which dominates our
moral activity and furnishes the subject-matter of ethics,
Taylor's principal charge, however, is directed against
Green's idee* of the Eternal Self as the metaphysical prerequisite of
his ethics. In order to prove the contention that there is no such
Eternal Self, he seems somewhat to distort Green's meaning. He rep-
resents Green as assuming that if the self has an evolutionary
origin, it is purely a physical product to v.hich only material con-
cepts are applicable, and to escape this conclusion the idea of the
Eternal Self must be introduced. Taylor, on the other hand, believes
that empirical psychology is valid, without any such Eternal Self,
: if the self is regarded as a psychical rather than a physical devel-
opment. In this, Taylor states the truth but not the whole truth, for
he see is to overlook Green's admission that man's psychic organism
a,
may have developed, phenomenally, from animal origins.
Taylor objects also to Green's assertion of the eternal
or timeless character of the self on the score that the actual self
• which we know is not only not timeless, but is not even permanent
within the range of our experience. "Self-identity", he sa,/S, "is
3
in fact altogether a matter of degree", for the psychic content is
so different in babyhood a.nd maturity that we are scarcely justified
^The Problem of Conduct, p. 63.
Prolegomena, pp. 94-96.3 The Problem of Conduct, p. 74.
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in assuming a permanent selfhood. Since the self is not timeless,
"but only relatively permanent in time , the Eternal Self, if such
exists, stands outside the circle of our conscious activity, and is
only a hypostasised abstraction of the subject-object relationship
t
involved in the knowing process,
Taylor does not rest with having reduced the Eternal
Self to an epistemological relationship, as many of Green 1 s critics
have done, "but he goes farther and even impugns the validity of this
relationship. He says, "We seem justified in denying that the sub-
ject-object relation is a primary and ii.dispensable form of human
experience". He justifies this belief by what seems a flimsy ar-
gument, i.e. that in the pre-natal and early infancy period there
is probably a form of experience without objects.
Having thus disposed of the eternal self to his own sat-
isfaction, Taylor says further, "If the eternal self exists, it is
yet positively useless and out of place in a theory of ethics, " It
is disconnected from the empirical wants and aspirations v/ith which
ethics has to deal, for if it is changeless it can have nothing to
do v/ith a changing order of human affairs, and if it is timeless it
must stand outside the time-processes by which we get our satisfac-
tions and reach our ideals.
Taylor's parting shot at the idea of the Eternal Self
ia found in his scornful comment on the advice, "Realise thine
i
^The Problem of Conduct, p. -75.
Ibid., pp. 76-78.
Ibid., p. 81.

Eternal Self". He says that to most men "Be yourself" means some-
thing because they know empirically what the self is, but "this self
that is hut the abstract ion of the subject-object relation is shad-
owy and formless as the moonlight reflection of a ghost; it is real-
ised as much in one mode of action as in another, as real in crime
as in heroism, In indolence as in strenuous industry."
Thus v/e find Taylor objecting'to Green's metaphysical
basis of ethics for these reasons: (l) ethics is not a normative
but an empirical science: (2) it has an evolutionary not a meta-
physical basis; (3) moral progress requires no ultimate standard;
(4) the Eternal Self is psychologically unnecessary; (5) if time-
less, it can not be an aspect of our temporal experience; (6) it
is simply a hypostasized abstraction of the subject-object relation,
which in turn is not wholly valid; (7) even if the Eternal Self
exists, a timeless self is ethically useless; (8) as a moral stimu-
lus it is an idea l ithout content,
4. Dewey, John: " Green's Theory of the Lloral Liotive"
.. Philosophical
Review (1) 1892.
In this article Dewey carries out somewhat the criticism
made by Caird regarding the negative character of the self and the
ideal. His attack however is more particularly directed against
the unsatisfactoriness of Green's conception of the ideal, and he
maintains the somewhat surprising position that Green so contradicts
The Problem of Conduct, p. 82.

himself as to make morality absolutely impossible. "Ho thorough-
going theory of total depravity", he says, "ever made righteousness
more impossible to the natural man than Green makes it to a human
being by the very constitution of his being."
Dewey prefaces his remarks on Green with a discussion
of ethical theory in its relation to individual conduct. "Ethical
theory", he says, "must be a general statement of the reality involved
in every moral situation. It must be action stated in terms so
generic that every individual action will fall within the outlines
a.
it sets forth". On this basis, he maintains that Green's theory is
not metaphysical in the true sense of being a guide to actual con-
duct, but in the false sense of being remote from contact with
3
actual experience.
The process by which Dewey arrives at the abstractness
and contradictoriness of Green's theory is by comparison with Kant.
Kant, he says, introduced a dualism by separating the self as reason
from the self as want or desire. Green, he says, has a similar
dualism in separating the end which would satisfy the self as a
unity or whole from that which satisfies^in particular cases of
actual conduct. This is based on Green's view that the ideal is
never fully realized in any particular act, and according to lewey
the opposition is even more distinct than in the dualism of Kant, for
there is no intrinsic impossibility of a harmony between reason and
^Green's Theory of the Moral Motive, Phi l. Rev . U) 1892, p. 598.
?
Ibid, p 596.
3 Ibid., p. 597.

will, while in Green's conception the theory itself makes it ante-
cedently impossible that the ideal should ever be attained.
Green's theory of the moral motive, as interpreted by
Dewey, means that the self, in becoming conscious of a want, otjec-
tifies that want by setting it over against itself. Such a theory,
he says, could be developed in either of two ways: (l) particular
wants and desires may be regarded as the content by which the self
"relieves itself of its abstractness, its . undeveloped character,
and assumes concrete existence"; or (2) the self may distinguish
itself from its particular wants and desires. The former, according
to Dewey, is metaphysical, but Green did not follov/ it: the latter
falls into the hopeless antithesis above indicated.
Dewey bulwarks his position with Green's admission, "Of
a life of complete development, of activity with the end attained,
we can only speak or think in negatives." Such a negative concep-
tion of the ideal, Dewey sa;s, relapses into a thorough-going
ascetism, for instead of pointing the way to the ideal it "condemns
3
to insufficiency every concrete step towards reaching the ideal".
It is an idea which cannot be used ( and therefore according to the
pragmatic standard untrue) • It contains furthermore the logical
fallacy of an undetermined infinite negative.
Dewey then discusses the three ways in which Green has
tried to give concrete content to the moral ideal and shows that
'Green's Theory of the Moral Motive, Phi l. Rev. (1) 1892, p. 599.
''Prolegomena, p. 180.
J GreenT s Theory of the Moral Motive, Phil. Rev . (1) 1892, p. 600.
H Ibid., p. 605.
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each attempt is unsatisfactory because of the inadequacy of the
foundation on which it rests. These three v/c.. s are (l) the cate-
gorical imperative; (2) moral progress; and (3) the existence of
permanent institutions.
The categorical imperative, Pewey says, is inadequate
because instead of telling us what to do, it simply tells us that
we ought to do something; and then Green's theory tells us that
whatever we do we can not obtain our objective. Rigidly applied
Dewey says that this would lead either to complete recklessness of
conduct or to pessimism.
With the idea of moral progress, trie case does not stand
very much better, for the mere idea that there is_ a better is a
mockery unless, we know what the better is. Though moral progress
can not be denied, its explanation can not be founa in any theory
which places its end outside the process itself.
With regard to the existence of permanent institutions,
Dewey charges Green with having introduced content into his theory
which does not logically belong there, for if the ideal has em-
bodied itself in institutions and the moral code with sufficient
fulness to make them in any measure a guide to the ideal, then
the ideal is not the abstract unity which Green elsewhere makes it.
If the ideal is in reality negative to everj special end, condemning
our actual efforts as contradictory to its true nature, then the
Green's Theory of the Moral Motive, Phil. Rev . (1) 1892, p. 603.
Ibid., p . G^o.
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moral command would be "Be not loyal to existing institutions, if
you would be loyal to me, the only true moral ideal".
5. Dewey John: "Self-Realization as the Moral Ideal"
,
Philosophica l
Review (2) 1893.
This article is a sequel to the one by Dewey previously
discussed, and while it is not devoted so exclusively to Green, it
contains a severe criticism of the theory of the self which Dewey
regards Green as holding.
Dewey begins, correctly enough, by stating that if self-
realization is to have any meaning, we must have some notion of what
the self is that is to be realized. Then he states two possible
conceptions of the self and attempts to shew that Green has chosen
the untenable one. The two conceptions are (1) "the self as a pre-
supposed fixec/ schema or outline, while realization consists in the
filling up of this schema " ; and (2) "the self as a concrete specific
activity, with therefore the identity of self and realization.
Dewey rejects the former and defends the latter.
Of Green's view, Dewey says that the assumption of an
"eternally complete conscion&sness" constituting the moral self to
be realized by man is an illustration of the fixed or presupposed
self. He regards this as a rigid framework to be filled in by self-
realization, rather than as a practical or working self whose actual-
ity consists in its specific content.
Green's Theory of the Moral Motive, Phil. Rev . (1) 1892, p. 605.
Self-Realization as the Moral Ideal, Phil. Rev . (2) 1893, p. 653.

Dewey does not enter upon an explicit metaphysical
discussion of the eternal consciousness, though his own atti-
tude is clearly indicated in a passage which is worth emoting
as typical of his general -position, "Why a completely realized
self should think it worth while to duplicate itself in an un-
realized or relatively empty self, how it could -possibly do
this even if it were thought worth while, and why after the
complete self had produced the incomplete self, it should do
so under conditions rendering impossible any adequate approach
of the incomplete self to its own completeness - this diffi-
/
culty should make us wary of the conception'.'
However his particular point of attack is directed
toward the idea that "upon the basis of a presupposed com-
plete self, the possibilities of the present, working or in-
lividual self are the actual content of this presupposed self".
In refutation of this view he maintains that the realization
of any capacity, e.g. the artistic capacity of a child, must
exist as an end in so.ie one '
s
consciousness, and can not exist
simply in general. "Capacity is not only relative to specific
3
action, but is itself action ". Therefore to realize a capacity
does not mean to fill up some presupposed ideal self, but to
act with the completeness of one's existing powers.
'self- Realization as the Moral Ideal, Phi l. Rev. (2) 1893, p. 654.
Mbid. p. 654.
^Ibid. p. 656.
\
Another objection which Dewey raises against the
"fixed self" idea is that it is essentially selfish. "What-
ever is done, is done for this fixed self I do not see
that it is a bit "better to act to get goodnes s &r the self,
than it is to get pleasure for the self.... The selfishness of
saints who are bound to maintain their own saintliness at all
hazards, is Pharisaism".
With specific reference to Green, Dewey says that
Green tries to get around the difficulty by splitting the pre-
supposed self into two parts - a realized self which is the
agent and an ideal self which is the goal of action. But the
problem which Green does not solve is how to get them back to-
gether again. Dewey says that what Green has done is to hypos-
tat ize into separate entities what in reality are simply two
stages of insight, upon our own part, into the same self.
Dewey concludes with the statement that the most pressing need
of ethics is the demand that the self be conceived as a prac-
tical, working self akin to the "working hypothesis" of science
rather than a st fixed ideal.
I
^Self-Realization as the Moral Ideal, Phil, Rev. (2) 1893, p. 661
Ibid.
, p. 662.

6. Hothouse, L.T.: The Rational Good. (Macmillan, New York, 1921)
In the last chapter of The Rational Good , Hothouse dis-
cusses the implications of his theory as compared with those of
Kill and Green, unile comparatively little space is devoted spe-
cifically to Green, the chapter contains some interesting suggestions
not only on self-realization in general, hut upon the metaphysical
"basis of ethics.
Hothouse T s own theory of the rational good makes har-
mony its central feature. Harmony is defined as "a form of mutual
support" and as "that relation of parts in a whole in virtue of which
they maintain and (if they admit of development) further one another"
Thus the theory of harmony has something in common both with Hill's
Utilitarianism and with Green's Ethical Idealism. Its point of con-
tact with the former lies in the fact that all true harmony involves
pleasurable feeling. But Hothouse points out that such harmony de-
pends upon desire for the pleasant (i.e. the satisfying) rather
than merely for pleasure, and thus cuts the roots of hedonism. Mill
in admitting qualitative distinctions in pleasures ceases to te a
consistent hedonist and approaches ' the theory of a harmonious ful-
fillment of human powers.
But the theory of harmony is much more closely akin to
Green's theory than, to Mil^s. For real harmony *«• depends not
/
The Rational Good, p. 69.
*-Ibid.
,
p. 137 f
.
3 Ibid.
, p 139.

simply upon pleasurable feeling out upon "a rational appreciation
of an intrinsically good life", and self-realization is practically
equivalent to "harmony in development". It depends upon the fact
that life is an organic whole, in which the development of one must
contribute to and "be conditioned by the development of all.
Y/hile agreeing with Green in the general outlines of his
theory, Hobhouse mentions two points in which he disagrees. Th%
first is with regard to plea~are, which Green regards as a secondary
consequence rather than an integral element of the good, Hobhouse
insists that the harmony of feeling with experience which constitutes
pleasure or happiness is an essential, though not the sole, element
in harmonious development.
The second point of divergence is concerned with the
conflict between self-realization and self-sacrifice. Hobhouse,
while not entirely disagreeing with Green, thinks he gives too op-
timistic a solution of the difficulty. The realization of the
common good through self-sacrifice can not be regarded simply as a
sum of self-realizations. The good of the whole, in many cases,
involves a real loss of the good of the individual. However such
sacrifice is not only necessary but justifiable, on the basis of the
organic relationship of the individual to the whole. If the good
of society requires the saarifice of the individual, such a coarse
of action is not only the best thing for society but "it is also the
The Rational Good, p. 141.
J
best, i.e., the least bad, thing under the circumstances for the
individual. It is his duty, and the worst thing he can do is to
I
shirk his duty". But such a sacrifice must be regarded not as a
good in itself but simply as a means to an end, and any state of
society which requires such sacrifice of the individual good in-
volves disharmonies, "what is good in itself is the sense of one-
ness with others and the desire to serve which make men ready
for self-sacrifice" . ^~
At the end of the chapter Hobhouse discusses somewhat
the relation of ethical theory to cosmic philosophy. lie saya that
there would be ample reason for the moralizing of human life accord-
ing to the theory of harmony even if - J has no metaphysical basis;
but without a belief that the ties which bind the world-order into
a harmonious whole are real and operative, our conception of moral
development must be greatly changed, "The harmony that we shall
seek will be that of the Buddhist, founded on the impermanenee of
things, rather than that of the Greek,, founded on -the intrinsic
3
value, the promise and the hopefulness of life". Thus while ethics
does not furnish a positive proof of the existence of God and im-
mortality it furnishes a strong presupposition in that direction.
The theory of harmony, when taken in conjunction with the general
theory of evolution, gives evidence of a teleological development
which implies a I.Iind at the center of tilings to give harmony and
unity to the world-process.
The Rational Good, o 143.
Ibid
, p 14.3.
Ibid!
, p! 160-161.
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7. Ayres, Clarence S. : The Mature :f the Helaticn-betv.ee:, Ethlgj
nd Economics . I Philosophical Studies, Univ.
of Chicago, No. 8)
Ayres criticizes Green's ethics from a pragmatic stand-
point to show that he has not been sufficiently definite in giving
practical guidance for moral conduct. He says Green recognizes the
dual tasl: of ethics, i.e., to explain how men do act (in making
moral judgments) and how they should act. But while Green sees the
failure of utilitarianism to fulfill "both functions, he dogs not
do so any "better himself.
Green's whole ethical theory, Ayres says, is a piece
of cyclical reason, and may be expressed in the proposition, "Virtue
is the devotion of the moral man to trie realization in his own life
of this perfection (of the eternal consciousness), which in turn
consists in the complete dedication of human endeavor to this self-
realization. In other words, "To be good is to seek to- be good,"
ihe source of this reasoning in a circle, Ayres says, is
found in Green's undue emphasis upon motives to the exclusion of
co resequences. Green recognizes that motives will not help a man to
3
know what he should do, but Ayres regards him as inconsistent, for
7
he seems to imply that ignorance excuses error.
Ayres makes a good deal of Green's admission at the end
of his theory that he has not given a rule by which effort is to
5
be guided. Green says, however, that while n£ theory will settle
Prolegomena, p 9.
,
•2-The Nature of the Relation between Ethics and Economics, p 7 #
3 prolegomena
,
p 331 f
Vjbid., p. 334.'
£ Ibid.
, p # 391-395.

a question requiring an analysis of facts and circumstances t self-
realization will direct what effects to look for in the analysis
and what values to put upon them. However Ayres maintains that
Green has not done even so much as he claims, nor has he given
anything beyond "traditional acquiescence in convenient dogma".
8. Mackenzie, J.S.: Manual of ethics
.
(University Tutorial Press,
London, 1904)
Mackenzie does not give a very lengthy discussion of
Green's ethics ^ but makes repeated references to Green's works,
especially to the Prolegomena. In twenty or more instances he sup-
plements the statement of his own theory with references to Green's
views on the subiect. He is mentioned by Rashdall in The Theory of
Good and Evil as a disciple of Green who has carried his theories
too fa r
.
With regard to the relation of pleasure to objects,
Mackenzie states Green's view and discusses Sidgwick's objections
to it. According to Green, pleasure can not be conceived as a
feeling, apart from the objects which produce it; while according
to Sidgwick pleasure may be regarded as an end of rational action
whatever its contributing causes. Mackenzie sides with Green.
In his constructive statement of Green's system of ethics,
Mackenzie emphasizes, more strongly than most writers, the rational
element in self-realization. He says that the rational principle
which is imolicit in nature and animal life is in man more explicit.
Prolegomena, 395.
J
Hi
"The significance of the moral life consists in the constant en-
deavor to make this principle more and more explicit - to bring
out more and more completely our rational, self-conscious, spir-
itual nature"/ Thus in seeking to distinguish the higher from
the lower among our "universes of desire, Green tells us to choose
that which is most eomplet ely rational. The true self is the
rational self, and while we can never hope fully to srrasp the
content of its universe we can at least approximate it by observ-
ing the orinciple of self-consistency.
Another point in which Uackenzie refers to ureen at
considerable length is with regard tt his comparison of modern
with Greek conceptions of virtue. Mackenzie calls this section
of the Prolegomena "the most original and suggestive chapter in
the whole of that great work". Green while recognizing the essen-
tial unity of the Greek and Christian moral consciousness, shows
that in the personal virtues, e.g. courage and temperance, we
have in modern times both extended the range of their application
and have deepened our conception of the principle on which they
rest. This has come about through an extension of the area of
human interests and a greater realization of the inwardness of
the virtuous life.
J Ibid.
,
p.* 272.
**, Prolegomena, pp. 284-28C.

9. Mackenzie, J.S. : Introduction to Social Philosophy . (Macmillan,
London, 1890).
Mackenzie's Introduction to Social Philosophy, like
his I.Ianual of Ethics abounds in incidental references to Green
(principally in foot-notes) without giving an explicit discussion
of his philosophy. One or two points, in which he quotes Green
at some length, are worthy of notice.
V/ith regard to the question as to whether the will can
he the end, an affirmative answer apparently involves a circulus
I
in definiendo , for to will means -to seek an end. Green holds
that this difficulty is not fatal to the theory, for while the
same condition of will must he regarded alternately as a means and
an end, there is a distinction between the full self-conscious
realization of capabilities and the various acts of will "by which
.such a realization is attained. Mackenzie's point here is that
Green avoids moving in a circle only "by introducing another element
for the good-will is to be regarded as the highest good, not be-
cause it is the most desirable thing in itself, but because it is
the fullest expression of self-realization.
Another point of some importance is Mackenzie's empha-
sis of Green's view regarding the limitations of civil law. ^ccord
ing to Green, "the lav; can do only that in the doing of which it is
3
not necessary that personal qualities should be displayed." This
i
Introduction to social philosophy ,p, 197 f.
^Prolegomena, p. 205.
A Works, vol ii, p. 342 f.
I - m
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is in harmony with the view that self-development is stimulated
more by encouragement through education than by compulsion
through law.
1C. Barbour, G. F. : "Green and Sidgwick on the Community of the Good",
Philo sophi cal Review, (17) 1908.
Barbour gives an excellent comparison of the views of
Green and Sidgwick regarding the common or non-competitive
character of the good. On the whole he is favorable to Green's
position, which he defends against Sidgwick' s attacks* but the
article is a fair and well-balanced presentation of both sides
of the question.
Barbour begins with an historical review of the point at
issue. He show that the community of the good may r*efer either
to its social or to its non- competitive character. We find the
former expressed in early Greek ethics, the latter expressed (though
not fu ly developed ) in Plato, and both conceptions fused in Stoic
and early Christian ethic3. Spinoza argaes from the unity of
reason to the unity, and hence the non-competitive ch^acter, of the good.
Kant by a similar process passes from the autonomy of the will to
the view that all good wills cooperate and harmonize in a "kingdom
it
of ends .
In presenting Green's vi»w Barbour shows its similarity
to that of Spinoza i na Kant. He quotes numerous passages from the
Prolegomena which show that Green regarded the true good as being
!
both social and non-competitive. Since the true good consists in
self-devotion to aid ideal of mutual service, and therefore in the
will ' to be good, there is no real conflict between self-realization
and self-sacrifice.
Sidgwick on the contrary holds that Green has not properly
reconciled the distinction bet?;een good for self and good for others.
Barbour in reply admits that the moral life must be lived in a
sphere of material goods which are competitive, but shows that since
the true good consists in a good will which is unlimited in its
exercise, the good remains non-competitive in spite of its material
environment. Thus, while self-sacrifice may involve the giving
up of material goods or of certain forms of enjoyment, it does not
involve a sacrifice of ultimate goofl.
Barbour maintains, furthermore , that the question as to
whether ethics is an empirical or a normative science rests upon
the opposing positions represented by Green and Sidgwicfe. If it
is to be simply empirical, it may rest on a hedonistic basis,
which to be consistent must be also egoistic. But ifi ethics is to
be a normative science, it must regard persons as ends rather than
means, and must aim to have each member of the social order
share in and work for the common good. The ideal of self-realization
in union with self-sacrifice then be#comes consistent and acquires
validity as a supreme regulative principle.
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11. Dewey, John and Tufts, J.H.: Ethics (Henry Holt A Co., New Yprk,1910)
We find in Dewey and Tufts' Eth l_c_s only a very meagre
reference to Green, although where he is quoted it is apparently
with respect and agreement. Green id credited with having pointed
out the fundamental fallacy of psychological hedonism, i« e. the view that
a desire can be aroused or created by the anticipation of its own
satisfaction. Green is again quoted with approval in his recognition
of the practical value of Utilitarianism. Excerpts are taken from
his statements in the Prolegomena to show that while he was a con-
sistent opponent of the hedonistic basis of Utilitarianism, he was
nevertheless able to recognize the practical service of the theory
in promoting political and social reform.
12. Everett, W. G. : Moral Values (Henry Holt & Gt>.
,
New York, 1818).
Everett, like Dewey and Tufts, quotes Green occasionally
but does not give a detailed discussion of his philosophy. He
disagrees with Green's metaphysical method and says that ethics
I
precedes and leads up to metaphysics . He maintains that neither
metaphysics nor theology has ever discovered a new type of human
value, and it is their task to deal with the preservation and completion
of values rather than to deal with the specific problems of morality.
He disagrees also with Green's view that that good in the motive
of an act is exactly balanced by the good in the consequence,
3
I
Moral Values, p. 12.
Mbid., p 286.

and says that such a view disregards too much the limitations
imposed upon conduct by the lack of insight, skill, or power.
Everett quotes Green with more approval with regard to
determinism. While Green himself was far from being as deterministic
as Everett, certain passages in which Green protests against
unmotived willing are introduced to bulwark Everett's position.
One of these refers to the continuity of conduct whereby the
choices of today are inseparably linked with the choices of
/
yesterday. Another is found in the fact that repentance and shame
for evil conduct are possible only to a person whose action
represents his character' rather than ^ome ar^itf'&ry freak of
unmotived willing. Everett introduces this point to show that
moral responsibility is compatible with determinism, but he does not
give sufficient emphasis to the self-determinism of Green's theory.
Prolegomena, p. 115.
2-Ibia., p. 113.
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E. Tforks I.Iainly Political .
ihe works dealing with Green's political theory are
not numerous, but they have a distinctive characteristic. While
his metaphysics, iiis general ethical theory, and (to a less ex-
tent)his religion have repeatedly been attacked oy his critics
witn only an occasional champion to defend his position, those
who nave thought it worth while to write upon his oolitical theory
are unanimous in their approval. This is doubtless due to the fact
that Green's political principles, while dependent upon his gen-
eral ethical theory, are so dominated by his own practical in-
terest in the common welfare that they are largely free from the
flaws that may be d -tec ted in his theory as a whole.
1. I.IacCuim, John: Six Radical Thinkers (E. ArnoicL, London,
1907)
The article on "Bhe Political Idealism of Thomas Hill
Green" is the co .eluding chapter of a series of articles by John
LlacOunn on Bentham, John Stuart Hill, Oobden, Garlyle, I.Iazzini,
and Green. The articles on the whole are keen and penetrating.
They are written in a very attractive style, ana while devoted
expecially to the political aspects of each man's work they show

u thorough acquaint, nee with the philoso ihy underlying each type
of political theory.
fifeoConn's attitude toward Green is thoroughly sympathet-
ic ani appreciative. His quotations and references include not
only the Principles of Political Obligation which is his chief ob-
ject of study, but also the Prolegomena , Introduction to Hume , and
most of Green's miscellaneous articles and addresses. TVhile he
does not give a detailed discussion of Green's metaphysics, he is
apparently familiar with its main outlines. MacCurm's article is
of special value from the standpoint of the present study for the
reason that it gives considerable recognition to the religious foun-
dation underlying Green's ethical principles. For this reason we
shall reproduce it with more detail than would otherwise be neces-
sary.
IlacCunn, like llettiesnip, regards Green's interest in
political activities as being derived from tro main origins, lie.,
his own strong sense of public duty, and the application of his
philosophical idealism. Y/e have seen that his personal character-
istics caused him to rank high the life of "the good neighbor and
the honest citizen". HacCunn says that the central object of his
philosophy, like that of Hegel, was to furnish a jasis in reason
by which to interpret the facts of human experience; and this ob-
ject applied to civic interests meant t e attempt from an ideal-
istic standpoint to shov; the reasonableness of democratic citi-
zenship.
'six Radical Thinkers, pp. 219-220.

BfecOunn does not hesitate to assort Vi at Green carried
the spirit of religious devotion into uis politics. This appears
in his work, not in religious phraseology, hut in his cardinal doc-
trine that the political life of nan is a spiritual revelation.
The "eternal consciousness" which is the basis of nan's activity
fron a metaphysical standpoint, is likewise the true source of
social institutions* Green Relieved profoundly that the noral
and political life of nan can not be made intelligible "except
through the oresence in so-called secular affairs of that uni-
versal spiritual force to which the religious consciousness bears
/
witness"
.
While neither Green nor ilacOunn uses the t ern "objec-
tivity of value", JflaeGunn in reproducing Green's thought gives
a fine statement of its essential elements. He first shows how
Green net the objections arising fron the problem of evil. Ob-
structions which seen to thwart human progress are to be regarded
not only as significant forces to be reckoned with (not overlooked
as by the Puritans J ^ but also, and more significant still, as
material which in the divine plan nay be transmuted to the service
of higher ends. Even the sins of men may be "overruled for good",
for behind the selfish passions which darken the course of history
we may see (as in the work of Uapoleon) that the final results
are good. In man's upward climb toward higher conceptions of
Six Radical Thinkers, p. 225.
a Ibid., p. 226.

IJLO
/
public good we see the immanence of the eternal eonscioueness.
The positive Bide of Green's belief in the objectivity
of values ajroears in his doctrine of the -progressive spiritual
revelation which cones to man through his ideals. '2n.e nerve of
st-
all progress is the presence and everlasting vitality of ideals,
for the contrast between what is and what ought to be is the
force which shakes man from their lethargy and neves nen to reform.
Furthermore, the ideal is not only loftier but it is more real
than the actual, for, says Green, "To anyone who understands a
orocess of development the result being developed is the reality."
The seeming paradox, tr.at the id eal is found in experience, yet
is more real than any of our particular experiences, becomes more
clear if we regard "the far-off divine event" as a communication
to the human spirit of the divine. Ideals are not mere guesses
and gropings of the human imagination; they are revelations of
that larger spiritual life which is working toward results far
greater and more truly real than anything mankind has yet attained.
I.IacOunn points out that this conception of political
life as a revelation of the Divine Idea tended to make Green both
H
a conservative and a radical. It gave him on the one hand a high
respect for existing institutions which though imperfect were an
earnest of better things to cone; and on the other hand his pas-
sion for the i&eai led him to throw himself into the battle for
Six Radical Thinkers, p. 226.
^Ibid., p. 231.
3 Works, vol. iii, p. 224.
H Six Radical Thinkers, p 236-237.

its realization with the enthusiasm of a prophet. Green him-
self may oe termed a sober-minded visionary.
In discussing (Treen's specific political interests,
:.IacCunn points out that in many respects he stood for the same
principles us. bright and Cobden and the other radicals of his
day, --sympathy with the middle classes and laboring men, accep-
tance of free trade, respect for non-conformity, dislike of ec-
clesiasticism, belief in parliamentary reform, national education,
land-law reform, interest in the Irish land acts mid the disestab-
lishment of the Irisn church, and in American politics ardent
i
sympathy with the northern cause.
Yet Green differed from the o trier radicals of his time
in the stress which te constantly laid upon social and political
institutions, These, us v/e have seen, he valued as the result
of tne action of the Universal Spirit; and in keeping with his
ethical theory he also esteemed them for their value as a means
to the development of individual character. I.IacCimn points out
that Green agreed with the Utilitarian radicals in stressing the
practical value of political institutions, out that j:e did so,
not on a hedonistic basis, but for their instrumental function
in up-building the lives of men.
l.IacOunn also compares Green with Bentham and :iill with
regard to their conception of society. Like them. Green is an
Six Radical Thinkers, p. 236-237.
Ibid.
, pp 241*243.

individualist, but he avoids their atomic individualism which
regards society as merely an aggregate of units. His individual-
ism, like that of Aristotle and Hegel from which it is largely
derived, takes the form of a protest against the fallacy of ab-
straction involved in regarding society us something existing in
itself. ~Ae stresses the fact that the welfare of the nation con-
sists solely in the welfare of its individual citizens, yet this
is not inconsistent with his other doctrine that man is by nature
fundamentally social. A national will is not a mere aggregate of
individual v/ills; yet it is only through the individual wills of
f
socially minded persons that it finds its substance and its force.
In discussing Green's belief that political institutions
should be democratic, IlacOunn points out that Green's personal
sympathies were strongly democrat c
,
yet he built his system not
on symoathies (nor on sent imentalism as diet Kousseau) , but like
Hegel ne founded it on reason f" He accepted ilant's dictum that
persons should be treated, not as means , but as ends in themselves.
But instead of faj.lxn.-r into Kant's error of exalting the moral law
above human feelings and desires, Green re^crded these feelings
and desires as tne distinguishing mark of humanity, and the incix>-
ient promise by which human nature despite its frailties may rise
to higher attainments. The less civilized races and the less de-
veloped members of society are to be regarded, not in the light
<
Six Radical Thinkers, p. 245.
Mbid.
, p. 248.
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of what they are, but of what they have it in then potentially
/
to become. It is this conception of the dignity of humanity,
joined with his conviction that the ideal is the truly real, which
2.
forms the foundation of his democratic sympathies.
A Significant r>oint of agreement with nant is found in
his doctrine that duty is more fundamental than rights. He be-
lieved that because God has given man the capacity for duty he
must claim his rights in order to be able to go his duty. Once
more, we find that Green's theory hinges upon the reality of the
ideal and man 1 .: kinship with God; for he argues for rights not
as an end in themselves but as an aid to the fulfillment of man " s
high moral destiny. The same line of thought is found in his
conception of freedom, for he jeiieved that true freedom consists
not in the mere possession of rights, but in the satisfying ful-
fillment of civ.lc duties. 2hus the only genuine freeman is the
fully developed man and citizen who endeavors to exercise his God-
'sgiven powers
.
On the mooted question of state interference. Green
a-rain makes the development of the citizen's character the real
criterion. His favorite )hrase "the removal of obstructions"
must be interpreted as involving more than a negative connotation.
He was in favor of any legislation which would favor the devel-
opment of personality. Yet none protested more vigorously against
^Prolegomena, p. 236.
Six Radical Thinkers, pp. 249- 251.
3 Ibid.
, pp. 25G-259.

the inadequacy of mere, legislation to take the place of religion
and morality. His plea for laissez-faire was baaed upon the
conviction that no< external compulsion can force a nan into fcight
relations with Sod nor supply the inner springs of action with-
out which no conduct is truly moral'. For he believed thair only
through an inward growth can man attain to the life of the good
neighbor and the honest citizen.
LlacOunn's interpretation of Green's political theory
requires little further comment. It appears not only to be an
appreciative statement of Green's position, but to be an accur-
ate and well-balanced presentation of political idealism. LlacCunn
justifies his inclusion of Green among the six radical thinkers
discussed on the "-round that Green's conception of civic duty as
a spiritual function was a radical position; and it is apparent
that LlacCunn is himself more closely in harmony with Green's po-
sition than with that of Benthan, Mill, Gobden, Carlyle, or
I.Iazzini. He seems to regard Green as possessing most of the
merits Without the faults of the other five.
b. Ritchi&j J.G. : Principles of State Interference (Swan, SonnenscheAn
£ Company, £ondcE , 1891.
'Jhe book by Ritchie entitled "Principles of State
Interference" consists of four essays dealing with the political
Six Radical Thinker., pp. 260-266.

philosophy of Spencer, Mill end Green. In the first two he
attacks Spencer's ind ividualistic and biological conception of
society, and the iaissez faire attitude toward tlie State v/hioh.
results from it. Ehi third essay in which he criticises -J. S.
Mill's conception of individual liberty is in reality the most
constructive section of the book, for in it Ritchie st; tes hit
own idea of the true function of the state and applies it to
particular problems. The last chapter, Which deals specifically
with Green, contains a restatement of Ritchie's own views, in
which he is in close agreement with Green.
The true object of the state, Ritchie says, is "the
realization of the best life by the individual" a best life
which is possible only in an organized society or state. As to
what constitutes this best life, the ideal determines the actual
out is also determined oy it. Ideals advance as man advances,
and the good man of any age is the standard of goodness for that
age. In the education of the race, correction and modification
o£ erroneous ideals are necessary, but the guiding principle of
the common good remains unchanged
.
xhis, in brief, is Ritchie's own theory which he op-
poses (with considerable sarcasm) to Spencer's naturalism and
Mill's utilitarianism. SThiB it will be noted, is very similar
to Green's theory, but with an important difference. Ritchie,
I
^Principles of State Interference, p. 102.
Itoid.
, p 1C3.
1
makes no attempt, as Green does, to rest the validity of the
ideal upon an objective or religious basis, though not anti-
religious or anti-theistic , he seems to regard the progressive
development of the ideal as a merely human achievement, and makes
no mention of an objective foundation.
This theory of the ,-ood he applies to the question of
itate interference with regard to certain specific problems: the
regulation of opinion (e.g. as in religious persecution); com-
pulsory education; free trade; and factory legislation. tie
shows that the policy to be followed in each case depends upon
what contributes to the highest physic a]
,
intellectual, and moral
welfare of the community. Restraint in itself, he says, is neither
good nor bad, but may be ^ood or bad according to the end for which
it is used. Tnis view-point v/e perceive to be in harmony with
Green's position that it is the human values to be attained which
determine the propriety of State legislation.
Turning to Ritchie's discussion of Green's philosophy
per Be ,we find that he regards Green as practically the only
English philosopher who has advocated a political theory con-
sistent With his philosophy. The individualistic prejudicss of
Spencer hindered him form giving an adequate treatment of the
nature of the state, and while in Mill, re can trace some connec-
tion between his psychical atomism and his political individual!SB,

the connection its far-fetched. Most of the practice.! reformers
have given little attention to philosophy, and vice versa , hut
in Or re en we find a meet ing-point of the speculative and practical
interests
.
Ritchie like I.lacCunn asserts that the point of contact
between Green's metaphysics and ethics is founa in his theory of
the self. Otherwise his self-realization theory would be simply
egoistic hedonism; for the pleas ure seeker might safely claim
that he was realising himself as much as the philanthropist, were
it not for the fact that the self is more than a series of feel-
ings. Furthermore in interpreting self-realization as the real-
ization of the common good , he finds a logical basis for the
altruism which the utilitarian may introduce, but without logical
foundation. Ritchie points out that in many practical issues
Green is fully in accord with Mill, but that he (Green) is more
consistent in his altruism and in his criterion for preferring
the higher pleasures to the lower/
3. Huirhead, J.H. : The Service of the State (John Hurray, London,
1908)
This work consists of a series of four lectures devoted
to Green's political Philosophy. While its main interest is in
Green's ooxitic^j. theory , the author also presents an excellent
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survey of the general uspec'-s of Green's thought in their relation
to his politics. While l.Iuirhead's analysis is very comprehensive,
we shall limit our discussion of it chiefly to the el orients which
have not been riven full consideration in connection with LlacGunn
and Ritcnie.
In his first chapter entitled "The Problem of the Seven-
ties", Iluirhead makes the interesting observation that of the
three outstanding men of Oxford at that period, Jowett, llettleship
and Green, the latter undoubtedly exerted the deepest influence.
-She source of this influence LIuirhead attributes to the union in
Green of the ideal citizen and the idealist philosopher. 'Jhe
problem of the times as stated by Green himself was to reconcile
the conflicting olairas of the modern spirit "to be free, to under-
/
stand, ana to enjoy" a reconciliation which could only be brought
aoout by putting a more rational basis for life in the nlace of
the old sensationalist ic philosophy. This affords the ra i s on d'etre
for his effort and for his vital influence.
Iluirhead makes un interesting c omparison of Green's
position with that of )ragmatism. While Green has often been at-
tacked by humanistic writers (see Ireland, Dewey, etc. ) as being
"ti.e prince if iBtellaetualiatB, a metaphysical Frankenstein who
spent himself in setting up as the ultimata truth of things a
'works, vol. iii, p. 94.
^Cupra, p. 100 f, 109, 135.
1
logical monster unrelated to human purposes*. Muirhead maintains
that his starting-point at least was humanistic, for he wanted
to establish through philosophy a working basis for human effort.
The charge often brought against him by pragmatista , that he un-
dermines the v; lue of human effort by making it merely a repro-
duction of results alreury achieved by the eternal consciousness,
involves a misconstruction of his theory; for the Absolute is not
a mere timeless summation of perfection, but is the underlying
reality of the temporal life of man.
Muirheud in discussing Green's theory of the good makes
a significant observation regarding the relation of pragmatism
to evolution. ?he pragmatist who turns to evolution in order to
determine from a sociological standpoint what "works", is in danger
of falling into the error of confusing origin with value and of
applying the nrarmat ic test on a narrow or utilitarian busis**3
Muirhead points out that Green was the first to use the t} eory of
evolution to demonstrate the reality and validity of an objective
id^al which is being progressively revealed to man. He thus
turned the flank of naturalism by showing that the history of
civilization itself pives evidence that it is the end being devel-
oped which is the true reality. r2ne value of any step must be
judged, therefore, in the light of ends r^ti.er than origins.
'The Service of the state, p. 8.
^•Ibid., p 18.
^ibid., P ; 32.
i Ibid., p. 41.
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In considering Green's conception of the true good as
personal and social, Muirhead maintains that it is the union of
these two elements in one which forms the real ground-work of
Green's political theory. On any other basis it is impossible
to reconcile the claims of the individual with those of society.
Hedonism attempts to do so
,
but can succeed only by a tour de
/
force . But if the good of self is so closely bound up by nature
with the good of others that self-rep li zation involves the ser-
vice of others as an essential element, there is no longer any
real conflict. Muirhead also indicates the relation which exists
between this standpoint and the principles of religion; for he
says, " Personality lives in the material ends with which society
supplies it, society lives through the form that free personality
impresses on its purposes It is the ethical and political
counterpart of the religious principle that he that seeketh his
life shall lose.it, he that loseth it shall find it".
This conception of the organic unity of the individ-
ual society forms the basis of Green's theory of the State.
The State it not to be regarded as some external force which
limits the natural rights of individuals, but is on the other
hand an expression of the corporate will of society. The older
political philosophies, fron the time of Hobbes to that of Spencer,
i
The Service of the State, p 36.
Ibid.
,
p 37.

though showing no close connection with the general nhilosouhical
systems of their f ounderf
,
had been "based in general on a theory
of individualism which regarded the State as a secondary and
t
artificial product. But Green, starting with the idea of the
community of man's essential interests, considered civil law not
as a means of restriction uoon the free pursuit of individual ends
but as a means of securing the highest welfare both of the indi-
vidual and society. His theory is summed up in the formula, "Will,
not force, is the basis of the State".
The subordinate elements of Green's political theory
all follow from his conception of the nature of the self and so-
ciety, and the objectivity of the ideal, Inst itutions then be-
come the habits of society and the concrete embodiment of the
ideal. Circumstances are to be regarded not as external and
purposeless factors but as representations of the influence of
the general over the particular will. Great men contribute to
the life of their ti^es by being the exponents of man's deeper
purposes and the correctors of t£-e shallow (though often pre-
3
valent) impulses. The general will itself, though not always
noble, rises to heights of idealism in a crisis ..and . reveals
the spirit of the Greater Will which shapes man's destinies.
Prom the organic nature of society, it follows also
The Service of the State, p. 51.
Ibiu
, p, 6^.
Ibid*
,
p* 66.
Ibid!, p- C7.
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that the rights of the individual are always relative to society.
Green says, "It is on the relation to a society, to other men
recognizing a cOEimon good, that the individual's rights denend,
as much as the gravity of a body depends on its relation to other
t
bodies". Every nan therefore has a right to be treated as a mem-
ber of society, and though not to be free from society, to have
the freedom of it. The issue in political reform is not a ques-
tion of the rights of man against society, but of a better form
of society against a worse.
Green's treatment of the right of -property is typical
of his general attitude. Property is more than the atrpropriati on
of some object for selfish purposes; it is a means whereby the
possessor may serve society through adding to his own efficiency.
3
On any other basis it is robbery. The justification of private
uro"oerty as opposed to communism is found in the theory that the
welfare of society is served best through individual ownership.
"The rationale of property". Green says, "is that every one should
be secured by society in the power of getting and keeping the
means of realizing a will which in possibility is a will directed
to social good".
In the closing chapter which deals with the relation
of Green's theory to national politics, Muirhead points out that
I
Works, vol
#
ii
, p. 416.
The Service of the state, p. 7l
I
Ibid.
, p 79.
^ Works, vol. ii
, p. 52o.
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Green was in thorough agreement with Mill in his defense of
political liberty ana the demand for the enfranchisement
of the masses. Both believed that the vote was necessary in
order to turn the natural loyalty of the people in the direction
of intelligent cit izenshi However, Muirhead takes issue with
Hobhouse's statement that in Mill the motive for democracy lies
deeper than in Green. Muirhead maintains (rightly I think)
that in Mill the democratic spirit is largely out of harmony
with his philosophy, while in Green it is a corporate element of it.
It is not to secure a transient happiness but to secure a greater
realization of man's divinely-appointed destiny that political
reform must be enacted.
4. Bosanquet, Bernard: The Phllosoph icglTheory of th e State
(Macmillan
,
"London, 1C99).
This work is included hep*?, not because it gives a specific
discussion of Green, but because it contains so many references
to him and is so often quoted in connection with his political
theory. It is evident that the Prin ci ples of Politic al Obligation
constitutes a very important background to Bosanquet' s political
thinking.
It is scarcely necessary to enumerate all the instances
in which Bosanquet makes reference to green's works. Among

; 2>t
ii it
them Wo way note hi^ uoctrine of the hindering of hindrances
,
which is identical with Green's plea for the "removal of obstacles"
to personal development. He draws upon Green also In stating
his conception of liberty, which is not simply the juristic
idea of freedom from constraint, but involves also the freedom
to act according to the principles of self-determination. The
philosophical idea of freedom is stated by Bosanquet, in
harmony with Greon, to consist of "being one's sel'fjin fullest
sense"
.
Bosanquet likewise agrees with Green in his conception
of rights, which are defined as "that which is really necessary
to the maintenance of material conditions essential to the
existence and perfection of human personality" . Bosanquet in
his general philosophical position follows Hegel more closely
than Green, but in his political theory his viewpoint is
very similar.
5. Leland, Abby Porter: The -pduc ational Theory §nd Practice
of T. H.Green. Columbia Contributions
to Education, No. 46. (Columbia
University Press, 1911).
This book, which was apparently written as a doctor's
dissertation at Columbia, contains a good summary of Green's life
and social theory, but in other respects it is very disappointing.
A large part of its sixty pages consists of lengthy verbatim
quotations from Green and his critics, many of which are repeated
at various intervals. The book contains a helpful bibliography,
;
The Philosophical Theory of the State, p. 137 f.
^Ibid.
, p. 203, quoted from Prin. of Pol. Obligation,
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although this does not "by any means exhaust the list of works
dealing with Green. Green's metaphysics is introduced only in-
cidentally, the paucity of its treatment being evidenced by the
fact that in only one or two instances does the author refer to
the "eternal consciousness", and to the theory of relations not
at all.
However, the work is not without its merits, and in
sr>ite of the limitations noted, it contains a good many valuable
ideas. While these are scattered at random throughout the book,
we shall attempt to bring together and note the most significant
of these.
The author's reason for undertaking a study of Green's
educational theory is not that he gives a specifically worked
out educational system, but that he lays down/princ iples on which
an educational system can be built. As Hiss Leland puts it,
"Green's aim was not educational in its reference but educa-
tional in its essence"; and she makes a good deal of Professor
Dewey's statement, "Rules are practical; they are habitual ways
of doing things. But principles are intellectual; they are
useful methods of judging things". It is on this basis that she
maintains (and I think rightly) that Green's philosophy affords
a good basis for educational theory. For Green, instead of es-
The Educational Theory and Practice of T. H. Green, p 4.

tablishing a set of rules for conduct, gives ne rather the prin-
ciples of self-development by which the individual may learn to
make decisions in concrete situations. He gives us also the
raison d'etre for education, for the whole business of education
is the development of personality in accordance with the principles
of self-realization.
In the chapter on Green's ethical philosophy, the author
discusses at some length Green's theory of the self and the ideal.
While her account of the finite self does justice to Green's con-
ception, she leaves out of account almost entirely the eternal
consciousness. Through this omission, she not only fails to
give an adequate presentation of a most essential element of
Green's philosophy, but she also fails to provide any real basis
for the realization of the values which are advocated by her ed-
ucational theorry. She approaches the problem from a pragmatic
and positivistic standpoint, and in fact, she makes the interest-
ing observation that while Green is a pragmatist and humanist in
his ethical theory, he is too intellectualist ic in his metaphys-
ics. If this attributing of pragmatism and humanism to Green
means simply that he was interested in life and all its activi-
ties, there is justification for the statement. But if these
terms are taken in their technical sense (as popularized by
Dewey) Green would scarcely choose to be complimented by these
The Educational Theory and Practice of T. H. Green, p. 24.
Supra, p. 129.
i
titles. The "intellectualistic" element (wherein Miss Leland
assumes that he has fallen into error), though it has difficul-
ties of its own, is nevertheless the basis for a theistic view
which is essential to a metaphysical interpretation of the reali-
zation of the ideal.
However, the author gives an excellent account of the
finite aspects of the moral ideal, and of its relation to self-
hood. She quotes at length from the Prolegomena to show that
it is %n abiding satisfaction of an abiding self" which ensures
responsibility for conduct. In Green's words, "If I could tram-
mel up the consequence of that which at any time I am and do;
if there could be any break of continuity between what I shall
be and what I am; then indeed I might be reckless of what I do,
so long as it is pleat-ant". She also quotes effectively to show
the similarity between Green's conception of the true good and
that found in the Greek classification of the virtues.
In the chapter on Green's social and political insti-
tutions the author brings out very well Green's conception of
the organic nature of society, in which there is an inseparable
relation of individuals to each other and to society as a whole.
On this basis the question of the priority of the individual be-
comes not only insoluble but meaningless. Only by a synoptic
view can their true relations be determined.
Prolegomena
,
p. 126.
•2The Educational Theory and Pfcactice of T. H. Green, p. 33.
11
i3%
The author gives also an excellent statement of Green's
theory of the origin of moral ideas and institutions, and of
their mutual relations. "The condition of a moral life", accord-
ing to Green, "is the possesssion of will and reason", and "all
moral ideas have their origin in reason, i.e., in the idea of a
possible self-perfection to be attained by the moral agent".
Moral progress tends to bring about the harmony of will and rea-
son, and becomes crystalized in institutions, Institutions then
may be regarded as the actualization of the moral ideal, or as
the habits of society. Their value, according to Green, lies in
their concrete realization of the capacities of will and reason
which are indispensable to moral life."^
Of the function of the various human institutions. Miss
Leland says that the essence of Green's political philosophy may
be expressed in terminology borrowed from Aristotle, "For as the
state (i.e. , institutions ) was formed to make life possible, so
3
it exists to make life good". That is, the sole purpose of the
family, civil society, the church, etc. is to contribute to the
common good. It is on this basis alone that questions of enfran-
chisement, property rights, etc. must be settled. Since all
virtues are in a sense social, there is no real conflict between
H
the good of the individual and the good of society.
^Works, vol. ii, p § 337.
?
The Educational Theory and Practice of T. H. Green, pp 34-36.
Politics, Book 1, Captor 2
.
"•Works, vol ii, pp. 550, 428, 450, et al .
»II
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In the chapter which deals specifically with Green 1 s
educational theory and practice, the author dwells ur>on Green's
desire to bring education within reach of the middle and lower
classes, to improve the position of teachers, and to raise the
standards "both of instruction and of organization. All this is
based, of course, on the theory that every person has a right
to the free development of his personality to the limit of his
capabilities. "Green's entire endeavor in theory and practise
appears to have been to findieate the essential reasonableness of
the claim of the modern spirit 'to be free, to understand, and
I
to enjoy 1 ". Attention is called to Green's desire that the
common school system, in extending its scope to the masses, should
level up without leveling down. All this of course is very true,
and its recognition is very important to educational theory.
But Miss Leland does not sjay very much which is original
or profound.
l
The Sducational Theory and Practice of T. H. Green, p 53.
^Works, vol. iii, cp. 459-460.
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The most striking characteristic of the works which deal
with Green's religious views is their scarcity. We have seen that
his philosophy of religion, though unsystematized , is nevertheless
a very essential element of his thought. The religious essays of
the third volume of his published works serve to supplement and
illuminate materially his more technical writings. Jut while Green
has any number of critics to discuss his metaphysics and his ethics
pro and con, most of them apparently do not think his religion
(except such elements as are implied in his general metaphysical
system) to be worthy of any consideration.
1. Chubb, Percival: "The Significance of Thomas Hill Green's Phil-
osophical and Religious Teaching". Journal of"
Speculative philosophy 1088.
The article consists of a semi -popular account of Green's
principal philosophical ideas and their relation to religion.
Chubb opens his discussion by commenting upon the general tendency
of the day to find solace for its loss of religion by recourse to
agnosticism and to culture. Both, according to Green (and the
author) are futile, for the only safety lies in a rational and
consistent view of human life in which religion is included. "It
is the true Nemesis of human life that any spiritual impulse not

accompanied by clear and comprehensive thought is enslaved by its
own realization", says Green. While the claim of the modern spirit
is "to he free, to understand, and to enjoy", the popular philoso-
phy of materialism and agnosticism leads only to confusion and
despair.
Chubb then gives an excellent summary of the historical
setting in which Green's work appeared, emphasizing especially the
Humean philosophy which had dominated English thought before his
time. He traces, as Green does, the connection between Hume's
sensationalism and Spencer's evolutionary philosophy, and shows
that in Spencer's view the associations hare become racial but are
of the same general nature. "It is at uottom the same old con-
tention that the edifice of thought is ouilt up of bricks of sen-
sation, cemented by the tendency to association. Ehe only differ-
ence is that the flux of the mind's thoughts and sensations is
styled a series of states of consciousness: out it is still a
straggling disorderly procession with no spectator to view it, or
(
know it as a procession". In contrast with the tendency of English
philosophy to follow Hume, numerous poets and writers were de-
fending idealism and the religious faith. Jut it was the task
of Green to establish the soundness of religion, not through
literature, but through philosophy.
The distinction between philosophy and religion, as
'The Significance of T. H. Green's Philosophical and Religious
Teaching, Jour. Spec. Phil . (22) 1888, p. 8.

stated by Chubb, is that philosophy aims to give a calm statement
of ultimate truths, while religion is the response of the mind,
heart, and imagination to these truths, i.e., religion is not
simply ''morality touched with emotion'' , as Matthew Arnold says,
/
but it is "philosophy touched with emotion". Heligion to Green
meant "the intellectual vision of the divine unity of the world
and the mystic:- 1 sense of the communion oetween the individual
and the universal spirit.
Green's conception of sin is stated t o be "partiality,
defect, negation" - a conception which follows from tiie rest of
his view of the world, for as intellectual error consists in re-
garding partial relations as totality, so "sin consists in the
individual's making his own self his object, not in the oossiole
expansion in which it becomes that true will of humanity, which
is also God's, but under the limitations of momentary appetite
3
or interest".
T7ith regard tp the Christian revelation, Chuob in dis-
cussing Green's attitude toward miracle and the historicity of
Jesus, emphasizes Green's vie"/ that the true meaning of the in-
carnation and the resurrection lie in their symbolism of the
spirit of God. incarnate in all mankind and the "death into life"
which is the essence of the moral life. "The importance of
T. H. Green's Philosophical and Religious Teaching, Jour. Spec Phi l.
(22) 1888, p. 14.
Ibid., p. 15.
iDid. P. 16.
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Christ to us lief: not in his supposed advent as a Messiah, or
his supernat ural place in a scheme of redemption; out, as it lay
I
for his apostle Paul, in the power of his spirit and example".
7/hile this interpretation of Paul ie open to question, the state-
ment accords with the "modified unitarianism" with which Green
labels his theological views.
Of the relation of Christianity to the other religions,
Chubb brings out the fact that Green states a decided preference
for Christianity-, not on grounds of prejudice or authority, but on
the basis of its practical value in inspiring life to nooler effort.
The idea of "death into life", which is the source of the divine
element in man, has in other religions lain barren. Green's ap-
plications of the pragmatic test of truth to religion is seen
further in his statement, "As the primary Christian idea is that
of a moral death into liie, as wrought for us and in us by God,
so its realization, which is the evidence of its truth, lies in
Christian love All other evidence is fleeting axid accidental,
x
but this abides". The pragmatic test does not here conflict with
coherence but supplements it.
Chubb closes with an appreciative statement of the un-
swerving loyalty with which Green not only insisted that religion
must reveal itself in moral living, out put into practice his own
ideals. The article as a whole gives a fair presentation of Green's
T. H. Green's Philosophical and Religious Teaching, Jour. Spec Phil.
(22) 1808, p. 17.
Ibid,
,
quoted, p. 18.
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views and contains little that is open to criticism.
2. Upton, C.B: "Theological Aspects of the Philosophy of Thomas
Hill Green" , The Hew V/orld (1) 1892.
This theological discussion forms an interesting contrast
to the one by Chubb previously noted, for while Chubb is exposi-
tory rather than controversial, Upton is decidedly controversial
without being sufficiently expository. His own position seems to
be a combination of personalism and theistic realism, and Dr.
Martineau, repeatedly quoted, appears to be the author of his
"philosophical Scriptures".
Of Green, Upton has scarcely a single good word to say,
except for the purity of his life (which nooody seems able to
assail). In his philosophy, he ranks him solely find completely
as a Hegelian. The Hegelian philosophy Upton regards as hostile
to religion, and Gr^en is singled out for denunciation as a typical
representative of this school. While Upton says a good many things
that are true in showing the inadequacy of the Hegelian elements
of Green's thought, I should have more respect for his criticism
if he had read Green far enough to discover that he was not entire-
ly a Hegelian.
The first objection he raises (which we have often met
before) is that the eternal consciousness "performs merely $he func-
tion of giving logical unity to the infinite variety of phenomena
"
/
.Supra, pp.42, 47, 59, 61, 64, 86 etc.
^Theological Aspects of the Philosophy of T. H . droon, New V/orld
(1) 1892, p. 141.

He bases his attack on Green's rather unfortunate statement (made
in refutation of supernaturalism) that the spiritual principle
which gives unity to the universe must not be regarded as a Causal
Will for the explanation of natural phenomena. On the same basis
Upton charges Green with having- made no provision for the direct
communication of reli.rious content, from God to man through revel-
ation. Upton overlooks entirely the asioect of Groen's thought
which makes man's whole religious and moral life a manifestation
of the indwelling presence of God.
Another charge which he orings 'gainst Green is that his
philosophy fails to accord with the facts of t lie moral conscious-
ness, especially as involved in sin. He declares that Green has
not dealt successfully with ethical and spiritual facts, and has
tended to weaken the pre-existing interest in theology . He bases
this objection on the ground that Green's conception is a "thorough-
pantheism", in which the eternal consciousness acts for man and
allows him no individual moral responsibility. He assumes (with-
out attempting to prove) that Green's philosophy is thoroughly
pantheistic
.
A closely related point of attack is directed against
Green's view of moral freedom, which Upton declares is in reality
determinism. In connection with this he enters upon a spirited
defense of the "transcendent self", hich he says is necossary to
any adequate conception of moral freedom. "The moral consciousness

involves the activity of a metaphysical or r.cumenal self which
has, not i_s, the various ideas and ha 'bits which make up its char-
acter". So he oojects strenuously to Green's view that "the
character is the man". What he is apparently trying to do is t©
refute sensationalism, out he has not ciscovered that Green has
already done it for him.
Another criticism of Green, which involves a serious
misunderstanding of him, is directed against his \'iew of immor-
tality. Basing his argument on the page devoted to the "fragment
on Immortality", Upton claims that Green makes man simply a phase
of the eternal thought, which after ceasing to oe the vehicle of
this eternal thought is fused with it and 1 oses all pers onal identity
He apparently does not know that in the Pro legomena Green expressly
argues for personal immortality on the ground that the continued
development of personality in a social medium requires it.
His concluding statement is that in a "metaphysical dream
the idealist may loersuade himself that nature has no reality save
in the thought that thinks it, and the soul no reality but eternal
thought, hut contact with practical life and its moral problems
will prove the contrary, ^nd he thinks he has discovered some-
thing which Green did not suspect I
Theological Aspects of the Philosophy of T. H . Green, New World
(1) 1892, p. 153.
j
3. Lilly, V/.S.: "Works of Thomas Hill Green". Dublin Review (22)1889
This article consists of a review of Nettleskip's ed-
ition of Green's works, and since it le largely biographical and
expository it will not renuire lengtliy comment. However, it has
one ^ery interesting feature not found in most articles on Green;
namely, that it is written from an avowedly Catholic standpoint.
The writer expresses his motive in the words, "My aim will be to
expound, not to judge, xtnd indeed, for the well-instructed
I
Catholic student, this should oe sufficient". At the close of his
exposition he repeats this observation with the remark that ill-
instructed Catholic students, though not numerous, are entitled
to some consideration. So he proceeds to criticise Green oriefly
for their benefit.
The main criticism which he brings against Green's phi-
losophy is that he adopts an abstract form of consciousness. "Hence
it not seldom becomes a system in the air, suitable perhaps to the
dwellers in Cloud Cuckoo Town, out hardly adapted 'for human na-
tures daily food'". Lilly adds that if he had consulted St.
Thomas, or some of his expositors, he would j.ave seen that the self
is a concrete act of experience. The criticism is not developed
sufficiently to be very effective (at least to a non-Catholic
student )
.
Works of Thomas Hill Green, Dublin Review (22) 1889, p. 100.
Mbid. p. 117. ~~
il
Another criticism (which has greater validity) is di-
rected against Green's separation of the historical Jesus from the
Christ of faith. Green assumes that we can hold to the latter
without the former. 3ut (to quote Lilly's somewhat unfortunate
figure), ''If we would drink wine, there would needs be a vessel
t
from which to imbibe it". He says further , , "The facts contain the
revelation: the Idea without the Pers-on is empty Reject his-
torical Christianity, and in the course of a very few years, how
much definite Christianity will be lei't?" And I think he is right.
Christianity, like philosophy, to be secure must he grounded in
a Person rather than an abstract principle.
^.Porter, Uoah:"The Late Professor Green of Oxford". Hew England er
and Yale Review (50) 1889.
This article combines the functions of giving a bio-
graphical sketch of Green's life and personality and a review
of the HettleshiiD edition of his works. His educational and
political theory are discussed at seme length, the latter being
characterized as "a theory in which seemed t o be blended the
poetry of Chivalry, the prose of Radicalism, ai d the consecration
of Religion". Green's theology, however, receives more explicit
treatment than any other aspect of his thought.
'works of Thomas Hill Green, Dublin Reviev:
. (22) 1869, p. 117.

porter speaks in the highest terms of the value of
Green's theological attitude in„ calling attention to the uses and
abuses of dogmatic theology, in combatting an unspiritual ecolesi
astieism, and in bringing out the fact that the creeds are largely
the products of the schools and hence not to be confused with the
faith of the church. But Porter does not agree at all with Green 1
attitude toward the historicity of Jesus. He thinks that Green
very much underestimated the impression which Jesus made upon the
people of his own generation and especially u^on Paul. He takes
issue with Green's assertion that Paul's conversion occuYied "in
spite of ignorance of the facts of our Lord's life prior to his
death as detailed in the synoptical pospels TT . Porter maintains
that such an exegesis of Paul's relation to Jesus does violence
both to the principles of rational psychology and of historical
criticism. He assumes (though not quite fairly) that Green
treated the stoiy of the earthly life of Jesus as largely myth-
ological. While this is somewhat farther than Green actually
went, Porter on the whole gives an excellent statement of the
discrepancies in Green's conception of the person of Christ.
(
Works, vol. iii, p. 161.
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A
IV. Gritica l Analysi s of Green 1 s Treatm ent of Lietapbysi c s , Ethic s
,
and Re ligion.
In the preceding paf?es a good many problems relating
to Green's metaphysical, ethical and religious views have been
touched upon. It is now our task to attempt a more minute anal-
ysis of the outstanding features of his system, and at the risk
of some repetition to bring together the main points by which to
evaluate the merits of his work.
1. Metaphysical problems .
Since it is the primary purpose ofjfthis study to dis-
cover the relations between Green's ethical theory and his rel-
igious thought, metaphysical questions will of necessity be
To
limited to outstanding features. But owing /the fact that his
ethical and religious views rest upon his metaphysics, the latter
must receive consideration. In discussing Green's metaphysics
we shall take up in turn his epistemology, his theory of rela-
tions, his conception of the self -- finite and infinite, his
idea of freedom, and his belief in the objectivity of value.
a. Epistemology .
We shall start with his epistemology because Green
himself makes it his starting-point. He makes no clear dividing
line between epistemology and metaphysics. In fact, a serious
weakness of his system is found in the fact that he often fails
i
to distinguish between the two. Both logically and chronologic-
ally he begins with the consideration of the question "How is
knowledge possible?" and on his answer to this ouestion he pro-
ceeds to build his metaphysical system. We shall first state
briefly the main outlines of his epistemology and then shall
offer some criticisms upon it.
Green's epistemological oosition in general is that of
Kant. rje insists upon the activity of the self in k:io\7ledge, and
in connection with his theory of relations (in which the world is
regarded as a single all-inclusive system) he makes the self an
indispensable factor in bringing together these relations and
giving them meaning. This "synthetic unity of apoerception" is
further extended to account not only for the grasping of these
relations by the finite mind but for their very existence, and
accordingly he proceeds to an epistemological proof of the exis-
tence of God.
Green's earlier works are devoted very largely to an
attempt to reveal the inadequacies of empiricism. In his Intro -
duction to Hume
,
he discusses the epistemology of Locke
,
Berkety and Hume, with the conclusion that in each case there has
been an attempt to build up a knowledge of the external world on
a basis which can give it no true unity or reality. Locke's
fatal weakness he thinks arises from his method of trying to base
all conclusions regarding the origin and nature of knowledge on
i
152.
passive observation of what goes on in one's own mind, without
due regard for the objective *orld which is percei ved'Berkeley
'
s
chief error fas interpreted by Green) lies in regarding the mater-
ial world as a mere succession of feelings (i.e. sensations) with
the conclusion that material substance is a fiction. 2" Hume, fol-
lowing Locke's premises to their conclusion, could find nothing
in his mind when he "looked into it" except a mass of sense im-
pressions which had no connecting bond except as they were somehow
worked over into ideas by the uncertain alchemy of association.3
In protest against such sceptical and inadeouate conclusions, Green
insists upon an objective mode of approach which shall do justice
both to the world as actually experienced and to the nature of the
subject who experiences it.
In his lectures on Spencer and Lewes, Green carries fur-
ther his attack on empiricism by showing that Spencer's philosophy,
under the guise of "transfigured realism", fails to give any ade-
quate solution of the problem of knowledge. Spencer makes the
object exist apart by itself, prior to and independent of the sub-
ject, and then assumes that the object somehow causes mental acti-
vity in the consciousness of the subject. This Green shows to be
untenable on the ground that the subject-object relation is an
indispensable aspect of all knowledge and that neither subject nor
object has any reality apart from the other.* While Green does not
Wks, vol. i, pp. 7, 11, et al.
*Ibid., p. 157.
J Ibid., p. 162 f.Tibia., p. 387.

use the terms epistemological monism and dualism, his affirmation
that every act of knowledge involves "both a subject and an object
indicates that his general position is that of eoistemological
dualism.
In the Prolegomena , the ouestion of the possibility of
knowledge takes the form, "Can the knowledge of nature be itself
/
a part or product of nature?" In reply he shows that the very
fact of our ability to know nature implies a principle in man
which is not natural, since the attempt to answer the ouestion
empirically or materialistically lands us in hopeless dilemmas.
Matter and motion, he says, are merely expressions of relations
found in our conscious experience, and however much we may seek
to explain experience by them, the very feet of there being an
explanation remains unexplained. From the inadeouacy of materi-
al formulae to explain the possibility of knowledge or the source
of thought relations, he concludes that an idealistic interpre-
tation must be sought.
The most important aspect of his eoistemology , aside
from its relation to his metaphysics, is his conception of the
test of truth. Sense perception (under the name of feeling) is
shown in the Introduction to Hume to be an inadeauate criterion,
since it fails to meet the demands of a unitary system. Author-
ity and tradition are rejected as criteria, as is evident in hie
Prolegomena, p. 11.
Ibid. p. 14.
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protests against the influence of religious dogma. The pragmatic
test had not yet come into sufficient prominence to call forth
any consideration. But in accordance with his view that reality
is a "single unalterable, all-inclusive system of relations", he
adopts una 1 1 e rab 1 e ne s s as a criterion. He insists that a thing
is really what it is unalterably. Appearances may change, but
the real nature of' the object remains the same amid changing
manifestations. Thus the scientific quest for truth is merely
the search for the uniformity or unalterableness which constitutes
the real nature of the object of inouiry. On this basis he holds
that Locke's antithesis between the real and the work of the mind
is unfounded, for in a sense every act of the mind is real; but
that it is nevertheless possible to distinguish between objective
reality and illusion on account of the unalterableness of the
relations which constitute wh ich oonotit titc the former.
Green has commonly been considered to be an exponent
of the coherence criterion, and it is accordingly pertinent to
inquire whether there is after all any real difference between
coherence and unalterableness. It is evident that both rest upon
the theory of truth as an organic whole. Whether a thing is true
because it is an integral and consistent element of the system,
or whether it is true because it can be depended upon to remain
an unchanged element of the system, in either case it is the
place it occupies in the system which makes it true. Green in
i
Prolegomena, p. 29.

his practical application of the criterion makes no distinction
betveen coherence and unalterabloness and seems to assume that
the one implies the other.
However, in theory at least, there is a difference.
Green's description of reality is that of a "single, unalterable,
all-inclusive system of relations". The distinction between un-
alterableness and coherence as a test of truth rests in turn
upon the distinction between the adjectives "unalterable" and
"all-inclusive". The former signifies the absence of change or
variability; the latter the absence of omissions. Or (stated
in positive terms) the difference is that between the sameness
and the completeness of the system. It is evident that these
concepts are not identical.
Having stated the essential elements of Green's epis-
temology, we may now attempt to make some criticisms iiuon it.
Its outstanding merits lie in its refutation of empiricism and
its insistence unon the activity of the self in knowledge. Green
was thoroughly sound in insisting with Kant unon the 'synthetic
unity of aopercept ion"
.
However, the charge is often raised that Green took
from Zant a legitimate epistemology and made it over into an
unwarranted metaphysics, and for this charge there is some justi-
fication. It may be said in Green's defense that he apparently
did not intend to allow epistemoloory to usurp the place of meta-
i
physics. In his discussion of Spencer and Lewes, he states that
metanhysics becomes a "presumptuous paradox" unless it is based
upon an analysis of the objective world, and not unon the orocesses
of our intelligence which presupoose that world. The same idea
is expressed in his refutation of Locke and Berkeley. But when
he comes to build up his own metaphysics, we find that he does
rest his system largely on eoistemological grounds, Net only in
the Prolegomena , but also in his Introduction to Hume , in his lec-
tures on Xant, and his lectures on Logic, he starts with an ex-
amination of the conditions of knowledge, and it is by proving
the inadeouacy of empiricism that he establishes his own theory
of the world as a system of knowable relations. His doctrines
of the conscious self which experiences these relations and of
the eternal consciousness which makes all knowledge possible,
appear to be an outgrowth of his epistemological inquiries.
This raises the ouestlon as to whether the eternal
consciousness is really "a hypostasized abstraction", "a mere
unifying principle", "an epistemological monstrosity", as charged
by many of his critics. While a full discussion of this Rroe-
lera must be reserved for the following section, it may be said
that in general Johnson's solution of the difficulty aooears
3
correct. That is, (Jreen saw that if the Ding an sich were
eliminated from the Kantian conception of the synthetic unity
of apperception, the self to have any value must be regarded as
'works, vol. i, p. 377.
*-Supra, pp. 4L, 47, 59, 61, 64, 8G et ai.J Supra, p. 80.
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metaphysically real, and on the same basis the Universal Self
must he more than an epistemological unity. But Green does not
make this ooint very clear, and he undoubtedly weakens his meta-
physics by leaning too heavily on episteraology for its support.
He seeks to avoid this fault by beginning ostensibly with the
object known rather than with the knower. But as a matter of
fact, in regards the objective world from the outset as a system
of thought relations, and thus brings in an idealistic interpre-
tation which rests upon epistemological grounds. Then when he
seeks to find an explanation of this system of thought relations
in a unifying principle, it is easy for him to slip fas Seth
suggests) from "consciousness in general" to "universal conscious-
l
ness".
Another ouestion may be raised regarding the consistency
with which he adheres to epistemological dualism. We have seen
that he insists upon the reality of the objective world and admits
the distinction betxveen the subject and object aspects of thought
relations. Yet in his theory of relations he seems in some re-
spects to be very close to epistemological monism. In making the
objective world itself a system of thought relations, he appears
to put the relations existing between its vari ous ' objects on the
same level with those existing between the objects and the self
that perceives them. For this reason he has often been considered
' Supra, p. 42.
1
mentalistic and solipsistic; and it may "be said also that if all
reality consists in relations this view is not far removed from
the epistemological monism of neorealism. But, as in previous
instances, we must attribute to Green's inconsistency the appar-
ent validity of the charges. It is evident from his main uosi-
tion that he did not irtend to reject the objective reference of
thought, even though in some instances he appears to be doing so
Again, his treatment of the distinction between truth
and error is not wholly satisfactory. In his discussion of the
relation between subjective and objective reality, he is, if not
inconsistent, at least unclear. We surely can not take him at
hia word in saying that we have no right to ask "What is the
real?" for if so we should be equally unable to ask "What is
the system?" But granting that he did not intend to deny the
possibility of distinguishing reality from illusion, the criter-
ion of "unalterableness" is an unfortunate term, for it appears
to deny the possibility of change in anything real. What he
probably means by it is that the real is subject to a uniform
law of change. But even so, unless we are to bring consciousness
within the chain of natural causation, to insist literally upon
unalterableness as a criterion would make consciousness itself
unreal. While he uses the term as practically synonymous with
"coherence within the system", it is in reality the all-inclusive
ness rather than the unalterableness of the system which gives it
its epistemological value.
(
SApra
,
p. 54.
^Prolegomena, p« 26 »

b. The theory of relations *
The connecting link between Grean's episteraology and
his metaphysics is found in his theory of relations. This, as
we have seen, involves the dual doctrine that "all reality lies
in relations" and that "only for a thinking consciousness do
relations exist", 'In this theory he attempts to bring together
the outer world and the self to form a unified system (1) by re-
garding every object as metaphysically conditioned in its nature
by its internal relations to every other object, and (2) by
making the conscious self indispensable to the recognition of
these relations.
In discussing the theory we shall attempt first to state
what may be said in favor of it, then to discuss the objections
that may be raised against it, and finally to try to see how its
discreDancies may be harmonized.
The chief merit of the theory seems to me to be its
emphasis upon the unitary nature of the system. It attempts to
solve the problem of the One and the Many b;v showing that while
each object possesses individuality by virtue of the uniqueness
of its own peculiar relations, it likewise possesses universality
because of its inter-relations with every other element in the
system. From an epistemologica 1 standpoint, the theory affords
an excellent basis for the application of the coherence criterion,

since truth may be tested by the possibility of fitting a given
judgment into the whole system of related judgments. Likewise
from a logical standpoint, the stating of relationships is in-
dispensable to the definition of terms. From a psychological
standpoint, it may be said in its favor that no
4
datum of con-
sciousness is ever given as an entirely unrelated event.
Another merit of the internal relations theory, as
found in Green, is his emphasis uoon the function of conscious-
ness in the apprehension of these relations. By this theory every
object becomes an object of thought, and the system gets its unity
through the unifying function of intelligence. Since all relation
implies meaning, and meaning exists only for conscious subjects,
the very existence of the external world affords an argument for
the metaphysi cal reality of the self.
Turning now to the objections which may be raised
against the theory, we find at the outset that its two cardinal
doctrines are inconsistent. If all reality lies in relations,
then the self, if it is real, must also consist of relations.
The self, by the law of identity and contradiction, must obvi-
ously be either real or unreal. If it is unreal, Green's whole
theory falls to the ground, for the ver7/ purpose of his meta-
physics as stated in the Prolegomena is to show the reality of
the self or "spiritual orinciple" in man. Green assuredly never
intended to deny the reality of selfhood, which is asserted on
J
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almost every paere. But on the other alternative, that the self
is real, if we take Green at his word we must "believe that the
reality of the self, as of the external world, consists in rela-
tions. This doctrine sounds very much akin to neo-realism, and
is open to the same objections, i.e. that it affords no basL s
for causality or substance, nor even for a unifying principle
by which to distinguish truth from error. Prom his emphasis
upon the unifying function of consciousness, it is evident that
Green, had he lived in this day, would have indignantly rejected
the charge of kinship to neo-realism. But if we take his state-
ment as it stands and make all reality rest in relations, this is
the conclusion we reach.
Another serious objection, oreviously hinted at, is the
fact that the theory of relations does sway with the category of
substance. If all reality lies in relations, then we have an in-
finite number of relations but nothing to relate. It is (as James
Ward says in another connection) like the grinning Chesire cat in
Alice in Wonderland which disappeared but left its grin. It
would, if taken literally, olunge us into tht very scepticism
which Green was endeavoring to combat in Locke and Hume. It is,
of course, not necessary to lapse into realism or materialism to
assert the reality of substance: but Green's theory, if taken at
its face value, would^ as we have seen^o away with the reality of
substance even in the self. If it does this for the finite
.1
consciousness, it has the same effect upon the nature of the
infinite consciousness. Laurie is right, I think, in saying
that on this "basis both the finite self and God would be simply
"a complex whorl of knots tied without a string".'
Two other objections commonly raised against the theory
of relations do not seem to me to be s o well-founded. One is,
that to regard the self simply as a unifying principle destroys
JL
the nature of thought. That is, it robs the self of its creative
function, and makes it exist only for the purpose of synthesizing
impressions that come to it from without. This argument, it seems
to me, rests upon the fallacy that a self which has a unifying
function acts only in this capacity. While the validity of this
argument will receive further treatment in connection with Green's
theory of the self, there is no occasion for denying that a
conscious self which apprehends and unifies relations may also
have a creative function.
Another fallacious argument, akin to this and refuted
on the same basis, is the contention of Sidgwick and others that
ifA regard God as a unifying principle we give him no ethical
3
character. But his very willingness to establish a universe which
has unity instead of chaos is an ethical consideration, and the
fact that God (or man) has metaphysical attributes does not in any
wise deprive him of ethical characteristics.
We have seen that the theory of relations has something
Supra, p. 56.
Supra, p. 55, 58.
Supra, p. 61, 63, 98.
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to be said in its favor as well as some objections to be raised
against it. It may be worth while to try to discover where the
difficulty lies.
The root of the trouble, it seems to me, lies in the
fact that Green tried to bes:in with the object of thought rather
than the subject, yet rested his argument uoon epistemological
considerations. An idealistic argument of some soundness can be
built upon epistemological grounds but it must begin with a study
of the immediate data of consciousness and the nature of the
"knowing process. In his fear of subjectivism, Green did not adopt
this method. A far more tenable idealism can be built upon meta-
physical grounds by an analysis of the object known. Such an
analysis Green attempted to make, but he fell into the error of
leaning too heavily upon enist emology . True reality must lie
not only in intellectual cognition but in active will, and the
self must be regarded as active not only in apprehending relations
but in providing the cause of change in relations.
Another source of error is found in the fact that Green
seems to have confused the descriptive with the constitutive
character of relations. It is true that every object of thought
stands in certain relations, and that in a sense Aristotle is
right in saying that the indeterminate is non-existent. But this
does not by any means nrove that it is the relatio -S of an object
Cf. supra, p. 51.

which constitute its metaphysical nature. The real issue is the
problem of what constitutes these relations and what causes change
in the relations. However valuable a statement of relations may-
be in defining- a term, naming a thins: does not make it what it is.
We have found the chief merits of the theory to be its
emphasis uoon the unitary character of t he system and upon the
function of the self in apprehending relations. Its chief defects
we have seen to be the inconsistency of its two major doctrines
and its banishment of the category of substance, leading even to
the destruction of the reality of the self if rigidly aonlied.
Its chief sources of error we have located in Green's confusion
of epistemology with metaphysics, and his misunderstanding of the
true nature of relations.
In conclusion, it may be said t^at if Green had revised
his doctrine to read, "All reality lies in conscious selves who
apprehend relations caused by personal activity", he would 'have
avoided the difficulties which we have mentioned. Such a con-
ception makes a place for the category of substance, while at the
same time it preserves the values of a unitary inter-related
system and emphasizes the function of the "spiritual principle"
which Green himself regarded as essential to metaphysics, ethics,
and religion.
I
c. The self -- finite and infinite .
In discussing the nature of the self, we shall consider
first C^4~iconcent ion of the finite self, then his theory of the
infinite self, and finally the relation he seeks to establish
between them.
In considering the theory of relations we have found
that Green's theory on the one hand makes the self indispensable,
yet taken literally it makes it impossible. In evaluating the
work of any philosopher we must consider his theory, not at its
worst, but at its best. Accordingly in fairness to Green we
must center attention not on its discrepancies but on its real
contributions.
So, taking Green's theory of the finite self as an
indispensable adjunct to the theory of relations, we find that
he makes it an epistemological necessity. Relations would be
utterly meaningless, were it not for the self which grasps the
relations and by its unifying activity brings order out of chaos
and makes the relations meaningful. The mere fact that we can
know an objective order ooints to the conclusion that there must
be a principle of organization, not itself one of the objects,
through which all objects derive their meaning.
But not only is the self an epistemological necessity,
it is also a metaphysical necessity. The self is unitary and

timeless, and it is only through a unitary, timeless principle
that we are able to solve the problems of unity and plurality,
and of change and identity. Through the function of the self
in synthesizing the manifold, it is possible to reconcile the
One and the Many, or fas Hegel puts it) to find the "concrete
universal". Through the non-temporal character of the self it
is possible to find a principle of permanency in the midst of
change; for while the stream of consciousness is ever changing,
its separate states are knit together by an abiding self.
Furthermore, the self is an ethical necessity. In fact,
it is for this very reason that Green prefixes to his ethics an
entire book of metaphysics. While it is quite possible to accept
the main principles of Green's ethics without accepting his meta-
physics in its entirety (e.g. the theory of relations), it is
impossible to regard ethics as a normative science without recog-
nizing the function of the self. Unless the fact of moral
obligation rests, as Green says, upon a "spiritual principle"
which is not itself a natural phenomena, we must be content to
regard ethics as a natural science, to be studied empirically
like physics or biology. Moreover, if one is to accept a self-
realization rather than a hedonistic theory of ethics, the abiding
self must be recognized as indispensable; for if the self were a
mere series of passing sensations, the sensual hedonist might
claim to be realizing himself cuite as well as the seeker after
I
moral perfection. It is only on the basis of an abiding self
whose character is shaped by moral choices that self-realization
has any meaning.
The fact that the self is a religi ous necessity grows
out of the foregoing. Were it not for the abiding self which
communes with the infinite and partakes of its nature,, religious
experience would be impossible. If religion is to be anything
more than a barren form, it must have an ethical and spiritual
content which would be impossible except for the conscious self.
Otherwise the cardinal religious requirements of God, freedom
and immortality would be meaningless.
Turning now to Green's conception of the infinite self,
we shall discuss first the reasons on which he bases the belief
that God exists, and then his theory as to what God is.
That God exists, is a fact which Green regards as
established beyond all doubt. "That God is", he says, "it (human
reason) enables us t o say with the same certainty as that the
world is or that we ourselves are. What he is, it does not indeed
enable us to say in the same way in which we make propositions
4
about matters of fact". Passing over the inconsistency of the
implication (apparently unintended) that the existence of God is
not a "matter of fact", we find him untouched by doubts as to
the divine existence. The grounds on which he regards this propo-
sition as established are similar to those on which he bases the
Work'?, vol iii, p. 268.

reality of finite selves. In fact, he has often been criticised
for "basing his argument for the reality and nature of God on
analogy with finite persons. As the existence of an objective
order of relations implies a spiritual principle in man by which
they may be kno\m, so too the very existence of the "unalterable
all-inclusive system of relations" implies the existence of a
universal spiritual principle which establishes and unifies these
relat ions.
If we analyz3 Green's argument for the existence of the
infinite self, we find that this, like the finite self, is shown
to be necessary on epistemological, metaphysical, ethical and
religious grounds. In the first place, God is necessary in order
to explain the possibility of finite knowledge, for it is the
eternal consciousness reproducing itself in us which establishes
a unity between the relations of the external order and our finite
minds. "The inference from nature to a being neither in time nor
contingent but self-dependent and eternal is valid because
the conception of nature, of a world to be known, already implies
such a being"/ Granting that the world exists, and that we exist,
God is necessary to explain our knowledge of it.
While Green rests his argument for the divine existence
largely on epistemological grounds (and weakens it by so doing) it
has also an important metaphysical aspect. For the very exis-
tence of an objective order of relations implies God as the source
Works, vol. i, p^ 129.
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of these rela. tions. The unity of the system would be impossible
were it not for a unitary being who posits and maintains these
relations, This unitary being must be infinite and eternal, since
no human consciousness is all-complete and all-embracing.
This view that God is the source of relations is appar-
ently Green's meaning, although in his effort to avoid the sem-
blance of the cosmological argument he obscures his point by
saying that God is not to be regarded as the cause of the objec-
tive order. This denial of causality in God has exposed him to
serious attack, and if taken as it sounds, it is inconsistent with
the rest of the system. What he probably means to deny is the
view that God caused the world to begin to exist at a given period
of time. He says, "We contradict ourselves if we say that there
was first a chaos and then came to be an order; for the 'first'
and 'then' imply already an order of time, which is only oossible
through an action not in time".
While Green in his mode of Drocedure places his meta-
physics before his ethics, there is a sense in which he would
agree with Lotze that that "ethics is the beginning of metaphysics"
For not only is God necessary to explain the possibility of know-
ledge and the source of relations; he is necessary also to explain
the possibility of moral life. The fact of moral obligation which
prompts men to strive toward an ideal is unexplainable unless
there is a supreme being who cooperates with men in their efforts
I
Supra, p. 47, 61, 63, 98.
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to realize the ideal. As coherence between the finite mind and
the outer world indicates a spiritual principle which harmonizes
the system, so also coherence between the moral life and the
reality of the ideal recuires a spiritual principle which gives
a teleological basis to the moral order.
Green in his metaphysical and ethical works does not
make much direct use of the argument from religious experience.
He seems to feel that mystical considerations, in particular,
should be kept in the background. But in his religious essays
the need of belief in a God "who is niprh thee" is stressed as
strongly as the "eternal consciousness" or "universal principle"
in his distinctly philosophical works. Religious considerations
are probably largely responsible for the direction taken by his
philosophical convictions, and these will be given fuller con-
I
sideration in a later section.
When we ask the question, "What is God?" Green frankly
asserts that the question can nevor be fully answered. Yet the
fact that our knowledge of God is limited does not imply the
Spencerian doctrine that he is unknowable. Green may perhaos
be charged with having occuoied a disproportionate amount of space
in showing that God is rather than what he is, but he gives us
nevertheless some idea of his conception of the divine nature.
Some. of God's attributes he regards as knowable within
a reasonable degree of assurance. Through analogy with finite
Infra, p. 254.
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selves we may regard God as personal (thocgh Green is not wholly-
consistent in this view). To perform the function implied in the
existence of t he world order, God mast be unitary. To serve as
the permanent correlate of change, he must be timeless and eternal.
To be a spiritual and non-natural principle, he must of course be
non-spatial. If he is not to be himself determined and limited
by the relations which he constitutes, he must be self-determined.
Green sums the matter up by saying, "We are entitled to say,
positively, that it (the spiritual principle) is a self-distin-
guishing consciousness; and negatively, that the relations by
which, through its action, phenomena are determined are not re-
lations by which it is itself determined".
Yet in this very statement which seems to assert so
positively what God is, and what he is not, we have a discrepancy
which is typical of Green's entire discussion. The spiritual
principle, he says, is a self-distinguishing consciousness. Again
and again he uses these terms as synonyms, with reference both to
the finite and the infinite consciousness. But we may ask, "Is
consciousness a principle?" If it is, it ceases to be self-
distingui shim?, for no principle has the power of distinguishing
itself, or anything else, from the rest of the world of objects.
If on the other hand, God is a self-determined and completely
conscious person, it is incorrect to call him a principle. By so
doing, eternity of thought is substituted for continuity of
f
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consciousness, and logical wholeness takes the plaoe of conscious
activity
.
The same discrepancy arises in Green's treatment of the
moral ideal, He is unclear as to whether God is himself the
ideal which man seeks to realize, or whether Goo! though having
a separate existence is the source of the ideal which he sets
"before man. The distinction is more than a verbal one, for if
God is himself the ideal, man in striving to attain it progress-
ively realizes God and in a sense "creates" him. Green expressly
rejects the implication that this theory in any sense makes God
i
unreal, yet his interpretation of God as the "possible self"
seems to ascribe to him a potential character which becomes real
on]y as man makes it so. On the other hand, if God is a complete
and infinite person distinct in his existence from man and capable
of ; purposes and plans of his own, he may set before men an ideal
which he bids them realize and may cooperate in their efforts to
grow into God-like-ness without in any sense losing his own iden-
tity.
These problems relating to the nature of God overlap
the question of the relation between the finite and infinite self,
to which we shall now give more specific attention. The dis-
crepancies above noted are characteristic of Green's tendency to
waver between theism and pantheism. There has been much dis-
cussion as to whether Green should be classed as a theist or a
i
Works, vol. iii, p. 224.
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pantheist, but this question can not be answered, I uelieve, except
by Raying that he was both. Instead of trying tc pigeonhole his
philosophy, we must content ourselves with marshalling the evidence
on each side. The pantheistic elements will be presented first.
There is, first, the tendency already noted to confuse
a "unifying principle" with a "unitary self". If God is merely
a principle, we have the barren 0:ie-ness, devoid of ethical value,
r
of which Sidgwick complains. The effect which this has upon the
nature of finite selves depends uoon how closely we regard the an-
alogy bet een man and God to hold true. If the finite self is a
"self-d istinguishing subject", man remains personal even though
God does not, and we ha^-e a form of plural ism. But if human
consciousness also is merely a unifying princiole, i.e., one
element in the universal system, then we have monistic pantheism.
3oth conceptions are found in Green.
Another strongly lantheistic tendency is found in his
conception of the divided or double nature of the finite con-
sciousness. If God is reproducing himself in man and making the
animal organism the vehicle of the eternal consciousness, then the
finite self tends to merge its identity in that of the infinite.
If there is one univers? 1 self which thinks in all finite thinkers,
the finite self is robbed of its uniqueness and separateness . In
so far as it is God, and not nan, who thinks, man is deprived of
'Supra
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freedom. On such a basis the Universal Knower must know and ex-
perience everything just as it is known and experienced by every
finite self; yet this is impossible without imposing upon God the
limitations and contradictions of finite existence. It may rea-
sonably oe granted that God is immanent in the lives of man, and
we may even go so far as to say that God gives content to human
consciousness which would not otherwise Qe experienced. But when
we assert, as Green in a measure tends to do, that God is meta-
physically merging his existence with that of finite selves by
reproducing himself in man, we hr.ve a pantheistic position which
is untenable.
As previously suggested, another pantheistic problem
arises o^er the question as to whether God is real or potential.
Green apparently intended to regard God as a complete reality;
yet he reprebents God as the ideal which is revealed, though never
completely, in the lives of men. as man seeks to attain this
ideal he tends to identify himself with the life of God. Green
is unclear as to whether this identification of man with God in-
volves numerical identity of existence, or an approximation of
identity of type. If the former, we must conclude either that
man loses his identity in God, or else that God is only potsn-
tia] except as he aoouires reality in the lives of men.
Green see^s to avoid the charge of unreality in God by
'Supra, p. 172.

pointing out that the ideal is itself the highest reality. rJhus
if God is the ideal self, he is the most real being. But while
the reality of the ideal may be admitted, the grounds on which
Green defends this position are somewhat Questionable. He de-
fines the real as "that which has dualities and relations of its
own" . God is therefore the highest reality oecause he is the
most completely related being, "his is in harmony with the rest
of his theory of relations, but as we have seen, there are some
objections to accepting the premises, and nence the conclusions,
of the relational theory.
When we turn to the theistic aspects of Green's philos-
ophy, we find many features which counteract the pantheistic ten-
dencies we ha^e noted. In the first place, Green apparently did.
not intend himself to be regarded as a pantheist. In discussing
the -^hilosoohy of :<Tegel, he explicitly denies the view that re-
ality consists in an absolute system of thought. He criticises
the view that "it is not we that think out the universal reason
which thinks in us" on the score that/this makes an unwarranted
le«n from the process or power of thinking to an "absolute spir-
itual life" which is God. This, as we haT'e seen, is the very
charge which has often been raised, with some Justice, against
Green himself; out he was apparently not blind to the weakness of
the Hegeliar position and tried to offset it by the theistic ele-
ments of his system.
I
^Works, vol iii, p # 143.
Supra, pp.*42, 47,'59, 61, 64, 86 et al.

In opposition to his pantheistic tendencies, he repeat-
edly affirms the self, both finite and infinite, to be a "self-
objectifying" and self-dist inguishing" consciousness. By tnis he
means a personal being that has the power of oei'lg conscious of
itself as an object and of ctistinruishing itself fron nature and
from otner selves. He says that our truest idea of the infinite
must come from analogy of the finite self as we .mow it, and that
personality must be ascribed to both. He says on the r>oint, "But
for reflection on our oersonaiity, on our consciousness of our-
selves as objects to ourselves, we could never dream of there be-
ing such a self -realizing principle at all...* It is only because
we are consciously objects to ourselves, t at we can conceive a
world as an object to a single mind, and t.ius as a connected who.ie
Y/hatever we mean by personality, it is certain that we
shall • only fall into contradictions by substituting for persons,
as the subject in which the divine self -reulizativ n takes olace,
any entity to which self-consciousness can not be ascrioed".
'2he a^ove oasoa rre clearly indicates that Green intended
to affirm the personal nature of the self while likewise represen-
ting God as realizing himself in finite minds. It is possible to
retain the nersonality of ooth God unci man if "divine self-reali-
zation" means simply that God is cooperating with men in their
own efforts to attain the ideal which he has set before them. As
Prolegomena, p. 206 f.
I
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pantheism is inconsistent with freedom, Green's emphasis upon the
free activity of men in their ethical endeavor implies that he did
not intend to regard man's identity as lost in that of the infinite.
If we seek to examine the causes of this apparent dis-
crepancy in Green's position, they may he found largely in his
failure to use terms with fixed meanings. For instance, in the
term "eternal consciousness" he sometimes uses eternal to mean
"rational" and sometimes "divine". ?hus , confusion arises between
the eternity of a thought system and of a timeless personal being.
Again, "universal consciousness" means sometimes an all-inclusive
system of thought relations; sometimes an omniscient person who
unifies these relations. From this, it is easy to confuse logical
identity with metaphysical identity, and the universal aspects of
selfhood become one universal self.
Another cause of lis frequent tnough perhaps unintended
lapses into pantheism may be found in his religious conviction of
the divine immanence* r2o him the deistic tendency which placed
God "afar of:?" was so repulsive, that in his efforts to show the
nearness and indwelling presence of God, he tended to overlook
his transcendence. A union of immanence and t ranscenaence in a
personal God is not an impossible conception, nor one which is
foreign to Green's thinking, but he pave a aisproport innate em-
phasis to the i.i:v:ueiice aspect of the divine nature. "he question
Il
as to whether he was in reality a pantheist, or whether he should
be classed as a theist with an undue stress upon the divine imman-
ence, must remain unanswered. Philosophy is not "the art of affix-
ins; labels' 1 .
d. Freedom.
Green's conception of freedom is fundamental to his
ethical theory. In fact, he states that the whole purpose of the
metaphysical inquiry with which he begins the Prolegomena is to
/
arrive at some conclusion regarding the possibility of freedom.
If man is a mere machine, moral choices are impossible, but Green
attempts to show that man is not a mere machine. His account of
freedom is on the whole satisfactory.
His conception of freedom centers around four leading-
ideas: fl) Han himself is a non-natural being who owes his origin
to the eternal consciousness rather than to natural causation.
(2) I.Ian, like the eternal consciousness, is a "free cause". (3)
]Ian, in his ethical activity, is determined in his choices by
motives. (4) I Ian is most free when he acts in harmony with the
ideals of service and self-realization.
?he first proposition has already been discussed. It
is the "spiritual principle" in man which sets him apart from
Prolegomena, p. 85.

natural phenomena. Since human consciousness is not a product of
natural forces, but is the Manifestation of the eternal conscious-
ness which reproduces itself in finite selves, nan's ethical ac-
tivity can not be limited by the chain of natural causation. To
consider man merely as a natural phenomenon, would involve a dis-
regard of the "self -objectifying consciousness" in which he is
akin to Ood.
The proposition that man is a free cause grows out of the
preceding. Green discusses this at considerable length at the end
of Book I of the Prolegomena. The chief point which he raises is
the question as to whether roan can still be free when his animal
erganism is determined like other phenomena by natural processes.
The answer which he gives is that man, as a knowing subject, is
a reproduction of the eternal consciousness and therefore partakes
of the freedom of the infinite self.
To the question as to whether this reproduction of the
eternal consciousness in the animal organism does not make man in
part a mere product of nature and only in part free, he gives a
negative answer. For he says the spiritual element in man is his
true self, and the animal functions which condition his organism
cease through their relation to consciousness to be merely natural
processes. "In strict truth, the man who knows, so far from being
an animal altogether, is not an animal at ail or even in part,*
Prolegomena, p. 90.

He bases this belief again on the "self-distinguishing'1 nature of
consciousness, for a living body does not consciously distinguish
itself from its relations, while nan possesses this pcwer as his
special characteristic.
Green's conception of ethical activity as determined by
motive is closely related to the freedom involved in the self-dis-
linguishing nature of consciousness. The crucial question as to
whether ethics is a natural or a normative science depends upon
whether the motives which determine conduct are products of natural
forces. At first sight it may appear that they are, since the
wants which determine motives are in large measure animal wants.
But if the animal organism, through becoming the vehicle of the
eternal consciousness, loses its animal nature and becomes a func-
tion of the conscious self, so also choices made by the conscious
T
self cease to be animal wants and become motives of free personal
activity. Among numerous "solicitations", perhaps natural in
their origin, one is chosen as a motive which represents an ideal
of personal good.
This question of the relation of freedom to motive is
discussed by Green at length, for the charge is often raised that
if the motive is the outcome of circumstances and character, free-
dom is abrogated. The answer which he gives is, that circumstances
{he
determine^ motive only through the action of the character or self

upon then, since circumstances take on new meaning in the light
of the consciousness that experiences them. "Thq circumstances
which in combination with character affect moral action, just
because they are so combined, are no loi ..or what they would be
merely as circumstances."' Furthermore, to the charge that char-
acter itself lacks freedom because it is inevitably determined by
past choices, it may be admitted that character is largely the
product of oast "presentations"; but this does not rob it of its
freedom because past like present choices are timeless acts, in
which the self identifies itself with some desire and thereby
transforms an animal want into a personal motive.
?o the question as to whether motivated action is in
reality determined rather than free because one always acts from
the strongest motive, Green admits that "to a will free in the
sense of unmotived we can attach no meaning whatever". But to
call the motive which determines action the "strongest" is mis-
leading, beca Lse one does not always act in accordance wi th his
strongest desires. He acts rather in accordance with an idea of
personal good. 2his ideal of personal good may be regarded as the
outcome of circumstances and character without any incompatibility
with freedom ,if it be understood that the choice is made not by
natural forces but by a self-distinguishing consciousness.
Prolegomena, o. 109.
S-Ibid., p. 108.

Applying Green's conception of freedom in a wider sense
to the activity of i lan in his social and political relationships,
we find him voicing the sentiment that true freedom consists in
the ability "on the part of t] 8 citizens as a body to make the most
and best of themselves". For this reason he was' opposed to slavery
and to every form of intellectual and political bondage, and la-
bored diligently for the removal of obstructions to the free devel-
opment of the oppressed classes. In his essay on The Force of
Circumstanc es , we find him expressing the view that the human
spirit escapes from bondage by recognizing the call of the eternal
spirit "whose service is perfect freedom". The' force of circum-
stances can not be evaded but it may become a power for good in-
stead of evil, for "the good man, by man ifest ing the power of the
creative spirit to bring good oat of evil, asserts the freedom
which the otner abdicates". Thus the faitn of the raartyr by rising
above untoward outward circumstances exerts the truest freedom;
while bondage consists in following the path of least resistance
instead of obeying the call of God to sacrifice and service.
Green's conception of freedom requires little criticism.
It is one of the most substantial and fruitful elements of his
philosophy, and while flaws may be found here and there, his main
position is securely grounded.
His conception of human freedom as resulting from the
Works, vol. iii, p. 371.
•Ibid., p. 6.
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reproduction of the eternal consciousness in man nay be criticized
on the score that this contains pantheistic implications hostile to
freedom. If we recognize only the pantheistic side of Green's th
thought, this charge oust hOj_d. However, the point which Green
is apparently seeking to emphasize is trie fact that man, like God,
possesses a conscious li:"e which is more than a natural function.
This view is entirely in keeping with personalis^is theism.
Again, he may be criticized for denying that fcSan is in
part a natural product. His account of the mind-body proulera is
not adequate. he was )erhaps over-meticulous in explaining away
man's animal nature, for by granting the possibility of interac-
tion, it may be admitted that man 1 s animal organise is a physical
machine without detracting from his spiritual nature. Green's
puroose, however, was not to deny this fact but to emphasize the
Tooint that the real man is not the physical organism but the con-
scious self which uses tne organism as its instrument
.
a furtner cnarge
.
(which Sidgwick raises) is that Green
by admitting the power of circumstance and character in controlling
motive, becomes in reality a determinist. It is trie that Green
somewhat overest imated tl e scope of freedom, and underrates the
power of ext-rnal forces which thwart its operation. However tne
charge as raised seems correctly refuted by Green himself in the
Supra, p] . 89, 116.

view that the free activity of the self by its conscious choices
has the power to resist c ire urns tance and to transform character.
e . The objectivity of v^Iue .
The central feature of Green's ethics is found in nis
theory of the moral ideal, and this in turn rests upon a deeper
metaphysical problem; namely, the objectivity of value. 7?hij_e
Green does not use this term, he fully affirms the belief that
values are not merely subjective experiences but have a real exis-
tence in the purposes and plans of the eternal consciousness. The
main problems of ethical and religious importance which relate to
the objectivity of value are fi) the relation of value to origin;
( H ) the reality and significance of the ideal; and (g) the problem
of evil. These will be discussed in turn.
(1) Valug and or igin.
The problem of the relation of value to origin bears
directly upon the question of evolution. Many i.ave thoug t it
Impossible to regard consciousness and social institutions as
haying an objective or divine origin in view of the fact tnat
their development can oe traced back histor ically to primitive
forms. Accordingly, such "posit ivists" nave regarded ideals
likewise as having merely a subjective, human existence and have

rejected "all moral and spiritual ontology*.
Green's treatment of the relation between origin and
value is not entirely clear, and from his vigorous rejection of
tne view that evolution can explain oil conscious phenomena, he
has been charged with overlooking the distinction between phenom-
enal and metaphysical origins. However, this does not appear to
have been his intention. He points out the fact that a genetic
study of man's life, whether physical or conscious, in no wise
abrogates the importance of the eternal consciousness as its meta-
physical source. Such an inquiry, he says, "may no doubt result
in discoveries of the greatest importance for the relief of man's
estate", but can in no rospect explain the ultimate nature of
human experience.
Green's treatment of the subject of origins appears
principally in his discussion of the bearing of the evolutionary
process upon the nature of consciousness. In his essays on Spencer
and Lewes, and again in the Prolegomena , he affirms the view that
there is no incompatibility between tiie relief in the non-natural
character of consciousness and the view that man's physical organ-
ism may have iiad a strictly natural history. Such incompatibility
would arise, he says, only if it could be proven that such physi-
cal r>rocesse8 actually constitute the self -dist inguishing con-
sciousness; but on tne contrary human action is explicable only
'Perry^.B:Present Philosophical Tendencies, p
>
344.
x Works, vol. i, p. 474
3 Prolegomena
,
p. 94.

by the action of the eternal consciousness which uses these phy-
t
sical processes as its organ8. These involve elements of space
and time which do not explain consciousness, but are only explained
by it. Accordingly from a study of physiological psyche ogy,
whether experimental or ,-enetic, we may add to our /cnowiedge of the
nervous organism but not to our conception of what consciousness
really is. For "when we analyse any mode of consciousness we do
not come upon neural tremors".
Green even roes so far as to admit that human intel-
ligence itself may have developed, -o;.enonenaliy, from animal origins.
But he asserts that such a discovery would not affect the fact
that our consciousness has value and significance to us only be-
cause it is not now an animal function but a reproduction of the
eternal consciousness in us. He says, however, that to attempt
to explain human consciousness by animal origins is to explain
ignotum per i-rnotius since "we have much surer ground for saying
what we are than for Baying what animals are not". He thinks it
highly improbable that animals possess any such intelligence as
would justify our assuming even the phenomenal development of
human consciousness from the animal mind.
On the relation of value to origin in the development
of social institutions, Ciroen takes a similar position. He makes
no attempt to dany t:.ut our social and political institutions have
^Prole^oniciia, ^. ^J.
^forks, vol. i, p. 47".
3 Prolegomena 7 p. 95.

/grown from humble origins. A study of tribal customs reveals
historical information which is of much interest and value; yet
such early customs afford no explanation of the teleological de-
velopment toward higher forms. In the gradual growth of social
institutions we find a manifestation of a orogressively-realized
ideal which is more than human in its metaphysical source. Plan's
social and political life then uecomes, not merely a natural pro-
duct of inevitable forces, but a spiritual revelation. The
guiding ideal, which throughout its various manifestations is
always at bottom an ideal of the common good, leads nan from crude
beginnings to an over-increasing realization of the God-given
values of life.
{?,) The reality of the ideal . The most significant
feature of Green's conception of the objectivity of value is found
in this theory of the reality of the moral ideal. We shall now
discuss the grounds on which he bases this view.
There is, first, the argument for the existence of an
ideal moral order, from analogy with our knowledge of the existence
of the physical order. Just as the possibility of knowledge of an
external order and o,ir desire for further knowledge of it gives
evidence of an objective order to be known, so too our desire to
be batter and to attain; trie moral Ideal is an evidence of an ab-
solute "best" wiiich has real existence in the eternal consciousness
i
Prolegomena, p # 21C.
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This argument is practically synonymous with that which Sorley
I
emphasizes as "coherence".
Anotner evidence of t<:e objective existence of the
moral ideal is found in the teleologicai character of moral prog-
ress. Thile the c out ent of trie ideal in various stages of man's
development i.as under 'one manif old changes, its form has remained
uniformly an ideal of the common good; and this ideal, as a su-
preme regulative priiiciple, lias shaped the progress of mankind
toward a definite goal. Unless the ,^oal of moral progress has
real existence in the mind of God, there is no guarantee that
progress will continue, and there is no explanation of the fact
that man thus far lias apparently been moving toward a. "far-off
divine event". He says, "If the history of mankind were si. .ply
a history of events, of which each determined the next following,
there would he no progress or development in it"; for there would
be nothing in it "to satisfy that demand for unity of the mani-
fold in relation to an end, which alone lec„ds -is to read the
idea of development into human affairs".
An argument from finite limitations appears in his
view that it is result being developed which is the true reality.
This likewise grows out of the demand for completeness. Since
the full realization of man's capabilities is not found in any
finite life (and so far as we know can not be fully attained
f Sorley, W.R. : Moral Values and the Idea of God, pp 96 f.
•Prolegomena, p. 216.
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under finite conditions) the only way to secure completeness in
the morel ideal is to posit an eternal spirit, free from finite
limitations, in which self-realization is complete. Plan's true
self tnen becomes, not the empirical self as it exists at any
given period of time, hut the ideal or "possihle" self which is
the reproduc tion " in h'm of the eternal consciousness.
On this basis Green reg-.rds God, not merely as the name
for an empty ideal (as may be charged) but as the most real being.
Man is relatively real, in oroportion as he identifies his life
with the eternal consciousness, but God alone is completely real
because in him alone is the ideal completely realized. "2here
must be eternally such a subject which is all that the self-
conscious subject, as developed in time, has the possibility of
becoming; in which the ;udea of the human spirit,, or all that it
has in itself to become, is com >j_ett,'yrealized . " '"he reality of
the ideal thus becomes a transformed version of the ontologicai
argument for the divine existence.
Of the nature of the ideal, Green asserts, as cardinal
doctrines, that it must be personal and soc ial . "Our ultimate
standard of worth is an ideal of n er s ona 1 v/orth. All other
values are relative to value for, of or in a person. '2o speak
of any progress or improvement or development of a nation or
society or mankind, except as relative to some greater worth of
'Prolegomena, p. 215.

persons, is to use words without meaning*. Accordingly in con-
sidering the development of man toward the goal established by
the eternal consciousness, we must rule out any conception which
would make this end consist in the extinction of personality or
in the treatment of persons merely as a means. This emphasis
uoon the personal nature of the ultimate ;~ood may be regarded as
Green's greatest contribution to ethical theory.
"he view that the ideal is personal is inseparably con-
nected with the idea that it is social * for as Green says, "Y/ith-
out society, no persons: this is as true as that without oersons,
without self-objectifying agents, there could De no society"."^
Society is the condition of the development of a personality, and
while the various membere of society d gvelop in various ways, it
is only as society seeks to fulfill the ideal of development of
human capabilities in the direction of the common good, that it
may be said "to fulfill its function, to realize its idea as it
is in God".
Green's conception of the reality of the ideal in gen-
eral is sound, and it is a fundamental conception both of ethics
and of religion. As we shall see, it affords the cnief meeting-
place of ethical theory and religious thought.
It may oe said, however, that Green assumes too much
in considering the reality of an objective ideal to be logically
Prolegomena
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denonstrated. Attention has been caiied to the fact that in
regarding God as the moat real being because the ideal is the
i
true reality, he practically restates the on tologieal argument.
'.Thile this conception has great Vidue ooth for religious and
ethical thought, it does not absolutely held as a "rigor and
vigor" proof.
Again, Green's conception of the manner in which man
attains the ideal is not waolly satisfactory. For here, as
elsewhere, the idea of the eternal consciousness which "reprodu-
ces" itself in man and constitutes his ret 1 self tends somewhat
to discredit the reality and distinctness of finite selfhood.
Jhis aspect however has already jeen discussed arid need not de-
tain us longer.
?he most valuable elements in Green's conception of
the objectivity of values are found in his doctrine of the re-
ality of tne idea± as )c.sed on coherence and teleology, and
also in his doctrine of the nature of t:ie ideal as personal and
social. Tnese are basis factors which are of permanent Yalue«
(3) '2he u-oniem of evil . The problem of evil is in-
cluded at this point, not oecause Green gives it a prominent
place in his ohiloso^hy, but because any theory of the objec-
tivity of value must be viewed with suspicion unless it provides
' Supra, p . 169
xSupra, p. 171 f.
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a consistent place for this age-long problem. She clearest ex-
pressions of Green's views on this subject are found in works
Which, chronologically, stand almost at opposite extremes of
his creative work; i.e., in his undergraduate essay on [The
Force of Circumstances and in the lectures on the Principles
of Political Obligation delivered not long before his death.
The view-point of the two does not differ fundamentally.
In The Force of Circumstances the main point which he
makes is that the obstacles which seem to thwart human progress
are placed in our way, not to be yielded to, but to be triumphed
over. Again ne draws an analogy between physical nature and the
moral life. Just as there is no chasm between man arid nature,
but "one is the living receptacle, the other the apt channel, of
i
the influx of divinity"; so we nay regard the circumstance* which
seem to enslave us, as being in reality forces to try our mettle
and bring us closer to God by overcoming them. "Bodily suffer-
ing has always been considered by religious men as chastisement
from a father's hand, which curhi the overweening conceits of
their childish assurance; and even the infection of past sin,
which they can n >t wholly purge away, becomes part of their spir-
9-
ltual training.
Green regards the different ways in which opposing
circumstances are met as being tne truest index of the character
Works, vol
#
iii, p. 5.
Ibid., p. 6.

of men and of nations. The greatness of people si rartly drift
with the tide, and in following the path of least resistance
they become slaves both to external forces arii to their own evil
impulses. Others there are who desire goodness, and who follow
the path of goodness rather than evil when they can do so without
too grer;t effort, but they never rise above the bondage of cir-
cumstance. Of these it may be said that "the spirit is willing
but the flesh is weak". But the redeeming feature of every age
is that it possesses a few rare spirits whose high creative en-
ergy is such that wi th the faith of the martyr they rise above
opposing circumstances that would seem insuperable. "When they
nre weak, then Are. they strong". Then a nation makes progress
in the direction of higher ideals and finer spiritual living,
it is not because of the rank and file who are the creatvres of
circumstf nee , but because of itv. nrophets and reformers who are
the creators of circumstance. "The spiritual energy of the lib-
erated? few introduces an element of good into the force to which
i
the many are subject." Such spiritual energy we nay regard as a
manifestation of the divine, and in triumph over opnosing cir-
cumstances we may see the hand of God revealed.
The orincipal ooint with reference to the problem of
evil which Green makes in his lectures on the Principles of
Political Obligat i ons is that God "overrules for good" even the
Works, vol. iii, p. 9.
i
selfish acts of evil men. '2he career of IJaooleon is mentioned
ae an outstanding example, for the passion for glory which dom-
inated Napoleon was selfish in its motive, yet in its outcome
it served the welfare of western Europe. The uossibility of
such "overruling" Green finds in the fact that no motive is
wholly selfish, and it is the /rood element in it which causes
it to work good results. Furthermore the "idiosyncrasy" of a
particular man may be evil, "but the results of his work are de-
termined in large measure by forces over which he does not exer-
cise control. An ideal of social good may cooperate with the
motives of selfish men, and it is only through such cooperation
that they become instrumental for good.
Green does not here develop very fully the view that
the "ideal of social good" which triumphs over evil is founded
on the activity of God, for the Princ iples is written from an
ethical rather than a metaphysical stand-point . However he
strongly suggests this idea in the vvords, "Perhaps, on thinking
the matter out, we should find ourselves compelled to regard
the idea of social good as a communication to the human con-
sciousness, a consciousness developing itself in time, from an
eternally complete consciousness." He states further that while
Works, vol. ii, p # 442.
Ml
its active presence in the minds of men is due to the institu-
tions under which they have been "born and bred, the very ex-
istence of these institutions is due in turn to the action of
what appears to be a universal idea.
Green's solution of the problem of evil is satisfactory
as far as it goes. As we have seen, he brings out clearly the .
fact that the existence of opoosing forces is not inconsistent
with the realization oi an objective moral ideal; and in his
view of the oossibility that evil may be overruled for good he
implies that the good is objective while the evil is not.
However, Green may be criticised for what he leaves
out. He makes no clear distinction between moral evil and Phys-
ical evil. He recognizes, of course, that both sin pnd suffering
exist, but we find in his work no definite attempt to separate
and solve the problems connected with each. His treatment of sin
is more adequate than that of suffering, and wi 11 be discussed
further in connection with his religious views.
Again he may be criticized for failing to state clearly
whether he rege.rds God as the metaphysical cause of the oooosing
circumstances themselves, as well as of the good which triumphs
over them. He seems to imply this in The Force of Circumstances
'infra, p. 285.

where he says that creative spirits regard their environment
not simply as "of the earth, earthy" but as a d ivinely-appointe
discipline. In our>osing circumstances- we may read "the li^in^
law of a supreme creative spirit". He brings out the same idea
also in his lectures on the English Commonwealth .when he says
that we dishonor God and the rationality of his operation in the
universe if t in doing honor to a hero, we depreciate the prr-
poses tha: crossed his uath, and find in them only unreason.
Howev r, in the Principles of Political Obligation we find the
idea that the forces which thwart progress are antagonistic to
the divine will ".and must be fought against by God as well as
man. He means, probably, that Physical obstructions and those
which result from natural causes owe their metaphysical origin
to God, while moral evil resides in the free activity of sin-
ful men. This distinction however is not clearly made.
I
Works, vol. iii, p. 7.
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2. Ethical Problems,
In attempting to analyze Green's ethics we shall
consider in turn the nature of ethics, the relation of ethics
to epistemology , its relation to metaphysics, the relation
of self-realization to formalism, and its relation to hedonism.
While the main principles of Green's political theory will also
be considered in connection with these tonics, no specific
discussion will be priven to it for the reason that it raises
no serious problems. Its main outlines have already been
stated in the reviews of ? TacCunn, Ritchie and K&fcrhead, and it
is in the main satisfactory,
a. The nature of ethics .
We can not proceed far in an evaluation of Green's
ethics until we know on "'hat basis we are working. While
men have moralized for centuries, we have not yet reached a
general agreement as to what constitutes the proper subject-
matter or the proper view-point of the science of morality.
Many of Green's critics have objected to his ethical theory,
not on the ground of any inherent inconsistency in the theory
itself >but because it has failed to coincide with their
own conception of the Deal nature of ethics, accordingly it
will be profitable to examine briefly the main questions which
rels&te to the nature of Green's ethics, with an analysis of

i 1$
Green's attitude toward these questions.
The question which first presents itself relates to
the problem as to whether ethics is a descriptive or a normative
science. Does ethics ask how men do act, or how they should
act? *t is otovious that results will differ widely according
to which of these view-points is selected. If ethics is
merely a descriptive science, it is placed on the sane basis
as the physical sciences, and conduct as it i_s becomes an
object of investigation and observation without reference to
any ideal standard of what it ought to be . Taylor, we have
I
seen, holds that there is no essential difference between
ethics and the physical sciences, for both involve descriptive
and also normative elements.
Green's position (and in this respect it coircides with the
„
commonly held) is that ethics is both descriptive and normative.
He maintains however that there is a real difference oetween
ethics and the physical sciences. Ethics considers meanings tnd
values and the possibility of free activity, while the
physical sciences limit their investigations to the existential
and naturalistic aspect of things. In the introduction to the
Prolegomena
.
he shows with considerable cogency the
inconsistency of trying to build a normative science on a
naturalistic basis. He says "It has generally been expected
' Supra, p. 96.
i
of a moralist, that he should explain not onlyhow men do act,
but how they should act, and as a matter of fact we find that
those who regard the orocess of man's natural development
most strictly as a merely natural one are as forward as any to
propound rules of living, to which man ought to conform',' '
It is in this connection that Green makes the statement so
frequently quoted, "It is obvious that to a being who is simply
a result of natural forces an injunction to conform to their
laws is unmeaning. " Green has been charged with overlooking
here the distinction between origin and present value, and
while he undoubtedly falls into this error, his main point
relates to the impossibility of building a normative science
on a basis which regards man's present nature as purely
naturalistic. He shows that such an attempt if adhered to
consistently (as it generally is not) leads invariably
to psychological hedonism. We can not tell a person what he
ought to do if he is in the p-rip of inexorable natural laws;
,
we can only state what the quest of Pleasurable sensations
called forth by physical stimuli obliges him to do. In this
I believe that Green's position is valid. Ethics must first
examine conduct as it is, but it must go farther and attempt
to set a standard of what ought to be.; and if this ideal
standard is to be in any sen se within the reach of man's
attainment ethics must be more than a naturalistic science.
i
Prolegomena, p. 10.
L Ibld., p. 11.

A second! and closely related) problem is involved
in the question. "Does etnics precede metaphysics, or does
metaphysics precede ethics? *hile we shall have occasion in
a later section to devote more space to tne relation between
ethics and Metaphysics, it nay be noted at this point that
Green's whole node of precedure in the Prolegomena rests upon
the answer which he gives this question. He believes that
metaphysics precedes ethics, i.e that there can be no ethical
theory in a real sense unless it can find a foundation in man's
metaphysical nature and in the structure of the universe.
Accordingly tne defense of tne "spiritual principle" in man
and in A cosmos is made a nrimary issue. It is tne priority of
metaphysics in Green's thought wnich fives the Prolegonena
its name, and in fact the first hundred pages which are
devoted to metaphysics are tne only oart of the books which
can properly be termed "prolegomena".
However, the majority of ethical writers (even those
whose ethical tneory does not differ naterialiy from that of
Green) hold to the view that ethics may proceed without
reference to metaphysics, and that through the study of
ethics data may ge gatnered which will be of value in
formulating our metaphysical world-view. On this oasis, ethics
precedes metaphysics. This position I believe to be valid.

A I
Nor is it necessary to assume tnatjin studying etnics
empir ically, or without regard to metaphysics, we are
necessarily committed to tne view that ethics is a purely
descriptive science. tureen seems to assume tnat to oe
normative, etnics mist be metaphysical, out he overlooks
the fact tnat norms of conduct may oe established and
-orinciples laid down for their attainment without raising
metaphysical issues. It is possinle to accept tiie essential
elements of Green's ethical theory and at tne same time to
reject the greater part of nis metaphysics.
Then how shall we evaluate Green's conception
of tne priority of metaphysics? Was ne entirely mistaken
in his view-point? The solution of tne proolem must oe found,
1 thinK, in a distinction netween ontoiogical priority on the
one hand, and logical, chronological and pedagogical priority
on the other. Green is right in maintaining tnat unless man
has the oower of free activityand the power of building moral
ideals, and unless tnere is something spiritual in the structure
of the universe to ensure him the exercise of this power,
there can be no moral conduct in the true sense of the word,
.but on the otner nand, man ma^es moral choices before he
reflects upon the possibility of maicing them. »«e may argue
from our actual moral life to tne metaphysical foundation on
which it rests, and. we may study the conditions of moral
it
conduct, both actual and ideal, without reference to under-
lying metaphysics! issues. Yet the issues are basic even
though excluded from our study, and for thin reason Green's
metaphysical method does not deserve the opprobrium that
it has commonly received.
A third problem regarding the nature of ethics
Is involved in the question as to whether the aim of
ethics is theoretical or practical. Green has
frequently been charged with having failed to provide any
practical guidance to moral conduct. Sidgwick raised this
objection on a hedonistic b^sis and the c> arge is brought
from a pragmatic standpoint by Dewey and Ayre? . *t must
be admitted that Green's theory does not provide any
can
convenient yard-stick or f:et of rules whioh/he apolied
infallibly to every particular case. Whether or not his
ethics stands condemned because Of such a limitati on must
rest upon our conception of what the true function of ethics
is
.
Green himself discusses the problem toward the
close of the Prolegomena
,
where he considers the comparative
functions of mora] philosophy and external authority in the
shaping of conscience. His contention is that it is the
business of the moral philosopher so to enlighten conscience
that it can make proper discriminations among opposing claims
but that if he attempts to lay down hard and fast rule;.; for
'supra, pp. 91, IOC, 109.
Prolegomena, pp. 191-596.
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the guidance of consc ience , lie is not only unsuccessful in
this attempt but he fails- to perform his higher function.
A philosopher may render .an important practical service to
morality in clarifying thought, but he can not supply the
"moral dynamic" which is the basis of right conduct. "llo
doubt, as Plato saw, till the character is set in the
direction of the ideal, a theory of the ideal can be of no
value for tne improvement of conduct in any sense."
It is on the ground of admissions such as these
that Green has been charged with supplying no practical
7.
guidance to conduct, however it may he questioned whether
his position is as negative as it appears. To borrow
Bosanquet's phrase, his conceptions of the task: of ethical
theory is the "hindering of hindrances" to clear thinking,
ana accordingly to right acting. This view, which appears
with p-reat distinction in nis political and educational
theory as the removal of obstructions to free development,
is implied throughout his whoie discussion of ethical
theory. Jsven his metaphysical starting-point depends upon
his neiief that false theories must he eliminated in order
to -nrovide firm grounds for the true. if the general
validity of this view-point he accepted, it is unnecessary
to charp-e Green with having promulgated a theory having no
practical val.ie.
i
Prolegomena, p. 395.
*"Supra, pp. 86 91 et al.
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Prolegomena, p. 395.
^Supra, pp. 86 . 91 et al.
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Furthermore (to quote a pragmatist) -^ewey says
"huies are practical, they are habitual ways of doing things.
But principles are intellectual; they are useful methods
of judging things." But Jev/ey himself would not say that
etnics is a matter of rules rather than principles.
Granting that it is true that the principles of seif-
realizution are intellectual (or theoretical) they still
remain "useful methods of judging tnings." It provides
furthermore, a standard of judging things which can be
apolied to specific circumstances, ana while it does not
enaDle us to determine with mathematical accuracy what
ought to be done. on every occasion, its standard is at
least as concrete and definite as that of any rival
theory. 1'he fact that Green aid not follow the Prolegomena
with a dook on practical ethics is no detraction from tne
value of the former; and tne extent to which ureen
himself participated in the solution of current ethical
problems affords sufficient evidence that '^e was no
impractical theorizer.
Supra, p. 134.

b. The relation of ethics to epistemology.
Bthica hears a closer relation to epistemology
than is generally recognized. Hiile the relation hetween
ethics and metaphysics has repeatedly been made an object
of disputation by philosophers, it is only occasionally
that one attempts to show the connection between the Vc eory
of morality and the theory of knowledge; and for this reason
it is much to y ''eon's credit that he faced the uroblem
squarely. To be sure, he sometimes confused the epist enology
of the English empiricists with their metaphysical views,
but since they did so themselves he is not wholly reprehensible.
The best statement of his conception of the relation of ethics
to epistemology is found in the Introduction to Hum e, anri in
and in his essay entitled Popular Philosophy in its Relation
to Life.
. There he gives an excellent discussion of the
ethical implications of English empiricism.
Sre en. points out with considerable cogency that
the only consistent outcome of a sensationalistic epistemology
is a hedonistic ethics which is also deterministic and
egoistic. If the content of consciousness consists

solely of a series of sensations, pleasurablejfeeling is
the only possible criterion of moral goodness. If there is
no rational self to function in acquiring knowledge,
neither is there a rational self to act in ma" ing moral
choices. "MB in the popular (i.e. empirical) theory of
Imov/ledge , no distinction is made between the sensation
itself and the intellectual judgment of which sensation is the
occasion or accompaniment, so in the corresponding theory
of morals, feeling is treated as the exhaustive account of
all modes of consciousness with which it is associated."
This theory;, first definitely formulated by Locke but
presupposed before his time, has been the basis of the
popular philosophy which has dominated. English thought and
life. Green traces the results of this theory through its
various stages and shows that only through doing violence
to the theory itself can it be made a tenable basis for
moral conduct. In Hoboes, the feeling on which morality
is assumed to rest is mere animal appetite, but he is
forced to* a surreptitious introduction of sel f-c onsciousnees
before he can even account for the universal warfare which
is the basis of his ethical theory. Butler likewise is
forced into an inconsistency (thougj? from a very di fferont
motive), for in his desire to save morality and religion
he is obliged to do violence to the principles of empiricism
3
by separating conscience and self-love.
I
Works, vol. iii, p. 97.
aIbid., pp. 07-98.
3Ibid. pp. 99-105.
II
While Green coes not specifically discus Berkeley 3
ethical theory, he might have added that Berkeley also, in
his effort to preserve a sound basis for morality and religion,
is obliged to depart from a consistently hedonistic position
"by making the general well-being of mankind the true end of
ethical endeavor, by recognizing qualitative differences in
pleasures, and bv insisting upon the rational guidance of
I
ethical conduct.
However, it is in connection wi th Hume that Green
gives the most complete account of the Hedonistic and
egoistic implications of sensationalism. Hume, he says,
consistently sifted the theory of Locke to the oottom and
found it wanting, yet English philosophers since his time have
continued to "dig in the old vein which he had exhausted, and
of which his final dilemna had shown the bottom. The desire
to show the futility of this procedure and to reestablish
both epistemology and ethics on a Kantian rather than a Humean
basis appears to have constituted a large element in Green's
philosophical motive.
Hume's epistemology , in its relation to ethics, may
best be orepented by exesrpts from Green's statement of it.
''Good and evil, according to Hume, always mean pleasure and
pain, either as actually felt or as anticipated. Pleasure
and pain, aprain, are ultimately impressions on the bodily
organs, or, in Hume's technical language, 'impressions
'Alciphron, pp. 63, 64, 150; Miscellaneous Works, pp. 179, 453f.
^Works, vol. i, p. 2.

of sensation.' Of these , ' 6 opiea are ta3:en by the mind;'
balled ideas; and as thus copied, the primary impress! one
of sensations give rise to 'impressions of reflection,'
and to the 'direct passions' of desire and aversion, hope
and fear." ' Indirect passions likewise arise from
modifications of the ideas originating in sensations and
copied on the mind. Green continues, "These passions,
according to Hume, either as simple or as complicated with
each other .... 'ire the causes of all the actions of men.
Pen son neither lias anything to do with their constitution,
nor can it conflict wit)- them. It pi TTes nothing, it
merely has to do with the relation of given 'ideas' to
each other, either in tic way of agreement and disagreement
or )f caurt arid effect, so in regard to action it merely has
to c ilculate the means to a pl&nsnre that is desired or
hoped for, and discovers the cause of a pain that is
disliked or feared.'' It Le obvious that on such a basis, '
ethical conduct is reduced to psychological hedonism. If
reason can not orirrininate activity and man must do what
the "passions" arising from sensations bid him do, the
de?ire ""or pleasure is the only possible motive for ao.ivity.'
'works, vol iii, p 1C6.
V
Ibid.
, p. 107.
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3ut Green does not rest Lis analysis of the
problem there. He asks further, "How do we come to speak
of a way In which we oujarht to act, of rights and
obligations?" ' He finds in Tune the answer that pain and
pleasure "are not only inseparable from "ice and Virtue,
but constitute their very nature and essence." ^Yut is,
the faculty through which th ey . re felt is itself the
moral sense, and the feeling of satisfaetion experienced
in contemplating a pleasurable act is identical with the
sense of moral approbation. "I.n brief, its pleasantness
makes an act or character virtuous; not however directly,
but through the medium of a further pic -sure arising in
contemplation of the first.
Thus on a sensat ionalistic basis, we are forced
to do the thing which pleasurable feeling dictates, and
virtue itself becomes a form of pleasure. The fact that
we apparently do acts unpleasant ' in themselves, from a
sense of obligation, is explained a T"ay by the view that
we actually do them from a desire for ultimate pleasure.
How the substitution of ultimate pleasure for
temporary feeling is p ossible without the activity of reason
is a question not answered by Hume and not given
sufficient attention by Gre ax- Yet it constitutes an
'works, vol. iii, p. 107.
*IMd. p. 108.
L
an important objection to Kume T s theory, for sensations,
' Ss gengat i ons , can not be experienced in the future, jrijty
through the activity of a unifying self can the necessary
connections be made which transform fleeting states of
consciousness into a unitary whole.
However, at this point Green raises a very
pertinent question, "How is vice possible?" Borrowing
Berk/eley ' s phrase, Green says that on Hume's basis,
the viciousness of an act, like its virtue lies not
in the e s r e but the per dp i • That is, its moral quality
depends not on the act itself but on the feelings which
it arouses. But since one is bound to choose that which
will afford pleasurable feelings, he is therefore bound
to be virtuous. If this be true, all possibility of
moral choice is destroyed. The empiricist who attempts
to build an ethical theory on pleasurable sens it ions
i^ caught in the grip of his own logic, and readies a
conclusion which experience itself refutes.
Green makes an interesting application of the
deterministic outcome of sensationalism in reference to
the main theme of his essay on "Popular Philosophy i.a
its Belation to Life." The claim of the modern spirit,
he says, is to be free, to understand, and to enjoy.
Works, vol. iii, p. 94.

But if it attempts to understand (i.e to be consistent]
on the sensat ionalistio basis, its claim to en^oy runs
counter to its claim to be free. The burden of moral
obligation nay be shifted off, but only to be replaced
by the shack.] es of natural necessity. The influence
of Hume's philosophy as it has permeated English
thought is held by Green to be "the source of much
undemonstrative aprons at the times when speculation
comes home to life."
We have seen how Green traces the epistemology
of Locke and Hume to conclusions that ane hedonistic and
deterministic, .a word should be said regarding its
egoistic inplications . Hume's only explanation of
altru.ism lies in the theory that the instincts of
sympathy or benevolence leads one to take pleasure
in the pleasure of another. But on the basis of
pleasurable feelings alone, there is no valid,
explanation of the possibility of choosing pain for
one's self in order to *?i\-e pleasure to an other. As
Green says, "The distinction between the selfish and
the unselfish only finds its way at all into Hume's
system at the cost of marring its unity^ *
Works, vol. iii, p. 111.A Ibid.
,
p. 111.
3 Ibid.
, p. 110.

for Hume admits that sympathy must "be taken as "an original
principle of our nature" which is not to "be reduced to the
derire for pleasure or aversion to pain. (A further
consideration of the egoistic implications of hedonism
will be given in a later section)
Whatever may be the limitations of Green's own
epistenology , he did an admirable piece of work in showing
up the ethical inadequacy of sensationalism. By building
on .Kant's foundation rather than Hume's and recognizing
the activity of the self in kno/led£e, he was able to
avoid the pitfalls to which empiricism is subject. The
self, then, is able to give rational guidance tc conduct.
Moral activity is thus prompted by a desire to conform
to a moral ideal rather than by desire for pleasurable
sensations. The self, thus liberated, is free to choose and
free tc eot; and in its moral activity it nay consistently
be directed by altruistic motives, ^n such, a basis it
is possible not only to understand, end to bo free, but
to enjoy (in the highest sense) without the hopeless
cont radicti o.is of empiricism-
1 Supra, p. 150 f.
I
c . The relation of ethics to metaphysics.
We hare already given considerable attention
to the problem of the relation of ethics to metaphysics
in discussing Green's metaphysics and also in considering
the nature of ethics. Accordingly it will be possible
to eliminate from this section some elements (such as the
relative priority of ethics and metaphysics) which
would otherwise require consideration.
xv s we have seen, the fundamental issue regarding th
relation of ethics to metaphysics centers about the nature
of the self. If the self is a mere mechanism, "simply
a result of natural forces" as Green puts it, then it
follows that "an injunction to conform to their la m is
unmeaning." On the other hand if the finite self loses its
ideality in the infinite, and a universal self "thinks in
all so-called thinkers," then it is equally impossible
for the fj nite self to exercise the power of moral choices
Katuraiism and pantheism, though differing vastly from
each other, are alike in robbing man cf moral responsibility
Empiricism a] so, when it exalts itself into a metaphysic,
affords an untenable conception of the self, for unless
there is an element which is unitary and abiding amid the
transient stream of consciousness there can be sotcontinuity
of ethical endeavor and pleasurable feeling oust be the only
guide to conduct.
Supra, p. 200.
Supra
, p . 42
.

We have noted that Green explicitly sets himself
to the task of refuting the anti-ethical implications of
naturalism and empiricism. The grounds on which he does this
are in the main conclusive, and as they hare already "been
discussed they need not be jsapeated at this point. But we
ha^e noted also, in considering his metaphysics, that lie
constantly wavers between theism and pantheism; This
inconsistency in his • thought has serious ethical consequences
which call for further discussion.
The most vulnerable point in Green's whole
philosophy is found in his theory of the relation of the
finite self to the infinite, and few of his critics have
failed to point out the ethical inadequacy of the "timeless
self" Seth, Sidgwick, Laurie, Sturt, Taylor, Dewey and
numerous othea s of lesser importance have d~».elt upon this
3
weakness in his system, and while their attacks have often
overlooked the constructive elements of his theory, there
is a measure of truth in the charges. Green could have made
his theory much stronger by giving a more positive, and
less ambiguous treatment of the self. The general problem
of the ethical inadequacy of his conception takes several
forms which will be discussed separately.
/ Supra, pp 180, 199
Supra, p. 171 f.
Supra, pp. 42, 61, 63, 98, 105.

xhe form which the charge nest frequently asrunes
ia that Green in .exalting an epistemological unity of thought
into a metaphysical unity of reality has riven us a
hypostcsizee abotraction which has no ethical value. In
reply
f
it must be admitted that Green it: guilty of the
fallacy of abstraction. He does rent his conception of
the self, both finite and infinite, too largely upon an
epistemological unity of thought* If the self reru merely
a unifying principle and nothing more, neither man nor
God would have much ethical signifance.
3ut Green's conception is not reduced to the paucityof
ethical content which most of his critics imply. The main
tenor of Green's thought indicates that he regarded the self
both finite and infinite, as metaphysically real, hairing u
causal ( and not merely a unifying') function, ^.s «/'olmson
t
has shown, this conception became logically necessary
when the "din? an sich" was eliminated from t e ilantian
epistemol ogy . Green's critics, howe-er, generally overlook
this feature arc" lake a good deal of his, a; arent denial of
3
causality in God. Sidgwick, for example, apparently
misconstrues Green's affirmation of V e self-limited
character of God to mean that God has no oharaoter except
' Supra, p. 81
*" Prolegomena
, pp. 86-88.
2 Supra, p. 61.
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unification. He overlooks the fact that Green is protesting
against a mechanical rather than a metaphysical conception
/
of divine causality. Sturt likewise claims that in making
God a universal relating principle Green has left out
teleology and so has failed to make God moral. Here again
attention is centered only on one side of Green's conception
of the moral ideal.
A closely related objection is found in the argument
(advanced principally by Sturt and Dewey) that in making the
self a unifying principle he has. made it static. tsoth God
and man.it is charged, are reduced to static entities
having no function except to maintain fcr to apprehend an
unalterable system of relations, nature also is by- implication
a static system which is not capable of being the sphere of
moral endeavor. On such a basis it is btovious that no
ethical activity could take place, uut ureen nowhere implies
that either God or man is to be regarded as static, and though
he calls nature an. "unalterable" system he apparently means
that its change is uniform rather than that it is changeless.
The basis on which the self is charged by his critics with
being static is found in the use of the adjective "timeless."
This to be sure is a confusing term and raised difficulties,
especially when applied to the finite self, but he apparently
/
x Supra, p. 63.
Supra, pp 64, 103.
Supra, p. 158.
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means that the self is not conditioned by time, rather than
not capable of change.
This brings us to the heart of the problem, which is the
relation assumed to exist between the temporal and the
timeless self. If th4 finite consciousness is a reproduction
of the eternal consciousness, in metaphysical essence as
well as in type, then we have the impossible dualism with
which ureen's critics have repeatedly charged him. As we have
seen in the section dealing with Green's metaphysics , the
pantheistic elements in Green afford considerable justification
for this view. in so far as the charge of a dualist ic self
is valid, his ethical theory rests <bn an unsound basis;
for the self is no longer the unitary agent which ethical
activity demands, and finite freedom is replaced by the
action of the eternal consciousness.
It must be frankly admitted that Green never
satisfactorily solves the problem of the union of the
temporal and timeless elements of the finite self, de tries
to do it by the analogy of the shield having two sides, but
this fails to hold in view of the fact that shields are
material objects having a meeting-place of the two sides at
the edge, while this can not be said of consciousness.
However from a practical standpoint, he assumes in his ethical
theory, a personalist ic unitary self whose moral ideal finds
Supra, p. 171 f
.
Prolegomena, p. 79.

its true reality in the eternal consciousness but which is not
analagamated with it. On such a basis, there i s no obstacle
to an ethical activity in which the self seeks to reproduce
God by attaining to a higher standard of Godlikeness
.
Fhen we examine the view-point of Ufeen's critics with
regard to this apparent dualism, we find as usual that they
center attention on the inadequate elements of the conception.
I
Dewey, in particular, protests against green's disregard of
the "practical working self" in favor of a presupposed
schema, or rigid framework (such as Dewey assumes the ideal
or timeless self to be} Taylor and Sturt likewise charge him
with leaving out the empirical self which is the true basis
of ethical activity. However it is unfair to Green's real
intention to assume that he disregards the present empirical
self in his theory of the "possible" or ideal self toward
which man is striving. On the contrary, the whole theory
of self-realization rests upon the view that the actual, or
empirical, or" practical working"self is striving progressively
to attain an ever-increasing ideal. Of the so-called static
nature of this ideal, it must be noted that there is a
difference between an infinite ideal which has objective
existence, and man's apprehension of it. It is the task of
the finite self to realize as flar as possible the ideal
existing in the eternal consciousness, but this does not
necessitate the filling in of a ri.- rid framework.
Supra
,
p 105
.
Supra, p|97, 64.

The proximate ideal which each man sets befordhim is fluid
rather than static, and does not exclude but dm the contrary
motivate ethical activity.
Summarizing Green's conception of the nature of the self
in its relation to ethics, we find that it is open to the
charges of being (l) an hypostasized epistemological unity,
(2) a static entity, (3) an impossible dualism of temporal and time
less elements, (4) a presupposed framework without empirical
content. On any of these bases it would be ethically useless,
but none of these charges does full justice to all sides of
Green's conception.
Turning to the closely related subject of the moral ideal,
we find that here too, as in his conception of the self,
Green s statement of its content is negative rather than positive.
In fact he says, "Of a life of complete development, of activity
with the end obtained, we can only speak or think in negatives."
'
J*-
As caird indicates, it was probably his aversion to dogmatism
which made him reluctant to speak in more positive terms of the
natire of the self, or of the ideal. But he ccula have
strengthened his system very materially, and could have answered in
advance a good many arguments v/hich have been raised against
it, if he had put more content into these two basic conceptions
whish form the foundation of his ethical theory.
f
Prolegomena, p. 180. Cf. also pp. 189, 204, 244.
"Supra, p. 37.

The objectivity of the m<bral ideal ia an essential element
in self-realization, for unless the ideal toward which men are
striving has some objective reality there is no ground of assurance
that it can ever be attained. Even pewey, who is most antagonistic
to Green's conception of the moral ideal, makes the statement,
"The realization of this (ideal) self can be made the end only
if it is present in some ones consciousness." it is precisely
on this basis that Green postulates the teternal consciousness
ir^order that the end of moral endeavor may have actuality, though
Dewey of course applies the term "some one" only to finite selves.
We may place beside his statement the words of Green, "^ state
of life or consciousness not yet attained by a subject capable of it,
in re lation to that subject we say actually is not : but if there
were no consciousness for which it existed, there would be no sense
in saying that in possibility it is, fot? it would simply be nothing
at all.
The chief charge raised against Green's conception of the
-3
ideal is that it is unattainable. Dewey, in particular, asserts
that a goal which is ex hypo thesi unattainable is not only useless
but lEads to pessimism and despair. This charge, however valid from
an abstract standpoint, overlooks the empirical aspects of the
ideal and the possibility of attaining the proximate goal wftich each
man sets before him. The ideal is unattainable in the sense that as
we progress dissatisfaction with the present leads us on to
Phil. fiev. (2) 1893, p. 655.
Prolegomena, p. 215.
Supra, p. 101.

something higher. Bat this "flying poal" instead of afford-
ing discourapement is on the otf.er hand the hiphest incentive
toward an ever-increasinp harmony between the ideal and the
actual. uJxr)erience instead of raisinp an impossible barrier
to the attainment of the ideal gives us our surest clue to
its nature, and points the way to our duty in particular
cases.
Green makes the teleolo srical character of the moral
ideal an essential element in moral nrofress. In fact, he
repards moral advancement as possible only when man
propressively extends the area of the common pood by
conceivinp the poal of human activity in more personal and
more social terms. The teleolopical character of the ideal, as
revealed throuph the ages, in turn affords prounds for belief
in an objective ur ultimate "best"' toward which the manifold
efforts for the "better" are tendinp. 'Jaylor, as we have
seen, denies this on the score that we empirically choose
the better without reference to an ultimate best. The
validity of the charpe denrnds upon whether we have a
psycholopical or an ontolopical a-nnroach. While it is
doubtless true that most men do not ston to consider an
ultimate standard in choosinp one thing in -preference to
another, it is also true, that unless there were some
ultimate standard, our choices would nevpr pet beyond the
relativity of the oonhists. 'Jhe urinci-ole involved is
Supra, p. 96.

analogous to taat found in the distinction between a
''reflective consciousness of self* experienced (though rarely)
by the few, and an 'experience of self-identity" which is
common to all e^en when not reflected upon.
The ethical significance of institutions is also
an important aspect of Green's conception of the moral ideal.
Hi regards them as the crystalized result of past efforts
i
to harmonize the ideal and the actual. Accordingly, in our
moral code and in our established institutions such as the
state, the family, the church, etc we can find practical
guidance to the determination of the content of tnp coral
ideal; for these while not perfect nevertheless indicate
the direction in which r>r ogress li°s. Green's critics in
charring him with "boing anti-prapnatic and too nerative in
his conception of the ii^al, havn connonly overlooked thp
ethical importance which he attaches to existing institutions,
or else have accused him of relyimg merely on conventional
morality. Both attitudes are unjust to Greea.
Other aspects of Green's mptapnysi^-s have eT.-.ical
implications, but as they nave previously been discussed, they
need not detain us long. dis conception of freedom, for
instance, is a fundamental factor both of his ethics and his
metaphysics, but this conception, as important as it is,
rpsts in turn upon his theory of the self, and stands or falls
Prolegomena, p. 236.
Supra, p. 66, LOS.

with the validity of his conception of the self. -he
relation of freedom to unmotived willing and the deterministic
asnects of choices based on animal atmetites and on past
character haffe already "been considered in connection \7ith
Green's metaphysics.
The question of immortality also, has "both
metaphysical and ethical implications, as Xant has shown,
It related to ethics in that it affords the only means
of balancing up the inequalities of this life and providing
a suitable reward for virtue. Jut this consideration does
not affect Green's thought materially, since he regards
virtue as being an intrinsic rood which brings v.ith it
its own reward. it is interesting to note that in regard to
the rewards to be meted out in the future life, Green is
less hedonistic than Xant. The aspect of immortality which
does affect Green's ethics is the need of a continued
possibiity of self-development . Green emphatically affirms
in the Prolegomena the belief that self-realization must be
continued in a future life which is both personal and social.
Just as the limitations of the finite Belf afford an argument
for God, so the limitations of our finite existence point to a
life beyond the grave in which the soul of man may attain to
its larger possibilities. Death, thesis merely a transition
by which r?e pass from the partial and fragmentary realization
of God which characterizes this present life to the possibility
of a realization wh ich is full und complete.
Supra, p # 179 f,
^Prolegomena, pp 216-220.

A . The relation o" self-realization to formal^JBB
•
w
e have seen that Green in hie epistemologjr follows
closely in the footsteps of Kant, and that while in his
metaphysics he departs from Jiant in some respects to introduce
Hegelian elements, he is . evertheless as much of a i'eo-i_ant ian
J
as a neo -Hegelian. It remains for us to examine Lis ethics
from the standpoint of its affinities to Aant'a ethical system,
in order to do this we shall first examine the general function
of the will in Green's ethics and then shall compare his theory
more specifically wit'r that of Kant.
^e have seen that Green makes the good will a
fundamental aspect or self-realization. it is in a sense both
a -eans and an end, for it is only through the will to he good
that man sets before himself an ideal goal, and on the other
hand the sroal which he sets is a state of virtuous living.
Green himself recognizes this two-fold asoect of the good when
he says (in speaking of Aristotle) "?or as as for him the good
for the individual is to he good, and to be good is to contribute
in some way disinterestedly, or for the sake of doing: it, to
SL.
the perfecting of man." He aids forthermore, that|it is the
altruistic impulse
t
or the recognition of the claims upon us
of other men, which constitutes the essential difference betv/een
our conception of virtue and ti.at of the Greeks. 'Jhus the
good will, properly regarded, is not only both the means and
the end of seli-realizat ion but it is also the basis of altruism.
' Supra, pp. 16 f.
i Prolegomena, p. 331.

Te shall first ezariine eeoh aspect of the theorr
separately and then shall evaluate the general charges raised
l rainst ireen's conception. That the good will is a legitimate
near s of elf- real i cat lor. ca:_ haril; ":e called in :pec:i::
-:lese ~e vrish t: rej'eot tie theory 1 :. tot o. Caterer ra~ he
' said of the possible selfishness of self- realization, the
theory in its hest form recognizes the rood will as not only
a possible factor the dominant factor in the effort to
attain a higher standard of perfection, if the effort for
self-reali cation is actuated by a bad or selfish motive, it
;
is no longer true self- real:' cation but is nerely self-indulgence.
lit has been charged, of course, that consistently to will the
good involves a self-sacrifice which is antagonistic to self-
real i -.at i or.. rut ~hile a full consideration of this conflict
a.
rust re reserved for 'he rest s-etior, r.t ^sfe_~ -e :.ssertei
that if virtue "be rega-ded as an essential element in self-
realisation, the good will is the most significant factor in
the attainment of this end.
Burning to the aspect w.ioh regards the ro. i will
as t e erd of ethical endeavor, we find that Jreen is
unequivocal in his assertion that this is one end, though he
1b not so clear as to whether it is the only end of 3elf-
realicat ion. His clearest statement is found in the words,
The ideal of virtue which our consciences acknowledge has core
| to be the devotion of character and life to a perfecting of
an, which is itself conceivei as consisting in a life of self-
'Surra, p 67, 90, 93.
*-Infra, r! 246.

Idevoted activity on the oart of all De-sona." He sars
reoeatedly that while we can not know in detail the content
of the true good, it must consist of an ideal of the
common good in which the individual seeks to serve the welfare
of the whole.
Thus we find that the good will, both as a Beans
and an end of self-realization, is altruistic. The union of
these elements is expressed in the statement, "The :Tood has
cone to "be conceived ~Tith increasing clearness not as anything
which one nan or set of nen can gain or enjoy to the exclusion
of others, hut as a spiritual activity in which all nay take
part, and in which all nust partake, if it is to amount to a
full realization of the faculties of the human soul." Jreen
raises but never answers the question as to whether the end
of self-realization is equally altruistic and universal if
made to include aesthetic and intellectual as well as character
3
values
.
we are ready now to examine the charges commonly
raised against Green's theory of the good will. These can he
reduced to two; (1) that it lacks content, and (2) that he
reasons in a circle. In fact, these can further be reduced
to me, for it is asserted that by reasoning in a circle, he
fails to introduce any content into his conception.
/
Prolegomena, p. 343.
Ibid., p 34C.
*Ibi«.
, p: 343-314.
I
/We have found that Ayres, from a pragmatic standpoint, regards
his whole theory as a statement of the trui-". , "To be good
is to seek to be good." which fails to tell how or rhat to
do in order to be good. If this accusation be true, it
reduces self-realization to a formalism as devoid of content
as the theory of Zant
.
However, I believe that the accusation is not
valid, and does not do .justice either to Jreen's intention or
to his statements. Granting that he does make the good will
Voth a means and an end, he does not use the term with quite
the same meaning in each case. As a me as s to self-realization
the good will has practically the same significance that it
has in Kant, i.e the categorical imperative, or the obligation
£o io one's duty, *s an end of self-realization, it signifies
a state of personal well-being of which virtue is the dominant
characteristic. This union of will and personality is implied
repeatedly, but is expressed most clearly in the words "The
will is simply the man. Any act of will is the expression of
the man as he at the time is." On such a basis, there is
nothing incompatible in the idea that the obligation to do jne'
duty constitutes a means or motive to the attainment of an
end which is £ state of character in wh ich the desire to do
one's duty shall be habitual.
I
smpra, p. 109. -
'Prolegomena, p 173.

The charge that jreen's theory 1? cks content is
kl8o invalid on account of the altruistic and social elements
which we have noted. If the zzzi Till ir.v;lv~s n:t . l; the
'obligation of the ir4 ividua! to be good, but also to do good
t , he, -a:. ,T5 hr.~e ole :. rl;- sr. :-r::- Thioh ir.elsi - •
within itself a =*reat many phases of activity. To be sure,
tareen does not attempt to point out the oor.ore'e eler.er. ts in
this objective, but maintains that through the institutions
that have cone down to us from the oast and through the
exercise of our own reason it is possible to determine its
specific eler.er.t s
.
Since the good will plays so important a pa rt in
Green's ethical theory, it may be pertinent to consider
briefly at this point his conception of the relation of the
will to desire, ireer, as we have seen, insists strongly that
there can be no unmotived willing. It has sometimes been
assumed that this theory simply identifies the motive with
the strongest iesire, sr.i is =22: ri:r.=:l; iet e :t ir. :" st i 2 . J-ree::
ainself foresees this objection, and answers it on the basis
of the activity of the self. Des'.re, he says, is to be
distinguished from mere instinctive impulse, for the reason
^B*t desire involves consciousness of self and Of an ob;ect%
n
Supra, cp32, 180.
afeillic^.1!;-,. 133.

Instinctive impulse (common to animals as v*Ll as man) may-
give rise to pleasures and pains, hut human consciousness
has the power of identifying itself on rational grounds with
a certain object of desire which is chosen among conflicting
"solicitations" as the motive of action. Thus while it is
perfectly possible for a man to desire at the same time
several incompatible objects, those which his will does not
choose differ entirely from the object of his choice, because
in the latter he identifies himself with his desire, i.e. it
becomes an aspect of his will. Uo say that the motive which
constitutes his will in a particular case is the strongest
desire is inaccurate, because it overlooks the distinction
in kind between the defeated desires and that with which the
self hns become identified, ureen summarizes his view in the
words, "It must be admitted that an act of will is never mere
desire, never a desire which has been in conflict with other
coordinate desires and has come out strongest . 'Jhe trud
distinction lies between passions as influences affecting a
man and the nan as desiring, or putting himself forth
in desire for the realization of some Abject iresent to him
in idea, which is the same thing as willing."
""n connection with the relation of tho will to
desire, we must consider also the relation of both will and
desire to intellect. Green shows the influence of ne^el in
Prolegomena, p. 166.

!his emphasis upon the rational elements involved in moral
choices. As we have noted, an object of desire becomes
an aspect of the will when the man on rational grounds
identifies himself with it. 'Jreen says decisively, "There
is always thinking in willing. A thoughtless will would be
no will." But there the question arises as to whether will
is simply a combination of thought and desire. io this Green
replies, ,,T,rill is not thought plus desire. Desire of the kind
which enters into willing involves thought: thought of the
kind which enters into willing involves desire; for the desire
is the direction of a self-conscious subject to the realization
of an idea, while the thought is the presence of an idea in
such a subject impelling its own realization." Thus, thought
and desire are not separable but only distinguishable aspects
of will, and the true nature bf both intellect and will lies
in the self-conscious subject. "Speculation and moral action
are coordinate employments of the same self-conscious soul, and
and of the same powers of that soul, only differently directed".
Green makes a practical application of this principle that
reason and will are inseparable elements of every moral choice
by pointing out that self-realization involves "not merely a
conception of a possible good for man, but the adoption by
H
or men of that good as his or theirs." it i s in harmony with
f
Prolegomena, p. i7o.
a
Ibid.
, p. 171.
J Ibid., p. 169.
H Ibid.
,
p 205

this view that he admits the inability )f any theory of the
ideal to improve conduct until the character is set in the
/
direction of the ideal.
Turning more specifically to the relation of Green 1
ethics., to Kant's we find that in various important features they
are in close agreement. In regard to the categorical imperative
the metaphysical postulates of morality, the worth and dignity
of humanity, and the relation of rights to duties, Green's
theory though expressed in different form does not differ
materially from Kant's.
The categorical imperative in Greon does not take
such an ascetic form as in Kant, for while he i s equally anti-
hedonistic, Green's recognition of the importance of the
object of desire in the exercise of the v/ill precludes the
possibility of a real conflict between duty and the desire
that motivates the ection. But the unconditional obligation
to virtuous living is expressed as emphatically by Green as by
Kant. In Green, to be sure, the obligation to do one's duty
is complicated somewhat by the fact that this duty is assumed
to be the realization of the eternal consciousness, and we have
noted how Taylor holds up to scorn the paraphased dictum,
2.
"Realize thine eternal self." But while the content implied
by the categorical imperative d ; ffers from that of Kant, the
obligation itself is equally uneof'di t ioned
.
I
Prolegomena, p. 395
'"Supra, p # 98
t
Green like Kant regards the postulates of God,
freedom and .immortality as essential to ethical theory. Both
make Sod and freedom the primary metaphysical assumption of
morality, but Kant lays considerably more stress upon
immortality than does i>reen. Green admits the need of immortal-
ity for continued personal development , but the Kantian argument
that immortality is necessary to ensure the Justice of the
'universe receives scant attention. This is due probably to
the fact that ureen makes no definite or systematic attempt
to solve the problem of evil.
A point of. agreement about which there can be no
question relates to the worth and dignity of humanity. Green
insists repeatedly that persons must be treated not as means
but as ends. This forms the keynote of his political and
educational theory. Kis intense desire to secure justice for
all, and especially to alleviate the suffering and remove
the ignorance of the masses by extending to them greater
o )portunities, arose not only from his own altruistic impulses
but from the conviction that ethical theory demands due
consideration for the value of personality wherever.- found.
It was the same conviction which made him an ardent advocate
of the northern cause in the fight for the extinction of
Blavery and made him insist that the backward races must be
judged not by their attainments but by their possibilities.
'prolegomena
, pp. 253, 521, et al .
*"Ibid., pp # 236-237.
I.
In the Prolegomena, the extension of the area of the coimon
good which is made such a prominent element rests on this
t
conception of man's duty to humanity as a whole. The idea
of justice, and of man's obligation to serve his fellow-man,
is regarded "both as an intuition of conscience and as a
result of social progress embodied (at least partially)
in our institutions.
Green agrees also with Kant in regarding duties
as rove fundamental than rights. This idea is expressed most
clearly in his Principles of Pol it ical Obligation, where he
maintains that man's possession of certain rights is directly
dependent uoon the fact that these powers are necessary to
»
3
the fulf illmentjof his duty as a moral being. He shows,
furthermore, that the recognition of a certain power as a
right depends upon the moral ideal, for unless a man were
caoable of conceiving some ideal sood for hi ri self and others,
he would have no motive for claiming the powers and privileges
V
necessary to the attainment of this end. The existence of
"natural" or universal rights depends accordingly upon the
existence of an absolute moral ideal, which gives a basis for
the moral strivings of each finite individual.
Turning to the points in which ureen disagrees with
Kant, we find a marked difference in the importance attached
^Prolegomena, pp 237-253.
Ibid., p. 245. *
forks, vol- ii, p. 347.
Ibid., p, 350.
Supra, p. 120.

to the objective or material aspects of morality. Green is
never a pure formalist, and while it has been charged that his
theory of the good will lacJrs content, it can scarcely "be said
of Green fas of Kant) that he emphasizes the intention of an
act to the neglect of its consequences. Green is right, I
think", in recognizing that even in Kant "the goodness of the
good will lies in the prevalence of interest in a worthy object?.
But in Kant this principle is largely obscured by an abstract
conception of the moral law, while in Green the importance of
the worthy object is made much more prominent. In his emphasis
upon the content of the good as embodied in an objective moral
ideal he successfully avoids a onesided Kantian formalism.
But while ween escapes one error he falls into
another, for in his recognition of the importance of the
outer aspects of morality he tends to over-estimate the
harmony which exists between motive and conseouence. ""e find
him saying, "It is only to one limited vision that there can
seem to be such a thing as 2;ood effects from an action that
is pad in respect to the will which it represents There
is no real reason to doubt that the good or evil in the motive
Of an action is exactly measured by the good or evil its
consequences, as rightly est imat ed-- est imat ed that is, in
their hearing on the production of a .^:ojd will on the
2.
perfecting of humanity." But this view seems to imply a
i
Prolegomena, p 310.
lIbid., p. 352.*
I
"pre-established harmony" which is seriously open to question.
If this exact balance is evident only to an omniscient mind,
as Green admits, it can be of little value to the finite
individual. Furthermore it is doubtful whether virtue gets
its due reward even in the production of a more virtuous will,
for when r£ll- intentioned efforts come to nought the result
is more apt to be Bitterness than purification of spirit.
Another point of difference between Green and
Kant lies in the attitude taken toward the po--sibilit2/ of
proving the metaphysical oostulates of morality, ^hile both
regard God and freedom (and to a less extent immortality)
as necessary postulates of ethical theory, Kant frankly admits
the impossibility of proving them on metaphysical or
epistemological grounds. Green apparently thinks he has
proved them in the first hundred pages of the Prolegomena. The
flaws in his arguaent have already been discussed and need
not be restated. But while Green asserts that we may know
that God exists as surely as we know that v/e ourselves or the
x
world exists, it should be noted that he is not entirely
unequivocal in his statements. ?or instance in the Fragment.
On immortality he says, "There can be no proof of the
'immortality of the soul 1 any more than there can be proof of
the 'existence of God. 1 ^ou can only orove the posterior by
3
the orior, the xx. rt by the whole". This is but another case of
the inconsistencies of Green's works.
i
' Supra, p. 155 f.
-•Works, vol iii, p 268.
3 Ibid.
,
p i6C

Another point of divergence from Kant is found
in the relation of theism to moral autonomy. Green "believes
as firmly as Kant in the general principle of moral autonomy,
and it is to establish its possibility that he gives freedom
such a prominent place. But ^ant though not anti-theist ic
seems to regard divine participation in human affairs as an
infringement of tooral autonomy, while Green looks -upon all
human efforts for the good as being in a sense divine in
their origin. The truth doubtless lies between the two, for
the significant factor in the question is the extent to which
the eternal consciousness, reproducing itself is man, enters
into and determines finite willing. '^od can guide and
cooperate, but he can not do the willing for man without
depriving man of his freedom. However, the relation of
theism to moral autonomy is but u special form of the larger
question of the relation of the finite to the infinite self,
and as this has previously been discussed it need not detain
us longer.
Supra, p. 165

e. The relation of self-realization to hedonism .
The relation of Green's theory to hedonism
is esnecially interesting in view of the fact that while he was
stronrly anti-hedonistic in his own attitude, he has often been
charged with havinp nronulrrat ed a theory which I >* really
r
hedonisn in disguise, Ace-ordlrip-Iy" we s^all examine his
attennte>d refutation of hedonisn, the validity of the charges
of hedonisn and efroisn which have been raised a^ainr-t self-
realisation, and the outstanding noints of agreement and
difference between Green and Mill.
Green's refutation of nsycholop-ical hedonism has
net with nore favor than his attitude toward ethical hedonisn.
TCe have seen that he conclusively established the fact that a
Consistent sensationalism can end only in osycholorical
hedonisn. But if the self is a real element in nan's nature
and is active in making moral choices, as Green shorrs it to be,
than it is oossible to conceive that the self acts, not solely
from the motive of oleasure, but from the desire to c >nf orm to
an ideal which may involve nain rather than uleasure in its
realization.
Green regards the true relation of desire to
nleasure, and of desire to its object, as beinr radically
different from that asrumed by osych olo^ical hedonism.
According to the 1.- tter, uleasure is considered more fundamental
than desire, and it is assumed that a desire can be aroused or
Supra, 89, 93,
* Supra, pj 19*.

created by the anticipation of its own satisfaction. In reality
Green maintains, a certain course of action seems pleasurable
only if there is already some desire for it. There can be no
desire in general but only desire for some object, and this
object of desire is not simply pleasure. To be sure this
object of losire may seem pleasurable, but it is the object
itself rather than the pleasure it engenders which maknp rns.n
Berk it. For example (as suggested in Dewey and Tuft's Bthlcs )
it ie assumed by psychological hedonism that the idea of
the pleasure of exercise arouses desire for :t, whereas in
reality the idea of exercise is pleasant only if some desire
for it ie aire dy present. "The object of desire is not pleasure
but some object is pleasurable because it is the congenial
.a
terminus of desire."
Green shows, furthermore , that usychological hedonism
ie wror.g in assuming, as it does, that there is no intrinsic
difference between a good and a bad will, for if pleasure be
regarded as the cole motive of action, moral distinctions are
obliterated. The unsophisticated conscience refuses to believe
that all objects of desire are alike save in the amount of
pleasure they afford, and when qualitative cL3 ff^rences in \
pleasure are admitted, as they are by Hill, the ground -work of
hedonism is destroyed.
1
Supra, p. 115.
*Dewey and Tufts: Ethics, p. 270.
^Prolegomena, p 17G f.
4 Ibid. p 184
<
The confusion;! arises, Green says, from failing to
distinguish "between oloasure and satisfaction, and alBo
between pleasure as an object and pleasure as a by-orodur- 1
.
!
Ten seek satisfaction in objects which they know will involve
the sacrifice of pleasure and while a certain type of
pleasure follows fron the attainment of self-sati sfscti on, this
is very different fron pleasure as an object . "It is the
consciousness that self-satisfaction is thus sought in all
enacted desire, in all desire that amoTntito will, combined
with the consciousness that in all self*satisfaction, if
attained, there is oleas^re, which leads to the false notion
/
that pleasure is alwagrs the object of desire."
Turning to Green's attitude toward ethical hedonism
we find that he gives a very keen and discriminating treatment
of the subject in Book HI, chapter 4 cf the Prolegomena under
the caption of "pleasure and common good," besides devoting
much attention to the subject in his consideration of Greek
ethics and in his comparison of utilitarianism and perfection-
ism from the standpoint of their oractieal value. To reproduce
in full his entire analysis of hedonism would extend this
article far beyond its legitimate limits, and only its
essential outlines can be stated here.
/
Prolegomena, p. 18C

Ae usual we find that is is the idea of the self
which forme Green's starting-point •> The self ie not a mere
bundle of desires, but ofting to the rational faculty ran is
capable of forming an idea of some object of desire which he
believes will contribute to hie permanent satisfaction. This
idea of a general standard or conception of the good by which
particular dnsj res are to be measured is a basic factor in all
moral judgment. In fact, "the abiding satisfaction of an
abiding self" may be regarded as the key-note of Green's
ethical theory.
"he question next arises as to whether pier- sure, cr
a sum of pleasures, can be regarded as constituting this
chief object of desire which will afford a permanent
satisfaction. Green maintains that it can not.
In the first Place, as Greer joints out, the
greatest possible sum of pleasures is intrinsically
anmeaning, for pleasures cannot be summoned. Pleasures are
not entities but states of feeling which from their very nature
are incapable of qualitative measurement, because they have no
common unit of valuefby which they nay be grouped together. All
that v;e can do toward measuring pleasures is to say that one
is preferred to another beca-se of its greater intensity or
duration, but since the preference varies so widely In
different individuals and in the same individual at different
times, there can be no real standard of measurement.

Furthermore, since the sum of pleasures admits theoretically
of indefinite increase, it is as meaningless to speak of a
greatest possible sum of pleasures as of a greatest possible
quantity of time or space. But a still more serious objection
arises from a practical standpoint, for irrespective of
numerical measurement or definiteness of end, it it- impossible
for the pleasures of the past to be accumulated, as so much
"stuff", to add to the amount of Pleasures experienced at any
given moment. "We may talk, if v/e like, of a larger sum of
pleasures as more of a good than a less sum. . . but in doing
so re are bound to remember, if we • would not be misled by the
words, that we are talking of "goods" of which, from the
nature of the case, there can he neither possession nor any
CL
aporoach to possession" .Accordingly, the bedonic calculus
is unsound.
But even granting that a sum of pleasures be
possible, this conception is inadequate as an idea of the true
good. Prom a formal standpoint, it can not serve as the
supreme object of desire since a sum of nloasures is j:ot
itself a pleasure and is not capable of being desired but
3
only of being thonght or conceived intellectually, This
objection (which bonders on being a mere verbal nuibhle) le
reinforced by a more substantial one; namely that a sum of
pleasures fails to afford the permanent satisfaction which
prolegomena
, p. 441.
Ibid. p. 265.
Ibid. p. 258.

the self requires. -he good must be conceived as being at
least relatively permanent, and there it- no as. trance that
the pleasure acquired from the pursuit of a given object will
be lasting. "LTow it is not in dispute that we may and
constantly do seek self-satisfaction for the moment in some
imagined pleasure, though in our calmer. mind we know that the
t
nleasure cannot afford the self-satisfaction sought But on
the other hand if wo are dominated by the idea of what is
good on the whole, or in the long run, the satisfaction abides
even after the particular enjoyment involved has ceased.
Green has sometimes 1 een charged with having advanced
a theory which is as hedonistic as that wrich he seeks to
refute. Sidgwick, in particular, claims that self-reali nation
it either equivalent to 1 edonism or else it is meaningless,
for if "abiding satisfaction" is the end of ethical endeavor
the only intelligible meaning this can have is the enjoyment
of permanent pleasures. While I think that the charge does
iiotdo justice to the self-reali nation aspect of Green's theory
it is a natural outcome of his emphasis on self-satisfaction.
It seems to me that Green over-emphasizes the element of
satisfaction in his conception of trie summum bonun^for while
it is undou. tedly true that satisfaction (if not pleasure. )
follows from virtuous living, this satisfaction is a by-product
rather than the essential element in it. He goes too far also
^Prolegomena, p. 260.
Supra, p # 89.

in asserting that "in all self-satisfaction, if attained,
there is pleasure." If the distinction between pleasure and
satisfaction fwhich nay involve pain) is clearly clrawrn, it is
possible to accept what Green says without charging him with
hedonism, but he could have made his position stronger" by
keening the element of satisfaction in the background. In
his theory as a whole, it occupies a much less prominent piece
than it appears to hold in his discussions of hedonism.
Another, and closely related, ob jeet ion to the
idea of a sura of pleasures as the true good is the fact that
it is an ever-receding goal, and one which can not be attained
by its pursuit. Aside from tho fact that thy universe seems to
be bo constructed that the persistent pleasure-seeker often
fails of securing the pleasure which he seeks t it is true also
that a long series of pleasure brings not increased enjoyment
but a sense of satiety. Pleasures can not be accumulated in
the tense that the more pleasures a man has had, the nearer he
is to the goal of self-satisfaction. "He cannot really look
forward to any millionth repetition of a ple?sant feeling as
bringing him nearer to the satisfaction of himself than he was
the first time the pleasure was felt." Nor it the situation
materially different if the good is reg; rded, not as a sura of
pleasures, but as a state of continuous enjoyable existence;
^Prolegomena
,
p. 18C.
^bid., p. 265.

for if the latter is sought for its own sake, it fails to afford
the satisfaction that is expected of it. ?he idea of a
continuous enjoyable existence to have any validity, must be
transformed to refer to a ctate of well-b eing consisting in the
attainment of desired objects for one's self and others in
/
harmony with an ideal of the common good. Through this
means alone can permanent satisfaction be acquired.
It may be charged, as it has been charged by P.ashdall
and Dewey, that the sum of "pleasures as a goal is no more
unattainable than self-realization. It is true that in each
we have a :,flying goal" which advances before us as we seek
it, and Green has failed to give due consideration to this
resemblance. But there is also a marked . difference , in that
telf-realization assumes the existence of an absolute objective
Btandard while hedonism does not. Furthermore in self-
realisation the values of the preceding stages are conserved
instead of being lost through lack of novelty as is the case
with hedonism.
Green's strongest argument against hedonism, however,
lies not in the impossibility of attaining the goal, but in
the nature of the goal itself. Self-realization, with its
ideal of the perfecting of man, provides a reasonable ground
for virtue; hedonism, with Pleasure as its objective, can not
consistently account for man's moral strivings toward goodness.
Prolegomena, p. 267.
Supra, pp. 93, 101.

If virtue and pleasure "be identified, experience itself
negates this position, for in the life of every man the choice
between virtue and pleasure ^repeatedly he nade. If it he
maintained that virtue sho id he sought as instrumenta l to
pleasure, experience again tells us that the path of goodness
often leads to pain. Hedonism may indeed say that p man
ought so to alter his character that he will take pleasure in
doing virtuous acts, hut hedonism itself offer no motive for
incurring the pain involved in such an alteration of
Character, on the nossihility or chance of increasing the total
amount of Pleasure. Some hedonists to he sure (especially
among the utilitarians) have advocated virtue, hut in so far
as they have done so they rave heen hftter than their theories.
The outstanding element of discrepancy with regard
to the kelonUtic hasis for virtue relates to altruism. Telf-
reali nation vith its emphasis on the common good and its
doctrine that the perfecting of man reguires the perfecting
of other men as well, has a reasonahle foundation for altruism;
but hedonism can introduce this conception only hy a subterfuge.
It is impossible on a hedonistic hasis to identify self-
regarding andfiltruistic motives, Green says, for we have a
different type of desire in seeking pleasure for self and in
seeking it for others. "Desires are determined by their objects,
and desire for pie; sure having an absolutely different desire
/
from desire for the production of pleasure to others."
J
Prolegomena, p. 274.

But even granting that it might be possible on a hedonistic
basis to seek the pleasure of others, in cases where it does
not conflict with one's own, we have still no motive for
incurring the pain of self-sacrifice in behalf of another.
Furthermore, we have no motive on this basis for seeking the
true welfare of others in cases where it does not involve
an increase of their pleasure.
Green's refutation of this fatal weakness in
f
hedonism seems conclusive. As Muirhead points out, all the
great hedonists of modern times have attempted to reconcile
egoism with altruism by a tour de force : Bentham by-
assuming that selfishness can be identical with benevolence;
''ill by regarding the pleasure desired by each to be
equivalent to pleasure as desirable (without saying to whom);
and Sidgwick by assuming like Xant the existence of another
order to give a proper hedonistic distribution of compejisat ions
.
But the question has another side, for we have seen
that Green's critics repeatedly charge him with having
introduced an illegitimate combination of egoism and altruism
in his own theory. Sturt
,
Sidgwick, Dewey and hashdall,in
particular, attack him on thlaground , and maintain that if it
is man's business to realize himself to the fullest extent he
H
can not do so without neglecting others, hobhouse also discusses
the problem but is more favorable to ureen.
B
Supra, p. 130
.,
Muirhead; The Service of the State, p. 36,
Supra, PP. 67, 90, 93, 105.
Supra, p. 107.

In evaluating the question there are two issues
involved: (1) Whether self-realization as the perfecting of
virtue is egoistic; and (2) whether the attainment of the
other values of life involves a necessary conflict "between
self-realization and self-sacrifice, ^e shall discuss them
separately.
Regarding the first there is less difference of
opinion. Dewe,T> to i^e sure, says that it just as egoistic to
i
get goodness for the self as it is to -ret pleasure. But this
attitude involves a serious misconstruction of 'Jre^n's theory,
for he repeatedly asserts that goodness. is to he sought, not
merely for the sake of the individual but for the sake of the
common vrelfare. It can not consistently be maintained that
virtue is an eEclusive value, and most of his critics have not
attempted to rake this charge.
However, the^real issue lies in the question as
is
to whether self-realization/compatible with self-sacrifice
when intellectual or aesthetic values are involved. It is a
common.jlace of our experience that one must frequently sacrifice
(not merely his pleasure) but the possibility of real self-
developnent along lines other than virtue if he would serve the
interests of others. This distinction between the broad and
narrow conceptions of self-realization is a question which
Green notes bnt never definitely discusses. After stating
Supra, p 105.

the question in the Prolegomena, he says , "it shall be dealt
with in the senuel, and is noticed here in order to record the
I
writer's admission that it cannot he oassed over." But death
cut short his work and we can only conjecture what the answer
would have been.
While this omission is regrettable, we can from
his general theorjr form a fairly adequate idea of his attitude
toward the problem. He insists repeatedly upon the organic
nature of society, wherein there is no distinctly individualistic
good, but the good of each (when rightly interpreted) is the
good of the whole. This as 'we have seen is the basis of his
political theory. If this conception be true, it is possible
to answer the question as to why one should sacrifice for the
a.
good of others by saying, "Because they are not other." This
does not imply a pantheistic oneness, but does involve a
conception of the self as being so organically related to
society as a whole that one can not tr^ly realize himself
without realizing that element in himself which is social.
This in general apoears to be the most adequate
means of meeting the cha rge of incompatibility. However, other
solutions are oossible. if it "fee ^ranted that virtue is a
catholic value, then it may be maintained that the goodness
of will involved in sacrificing self for others is sufficient
to outweigh any loss of other values that fflay be incurred.
Prolegomena, p. 344.
Cf. Fairbrother: The Philosophy of T. H . Green, p. 183.

IGreen himself, as have seen, makes the good will the supreme
end, as well as means, of moral activity. On this "basis, it
is possible to say that to do one's duty, though it involves
sacrifice, is the "best thing for the individual as well as for
society, since to shirk one's duty involves a greater sacrifice
of values. This explanat ion^legitimate , I think, unless it is
carried so far as to rob the good will of its content by
overlooking the object toward which it is directed.
The question as to whether self-sacrifice is compat-
ible with self-reali r.at ion depends ultimately upon the object
for wh'ch goods are possessed, and for which the sacrifice is
made. On the hedonistic assumption that values (either
material or spiritual) are to he acquired as a means of
enjoyment, it is true that a real conflict is involved and the
charges of Sidgwick and others are justified. ^ut if the
values to which self-realization points are to be acquired for
mutual service, then he best realizes himself who serves most.
A discussion of the relation of self-realization
to hedonism would be incomplete without a more specific
consideration of the relation of Oreen to Mill. Oreen himself
devotes two chapters to utilitarianism, besides making numerous
references elsewhere to Hill and his theories. Vie can here
note only the outstanding points of agreement and difference
Supra, p. 224 f.
Supra, p. 107.

It should he observed that Green frankly admits
the practical value of Utilitarianism. He regards it as
having rendered the greatest public service to modern "^Jurope
of any philosophical theory. He says of it , MTTThatever the
errors arising from its Hedonistic psychology, no other
theory has been available for the social or political reformer,
combining so much truth with such ready applicability. So other
has offered so commanding a point of view from which to
criticise the precepts and institutions presented as authoritative.
Thile he admits fiat Utilitarianism has tended to j rprove human
conduct and character, he is not enough of a pragmatist to
advocate its adoption for this reason. Un the contrary he
points out the errors in its hedonistic basis which we have
noted, and maintains that self-realization is equally suitable
•£8 a basis of reform, and more free from speculative difficulties.
Thus we find that Green joins with Mill in
advocating political and social reform, but he finds the
Utilitarian justification for such reform, not in a typically
hedonistic element, but in a principle borrowed from Kant.
Green says, "The principle nrabodied in the formula, that
•everyone shoud count for one and no one for more than one 1 —
has been the source of its real beneficence in the life of
modern society "because, auite independently 6t the id ent if ic-at i ei
of the highest good with a greatest possible sum of pleasures---
'Prolegomena, p. 396.

it has practically meant for utilitarians that every human
person was to be deemed an end of absolute value." In this
principle Green is in full record with Mill.
Green agrees with Hill also in another principle
which is inconsistent with hedonism per s e; namely, in the
qualitative distinctions between pleasures . Green says that
in regarding some kinds of pleasures as more desirable &nd more
valuable than others because of their intrinsic nature, Mill
exalts the Lit i lite.1 rian theory but departs from the doctrine
that pleasure is the only object of desire. The inconsistency
is due, rreen thinks, to the fact that the desire for the
sense of dignity which comes from having chosen the better
ob;ect is confused with desire for the pleasure the chosen
object may bring.
Turning to the differences between Green and Mill,
we find the most outstanding difference in the nature of the
sunmun bonum. This involves the whole distinction between self-
realization and ethical hedonism, and the points of disagreement
which we have noted need not here be restated, ""hile the
egoistic elements of hedonism do not ap oly to Mill personally,
they are nevertheless inherent in his system.
Another outstanding difference (which v/e have
5"
previously touched upon) relates to the nature of society.
Prolegomena, p. 247.
Ibid., p. 184.
Ibid., p. IBS.
Supra, p! 239 f.
Supra, p. 121.

Mill's conception was ' tonic and individualistic, and accordingly
he regarded society as an aggregate of individuals. On this
basis he had much to say of "self-regarding" rights. Green's
theory on thejother hand was organic, and he regarded the welfare
of the individual and society as being so intimately bound
up together that one could not be injured or helped
without an effect upon the whole. On such a basis no act is
really self-regarding
.
The distinction between their conceptions of freedom
rests on a similar basis. Mill regards freedom in the merely
negative sense of "absence of restraint." "his conception
rigidly applied would mean, sinrnly the' tyranny of the
strongest. Mill tries to avoid the anarchistic implications
of this view of freedom by saying that since liberty consists
in doing what one desires, one must sometimes be restrained
from following a lower desire }(e.g. to cross an unsafe bridge)
in order to further a higher desire (to remain alive and dry),
is
But thie/inconsistent , for it affords no valid criterion of ^
det ires and would justify an endless amount of interfrrenoe
and restraint. Ore en, however, goes at the question of
freedom from a different angle. He distinguishes between the
use of the term in a generic sen se, i.e. as it applies to all
acts of will, and in a particular sense in which only those
acts are free which tend to man's self realization.
^•Ritchie: Principles of State Interference, p. E5.
Ibid., p. 86.

On the latter basis Green regards state notion as expedient
when it tends to promote the true freedom (i.e the self-
realization) of man, but inexpedient when it interferes nith
this. It is for thin reason that he advocates legislation
for thee "remov, - 1 of obstructions" to free development
.
In one other respect Green stands in marked contrast
to Mill, i.e. in the relation of religion to ethical theory.
To Green the metaphysical postulates which underlie religion
are equally necessary as a basis for ethics, and even in
regnrd to his political theory he has been termed a
r
"religious radical. Mill, on the other hand, rests nothing
on religion snd regards God as too impotent to be of any
ethical significance. For this reason he has been more
popular with those who scorn "theological mysteries" in
favor of something" practical? In a' later section, we shall
ser how successfully Green combined $ hical with religious
concepts
.
Supra, p. 120, 124.

3. Religious problems .
a. Religion and metaphysics.
There is an inseparable connection between Green's
religious views and his metaphysical conceptions. Any view of
the world which makes the belief in God an important factor must
rest upon a metaphysical rather than a loositivistic basis, and
Green's metaphysics is well fitted to support a religious out-
look. While logically his philosophy of religion rests upon his
metaphysics, it is probable that the solidity of his religious
convictions furnished the basis, in his personal life, which
caused his metaphysics to take the turn which it did.
In discussing the religious problems connected T7ith
Green's thought, we shall first attempt to state the general re-
lation between his religious and metaphysical views, and then s^hall
take up in turn his conception of mysticism and religious exper-
ience; of dogma and authority; of the incarnation and the person
of Christ; of sin and salvation; and of immortality.
The connecting links between his religion and his meta-
physics are found, on the one hand, in his conception of the self-
conscious subject; and in conjunction with this, in his doctrine
of the immanent God who reproduces himself in the moral life of
men. The most definite statement of his conception of the meta-
physical basis of religion is found in the fragment entitled,
"The word is nigh thee", and it is very unfortunate that this

was never completed. He expresses the key-note of his religious
belief in its opening phrases where he says the essence of
Christianity is the thought of God "not as 'far off 1 but as 'nigh',
not as a master but as a father, not as a terrible outward power
forcing us we know not whither, but as one of whom vre may say
that we are reason of his reason and spirit of his spirit; who
lives in our moral life, and for whom we live in living for our
brethren, even as in so living we live freely, because in obe-
dience to a spirit which is ourself; in communion with whom we
triumph over death and have assurance of eternal life".
In this article Green develops the idea of God as the
"possible self", who is manifested in the struggles of our moral
life to realize our highest possibilities. "God is the final
cause of the moral life, the ideal self which no one, as a moral
agent is, but which everyone, as such an agent, is however blindly
a.
seeking to become". To the charge that this makes God unreal,
he replies with the teleological argument previously stated, that
in any process of development it is the end being developed which
is the true reality. To the objection that it identifies God
with man, he admits that it does in a sense identify him, "not
with an abstract or collective humanity but with the individual
man. But identity in this sense, he says, is compatible with
difference; for God may be regarded as the realization of every
man's determinate possibilities without affirming that God is no
more than man. In the attainment of the ideal, man must overcome
i
Works, vol iii, p 221.
1Ibid. p. 225.
3 Ibid, p 22*.
I
the contradiction between the actual and the possible, "On the
recognition of the difference depends the significance of the
i
assertion of identity".
Green regards the self-conscious subject as the bearer
of religious values, and in this he finds a close analogy between
faith and knowledge. Reason, he says in his article on Faith ,
is the source alike of faith and knowledge, for reason is self-
consciousness. In our knowledge of nature, everything we know
is known to us as a constituent of one world, from which we build
up the conception of the uniformity of nature. While we know
only in part, this partial knowledge leads us to believe in the
existence of a wider sphere of knowledge beyond our present at-
tainment. Just as the assurance of there being a reality, one
and complete and absolute, is the basis of our finite strivings
after knowledge; so also faith in an unseen reality sets before
us a goal for our moral strivings. "Though communicated to us
in a mode which does not allow of its being itself in a strict
sense known, it keeps before us an object which we may seek to
become. It is an element of identity between us and a perfect
being, who is in full realization what we are only in principle
and possibility".
Not ohly do we find an analogy between religious and
intellectual values, but we find also an analogy between reli-
gious and artistic values. "In a certain respect there is a
correspondence between faith, as the practical consciousness of
(
Works, vol. iii, p. 225.
Ibid p. 268.

God, and the artist's consciousness of an ideal". Green shows
that the ideal which dominates the artist's work is something
he experiences in his consciousness but never completely attains;
yet the fact that the ideal exists, above and beyond his attain-
ment of it, makes it in the highest sense real. Green gives us
an excellent statement of the personal yet more than human basis
of the ideal in the statement, "There is an identity between it
and his consciousness of it; otherwise it would not exist for
him at all. Yet it must be more and other than his consciousness
of it, or that consciousness would not be of an irieal." Thus God,
as the object of religious faith, may be said to manifest him-
self, though never fully, in the conscious life of finite persons.
In view of the fact that tireen has sometimes been con-
sidered to have made the reconciliation of religion and science
his primary object, a word should be said on this topic. lireen
stood staunchly for the maintenance of the scientific spirit, so
long as science is kept within its proper 1 bounds. In his article
of Faith he protests vigorously against the tendency of tradition-
al theology to raise an impossible barrier between religion and
science. He maintains that both have a common basis and should
not be set in opposition to each other. "The human spirit is
one and indivisible, and the desire to know what nature is and
means is as inseparable from it as the consciousness of God and
the longing for reconciliation with him. The scientific impulse
on the one side, and the faith that worketh by love on the other,
Works, vol. iii, p 268.
Ibid., p. 269.

Iexhibit the same soirit in different relations".
Accordingly Green rejects the "belief in miracle as be-
ing not only hostile to science but unnecessary to religion. It
is in this connection that he says, "A proposition which asserts
divine causation for any phenomenon is not exactly false, but
turns out on strict analysis to be unmeaning". By this he means
that science is right in objecting to any intrusion of the
supernatural within the natural. But science goes too far, he
says, in trying to assert that there is nothing which is not
natural. "Its own existence is a witness to the reality of the
spiri tual. . . . The true lesson which it teaches is that God is not
to be sought in nature, nor in any beginning or end of nature,
3
but in ;man himself". The scientist who rules out the reality of
religion because it can not be made an object of science is equal-
ly in error with the theologian who demands assent to propositions
which science declares impossible.
b. Mystici sm and religi ous experience.
If we attempt to evaluate Green's personal attitude
toward religion he may be adjudged a mystic; yet it may be asser-
ted with equal correctness that mysticism figured very slightly
in his religious experience. The explanation of this apparent
paradox may be found in the diverse connotations attached to the
term. With mysticism, in the sense of religious ecstasies and
emotional outbursts, Green had very little sympathy. ^ot> in
/
Works, vol. iii, p, 264.
*-Ibid., p. 264.
3 Ibid.
, p. 265.

his personal life and in his thought system he laid emphasis
upon the primary function of reason, and the emotional side
of religion appealed to him far less than its intellectual and
ethical aspects. But on the other hand, if mysticism be de-
fined as the consciousness of the indwelling presence of God,
his whole religious outlook makes mysticism a basic factor.
In his essay on Faith he gives an unusually clear state
ment of the inward, spiritual character of true religion. In
this he protests strongly against the view that faith is the
intellectual acceptance of certain doctrines. In its place he
puts the conception that faith is "a certain attitude or dispo-
sition which belongs distinctively to the 'inner man' and gives
(
us our worth as moral and spiritual beings". Such a conscious
relationship to,God makes a real difference both in one's own
personal outlook on life and in his dealings with others, as
Green repeatedly asserts. "If we are honest with ourselves, we
shall admit that something best called faith, a lorevai linn* con-
viction of our presence to God and his to us, of his gracious
mind toward us, working in and with and through us, of our
duty to our fellowmen as our brethren in him, has been the
source of v&iatever has been best in us and in our deeds".
3Reference has been made in the Drecedins: section to
the fact that Green drew an analogy between faith and knowledge,
and recognized that both rest noon a common foundation. Be-
tween faith and genius we find
A
even more direct connection.
I
Works, vol. iii, p. 260.
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Ibid., p. 268.
3 Supra, p. 256.
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The moral insight, or "high creative energy" which in his essay
on Ine Force of Circumsta ices is called faith, appears as genius
in his paper on The Influence of Civilization on Genius . In both
he assumes that there is aTlivine idea" in the world, manifested
in every created thing, but manifested most perfectly in nan.
The religiously-minded oerson is conscious that God has a pur-
pose in his life, and seeks by his living to realize this divine
idea. "But when the divine idea manifests itself in the mind of
man in an intellectual form, or when, to reverse the picture,
man apprehends the idea through the medium of his intellectual
faculties, then we discern the man of genius". In either case,
it is the possession of depths of insight experienced only by
the "liberated few" which makes them masters of destiny.
On the relation between faith and outward ordinances,
or between mysticism and religious forms, Green adopts a very
sane view-point. That ordinances can successfully take the
place of faith he emphatically denies. He repeatedly asserts
the folly of trying to substitute the outward forms of worship
for inner communion. But on the other hand, he says it is
equally erroneous to try to dispense with ordinances entirely.
This idea is brought out very prominently in his lectures on the
English Commonwealth, in which he asserts that the fundamental
error in the puritan position was a disregard of existing forms
of worship. "Its danger lay in the attempt to construct a re-
ligious life, which is nothing without external realization,
*
Works, vol. iii, pp. 11, 12.

on an inward and momentary intuition." English puritanism,
originating in the conscio usness of a spiritual life which no
outward ordinances could adequately express, set up a false
antithesis between the spirit and the form. It ignored but
could not escape the law of human life which makes them insep-
arable, and soon found itself crystalized into the outward form
represented by the Commonwealth, under an authority more heavy
and secular than that from which it had revolted. Thus, when-
ever an attempt is made to divorce religious experience from
religious forms, the result is either a disappearance of the
experience or a creation of new forms*
Of the relation between mysticism and moral activity,
more will be said later when we enter upon a detailed discussion
X
of Green's religion and ethics. Suffice it to say at this point
that he believed, as firmly as James, that "faith without works
is dead". The inseparable connection between religious experi-
ence and Christian living is brought out in a very practical
way at the end of his lecture on Faith, where he gives advice
to students who have felt their faith to be waning. He shows
that the subtlest foe of religion is not intellectual doubt,
but ethical indifference to the call of God and duty. He says
to his students, "You can not find a verification of the idea
of God or duty; you can only make it The true verification
of the consciousness of God is the life of prayer and self-
denial which expresses it. Though the failing heart cries out
Works, vol. Hi, p 286.
Infra, p. 365.

for evidence, at the worst live on as if there were God and
duty, and they will prove themselves to you in your life".
After advising them not to soorn to engage in Christian ac-
tivity along side of those who may differ widely form them in
theology, he ends with the trenchant statement, "Faith in God
and duty will survive much doubt and difficulty and distress.
....But if once we have come to acquiesce in such a standard of
living as must make us wish God and duty to be illusions, it
must surely die".
A discussion of Green's attitude toward religious ex-
perience would not "be complete without a more specific refer-
ence to his conception of prayer. Prayer to Green means two
things, and two things only; communion and moral activity.
Plan's inner relationship to God reveals itself "in prayer and
praise -- the prayer which asks for nothing, the praise which
thanks for nothing, but God's fulfillment of himself — and in
that effort after an ideal perfection which is the soring of
the moral life." Elsewhere he says, "Prayer, indeed, if of the
right sort, is already incipient action; or more properly, it
is a moral action which has not yet made its outward sign."
Of the answer to prayer, he says that we must not look for an
external answer, for the prayer will be its own answer, just
as virtuous action is its own reward.
This conception of Drayer, it seems to me, is disap-
pointing, and is oractically the only ooint 'in Green's treat-
ment of religious experience which is open to serious criticism.
^orks, vol. Hi, p. 273.
Ibid., p. 276.
^Ibiu., p. 265.
Ibid., p. 273.

HThile the consummate value of the prayer of communion must not
be discounted, to rule out the prayer of petition seems not only
religiously destructive out philosophically unnecessary. To
persons who believe that God is real, and that God is personally
interested in the welfare of finite 3ee>ers, tv ere is no obstacle
to the belief that God not only hears cut answers their petitions.
To deny the possibility for the probability) of specific answers
to specific prayers "sould eliminate religious values which we jan
not afford to lose. ".Vhile ';re?n is right in cautioning us a?ainst
making pra7er a matter of "signs and "wonders", he goes too far in
the limitations which he places upon its nature.
But on the other hand, the merits, even of this concep-
tion, surpass its defects. In it vre find a statement not merely
of the metaphysical oneness of man with God, but of the intimate
fellowship which lifts man above his finite limitations and
leads him into the "holy of holies". The possibility of prayer,
as of duty, is founded on man's spiritual kinship ^ith God. "It
is the God in you nfcich strives for communication with Sod",
6#d has long been revealing himself in the high endeavor and
long-suffering love which have moralized mankind, and God still
speaks to the hearts of men. "The word of God is nigh thee, even
in thy mouth and in thy heart," and it is to the nerson isho will
open his heart to hear it that the word of God is revealed.
Works, vofc. iii, p. 273.

£.6 1
c. Dogma and authority
Green's treatment of dogma is one of the most satis-
factory, and at the same time one of the least satisfactory,
elements in his whole discussion of religious thought. He un-
doubtedly rendered a great service to rational and vital
Christianity in showing that its inner essence is something
which can not he fettered by any system of creeds. He gives an
excellent 'account, in his essay on Christian Dogma , of the manner
in which dogma arose in the early church, and of the factors which
have given it its grip unon the church from that time until the
present. 3ut while he admirably defends the right of the thinking
Christian to cast off the shackles of dogma and put in its place
the inner life of faith, he is exceedingly vague as to the rela-
tion between this life of Christian faith and the claims of his-
torical Christianity which have found expression in the creeds.
He seems at one moment to admit the need of an historical back-
ground, and at the next to sneak as if this were a superfluous
element. Again, he seems to admit the need of retaining the
organized beliefs of the church for the sake of concreteness,
and yet to protest against their tendency to vitiate religious
experience. While in a sense it is "crue that both these stand-
points are tenable, he fails fully to reconcile them.
Leaving for the present the unsatisfactory elements in
Green's conception of doerma, we find him taking a very whole-
some attitude toward historical criticism. A half- century as-o
I
when Green was making his contributions to current thinking, the
historical method of Biblical criticism was just coming into
prominence, and the violence of opposition to it (which has not
yet spent its fury) was causing a turmoil among both its friends
and foes. The fear that it was undermining religion was not
wholly ungrounded, owing to the destructive attacks upon Chris-
tianity made by so.ne of the advocates of the historical method;
while on the other hand the proportion of well-meaning but
unintelligent Christians who opposed "higher criticism" as an
invention of Satan was even greater then than now. The effect
upon the current attitude toward dogma ra.s to make the opponents
of Biblical criticism fall back more firmly upon dogma and author-
ity to bulwark their Christian convictions, while the advocates
of the historical method stressed the claims of reason as opposed
to those of dogma.
The great need of the times (then as now) was for
Christian leaders who could unite the claims of reason with those
of faith. Green through his transls. ti ons of the works of Baur be-
came interested in Biblical criticism, and he exerted a profound
influence upon his generation in showing that it is possible to
accept the findings of the historical method without any loss of
the spiritual elements of Christianity. While he did not him-
self become a great Biblical scholar, he was able to furnish a
philosophic basis upon which Biblical criticism could proceed
without endangering the faith of its adherents.
i
The fundamental element in his conception was the belief
that religious faith depends unon the inner experience of the be-
liever rather than upon the intellectual acceptance of certain
historical statements. He points out in his essay on Ghri stian
Dogma and again in the lecture on Faith , that it is one's Christian
experience which determines one s altitude toward the historicity
of 3iblical statements rather than the reverse. "When events are
aaid to have hapoened as a medium of God's revelation of himself
to man, it is not by an intellectual process of estimating evidence,
but by our convictions about God and by what our hearts demand
of hira, that we are determined to believe or disbelieve their re-
i
ality". While this statement taken literally, would nullify the
objectivity of Biblical research, it contains an important truth
in that it stresses the need of taking into account the moral
and spiritual demands of human nature.
Dogma arose, according to Green, from the fact that an
immediate intuitional experience, such as that exemplified by
Paul, was transformed by the early church into something external
and authoritative. Thus the three characteristic* of dogma which
he enumerates are: (1) it presupposes an immediate intuition,
and while retaining the limitations of this intuition it reduces
its concrete object to an abstraction; (2) it rests upon the au-
thority of the church; and (3) it is unsystematized. In tracing
the development of dogma he shows that scholasticism attempted
to free it from the third charricterist ic , and succeeded in a
i
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measure "by reducing it to an artificial system, which however
was not truly systematic in the sense of beins- reasonable and
coherent throughout. It was the task of Luther and the Refor-
mation to free dogma f^cc d ogma from its second characteristic,
and here again the attempt was only partially successful, for
the authority of the Bible and of Protestant ecclesiasticism
was substituted for that of the Catholic hierarchy. It is the
task of the modern spirit, Green says, to complete the system-
atization and emancipation of our religious beliefs, and even
more to do away with the first characteristic of dogma by
getting back of its external and. abstract features and experien-
cing again the immediate intuition of God from which it took its
rise.
This conception of the origin and present status of
dogma gives us a clue whereby to interpret Green's apparently
contradictory attitude toward creeds. He says on the one hand
that it would be idle to depreciate their value. In the early
days "they served to gather up the various elements of the
Christian consciousness, as represented by the various churches,
and thus preserved Christian truth". In a more general sense he
says, "Thought first becomes definite in language, and it is in
the language which the creeds furnish that the bare conscious-
ness of God which is involved in the consciousness of ourselves
-the yearning after him which is inseparable from the impulse to
fulfill ourselves- has become a working theory of the relation
I
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between God and man". But while admitting the value of creeds
as a framework of truth, he deprecates the fact that the for-
mulation of creeds, even in the early church, meant a loss of
the spiritual and intuitional elements of Christian experience,
and that as the creeds have become crystalized through the
centuries, tbe emphasis has been laid more unon the form and
less unon the spirit. Thus the challenge of the present day is
to 2:et away from creeds and back to their spiritual significance.
In this attitude it seems to me that Green speaks the
truth but not the whole truth. It must "he admitted that spirit-
ual truth is far more vital than its creeiil formulation, and that
the latter has in many instances obscured the former. But Green's
theory seems to proceed on a line analogous to Rousseau's "back
to nature" argument, and is (at least partially) fallacious for
the same reason. It may well be doubted whether Christianity in
its early stages, before the formulation of the creeds, really
was more spiritual than after their formulation. Green cites
Paul and the author of the fourth gospel as beinrr untheological
and creedless exponents of the religion of the inner life. But
while granting, with Green, the denth of spiritual experience
found in both, I Question whether they are also free from theo-
logical implications. ^aul's theory of the atonement, for
example, seems as doermatic as any of its later formulations.
Furthermore, Green seems to believe that creeds should
f „
*
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be taken in their original sense, or not at all. Thus w» find
him saying, "Inability to adont the creeds of Christendom in
their natural sense - and in any other sense they are best left
alone,- need not disqualify us from using its prayers. A creed
is meant to serve either as an article of agreement with other
men, or as a basis of theological argument; and from each point
of view there are objections to using its words in any other
meaning than that which they are ordinarily understood to bear. n
I think however, that creeds have a third and very important
functi on; namely, that of enabling the individual Christian to
express his allegiance to the corporate faith of the church.
In this sense, it is unnecessary and trivial to refuse to re-
peat the statement of a creed simply because there are some
minor elements in it with which one does not agree. Chadwick
in the Unitarian Heview (31) 1889 calls attention to the fact
that if Green were taken literally at this point we should soon
lose from our churches all the more enlightened of our clergy.
Green's attitude toward ecclesiastical authority is
typical of his attitude toward creeds. In so far as the author-
ity of the church tended to hamper the expression of the individ
uality of its members, he disapproved of it. His intense zeal
for democracy, in addition to his zeal for freedom of thought
and ac'uion in religious matters, led him to think unfavorably
Works, vol. iii, p. 274.

SL 70
of the Established church. Yet he did not withdraw from it, nor
join any of the non-conformist denominati ons, for he felt that
there was none which embodied with sufficient accuracy his o~m
religious convictions to make the change worth vshile. We find
him offering an interesting pragmatic reason for failure to
unite with any of the more liberal denominations i± the words,
"Though I admire and agree with the leaders of the unorthodox,
I do not like the tone and spirit of their following". He
repeatedly advised his students not to neglect the external forms
of religion, lest they lose the inner content as well. Thile
he terms his own views a "modified Unitarianism" , he signed the
articles of faith of the Episcopal Church in order to get his
LI.A. degree from Oxford. He apparently had some conscientious
scruples in doing so, but the fact that he Hid it affords an
evidence that he did not take too seriously his own dictum of
refusing to accept creeds in any but their original sense.
The two aspects of dogma with which Sreen carae most
sharply into conflict center about the belief in miracle and
the historicity of Jesus. He looked upon both with disfavor,
and his lack of orthodoxy on these points has led some of his
Opponents to consider him unchristian. The justice of the
charge must rest upon the deeoer Question as to what are the
essential elements of Christianity. We shall heri attempt to
state his position with regard to miracle, and shall reserve his
ISupra, p. 11.
*"Works , vol. iii. p xxxvi.
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conception of the historicity of Jesus for further discussion
in connection with the incarnation.
uhile the belief in miracle and the reliance upon the
historical events in the life of Jesus are regarded by Green as
twin dogmas that have distorted the true conception of faith,
the former is regarded as the more basic error, for most of the
dogmas relating to Christ have arisen from placing too great de-
pendence upon the miraculous elements of his life. Green objects
to miracle on both metaphysical and religious grounds. Two cues-
tions are involved in the problem: first, whether miracles are
possible; and second, whether granting their possibility we may
regard them as having religious value. To both Green gives a
negative answer.
Aside from religious considerations, Green's metaphy-
sics leaves no place for miracle, for the view that nature is
an "unalterable all-inclusive system of relations" carries with
it the implication that there can be no break in the continuity
of the system. Both the possibility of knowledge and the possi-
bility of moral activity depend upon the fact that the uniformity
of nature can be relied upon. If we could conceive of God as
interrupting the order which he has established as an all in-
clusive system, we should have to regard him as being untrue to
himself and in a sense as "uncreating himself". As we have
previously noted, Green says, "A prooosition which asserts divine

causation for any phenomenon is not exactly false, bat turns out
on strict analysis to be unmeaning". Per The only sense in which
we may correctly ascribe divine causation to any physical event
is that in which we may regard the entire universe as being a
manifestation of the divine energy. God "renroduces himself"
in nature but does so through a continuous system in which all
events are general manifestations rather than particular effects
of his causal activity. It is for this reason that Green, in
his review of Oaird's Philosophy of Kant
,
objects to the fact
that Mansel for the purpose of justifying miracle distorts
Kant's conception of God as a noumenon : for Kant, as Green
states, emphatically affirms the uniformity o f nature in the
principles "in mundo non datur saltus" and "in mundo non datur
X-
hiatus". With this view, Green is in full agreement.
But Green has religious reasons also for rejecting
miracle. As we have seen, he objects to dopma in general on the
score that it tends "to obscure the spiritual elements of relifion.
For the same reason he objects particularly to the belief in
miracle, which he regards as largely resoonsible for the existence
and spread of dogma. We find him saying, "Hence dogma, a theory
of faith originating in miracle, has come to be regarded as
part and parcel of faith itself". He protests against the ten-
dency prevalent among both theologians and men of science to
regard faith as standing in opposition to reason, and he traces
/
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this tendency to the confusion of faith with miracle. Examples
are cited of a pure and lofty faith which did not rest upon
miracle, for to Paul "the belief in miracle was not its source
but a mode in which it found expression"; and to John
"the relation of faith to miracle is not that of effect to cause:
faith is rather the condition of the significance of the mirac-
x
ulous sign". But theologians, reversing the order, have made
faith depend upon miracle, and the tendency of the church has
been to defend its belief in miracle at the expense both of rea-
son and of true religion.
Green however is honest enough to admit that from a
practical standpoint it is sometimes unwise to seek to overthrow
the belief in miracle. When faith and miracle have become so
closely intertwined that a rejection of miracle involves a loss
3
of faith, he says "let no one rashly tamper with it". His view
is expressed succinctly in the words, "In those who must put
God at a distance, or into a mystery, in order to recognize him;
who hold that a revelation which is not through signs and wonders,
is no revelation at all, - it is not reli9ion but lo^ic which is
at fault. Just so far as they make their own the Christian doc-
trine of the indwelling spirit, they are superior to their
own logic." But while he frankly admits that deep faith and
distorted logic may go hand in hand, he calls upon the thinking
people of his day to bulwark their religion by a clearer logic
instaad of by blind adherence to a faith that rests on signs and
wonders.
'Works, vol iii, p. 221.
^Ibid., p. 255.
Mbid., p 244.
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d. The incarnation.
Green's views regarding the incarnation and the person
of Jesus are expressed most clearly in his essay on Christian
Dogma and in an article entitled The Incarnation which is an
extract from a lecture on the fourth gospel. In neither does
he express his own position with entire clearness, although the
vagueness which attaches to his discussion may be due in part
to the nature of the subject. In rejecting the dogmatic concep-
tion of Christ which makes his nature rest upon miraculous ele-
ments in his life, Green is very emphatic; but he is not so clear
regarding the positive conception of Christ to be put in its
place.
Green, as we have seen, refers to his own oosition as
i
a "modified Unitarianism". The ouestion as to whether Green
should properly be classed in his theology as a Unitarian, de-
pends in turn upon what we mean by Unitarianism, and would lead
us too far afield for discussion at this point. Green himself
had very little interest in the affixing of theological labels,
and took little part in the current gladiatorial combats between
orthodoxy and heterodoxy. If people "had the root of the matter
in them" (as he phrased it), he cared not in what dress their
faith clothed itself
.
^
With regard to the historical life of Jesus, Green
considers that we know so little about it that it is unwise to
i
^Supra, p. 30.
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plaoe much dependence upon it. It must be observed that he does
not reject the historicity of Jesus fas implied by some of his
i
critics, e.g. Lilly and Porter) but he regards it as being so
shrouded in obscurity that it affords no sure foundation on
which to build. As we have seen, he prefers instead to rest
his conception of Jesus upon such spiritual intuitions as are
found in the writings of Paul and the fourth Gospel. We find
him making occasional references to the synoptics, but he re-
gards their value as limited to the glimpses they give of the
spirit of Jesus revealed in his teachings (especially the
Beatitudes and the Sermon on the Mount), rather than in what
they can tell us regarding the facts of his life. Of the nature
of the actual Jesus he says that while we can not "penetrate
the ideal vesture that shrouds from us the son of Mary ", yet
nevertheless "it is better to say vaguely but simply, that to
no form less than divine could that vesture have adjusted itself,
than to construct a shape, on Parisian models, hopelessly dis-
SL
proportionate to it". He believes that John, whose picture of
Jesus is superior to that of any of the other Gospel writers,
has nevertheless portrayed a "glorified" Christ, such as Jesus
of Nazareth was potentially but not actually. So it is futile
to attempt to penetrate behind the veil of historical obscurity
with the hope of finding there a basis on which to build our
faith.
^Supra, j.p. 148, 149.
.Works, vol. iii, p. 164.
Ibid., p 219.

But this does not mean that we must relinouish oar
Christian faith for lack of historical evidence. On the contrary,
the "burden of Green's doctrine is that we must substitute the
ever-living Christ of faith for the miraculous Christ of histor-
ical or Biblical tradition. He believes profoundly that the
faith which is the essential element of all real religion depends
for its witness upon the inner experience of the individual
Christian and not upon historical evidence. Therefore his con-
ception of Christ is that of "a Christ within us" t a continuous
manifestation of God, who thus reveals himself to the hearts of
those who seek him. On this basis Christ's death and resurrec-
tion become, not past events to which a magical or even theolog-
ical significance can be attached, but a continuous ''death unto
life?, an eternal process by which the Christian -my find God,
and finding him may die unto sin and live unto righteousness.
In this connection Green's views regarding the theology
of ?aul and the author of the fourth Gospel are interesting, and
form a large part of his discussion of the subject. He regards
Paul as having had a faith which depended wholly on religious
experience for its evidence and was entirely independent of the
miraculous and even of the historical aspects of Jesus' life.
To the charge that Christianity depends upon a set of written
Dropositions taken from the Hew Testament, he asks the question
"Was Saint Paul a Christian or was he not?" In reply he says,
'works, vol. iii, p. 221.

"If he was a Christian, he was so not only without any acauain-
tamce with this collection of propositions as such, but in spite
of ignorance of tho facts of our Lord's life prior to his death,
as detailed in the synoptical Gospels, and with no developed
consciousness of the theosophy which forms the basis of the fourth,
or of the doctrines found in the canonical epistles other than
his own".' Paul's conversion (as recorded by himself in the epis-
tles) came about as a result of a direct revelation of Christ to
him, i.e. as an intensely spiritual (but not miraculous) exper-
ience. Accordingly Paul's preaching bears the marks of the in-
tuitional nature of his own experience, and while accepting the
reality of the historical Christ he puts his major emphasis
upon the living Christ of religious faith. "With Saint Paul,
the past historical existence, the determinate individuality of,
Christ, are so overshadowed by his spiritual presence, by his
ideal 'filling of all things', that the former elements tend to
vanish altogether". These words of Green regarding Paul could
be applied with equal truth to Green's own position.
Green's view of the relation of Paul to dogmatic theol-
ogy in general is worthy of notice, for he denies the view that
Paul was the founder of Christian theology. He admits of course
that the epistles contain much argumentation, but says that this
consists merely of a polemic against the Jews and Judaizers rather
than a statement of Christian doctrine. "His reconstruction of
LWorks, vol. iii, p. 221.
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the spiritual fabric, his positive view of God, man, and the
world is, as we have seen, intuitive, and cannot really be fit-
\
ted into the argumentative mould." While Green is doubtless
right in asserting that Paul does not give us a systematic the-
ology, he seems to me to underestimate the combination of Jewish
tradition and Christian theology which forms a large part of
^aul's writings and has exerted a profound influence on subseouent
theological controversies.
Another point of interest in Green's view is the extent
to which he regards Paul as contributing to the origin of Chris-
tianity. He speaks of Jesus and Paul as "the two parents of our
faith" and while recognizing the priority of Jesus he regards the
and work of Paul as a necessary complement. Since he considers
the latter as independent in its origins of any historical con-
nections with Jesus, he thus makes Christianity rest upon two
corner-stones instead of one. But while Christianity undoubted-
ly needed Paul to spread its message, it may well be ouestioned
whether, without the historical Jesus, Paul would have had any
message to spread.
This, it seems to me, is typical of the fundamental
difficulty in Green's discussion of Paul. He admits, on the one
hand, that Paul connected the Christ of faith with the Jesus of
history; yet he seems, on the other hand to underestimate the
extent to which Paul's work was actually dependent u"oon the
l
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historical life of Jesus. To "be sure, ^aul -aires little refer-
ence to the miraculous elements of Jesus 'life, but the "burden
of his message is, "I preach Christ and him crucified." Thile
Paul wisely emphasizes the significance of the cross in the lives
of individual believers, this doctrine could hardly have been
preached with effectiveness without reference to the actual death
of Jesus. Even though Paul w.s not an eye-witness of the work
of Jesus, it is obvious that his contact with the other disciples
(at least after his conversion, e.g. Acts 9;28; Gal. 1:18] vast
have given him an accurate knowledge of the events of Jesus' life,
and it could scarcely be expected that he would disregard these
in his preaching. Even the conversion exoerience itself reruires
an historical setting which Green seems unwilling to ascribe to
it. For granting that the experience consisted of an immediate
intuition of Ohrist, as Green maintains, such an experience would
have been psychologically imoossible without some orevious prepara-
tion. Unless we assume some previous knowledge of the life and
teachings of Jesus (acquired probably during Paul' 3 career as a
persecutor) such a direct revelation can be explained only as a
miracle, and for miracle Green has no olace.
Turning now to Green's conception of the Joh&nnine
Jesus, we find 'im regarding the fourth gospel as greatly infer-
ior to the writings of Paul in its portrayal of the real nature

o2 go
of Jesus, bat still above the level of the synoptics and of
dogmatic theology in this resnect. He regards the great value
of John's gospel as lying in its attempt to clothe religious
truth in a form picturable to the imagination. He says, "All
religion fas distinct alike from thought and morality) consists
in the presentation of the objects of thought under the forms of
imagination. The value of the religion depends on the adecuacy
of the imagined form to the object thought of (to which it never
/
can be quite adequate)". In John he considers that we have a
combination of the sensuous and spiritual conceptions of Jesus,
wherein the attempt is made to present spiritual truth in sen-
suous forms, Accordingly we find in the fourth gospel the con-
ception of the divine immanence made manifest in human flesh,
in the form of a person whose consciousness was both divine and
human. The miraculous element is present in John's gospel, but
is subsidiary to its spiritual truth; and in the effort to pre-
sent the divinity of Jesus in a form that can be grasped by the
imagination, it succeeds in its main object, yet fails fas any
such effort must) to give a fully adeouate account of Jesus'
personality. Thus its picture is that of a "glorified" Christ,
such as Jesus was potentially but not actually, and the religious
imagination has made this conception of the divine-human Christ
Works, vol. iii, p 219.

the corner-stone of its theology.
This conception, to Green, has both its merits and its
limitations. So far as it emphasizes the spiritual elements of
the living, immanent Christ, he considers that John, like .^aul
has rendered a gr?at service to religion. "It is because the
evangelist blended, or fif you like) confused, the sensuous see-
ing and the spiritual cognition, while yet he makes the latter
the one thing needful, that this gospel has filled the special
function of presenting the highest thought about God in language
of the imagination, and has thus become the source of the high-
it
est religion.
On the other hand, Green regards the view of Christ's
divinity, as presented in John's gospel, as having serious dif-
ficulties, A si de from the miraculous element, (which is unimpor-
tant because incidental and subsidiary to the spiritual), it
involves "the hopeless irrationality" of ascribing a double con-
sciousness to Christ. Green makes a good deal of this point,
(which of course has been repeatedly advanced against the Trini-
tarian position) but it is interesting to find him urging the
same objection against Christ's divinity which his critics have
often raised agai.ist his own conception of finite consciousness.
Green seems to think it consistent enough to regard the conscious-
ness of ordinary men as having both a divine and human element
l
,
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whereby God reproduces for manifests) himself in man, hut when
the consciousness of Jesus of Nazareth is taken as a special
case of such a manifestation, he finds in the view a "hopeless
irrati onality.
"
Another ground on which Green objects to the
conception of Christ's divinity is that if we regard Jesus as a
manifestation of God in any special sense not vouchsafed fat least
in kind) to other men, we must regard him as summing up in himself
all the metaphysical attributes of God. That is, he must be re-
garded as including- in his consciousness the divine unity of the
natural world as well as the moral order. Green dismisses this
possibility with the remark, "No rhapsody of imagination can "ore-
sent this cosmos as involved in the consciousness of a man who
4
walked the earth." I think, however, that the objection is not
valid, for it is not necessary to assume that Jesus, in order to
give a unique manifestation of God, must have been a complete du-
plication of him in every aspect.
We are ready now to summarize and evaluate in general
terms Green's conception of Christ. He seems to have regarded
Jesus of Nazareth as a man who, like other men but in greater
degree, reproduced within himself the eternal consciousness; and
who ftogether with Paul) gave to the world a conception of God
which makes Christianity vastly superior to any other religion.
Works, voi. ill, p. 183.

But to Green the real significance of Christ lies not in the life
of Jesus of Nazareth (which we can not really know], but in the
immanent Christ who lives as an eternal spirit in the hearts of
men. Thus his sacrifice on Calvary is to be considered merely as
a symbol of the eternal sacrifice of Cod, and his resurrection is
to be interpreted as symbolic of an eternal renewal of life in the
hearts of his followers.
The merits of this conception are patent. In making
Christianity a matter of vital faith other than historical evidence
Green lifted the reality of religion out of the realm of doubtful
controversy and. grounded, it upon the far surer foundation of per-
sonal experience. Whatever may be our view of the possibility of
miracles, it must be, admitted that Christ's divinity rests not on
the miracles that he may have performed, or upon miracles that may
have been connected with his birth or death. It rests rather upon
what he has meant to the hearts of men, and Green in affirming the
power of the indwelling Christ is as orthodox as any dogmatic
Trinitarian.
But the question has another side. Jesus of Nazareth
was to Green a man as other men, possessing to be sure an exception
al purity of spirit, but nevertheless divine only in the sense in
which all men may be said to be divine. Here we have a disparity
of conceptions which Green fails to reconcile. The immanent Christ
of religious experience is God; yet the Christ of Nazareth and

Jerusalem was man. It is impossible consistently to amalgamate
the tvo conceptions. If Christ i_s God, then Christ was God.
If the sacrifice on Calvary is to have any value as a symbol of the
eternal sacrifice of God, then it must be regarded as more than a
symbol. If Christ is actually present in the world today as a
living spirit, the resurrection also must be regarded as more than
a symtool. Green rendered an incalculable service to Christianity
in helping to emancipate its spiritual elemsnts from unreasoned
dogma, but in regard to the person of Christ his attempt to
amalgamate two disparate conceptions fails to free the problem
from its difficulties.
i

e . Sin an d salvati on .
In Green's writings we look in Bin for any definite or
detailed treatment of the problem of sin. In fact, one of the
charges raised against his ethical theory is that he overlooks
the v;illful choice of evil, and the same charge could be raised
with some justice against his treatment of the religious aspects
of the problem. But after all, it was not Green's purpose to
write a complete or systematic philosophy of religion, and if we
glean carefully among his miscellaneous writings we may find
enough references to sin and salvation to gather a fairly definite
idea of his conception. The most important of these sources are
the fragment entitled, "The vfc) rd is nigh thee", the essay on
The Force of Circumstances , and the essay on Popular Philosophy
in its Relation to Life . Incidental references are found also in
the essays on The Philosophy of Aristotle , The Witness of God , and
Faith .
The essential characteristic of Green's conception of
sin is that of incompleteness, or the will to realize one's poten-
tial capabilities only partially instead of to the fullest possible
extent. This is inseparably connected with Green's metaphysics,
for if man's main business in life is to reproduce God, t^en he
sins who deliberately fails to do this. Instead of trying to
manifest the divine elements of his nature he is content to remain
I
Supra
,
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"of the earth, earthy". In the essay on Popular Philosophy in
its Relation to Life Green defines the consciousness of sin as
"the consciousness of an infinite vacancy only possible to a
"being capable of an infinite fulness". The relation of sin to the
divine immanence is also brought out in the essay on The Philosophy
of Aristotle in which he draws a parallel between sin as the sub-
stitution of the finite for the infinite self, and intellectual
error as taking a partial truth where the whole truth is available.
He speaks in rather scathing terms of the man who refuses to re-
cognize the divinity that is within him. "Stretching out his hands
to an unknown God, he heeds not the God in whom he lives and moves
and has his being".
It is evident that in this sense Green's idea of sin
as incompleteness is closely akin to the idea of sin as a thwarting
of the divine will. For if sin is the will to be a fragment in-
stead of a whole, it is the will to pursue finite partial ends
instead of the infinite ideal established in the will of God. Thus
it is sin which thwarts moral progress, and it is sin which separ-
ates the individual from God. In The Witness of God Green traces
the growth of manifold agencies through which the will of God has
been progressively revealed to man, and ends with the trenchant
statement, "If it does not reach within the heart, it is because
the heart has a darkness of its own, some unconquered selfishness
which prevents its relation to him from being one of sincerity
'Works, vol. iii, p. 121.
Ibid., p 87,

and truth."
This brings as to a farther conception of sin (which is
in reality only a modification of Green's primary view) i.e., the
idea of sin as selfishness. This, of coarse, is the carrent con-
ception and wo aid not reaaire special notice except for the fact
that Green unites the idea of selfishness with that of incomplete-
ness. That is, the man who centers attention on self instead of
others, thereby fails fully to realize event himself. He who would
truly realize the divine potentialities within him must ouench the
impulse to self-seeking and must give himself in service of the
conmon good. This is significant in view of the fact that self-
realization has often been charged with being an egoistic theory.
Still another (and also related) conception of sin which
we find in Green is that of oleasure -seeking. In fact the most
concrete definition which he gives is expressed in the words, "Sin
is the effort to actualise one's possibilities in that in which
they cannot be actualised, viz. in pleasure". In his essay on
Popular Philosophy in its delation to Life Green discusses the
relation of this idea to the sensationali sti c and hedonistic
philosophy of the eighteenth century. The main point which he
makes is that the attempt to identify righteousness with pleasur-
able feeling, and the consciousness of s in with regret for a mis-
taken balance of pleasures and pains, led inevitably to a dulling
of men* 8 sensibilities to the real nature fo sin. Accordingly
Works, vol. iii, p 248.
Ibid., p B 226.
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when the evangelistic impulse in England again began to empha-
size the sinfulness of sin, philosophers a3 a whole found them-
selves out of sympathy with the movement. Green regards the ouest
for pleasure as responsible for false conceptions of man's true
destiny, and hence for failure to realize his divine possibilities;
but it should be noted that Green is not an ascetic, for he nowhere
represents pleasure itself as being intrinsicly wrong.
Turning from the religious to the ethical aspects of the
problem of sin, we find substantially the same idea although couched
in different language. All moral activity, according to Green, is
based on moral motive which involves an idea of personal good. This
moral motive arises from a conscious choice between conflicting
objects of desire. Accordingly if one sins, he does so on account
of choosing a lower instead of a higher motive. In other words,
his idea of uersonal good is erroneous because it lacks complete-
ness. His moral ideal fails to measure up to its highest possible
standard
.
In the Prolegomena Green discusses the possibility of
sin in connection with the freedom of the Trill. There he shows
that the consciousness of sin would be impossible , /ere it not for
man's power to choose deliberately among various courses of action.
Accordingly the statement that a man sins because of the temptations
of animal appetites is only a half-truth, for while these animal
appetites are undoubtedly responsible for presenting to him objects
^Works, vol. iii, pp. 121, 122.
Prolegomena, Book II, Chapter 1.

of desire the choice of which would involve sin, it is his con-
scious power to choose among conflicting motives which gives him
the possibility both of sin and righteousness. On any other basis,
remorse and self-reformation would be impossible.
If we return now to the religious implications of Green's
conception of sin, we find that sa lvati
o
n stands as a necessary
correlate. To be sure, Green discusses no theological process which
he labels salvation, but he believes profoundly in the possibility
of man's overcoming his sinful impulses and thereby turning from
sin to righteousness. To Green salvation means not an escape from
hell, nor even the attainment of heaven, for while he believes in
a future life (as we shall see in discussing immortality) he does
not link the future life theologically with sins committed in the
present. His idea of salvation is rather that of the expulsion of
sin through a greater realization of the indwelling presence of God
and a reconciliation with his will.
The connection of sin with salvation is brought out clear-
ly in his essay on The Force of Circumstances
,
in which he shows
that obstacles which seem to thwart our progress, and even the in-
fection of past sin, are elements in our spiritual training. He
says, "The common doctrine, which connects the sense of sin with
the confidence of salvation, has often been denounced by theologians
but it seems to have its root in the truest feelings which bind
I
Iearth to heaven." He says further that "our very imperfections
may win us to that child-like dependence on God which is only
another aspect of the assurance of salvation". Thus we see that
Green makes the essential element of salvation the dependence on
God, or cooperation with God, which enables man to triumph over
sinful tendencies.
The connection of sin and salvation to their common
metaphysical basis is further developed in the article entitled
"The word is nigh thee". Here we find him saying, "The source
of selfishness and sin is also the source of that which overcomes
si^. Through 'mortal yearnings' we ascend towards a higher object;
through influences born of self-consciousness the presentation of
a self satisfied by that which cannot satisfy is superseded as the
moral motive by that of a self actualised in a life like itself
eternal. Sin then, in itself, is no final reality". The relation
of sin to God is brought out in the statement that except for man's
identity with God (involved in the spiritual nature of the self)
men would not be sinners; yet we can not impute sin to God, for in
God sin is already overcome, and in man so far as the divine nature
is realized sin is in process of being overcome.
The relation of salvation to the atonement is not dis-
cussed by Green to any great extent. However, as we have previously
H
seen, he regards the sacrifice of Christ, not as any miraculous
I
Works, vol. iii, p 6.
J
Ibid.
,
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' Ibid.
,
p. 226.
Supra, p. 283.

prerecuisite^to the assurance of salvation, but as symbolic of the
eternal process which is being enacted by the indwelling presence
of God in the hearts of those vfoo seek him. "The consciousness
of sin", he says, "is already the promise and potency of faith.
It determines the soul to believe the narrative which tells how
the Son of God took on him our nature and obtained our free for*
giveness".' But he says further that it is "not on historical
evidence: that anyone has ever been brought to believe in Christ
to the saving of his soul." He maintains correctly, I think, that
the great concern of the best Christian teachers has not been to
convince people that Christ was miraculously born and died and
rose again, "but so to affect them as that they shall die and rise
again with him and live as those to whom their sins have been for-
given and the gate of eternal life thrown open". How this may be
done without attaching more importance to the work of the histor-
ical Christ than Green is willing to grant is a serious problem,
but as it has already been discussed in the preceding section it
3
need not detain us longer at this point.
In criticism of Green's conception of sin and salvation,
it may be said that it is in the main satisfactory. It accords
with the view that life is an organic whole, and that no one can
truly fulfill his function in life unless he strives to realize
his capabilities to the utmost. It emphasizes the need of con-
sciously putting one's self in right relations to God and his
/
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fellow-man. It makes the divine immanence a matter of every-day
experience, and goes to the heart of religion in making righteous-
ness consist of conscious cooperation with God in the attainment
of the highest values of life.
But there are some points in which Green's theory seems
to be defective, and these may be "briefly noted. In the first place
the conception of sin as incompleteness is somewhat ambiguous, for
it is impossible to assume that any man can completely realize the
divine possibilities implanted in his nature. All that Green him-
self appears to mean is that to avoid sin one must live as complete
a life as possible . While this serves very well as a working: prin-
ciple and is probably as satisfactory a theory as can be established
it nevertheless fails to set any definite standard by which to mea-
sure moral responsibility. Consciousness of incompleteness can not
afford a safe guide, for, as Green admits ,it is a fact established
by experience that the consciousness of incompleteness grows more
keen as one attains to higher standards of righteousness.
Another criticism may be found in the fact that Green
nowhere clearly distinguishes between c orapleteness in the attain-
ment of virtue and of the other values of life. This, of course,
is merely a corollary of the objection raised by Sidgwick and
others that he confuses the broad and narrow conceptions of self-
realization. This, I believe, constitutes a real di fficulty, which
has alreadj been/discussed in connection with his ethics.
i
^Wo^ks, vol. iii, p 226.
Supra, p. 247 f.

Still a third problem is presented with reference to
Green's theory of the willful choice of evil. Every moral act,
he says, arises from an ideal of personal good, and sinful acts
accordingly arise from false or limited moral motives. While this
theory accounts satisfactorily for evil acts which originate from
ignorance or low ideals, it seems to me that it fails to provide
for cases in which people who have high standards and a full know-
ledge of the right nevertheless deliberately choose an evil course
which is not in harmony with their own ideals. But nevertheless
even here the merits of the theory outweigh its limitations, for
it emphasizes the need of building right ideals which
|
in general
(
are the basis of right conduct.
*
f . Immortal ity
The most obvious place to look for a statement of Green's
views on this subject is his fragment entitled Immortal ity » This
indeed is fragmentary, but since he nowhere else gives a definitely-
labeled statement of his views, his critics have generally (though
incorrectly) assumed that this is representative of his thought.
However, a far clearer statement is found in the Prolegomena , Book
III, Chapter II A, where in connection with the moral ideal he
makes personal immortality a necessary postulate of the full re-
alization of the ideal. Yet for the most satisfactory statement
of his own personal attitude toward immortality, we must look to
two sources which have not found a place in his collected works
(except as quoted by Nettleship in his Memoir ) . These are the
essay written in competition for the Sllerton theological prize
in 1860, and excerpts from letters to his fiancee written at the
death of her father.
The essential idea in Green's conception of immortality
is that death is merely a transition from a lower to a higher
stage of development. This appears in the Fragment on Immortality
in the view that even extinct races of animals, as stages in the
process of development, live on in higher forms. "The process is
eternal, and they as stages in it are so too". This, however,
taken by itself gives a false conception of Green's view, for it
Works, vol. iii, p. ire.
i
seems to imply that the immortality of persons likewise is merely
immortality of influence. For a clearer statement we must look
to the Prolegomena , where we find nim saying, "We empty the idea
of development of any real meaning, if we suppose the end of the
development to be one in the attainment of which persons - agents
who are ends to themselves - are extinguished, or one which is
other than a state of self-conscious being".
1
Immortality, then,
means the conservation of personality in a higher, more spiritual
stage of development.
Closely joined with this idea is the thought that death
consists in the throwing off of the fleshly impediments which sep-
arate man from God. In fact, the real meaning of the Fragment on
Immortality is found in the words, "What then is the meaning of
death? It is the transition by which the highest form of nature,
i.e. the highest realisation of spirit, short of its realisation
in itself, passes into a perfectly adeouate realisation, i.e. a
spiritual one". Hhe same idea is brought out in his lecture on
the Incarnat i on , where he alludes to the words imnuted to Christ
in John 14: 16-18, i.e. that Christ must relinouish the fleshly
vesture in which the disciples have known him, in order to come
3
again as an indwelling spirit. The clearest statement of this
conception of immortality as an emancipation of spirit by a put-
ting off of the flesh, is found in his letter of condolence to
i
^Prol^oreria ,p. 217.
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his fiancee, where he says, "I think the best notion we can form
of the state after death is that it is one in which all the spirit-
ual result of our present sensuous life remains in a higher and
freer form; in which all that the good have been to each other by-
means of sensuous symbols here, they will still be, though the
symbols are different ,, Don't you sometimes feel that com-
munion 'spirit to spirit 1 may be purer and freer when it is not
'face to face'?* This clearly indicates that Green believes not
only in immortality as a development of personality, but as a con-
tinuance of personal relationships, in a more spiritual form.
The personal-social nature of immortality is brought out
very distinctly in the Prolegomena . After stating the general
premise that the human spirit has caoacities which can not be re-
alized amid earthly limitations, he suggests three possible
courses: (1) We may say that the personal life begun on earth is
continued in an ideal society which carries forward the attain-
ents of this life, (2) We may say "that the personal self-con-
scious being, which comes from God, is forever continued in God",
a.
or (3) We may declare the problem insoluble. Some of Green's
-3
critics have assumed that he did not attempt himself to choose
between these three possibilities, but this is clearly a mis-
interpretation of his meaning. He rules out the third, and while
he has so r.ne leanings toward the second, it is the first which
states the essential elements of his thought. The inseparable
/
Works, vol. iii, p cix #
"Prolegomena
,
p. 213.
1 Supra, pp. 90, 146.

connection between persons and society is well expressed in the
words, "In saying that the human spirit can only realise itself,
that the divine idea of man can only be fulfilled, in and through
persons, we are not denying but affirming that the realisation
and fulfillment can only take place in and through society. With-
out society, no persons; this is as true as that without persons,
without self-objectifying agents, there could be no such society
as we know". Since society is the condition of the development
of personality, we may conclude that the future life consists of
a society of immortal spirits, who freed from the limitations of
earth are striving to realise their divine destiny.
The idea of immortality as absorption in the infinite
creeps in occasionally where his pantheistic tendencies are upper-
most. In the Fragment on Immortality he seems to confuse contin-
uity of life with eternity of thought. Here we find him saying,
"The 'immortality of the soul'^ asrthe eternity of thought tfthe being
of God, is the absolute first and the absolute whole. To deny the
'immortality of the soul' in this sense is to maintain the destruc-
.2,
tibility of thought, and this is a contradiction in terms". A
little later in the same article he says, "The living agent, man,
then like everything else, is eternal as a determination of thought
J
In the Ellerton essay there is a suggestion that immortality begins
in this life through a mystical experience in which the finite self
loses its identity in God.-^ But while we find occasional hints of a
'Prolegomena, p. 218,
*Works, vol. iii, p. 159.J Ibid.
,
p. xxvii.

pantheistic conception of immortality, this is not his dominant
idea.
The relation of Green's conception of immortality to his
metaphysics is significant in view of the fact that in regard to
immortality, personal ism triumphs over pantheism. If his main
idea of the future life is that of a personal and social existence
in which the continued development of personality may he achieved,
this is clearly an evidence that his major conception of the di-
vine spirit in man is one in which personal distinctions are main-
tained instead of being merged in a Universal Self. The time-
less self, to be sure, is the basis of man's continued existence,
but it is not the pantheistic self imputed to Green by Seth,
l
Sidgwick, Upton and others (q.v. ). In discussing Green's meta-
physics we^reached the conclusion that there is an irreconcilable
inconsistency between his personalism and his pantheism, and while
our findings with regard to immortality do not alter this conclu-
sion, we see that in the applicati on of his metaphysics to an im-
portant problem, Green assumes in general a personalistic rather
than a pantheistic basis.
The relation of Green's conception of immortality to his
ethics will be treated more fully later, and does not reouire much
comment at this point. We have seen that he regards it as an essen-
tial element in the achievement of the moral ideal, and it is for
this reason that he introduces a discussion of immortality into the
' Supra, p£. 43, 61, 145.
*Sui:ra, p. 282.

Prolegomena , from which other religious considerations are excluded.
In the Ellerton essay he shows that the same "ever present sr>irit
of life" is the basis both of moral progress in this life and of
immortality in the next, and that the stimulus to moral endeavor
afforded by the belief in immortality is essential both to re-
r
ligion and to ethics. While Green frankly admits that immortality
can not be definitely proved, we #re told that his own staunch
conviction of the reality of the future life enabled him "to meet
death unafraid. His consciousness of the eternal spirit within
hin gave him the confidence that he was following the way "to which
all the world's ways converge, the way that leadeth unto eter-
nal life."
Works, vol. iii, p xxvi.
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V . The Relations between Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion..
Co
We come now„the problem which pertains most directly to the
subject of this study. We have analyzed Green's metaphysics, his
ethics, and his philosophy of religion in order to get a synoptic
view of his thought. We have seen how closely his metaphysics is
related both to his ethics and to his philosophy of religion.
We have found in numerous instances parallels and points of connection
between his ethical and religious doctrines, but we have as yet made
no definite attempt to group these together or to show their larger
implications. It is the purpose of this section to point out as
specifically as possible the elements of similarity and interdependence
between Green's ethics and his philosophy of religion. In doing
so, we shall attempt also to show to what extent Green's system
gives an adequate conception of the relation between ethics and the
philosophy of religion in general.
It must be noted at the outset that the relations which we
shall attempt to indicate are in many cases present in Green's works
by implication ^than by explicit statement. In his religious works,
to be sure, he gives morality a very prominent place, and it is from
these works that we must drav< most of our specific references to
his conception of the relation between religion morality. But in
his ethical works, while he has much to say of the eternal conscious-
ness, he makes slight reference to religious experience as such.
In a few passages, which we shall later indicate, he approximates
a discussion of the relation between religion and ethics. But

nowhere does he give a definite and systematic statement of
what he considers this relation to be. We shall therefore be
obliged frequently to indicate elements in his ethical theory
and religious thought which Green himself does not explicitly
connect, but in which valid points of connection in harmony with
the spirit of his philosophy can be found.
1 . Their common metaphysical basis
a . General considerations
In discussing the relations between morality andjreligion
we shall give much more attention to points of agreement than to
points of difference, for the reason that Green himself does so.
His conception of the essential unity of experience le^ds him to
regard both religious faith and the moral life as manifestations
of the eternal spirit; but he never draws clearly the distinction
between these manifestations. Religion he defines as "a God-seek-
ing morality", yet morality also is represented as the effort of
man to manifest the life of God. He says it is useless to attempt
to contrast the zeal of the moral reformer with the devotion of
the saint, for the value of each is intrinsic and identical. An
example of the vagueness of his consideration of whether religious
values are unique is found in his sermon on Faith where he says,
"In its true nature faith can be justified by nothing but itself.
Like the consciousness of God and of duty--of which indeed it is
but another mode-it is a primary formative principle, which cannot
be deduced or derived from anything else". But he fails to indicate
Works, vol. ill, p. 270.
Prolegomena, p. 363
Works, vol. iii, p. 263.

how faith can at the same time be "but another mode" of duty
and also a primary and underived principle.
Elsewhere he defines faith as "a personal and conscious
relation of man to G-od . This is suggestive of a distinction between
morality and religion which is implied though not very clearly
stated in his works While both are equally personal and involve
God as their basis, the relation in the case of religion is more
conscious than in morality. Green says that God is "the final cause
of the moral life, the ideal self which no one, a moral agent, is,
but which every one , as such an agent, is however blindly seeking
a.
to become." But he assumes that in religion, the quest for God
is not blind, but conscious and definite. On such a basis, "a
God-3eeking morality must be interpreted to mean "a consciously
God-seeking type"
.
Again we finfl him saying, "All religion (as distinct alike
from thought and morality) consists in the presentation of the
ti 1
objects of thought under the forms of the imagination
.
Here the
distinction between morality and religion appears to be the greater
degree of action involved in the moral life. This however is not
typical of his dominant conception.
While these distinctions are suggested in Green's works,
they are so over-shadowed by his conception of the essential anity
of morality and religion that the latt^ must receive the major pert
of our attention. We pass now to a consideration of their common
metaphysical basis.
We have seen that Green's ethics and his philosophy of
religion rest upon the same fundamental metaphysical conceptions
'Works, vol. iii, p 263
jlbid. p. 260.
Prolegomena, p. 36.3.
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.
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We have found that in both the activity of the conscious self
and the existence of God are primary necessities, and
that in both man's primary task is to realize the divine
potentialities of his nature, ^e have found also that both
look forward to an ideal which consists of a better state of
personal and social existence, and which requires a future
life for its fulfillment. Both religion and ethics urge men
to bend their energies to the increase and conservation of
values, and both assume that these values are objective.
The question at once arises, "Do we need this common
metaphysical basis?" In fact, do we need a metaphysical
basis at all? ^e shall consider the second question first.
The need for a metaphysical basis of ethics has already
been discussed in connection with the nature of ethics/ To
restate our conclusions, we found that Green began his ethics
with a consideration of metaphysics because he believed that
ethics can not properly be considered a science of conduct in
which moral choices are involved unless man's essential nature
can be shown to be, not a natural mechanism, hut a spiritual
principle endowed with the power of free activity. To establish
this spiritual principle in man, Green found it necessary also
to extend the idealistic conception to physical nature and to
God. In evaluating Green's conception we found that it was
possible both to engage in ethical activity and to study ethics
empirically without raising metaphysical issues, and that since
ethics furnishes data which metaphysics must interpret, it is
more correct from the standpoint of method to follow Lot^e's
Supra, p. 200 f.

dictum that "ethics is the beginning of metaphysics." But
Green is right in maintaining that the possibility of ethical
conduct itself rests upon underlying metaphysical consider-
ations which are present even though not reflected upon.
Tiile we need not accept all of Green's metaphysics, e. g. the
theorj?" of relations, in order to accept his ethics, the latter
is untenable from a speculative standpoint unless we accept
the basic metaphysical postulates of the free activity of the
self and the objective reality of the moral ideal.
Of the need of a metaphysical basis for religion there is
little Question. Gomte, to besure, attempted to found his
religion of humanity on a positivistic basis, and there have
been numerous sporadic attempts to conserve some of the values
of religion without the belief that these values are objectively
founded in God. The movement of the present day (represented by
Leufc^ and Dewey) which attempts through the psychology of re-
ligion to do away v/ith an objective basis for the psychological
phenomena manifested in religious worship, may be regarded as
the most serious attempt to deprive religion of its metaohysical
foundations. But in reality, religion must be metaphysical, or
it is not religion. It is oossible for a person *o engage in a
high type of ethical activity without the belie? in God, and in
fact, without any definite metaphysical conceptions; but as soon
as he believes that the values of religion are merely subjective

they cease to be values. It is impossible to worship one's
own psychological reflexes. For this reason religion, how-
ever crude its forms, has always held to sor.e sort of an ob-
jective metaphysical basis, and there is little doubt that it
will continue to do so. Green, therefore, in making religion
consist of communion a-nd cooperation with God, adopted a meta-
physical position which is essential to religion.
find, accordingly, that both ethics and religion need a
metaphysical basis, though the need in ethics is primarily spec-
ulative while in religion it is both practical and speculative.
?he question as to whether ethics and religion require the same
metaphysical basis need not detain us long. ?he very possibility
of philosophy rests uoon the assumotion that the various elements
of our thought py3tem must not be kept in water-tight compartments
"^ut that the system must be coherent and systematic throughout.
If this be true, it is obvious that we can not have one type of
metaphysics for ethics and another for religion. ~e may find that
ethics and religion emphasize different aspects of the common
metaphysical basis, as in the fact that ethics lays its major
emphasis upon the free activity of the self and religion upon
the reality of God. But if we find discordant elements in either
ethic3 or religion, we must in the interests of coherence adjust
our conceptions to form a systematic whole, '""e shall now attempt
to see to what extent Green did this in specific points.
J
3 o b
b . Green 's conception of the self .
oinoe we have found the activity of the self to be
a primar" postulate of Green's philosophy, it will be worth
while to consider more definitely the relations Which this
bears hot?: to ethics and religion.
Green's startinfr-point, as we h r vc seen, is epistemolog-
ical. He asks the Kantian question, "Kow is knowledge pos-
sible?", and answers it with the theory of relations of which
the most significant element is the dictum, "Only for a think-
ing consciousness do relations exist". Green's epistemology
has important ethical consequences which we ha^ r e considered.
It gives rational guidance to conduct, and makes possible the
moral distinctions between virtue and vice which, on the basis
of empiricism, are reduced to pleasurable and painful sensations.
It also has important religious conscouences , which though not
so definitely traced are nevertheless implied, "ithout the
"synthetic unity of apperception", religious experience, like
all other connected experience, would be impossible. We have
seen also that Green makes the possibility of knowledge a
strong argument for the existence of God, and thus supplies a
rational basis for the most important element of religion*
Burning now to the more distinctly metaphysical aspects
'Supra, p . 150
1 Supra, p. 205 f
3 Supra
, p . 168
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of the self, we find thi t he makes the need of a unitary
and abiding self the corner-stone of his philosophy. Of
course the charge has often jeen raiser! that Green' a con-
ception of the self is not in reality unitary, but dual-
istic. ^e have evaluated these charges.* and have found that
while his theory of the /'timeless self", is open t o serious
criticism, Oreen from a practical standpoint is more person-
alistic than pantheistic. He assumes a unitary Self in his
ethical theory even though many of his jnetaphyslcal fcate-
ments may he otherwise construed. Of the ah id ing nature of
the self there is no question. T"e have' seen that Oreen makes
''the abidinrr satisfaction of the abiding Self" the test of
the summum "bonum
.
and his repeated reference to the "timeless"
self is doubtless intended to indicate the abiding nature
of the finite self fully as much as to emphasise its relation
to the eternal consciousness*
If we ask why this unitary and abiding self is ne^cessary
as a basis for' morality and religion we find several reasons.
T
"e find, in the first -place, that a unitary self is necessary
in order to ensure moral freedom and responsibility. If
Green's conception of the self la in reality dualistic or
pantheistic he has no better basis for moral activity th in
does materialism. It* is the Eternal Consciousness which
Supra, p. 217
Supra, p. 240

thinks in nan's thoughts and 'jets in man's activity, he is
as much in the grip of an external force as he would "be if
his acts were all determined by the chain of natural caus-
ation, '"here man is not free he is not responsible , and on
such a "basis human sin must "be attributed to God. rJhis ob-
viously is not the conclusion which Green intends to draw,
nor do the major elements of his Byetea necessitate this
conclusion.
But if this conclusion were the necessary outcome of
his theory, religion would suffer alonf: with morality, for
religion likewise requires freedom for the exercise of its
functions. ?here can b no conscious cooperation with God
unless there are two separate persons to cooperate. Even
the communion with the Infinite in which we seem to have a
pantheistic blending of the finite self with God, requires
as a necessary correlate the metaphysical separateness of
the two elements in order that" the communion may be volun-
tary. Mystical experierce is not a blend, but a bond.
The existence of a continuous and abiding self is nec-
ssary also both for morality and for religion* Without it,
we oould have neither continued moral development nor reli-
gions growth. We have seen that the essence of self-realiz-
ation consists iii the effort to .-ittain to higher and I Lgher
stages cf personal development. If there were no abiding
Supra, p. 176
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self, it would be impossible in each forward step to conserve
the results of the preceding. One great difficulty with r <d-
/
ouism, as Green has shown, is 4-b. the fact that pleasures per
se can not be progressively conserved. Only as they enter into
the content of the self is this possible.
In religion, as in morality, the continuance of the self
is necessary for the conservation of values. If one is to
"grow in grace'' (and if the spiritual nature does not grow it
Iosjs its vitality), he must have some basis on which to grow.
Paul is stating the essential principles of self-realization
in religious terms when he urges the Ephesians to "attain unto
the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ". (Uph.4:13)
T
.7hile immortality will later receive fuller consideration, it
may also be noted here that both morality and religion require
a continuance of the abiding self into the future life if the
growth is to be in \ any wise complete.
Approaching the problem from the standpoint' of the contrast
of Green's conception to that of sensationalism, we find that
the latter from an ethical standpoint has deterministic and
hedonistic implications, and from a religioue standpoint it
has exerted a deistic or utheistic influence. He have seen how
Green analyzed Hume'fl sensationalism and found that where con-
sciousness was made to consist solely of a disconnected se:ios
Supra, p. 241
i
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of sense impressions, the inevitable outcome was psychological
f
hedonism. If there is no rational self to distinguish higher
from lower values, there can "be no voluntary choice of a dif-
ficult or unpleasant course in the light of an ideal. On a
purely sensationalistic "basis, we will "trammel up the con-
sequence" and choose the pleasure of the moment.
While Cfreen says, less of the religious than of the ethical
influence of sensationalism, it is apparent that his effort
to p] ,ce religious faith on a rational brris is due in a large
aeasure to the anti-religious influences of English empiricism.
Since' "Jod can neither be a sense impression nor a combination
of sense qualities, there is no logical basis in sensationalism
for his existence. The empiricists who attempted to retain the
divine existence did so on a deictic basis by assuming that
C!od
;
at some time in the past^set in operation the material
universe which ii the cause of sense impressions. The empirical
philosophy when applied to evolution became in general hostile
to religion by trying to substitute evolution for Cod. It
became Green's task not only to provide, through the spiritual
principle, a rational baric for Cod; but also to make evolution
an asset to religion by showing the neod of God as the objective
basis of evolutionary progress toward q definite \ '1.
' Supra, p. 207.
Prolegomena, p. 126.
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77e see therefore that both morality and religion depend
I
upon a spiritual principle in nan which extends also to nature
and to God. The presence of this spiritual pri'-ci^le,
18 evidenced *y epirtenol OtTically by the possioili 4:;; of hi.r-
mon^ hot-veer. .'" thoughts and the cuter '.vorld, is evidenced
also from a moral standpoint by the fact the t in nan's noral
nature ve ree a revelation of God. 2ho "ery fact of our
stri~i:-~-r points to an objective .".oral order through. vhich
these noral strivings may be satisfied. Man's religious
aspirations also -point to the objective existence of a 3od
through -.7hom these aspirations nay attain fulfillnent. The
nature of the self, as ":e knovr it, points beyond the finite
self to the infinite. This brings us to a consideration of
the second corner-stone of Green's philosophy, his con-
ception of Sod.

3 /SL*
c . Green \ s conception of G od_.
We have seen that Green goes farther than most -philos-
ophers in asserting categorically the existence of God. If
challenged point blank with the question "Can we prove the ex-
istence of God?", he probably would ha^-e answered in the negative,
but would have added that neither can we prove the existence of
ourselves or of the world. But from a practical standpoint he
considers that we need have no doubts about the existence of all
three factors. As we have seen' the lines along which Green at-
tempts to prove the existence of God are mainly (1) epistemolog-
ical, to explain the possibility of finite knowledge; (£) meta-
physical, to explain the existence and interaction of the system
of relations; (3) moral, to explain the existence of man's moral
nature and to provide for the objective existence of the moral
ideal; and (4 ) religious, to afford a legitimate basis for religious
experience. Passing over the distinctly epistemological and meta-
physical considerations {which have been discussed in section IV),
we must give more specific attention to the moral and religious
basis of theistic faith.
"he only way to approximate a "proof" of the existence
of God is to show inductively that there are certain undeniable
factors of our experience that are otherwise unexplainable . Such
Supra, p # 168 f.
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a proof is accordingly synonymous with a demonstration of man's
need of God. If it "be charged that this procedure is anthropo-
centric , it may be said in reply that all philosophy (e^en that
of positivism) proceeds from the need of explaining human exper-
ience . We shall consider first why God is needed as the basis
of morality, and then shall examine the points wherein there is a
parallel or related need from the standpoint of religion.
We have found, in the first Place, that Green regards
God as necessary to explain the possibility of man's moral nature.
He believes, as firmly as Lotze, or any of the other advocates of
the priority of ethics to metaphysics, that in the very fact of
the existence of the moral consciousness which experience reveals
we find a valid argument for the idea of God. Whatever may be
the phenomenal antecedents of the emergence of sense of ought, it
is impossible to explain why Persons should Persistently have the
impulse to seek the good in the face of overwhelming obstacles
unless a Supreme Person who cares for moral values has made the
sense 01 moral obligation an intrinsic element of man's nature.
Custom and environment may explain in large measure the content
of this sense of moral obligation, but the fret of the moral nature
itself cannot be thus explained. The claims of Pleasure r nd sel-
fish advantage are sufficient to explain why men seel: the evil,
but they give no legitimate answer to the question of why men seek
/Works, vol.ii, p. 74 ~; vol.iii, pp. 223
,
258, 269 et al .
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the frood . The latter can only be explained by the belief that
there is in "ian "a Dower not ourselves which makes for righteous-
ness"; or in Green's more stilted phraseology, "a spiritual urin-
l
ciple striving to reproduce the eternal consciousness".
God is necessary, furthermore, to refute moral scepti-
cism and relativism by oroviding an objective moral ideal, ~>ile
we shall later give fuller consideration to the moral and religious
aspects of the ideal, it may be noted here that an argument for
theistic faith is found in the fact that there can be no legitimate
assumption of an absolute good which men should seek unless there
is a Supreme Person who establishes and gives objective reality to
this absolute good. To be sure, we may believe with Sophists
that each ~ian is -orivileged to set his own standard of morality,
but the chaotic incoherence of moral 'udgments which rest' Its from
this assumotion makes a science of ethics impossible, and if ac-
tufllly adhered to would make all social life itself Impossible.
Dor is the problem solved if we try to find an objective standard
of morality in the social code, for codes, varying widely with
different times f nd different places, oossess no true uniformity
or objectivity. No one recognised more fully than Green the em-
pirical value of social institutions as embodiments of the moral
judgments of the past, but he insisted that these were to be re-
garded, not as merely human achievements, but as progressive
' Prolegomena
, p. 3 f.
L Works, vol. iii, p. 224

Irevelations of the Divine Ideal.
We come now to a closely related argument for theistic
faith which occupies an important Place in Green's conception;
namely, the argument from teleology and moral progress. As we
have seen, Green was among the first (and Mairhead thinks he was
the very first) to turn the flank of the evolutionary hypothesis
in favor of theistic faith, by showing that it revealed a teleol-
ogy, not only in the organic world but still more in the world of
values, which could be explained only on a theistic basis. What-
ever may be the apparent dysteleology of the natural world, the
history of mankind reveals unmistakably an upward climb toward
higher stages of moral attainment in which ideals triumph over
brute strength. Green shows that on a purely naturalistic basis
there could not only be no science of ethics but there could be
no explanation of the indubitable fact that right has gradually
rained the ascendency over the opposition presented by the force
H s
of circumstances. While, as we have seen, Green is not entirely
clear as to whether God is himself the metaphysical cause of these
opposing forces, he maintains staunchly that the possibility of
man's moral progress toward a definite goal depends upon the gui-
dance and cooperating activity of the eternal consciousness. Green
has been charged with having merely revived the old argument from
design of which Kant had shown the inadequacy, but I believe that
i
Works, vol. iii, pp. 248, 270.
Supra, p. 129
3 Woris, vol. ii, p. 437
''Works, vol. iii, p. 5 f.
Supra, p. 195
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in his union of teleology with the increase and c onser\Tat ion of
moral values he nresented a much stronger basis for theietic faith.
While Dewey argues for a naturalistic teleology without the classic
metaphysical basis, it is difficult to explain how man can be pro-
gressing toward an apparently objective goal unless there is a
God who establishes this "far-off divine event" and aids man in
his struggles to attain it.
This brings us to another closely related element in
Green's conception of the theistic basis of morality; i.e., that
divine cooperation is necessary for the attainment of the highest
moral values. This is significant in view of the fact that the
dividing line between morality and religion has often been con-
sidered to be the presence in the latter of a divine cooperating
factor which is absent in the former. For Green, no such sharp
dividing line exists. In his thought the unity of experience is
such that both the life of faith and the life of moral endeavor
are characterized by the indwelling presence and cooperating ac-
tivity of the eternal consciousness. To be sure, in moral con-
duct one may be less conscious of the presence of God within him
than in his religious aspirations; yet in so far as he is moral,
he is (however blindly) working with God to realize the "possible"
self.
American Philosophical Association, New York, 1922
Nforks, vol
#
iii, pp. 225, 258 f.
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Thus we have found that in Green's conception, God is
needed as the basis of morality for several reasons: (1) to ex-
plain man's moral nature; (2) to refute moral scepticism and sub-
jectivism; i'6) to provide for teleology and moral -or ogress; (4)
to afford a cooperating factor in man's moral struggles.
We turn now to the religions asoects of the divine ex-
istence. If religion is regarded as a real element in human ex-
perience, the need of God as its basis is almost self-evident, for
an atheistic religion is a contradiction in terms. We shall exam-
ine the conditions of religious experience to see in what respects
the noral and religious demands for God are parallel.
If God is needed to explain man's moral nature, he is
needed even more clearly to explain the existence of the religious
consciousness. Whatever maybe the verdict of psychologists re-
garding the nature or the universality of the "religious instinct",
experience reveals the fact that there is an element in man's na-
ture which craves religious expression. This relir^ous impulse,
however crude its manifestations in its lower forms, has always
tended to lift men above the level of their environment and to
direct their worship toward a higher power. The impulse to seek
God is unexplainable unless it has a theistic basis. While Green
enters upon no specific discnss ion of the psychology of religion,
he repeatedly asserts the belief that religion, morality anri the
:
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quest for truth, are all grounded in that element of nan's nature
/
which is infinite and eternal
.
We have seen that morality requires God in order to have
any truly objective basis; yet moral values do not wholly disappear
if the belief in God is rejected* Heligion, to be of any value
whatsoever, must have an object of warship which is believed to be
real. Heligious experience disappears- when believed to be merely
subjective. While the forms of religious worship have varied as
widely as the forms of morality, religious experience itself has
always pointed to some objecive reality as the source of its
values and the object of its a suira ti onr . This, to be sure, does
not constitute a logical proof of the existence of this objective
reality; but unless we are to believe that the universe is fun-
damentally awry, we can scarcely conclude that the spiritual yearn-
ings of mankind have all been directed toward an illusion. It
requires a bold assrjnotion to believe that the religions values
for which the choicest spirits of the worli have given their lives
have been merely their imaginings. But to be consistent, we must
either reject the validity of religious exuerifrce outright or
assert an objective basis for these values.
Green, as we have found, chose the latter course. He
was honest enough to recognise here that the need of an objective
basis for religious experience did not constitute a logical dem-
3
onstration of the existence of God, but he reueatedly sts.ted that
'Works, vol. iii, pp 9C, 225, 26G, 272, et al.
3-Works, vol. iii, p/272.

the truest evidence of the reality of faith is found in its ex-
ercise. We have found hira Baying, "The true verification of the
consciousness of God is found in the life of prayer and self-
I
denial which exnresses it." Again he speaks of a consciousness
of God "which defines itself in the moral life expressive of it;
which is not indeed an external proof of the existence of God, but
is in principle that existence itself, a first connnunieat ion of
the Godhead." To those whose faith is wavering he s?ys, "Live
on cs if there were God and duty, end they will Drove themselves
3
to you in your lives".
In considering the moral demand for God, we found that
a theistic foundation was needed to account for teleology and
moral progress. It is even more evident that God is needed as
the basis of a progressive religious revelation. We do not need
to have recourse to .Biblical authority to belief that God has
revealed himself "by divine portions and in divers manners", for
the history of .iankind is a record of his progressive revelation
through ihose who have sought to manifest his spirit. This, as
r
we have seen, is a fundamental element in Green's conception, for
in his theory of God as the possible self, he holds that every
man, to a greater or less degree, is revealing God. While this
divine revelation was manifested in its highest form in the life
of Jesus of IJazareth, God is also revealing himself continually
'worka, vol. iii, p. 273.
?"Ibid
,
p. 269.
* Ibid;
,
p, 273.
^ Hebrews : 1 ,
1
* Su: ra, p. 255.
I
3 cZ o
in ever-increasing richness through the spiritual progress of
mankind. It is for this reason that Green regards the Christ
of religious faith as having more significance than the Jesus
of history.
7/e have seen that Green found God necessary as sn aid
in man's moral struggles. It is equally true that God is needed
as a cooperating factor in religious endeavor. In Loth, the
divine immanence is a fundamental element. As we have noted, Green
does not draw the line very sharply between religion and morality.
To him, prayer is "incipient action", and moral activity is "the
reproduction of God". Heligion is defined as "a God-seeking mor-
ality", and reference is made to "the yearning after him wh:"ch
is inseparable from' the impulse to fulfill ourselves". It is
unfortunate that Green does not give more specific attention to
the question of whether religious values are unique. But while
he would have strengthened his position by pointing out more
clearly the difference, as well as the identity, between morality
and religion, it is of importance to note in this connection that
by putting them on a common objective basis he found an argument
for the existence of God more valid than the epistemological con-
siderations which occupy so much suace elsewhere in his works.
If we recapitulate the points of contact between moral-
ity and religion which we have noted in connection with the divine
existence, we find that the idea of ^od is needed to exule in both
4
'Works, vol. iii, pp. 240, 270.
x Ibid.
,
p. 27u
3 Ibid.
, p. 261.
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the moral and the religious c onsc ion sues
e
t
to provide for objec-
tivity, to afford a me tr physical basis for Progress, and to aid
man in his upward climb. These common elements reduce eventually
to two, the objectivity of valueB and the divine immanence. In
his ethical and religions philosophy Green everywhere assumes that
both morality and religion are real factors of our experience, the
possibility of which rests upon a more-than-human basis, and that
the essence of both consists of the reproduction of the life of
God in the consciousness of man.
We turn now to Green's consideration of the nature of
God. We have noted that he gives much more attention to the divine
I
existence than to the divine nature, and thereby weakens his system.
But we shall attemtp to consider briefly what sort of a God is
necessary to fulfill these demands of moralitj' and religion. The
general postulates of t heist ic faith require a God who is Personal,
ethically perfect, infinite in -power, completely rational, and
eternal. There attributes appear with varying degrees of promin-
ence in Green's Philosophy.
The Personal character of God is a orime essential if
we believe that only persons are the bearers of values* To ad-
duce all the evidence for the need of a personal God would require
a volume in it; elf , but it may be asserted on a theistic basis
' Supra, p # 170

3that morality and religion alike requ: re a Snnreie Person as their
objective ground. The extent to which Green regerds God as such
i
a Supreme Person is onen to some question, as we have seen, "but
however much we may charge him with pantheism, it is unfair to
Green to say that in his ethics and uhilosouhy of religion he makes
God merely an impersonal unifying principle. The very fact that
he regards God as "the possible self" which all men should seek to
realise, indicates that he thinks of God in personal terms. There
may be a blending in Green's thought of the finite and infinite
selves, but the Infinite remains nevertheless a self and is not a
material or impersonal element. His insistence upon the personal
character of the moral ideal also bears out this conclusion.
Of the need of a God who is ethically perfect there is
no question. A sinful God would be no worthy object of worship
nor adequate conserver of moral values. While Green has occasion-
ally been charged with ascribing to God man's ethical limitations
on the score that he identifies divine and human activity, the
charge is unfounded unless we regard him as a thorough-going r>en-
theist. He himself refutes the charge of imuuting sinfulness to
God by saying that if sin is inc omuleteness , it is overcome in
God who is all-comulete
•
The Omnipotence , or at least the self-limited . character
of God is also an attribute of prime Importance from a moral and
i
£Supra, p. 171 f.
Supra, pp. 63, 88.
*Works, vol, iii, p. 226.
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religious standpoint. While the conception of the Finite God
may help to solve the problem of evil, it raises more problems
than it solves, for it removes the possibility of dependence upon
an unlimited power for the realization of values. Green's entire
metaohysical system rests upon the belief that the universal con-
sciousness is the source and sustainer of the harmonious system
of relations which constitutes the \vorld : and while he doe:- not
directly discuss the question of the Finite God he says, "The
agent (which determines the v/orld) must act absolutely from it-
self in the action through which that world is—not , as does every-
/
thing within the v/orld , under determination by something else".
The rational character of God is another corner-stone
of morality and religion, for if God be ascribed any place at all
in our philosophy we must assume that he is true to himself and
to his laws. The importance of the rational element is very prom-
inent in Green's thought and is especially conspicuous in his
treatment of religion, vh ere he insists that everything irration-
al must be rejected as unworthy of God. We have seen that in
applying this principle he not only rules out the belief in miracle,
but on a constructive basis he goes for toward harmonizing the
claims of religion and science by showing that they have their
origin in a common reason.
But perhaps the most outstanding attribute which Green
i _
Prolegomena, p. 88,
J-Works, vol. ill
, p 239.
Supra, p. 270 f.

ascribes to God is his eternity. The prominence of this concep-
tion is indicated "by the very fact that he constantly uses the
terms "eternal consciousness" and "timeless self" to indicate the
divine element in man. While the eternity of God is important as
a "basis for the realization of eternal values, Green probably de-
tracts somewhat from the personal character of God in emphasizing
his eternity, for he has thus laid himself open to the charge of
confusing eternity of thought with continuity of conscious exis-
tence.
We are ready now to summarize and evaluate our conclu-
sions regarding the moral and religious factors involved in the
divine existence and the divine nature. With regard to the former
we have found that the existence of God is needed from the stand-
point of morality to explain the possibility of man's morsl nature
and to afford an objective ideal by which to refute moral scepti-
cism and provide for moral progress. Prom a religious standpoint
we have found a parallel need for God to explain the existence of
the religious consciousness and to afford an objective grounjj for
the values of religious experience. In both, the divine imman-
ence and man's need of divine assistance are fundamental fectors.
With regard to the moral and. religious requirements of the divine
nature, we have found the most essential attributes of God to be
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personality, goodness
,
omnipotence, rationality, and eternity.
'Then we evaluate Green's coj^eption of God with refer-
ence to these requirements we find that it is on the whole satis-
factory. With the few exceptions which we have noted, his phil-
osophy is in accord with the general postulates of a theistic
interpretation of morality and religion. The chief points of
weakness may be summarized as follows: (1) he over-estimates the
possibility of proving the divine existence and gives too little
attention to the divine nature; (2) he fails to consider adequately
whether religions values are unique; and (3) he is not entirely
consistent with regard to the question as to whether God is personal
I
d . Green's conception of freedom .
~Ye have touched upon the moral and reliriou:. implications
of the problem of freedom in considering Green's conception of
the self. However, since the possibility of freedom is so fund-
amental to Green's ethical theory, the subject merits further
consideration.
We fine, in the first place, that freedom is needed both as
the basis of moral responsibility and of religious aspiration*
As we have seen, Green's whole purpose in writing the metaphysical
part of the Prolegomena was to estaulish the proposition that man,
/
as a free cause, is eapaDle of ethical activity. If man is merely
the puppet of inexorable circumstances, there is no reason for
blaming him for his evil acts, nor on the other hand for trying
to inculcate in him the ideals Which will lead to virtuous liv-
ing. Green holds firmly to the view that a deterministic ethics
is in reality no ethics at all, for it eliminates the element of
choice which is the distinguishing feature of moral activity.
(Green's general conception of the relation of freedom to ethics
has oeen discussed m section IV and need not oe repeated here.;
The religious need for freedom does not receive specific
discussion in Green's works. 5ut in his insistence upon the ra-
tionality of religion and the need for its union with virtuous
conduct, we have an evidence that he regards religious experience
like morality^ possible only to a "self-objectifying" conscious-
ness having the power to initiate activity. Even though relirion
be regarded merely as a passive infilling of the divine spirit
/
Supra, p. 178.
xSupra, p*. 180 f

(and in Green it is always more than that) freedom is necessary
in order that one may put himself in such an attitude that he
can receive this influx of the divine. A deterministic religion
would oe a strange anomaly, for the essence of religion is vol-
f
untary communion and cooperation with Cod. furthermore, the
possibility of sin and the need of salvation would vanish along
with moral responsibility.
But granting the need of freedom for morality and religion,
the question arises, ''Is freedom possible?" This Green answers
in the affirmative through his doctrine of the ''spiritual prin-
ciple" on which both morality and relipion rest, and to which
we have already given much attention. in discussing the self.
3ut if we grant the validity, from the standpoint of ethics and
religion, of the oersonalistic elements of his conception, we
have still to inquire regarding the relation of materialism
and pantheism to the moral and relig-ious aspects of freedom.
Green is uneauivocal in his insistence that materialism
destroys the possibility of freedom and accordingly of ethics,
"e find him saying, rome .hat sarcastically, "The elimination
of ethics, then, as a system of precepts involves no intrinsic
difficulties other than those involved in the admission of a
natural science that can account for the moralisat i on of man."
(Prol. p. 11) In the opening wares >f the Prolegomena he sets
natural science and dogmatic fneology in opposition to each
other, referring to the latter as the chief means by which
people ha-"e sought to escape from the mechanistic conception
'works, vol. iii, pp . 258 f.
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presented by the former. But in his constructive statement we
fird no condemnation of natural acience as such, nor commendation
of dogmatic theology. He find instead the insistence that the
realm of values, wh&her moral or religious, can not be accounted for
on a naturalistic basis, and can only find a legitimate place
in a world view which admits freedom and is at bottom theistic
The anti-ethical and anti-religious implications of
pantheism are more subtle, and of course G-reen has frequently be 3n
charged with having failed to escape them. If the eternal conscious!*
ness usurps the prerogatives of mar., finite freedom disappears
>
and with it the possibility of moral choice and religious experience.
Green foresaw the possibility of this interpretation ana devoted
a chapter of the Prolegomena to its refutation. (Bk.I, Ch.3, The
Freedom of Man as Intelligence). The main thought o*' this chapter
is that though man's organic life is determined like other natural
phenomena by the eternal consciousness, as a knowing subject he is
not determined by it but is a reproduction cf it, and is therefore a
free cause. But as we have seen, Green's affirmation of freedom
on such a ha si 3 is not sufficient to constitute a proof; and when
he says, "Human action is only explicable by the action of an eternal
consciousness, which uses them (man's organic processes-* as its
organs and reproduces itself through them" , it is not surprising that
he has been charged with having destroyed the finite freedom which
he has elsewhere labored so vigorously to establish.
Prolegomena, p. 69 f.
Mbiu
, p. S3.
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Whan we inquire regarding the nature of freedom, we find
that Green's conception is closely connected with the demands
ooth of ethics and of religion. As we have found, he regards
true freedom as consisting, not of the lioerty to do sfhat one
pleases, out of the possibility of attaining one's highest cap-
acities and ministering to the common rood. In his lecture on
Liberal legislation and freedom of Contract where he speaks of
it as the pover on the part of all to make the most and best of
themselves, he says, TT ""e mean by it a power which each man
exercises through the help or security given him oy his fellow-
len, and which in turn helps to secure for them. ' Furthermore
the social and altruistic nature of freedom is not onl; ethical
but religious, in "reen's conceotion, for he insists that true
freedom consists of the service of God as .:ell as of man. In
his essay on 2he loxce of Circumstances he gi'res a noule challenge
to men to overcome the oonda°:e of inertia and selfishness and
put themselves in harmony with the eternal spirit, "whose service
is periect freedom. ' -iVol . iii p. 6)
The freedom of thought, as veil as of action, in Green's
concent ion becomes a form of harmony and cooperation fith the
divine spirit who rives rationality to the world . Ho one
acceded more firmly than Green the meaning of the words,
"Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free."
The ouest for truth on such a basis oecomes a form ooth of
ethical endeavor and of relirious insipht.
'Works, vol. Hi, p. 371.
Ibid.
,
p. 6.

Summarizing our results, we find that Green regarded
freedom as beinp- necessary both for moral activity and (by
implication) for religious experience. e find that he also
pointed out the impossibility of freedom on ooth a material-
istic ^nd a pantheistic basis, though his refutation of the
latter is not conclusive. '2he personalir tic elements of his
syp":em afford a firm oasis both for relirioun and. for ethics;
and in his conception of the nature of freedom as self-real-
ization, service, and cooperation with the Infinite throu h
activio^ and reason, we have a union of ethical and religious
postulates
.

e , Green's conception of the moral ideal .
We have already discussed the problem of the objectivity of
the moral ideal in connection with the arguments for ttee- theistic
i
belief, and what was said there if the metaphysical existence of
such an ideal need not here be repeated. Tvhile of course the ob-
jectivity of values has not been completely demonstrated, we have
found that morality and religion alike require the postulate of an
objective ideal which is grounded in the purposes and plans of God.
7e come now to the question, "'That is the relation of the
ideal to the actual?" Important consequences both for ethics and
for religion depend upon this relation.
Green answers this question with the statement that "thejend
2.
is the true reality". This doctrine he doubtless took from
Aristotle, though he combined it with a Platonic theory of the
objectivity of values. In Green's theory a man, or a movement, is
not to be judged by what is present at any given moment, but by
potential capacities. 7/e have seen that he regards man's true
nature as the ideal or possible self which he must strive to bring
to actuality. In society as a whole, lower stages of development are
it d
not to be scorned but are to be valued for what they may grow into.
Applied to the problems of morality and religion, we find
that this theory of the reality of the ideal affords a most im-
portant dynamic. It is possible for a man to "scorn delights
and live laborious days" if he has before him some ideal which
/
Supra, p$. 187 f, 312 f.
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there is a possibility of realizing by his sacrifice. We
find the truest index of a person's character in the kind of
ideals which he is willing" to bend his energies to realize.
1Mb dynamic is religious as .veil as moral, for the truly re-
ligious person is the one .ho endeavors to obey the command
"Seek ye first the kingdom of God'', with the faith that this
ideal is attainable because it is grounded in a more-than-
human power.
T
7e found in ex-mininr Green's theory of the .ill, that
the rood will is in a sense both a means and an end. Jhe
same may be raid of the ideal, which, is uoth the dynamic and
the proal of moral and religious striving. '2he effort to attain
self-reali zati on would oe valueless, were there not come ideal
self as the goal of the endeavor. The religious consciousness
has also pictured to itself some ideal state ( usually in another
world) as the end to be attained. Jhis brings us to the need
of examining the characteristics of this ideal goal.
jip :e have found. Green's conception requires, first of all,
that this ideal goal oe personal. His statement t "our ultimate
standard of worth is an ideal of personal /ortii," hai oeen BO
often ouoted as to uecome •> classic aphorism- And if 9Q accept
his statement that "all other values are relative to value for,
of, or in a person" it is evident that from the standpoint of
both morality and religion personality must oe conserved if
values are not to be lost. Accordingly ooth morality and religion
'Supra, p. 224.
Prolegomena, p. 210.
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reouire that persons be tre?3.ted as ends rather tlian means, and
that the vorth one dignity of humanity, even in its most degraded
forms, be recognized. The social reformer who strives to ameliorate
physical conditions and the exrangelist who strives to save souls
from sin are ooth actuated by the impulse to bring- about a better
ptate of personal existence. Furthermore, ooth morality and rel-
igion reouire the continuance of personal existence, beyond the
prave if the -"alues attained in this life are to be conserved
and continued to their full fruition in an ideal "kingdom of ends".
Furthermore ooth morality and religion require an ideal
which is social as ".veil as personal. Whether in this life or in
the next, man can not live "unto himself alone". The net-work of
social relations amid vhich we find ourselves calls for the up-
building of personality through an extension of the field of
mutual service, and for an alleviation of the world *8 pain
through the impulse of sympathy. It is in the extension of tin-
common p;ood throurh the idea of human brotherhood that Green
finds the chief difference between Greek and Christian ethics.
3ut whether the problem is approached from the tide of morality
or of religion, the social character of the ideal presents a
challenge to the cultivation of righteousness and will-being not
only in one's self but in others. Jhe charge bhat self-realization
is egoistic .111 not stand.
Furthermore, both morality and religion require an ideal
which is teleol ogical . . s was noted in connection .ith the
Prolegomena, p. 217 f
^Ibid p. 321 f.
J Supra, p. 246 f.
Supra, pp. 315, 319.
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religious revelation is explainable on any other ground. Morality
and religion are alike in considering final, and not merely tempor-
al, ends. Hedonism and atheism can be content with the satisfac-
tion of the moment, but self-realization and theism look beyond the
moment to the final end. This is significant in view of the fact
that the positivistic philosophies of the present dny often pride
themselves, without just grounds, on being more progressive than
those which are based on theistic faith.
Finally, both morality and religion require a goal which is
both changing and permanent. The problem of reconciling change
and identity is one of the most persistent that has confronted
philosphers, and if we believe that in personality alone we find an
adequate solution, we may believe also that in a personal Ood we find
a legitimate basis for an ideal that is both changing and permanent.
That ideal must be changing, at least in its human manifestations and
in man's apprehension of it, can scarcely be denied. Chanp-ing
conceptions of religious truth arc evident on every hand as well as
revealed in history. But unless there is something "changeless in
the midst of change" we can scarcely hope for the permanence of
human values. In Green's thought morality and religion alike find
this ground of permanence in the eternal consciousness.
Summarizing our observations regarding the moral ideal, we find
that Green regards the end as the true reality, and that in this
relation of the ideal to the actual we have a dynamic an<f coal which
is of great ethical and religious significance. Examining the char-
acteristics of the ideal, we find that it is personal, social, teleolog-
ical, and both changing and permanent.

3 S<i>
f . Green's conception of the oroolcm 01' evil.
While Green makes no sharp distinction between moral evil
nnd physical e iril, the problems involved are of a somewhat differ-
ent type. I.Ioral evil, or sin, though it has a metaphysical basis
in freedom, belongs obviously to the province of ethics and of
religion. Physical e^Til is a more distinctly metaphysical issue
involving the nature of causality; yet it presents proolems which
both ethics and religion must take into account.
In examining Green's conception of moral etfil, we found that
from a religious stand joint he regards sin variously ae incom-
pleteness in the realization of the divine potentialities, a
desire to act in opposition to the divine will, as selfishness,
and as uleas ure-seeking. In his ethical theory, moral evil consists
of the will to act from a low motive; i.e. to chuose an unworthy
object of desire instead of that which is in harmony with one's
highest ideals. Jhe essential unity of these views is evident.
^3 e s t
If one fails to realize his^self, he is thereby guilty both of
failing to reproduce the divine Bpirit to the limit of hie powers
and also of failing to act from the highest possible motive. If,
knowing the divine will, he refuses to fo it, lie not only sins
against God but against the uest impulses of hi 1 ' own nature. To
put self before others and to choose pleasure ;f ore virtue are
courser ?mtagoni : tic to the hirhest demands ooth of morality and
of religion.
i
Supra, p- . 285 f
.
prolegomena, p. 175 f.
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Perhaps the closest bond of union between morality !_.nd
religion which is anywhere to oe found lies in thejfunction c.:
relipion in overcoming moral evil. 2he supreme business of
Christianity, (in its aest forms) h is always oeen considered
to be the conversion of sinners* While this has sometimes oeen
construed to mean an emotional excitation devoid of moral content,
or an antisocial preparation for another ./orld. , the dominant
conception of the meaning of this experience has always involved
the turning o:' men from sin to righteousness. There has been
vastly more agr-e-ementreprardins: the need of such an escape from
sin through the power of religion than there has oeen regarding
theories of the atonement or other means by which it could "be
effected. In Green we also find that he puts the major emphasis
upon the power of the indi^lling spirit of God which enaoles men
to live Godlike lives. To him, a type of religion whi&h does not
aid men to overcome their selfish impulses and to li T*o more
completely in harmony with the divine will in ethical endeavor,
is not religion out a travesty.
Turning to the ouestion of physical evil :e find that in spite
Of the difference in metaphysical issues rhioh we have noted, there
is a reciprocal relation oetweon moral and physical evil. fin
is a cause of a rrrent deal of the ..orld's suffering, and conversely
suffering in weakening the physical find moral oower to resist tem-
ptation leads commonly to sinful acts.
j
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From this situation arise?: the moral and religious stimulus
to seek the removal of physical suffering, Whatever may ue said
Of the disciplinary value of suffering, the fact remains that it
destroys more values than it creates. 3oth the moral life of
service and "Che religious life of love present a challenge to
make the world hap'oier as well as better. ' e have seen how strong-
ly this impulse figured in Greenes sympathy for the masses and ^n
his desire to lift them to a higher plane of living through the
removal of physical impediments.
Religion is connected with the problem of suffering in a
special ; sense in that this ^resents one of the most potent ob-
stacles to theistic faith. Green does not give this aspect of the
problem the attention which it merits, In fact while he asserts
that faith in God and duty if properly directed will survive much
f
difficulty and distress, and indicates that there is no inherent
incompatibility between ' ^ -oroolo ^ n.- su.'ferinr and the object-
ivity of values, he makes no definite attempt to consider the
barrier to theistic faith which the oroblem presents. Lie seems
to assume the validity of the disciplinary conception vithout dis-
cussing its metaphysical oar is.
however, as we have seen, in jghg Force of Circumstances Green
presents a nojle challenge to the human spirit to triumph over
opposing forces, here he represents the hijrh creative energy
which presses forward bravely in the face of obstacles as oeing
a manifestation of the divine soirit. Eeli^ion has its function,.
'Works, vol. iii, p 27C
*Ibid., p. 6 f.
1
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not only in removing as many of the sorrows of life as possible,
tut in enabling men to triumph over unavoidable suffering.
Though the flesh be weak, no physical obstacle can separate men from
God. Green beliefs that in endeavoring to alleviate the
sufferings of humanity and to triumph over the ills which
beset one's own life, it is one's moral duty, as it is his
religious privilege, to seek to manifest the spirit of the
divine. Here again we (fiind the essential unity of moral
endeavor and religious faith in the cooperation of the finite
with the infinite for the attainment of higher values.

2.
Religious implications of Green's ethics .
a
.
Elements common to self-realization and Christian! t
y
We have noted that the place of reliprion in
Green's ethical theory is not nearly so prominent as the
place of morality in his religious philosophy, "he reason
for tMs is obvious, for he undoubtedly realized that to
introduce theological considerations into his ethical system
would immediately lay it onen to the charge of sunernaturalism
and authoritarianism. As it is, the dependence of his ethics
nnon the eternal consciousness has caused him to he charged
with having given "theological mysteries" and"traditional
acquiescence in convenient dogma'' instead of sound ethical
principles.
However, in considering the common meta-nhysical b
basis of ethics and religion we found that self-realization
involves many elements which are fundamental to religion
as -veil as to ethics. While these need not again be
discussed in detail, we shall briefly review them with snecial
reference to their relation to Christianity.
Among the aspect! of Green's thought which afe
common to both ethics and religion, we found in the first
place, that both require a self to be developed. Tf self-
realization makes its aim the "perfecting of man" it is equally
Supra, p. 300
Supra, p. 41,110
Supra, p. 306 f.

true that the whole burden of Christian teaching centers
about the need of religious prrowth. The words of Christ
abound in parables and aphorisms which point the way to an
increase of personal holiness. The sacredness of personality
is A dominant concent both of self-realization and of
Christianity.
Both ethics and religion insist, furthermore,
that the self must be develpped for the increase of social as
well a*- individual values. V/e have seen how intimately in
Green's thought the self-realisation of the individual is
connected with altruism. Sneaking in religious terms, if the
love o^ God and the love of one's fellow-nan constitute the
heart of Christianity, we have here an expression of the need
both of strengthening the inner life and of showing" forth
the religious impulse in deeds of service.
Again (to use Green's phraseology) both self-
reali::ation and Christianity demand that the self must seek
reproduce God. Leaving out Green's pantheistic implications,
we find that there is much real truth in the theory that man's
moral nature rddws by attempting to Measure up to the
possibilities divinely in-planted in his nature. R elirrion
likewise demands that man who is made in the imare of God
must bring this spiritual likeness into fuller realisation.
|urra, P. 226.Supra, p 255
#
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Furthermore, both self-realization and Christianity
require that in the process ofjperfectinpr the soul of nan, the
divine perfection must be used as a standard. Ethics
formulates this perfection in terms of a moral ideal which
f
embodies man's hirrhest aspirations. Christianity sets before
man an example of this divine perfection in the nerson of
Jesus, and bids men to grow ''into the measure of the stature
of the fulness of Christ."
We find again, that both self-realization and
Christianity require a real though not a hedonistic
satisfaction. Both require that t"be final end be taken into
account and bid men relinquish temporary Pleasures for the
sake of ultimate good. Whether the future life be conceived
as a ola.ee of rewards and ounishments or as a olaee of
continued personal development, self-realization and
Christianity unite in a protest against the belief that death
ends all. Immortality will later receive more specific discussiorf
?!oreover, the satisfaction or happiness which
comes (in this life or the ne::t) from having followed the
path of rectitude is regarded by both self-realization and
Christianity, not as the real objective, but as a by-producl
of righteousness. When Green tells us that self-satisfaction
follows from virtuous living, he merely exnresses a correlate
i
S'
..ra, p 220 f.
Suppa, p. 240.
1 Infra, p. 302.

of the greater orinciple, "Seek ye first the kingdom of God
and his righteousness , and all t>ese things shall be added
unto you." 3ut whenever religious en.'oynent, like
hedonistic pleasure, is sought fir its own sake it loses its
vitality.
Furthermore , in Green's theory of the moral
motive we find elements which arejconnon both to self-
realization ;i.nd to Christianity. It is a^uarent that both
demand freedom to act, for it would be fruitless to ask
men' to form motives and purposes which could never be
executed. We lave noted the urinary nlace which freedom
occupies in Green's ethical theory. While in relirion the
need for freedom nay be" less explicit, it is equally essential
for reasons which we have oreviously discussed.
Both self-realization and Christianity recognize
the influence of evil tendencies inherent in man's nature.
In ethics fas in psychology) we call these tendencies the
instincts
->f our inherited psycho-physical organism, or in
Green':: language "the solicitations arising from aninrl wants.
Religion in the older days branded these iriuulses as "original
sin" or as the temptings of the devil; and while we have
largely outgrown these conceptions the fact remains that every
person who seeks
. to live the religious life feels at tines the
Warfare between flesh and snirit which Paul has described so
graphically.
i
^Supra, p. 178 .
5u[ra, p. 179.
* Romans 7.

But the redeeming feature of the situation lies
in the fact that both self-realization and Christianity
recognize the transforming power of consciousness in over-
coming these sinful tendencies. Green, in ethical terms,
expressed this process as t^e identification with the self
of a worthy motive rather than a lower one, so that in
choosing among conflicting objects of desire one selects
that which is in harmony with the ideal of humanity.
Religion expressed the sane thought when it calls upon men
to overcome evil with good through loyalty to a great ideal.
Furthermore we find that green's concent ion of
eelf*»reali zation harmonizes with Christianity in recognizing
a divine element in human motivation. '.Then the Christian
8ays,"T can do all thinrs through Christ which strengtheneth
me," an attitude of cooperation is expressed which is
essential to Christian faith. we have observed that in
Green's thought this element of coooeration is nresent also
in moral endeavor as men see>: to realize in their lives the
divine ideal. However religion demands that this coooeration
be consciously present, while in morality it may be merely
implicit in the nature of the ideal. Herein we find not only
a point of identity but also the chief -point of distinction
between religion and morality.
Supra, p. 180
Supra, g 316
Supra, p 302
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b . Iteligious problems discussed in the Prolegomena *
While Green's chief ethical work affords also the best
statement of his metaphysics and thus presents a theistic foun-
dation for religion, we have noted that specific references
to religion in the Prolegomena are not numerous. General con-
siderations relating to the eternal consciousness and the moral
ideal are found, but these have already been sufficiently dis-
t
cussed. However, aside from a few random references, we find
in the Prolegomena three passages in which Green somewhat def-
initely diBcusses the relation between ethics and religion.
These are worthy of further consideration.
This first of these appears in his comparison of Greek and
Christian ethics. The general characterictics of this comparison
we have mentioned; i.e., that the Greeks, in Green's opinion,
gave to the world tho general principles of self-realization and
formulated the connected scheme of virtues which have since been
accepted by civilized society; but it remained for Christianity
to extend the application of these principles through the concept
of human brotherhood and to furnish the dynamic by which to put
them into practice. The Greek definition of the true good is one
which modern Christianity can still ficceot, "It is the will to
know what is true, to make what is beautiful; to endure pain
and fear, to resist the allurements of pleasure ( i.e. to be
<Supra, p. 3l2f, 331f.
*Supr?*, p 111.

brave and temperate), if not, as the Greek would have said, in
the service of the state, yet in the interest of some form of
human society."
Green also gives a somewhat extended discussion of the Greek
and Christian conceptions of self-sacrifice. This is especially
pertinent to our study in view of the fact that religion is a
most vital factor in the conflict between self-sacrifice and self-
realization. Religion, more than any other power, callc upon
man to deny himself and take up his cross in response to the call
of duty. We find the heart of Christianity in the self-sacrificing
love of God which challenges man to give up their personal pleas-
ures, and sometimes even their lives, for the sake of devotion to
God and duty. Jut on the other hand in this conflict, genuine as
it is, Christianity is the chief power in overcoming the conflict,
and in glorifying duty until the doing of it becomes not a sac-
rifice but a joy.
The aspect from which Green takes up this problem is the
question as to whether the greater sacrifice which is demanded
of the Christian because of the greater oreadth of his social
sympathies really represents a higher type of virtue than that
of the Greek. The answer which he gives is that the renunciation
of pleasure, as such, has in it no merit, and that accordingly
'Prolegomena, p. 303.
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the value of public-spirited service can never be judged by the
amount of self-denial which is involved. He does admit however
that there is a real superiority in the Christian attitude.
"It is not the renunciation as such, out the spiritual state
which it represents, that constitutes the value of the life spent
in self-devoted service to mankind." Again he says, "The title
of the modern or Christian type of virtue to a positive superior-
ity is not to be found in the burden, unknown to the Greeks,
which it bears, but in that which the presence of this burden
implies; the new spiritual activity, namely, on the part of the
multitude and the wider range of interests in human good
2.
which are awakened in the hearts of the virtuous." This dis-
tinction is a very significant one and could well oe applied in
the present day by those who make a fetich of self-denial and
glory in a petty martyrdom regardless of service rendered.
Green faces souarely the ouestion as to whether self-eacri^
fice can be justified onja hedonistic basis, and maintains that it
can not. However much one may delight in giving pleasure to
others, it is not the pleasure he gets from the act which mot-
ivates the self-denying altruist, furthermore, there is no
assurance that the reformer who endeavors to make men oetter will
also make them happier, for an intrinsic element of his work is
the cultivation in them of the willingness to deny themselves for
Prolegomena, p. 323
Ibid., p
#
326.
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the sake of duty. How closely this fact is related to the
spread of religion is suggested by the significant statement,
"He must be much stiffened in hedonistic theory who could main-
tain that the life which ended on the cross was one of more
enjoyment than that which would have been open to the Crucified
but for the purpose which led to this end; and the Crucified
himself foresaw that he came not to send peace on earth but a
sword." ^ There is of course another side to the cuestion and there
is little doubt that the Christian life is in the end the most
satisfying; yet Creen was thoroughly right in pointing out that
it is not necessarily the most pleasuraole.
Another passage in the Prolegomena where Green discussed
(though somewhat vaguely) the relation between religion and
ethics is found in the section on conscientiousness. Here he
examines the question as to whether there is a real difference
between the "moral reformer" and the "self-questioning saint".
3y the latter he seems to mean the person who conscientiously
seeks to purify his heart because of relirior.s motives.
After paying his respects to the over-conscientious person
who is always fingering his motives in an abnormally introspective
3
fashion instead of engaging in disinterested service. Green
asserts that it is throuph a conscious effort to purify the inner
Prolegomena, p 328.
bid
#
, p. 355*f #jbi
d
' p. 355.

life that one derives the impulse to moral living. He says,
"The comparison of our own practice.. with an ideal of virtue,
is the spring from which morality perpetually renews its life.
It is thas that we "lift up our hearts, and lift them up unto
the Lord'"/ Green is somewhat indefinite as to whether this
purification of spirit is necessarily religious, hut his phrase-
ology implies that he regards it as essentially a religious act.
In comparing the attitude of reformer and saint, Green says
that there is a real identity in the spiritual principle which
dominates the work of each. Examining outward results, there
may seem to "be little difference between the two. 3ut Green
continues, "If we could watch him (the saint) closely enough,
indeed, even in outward conduct there would appear to he a dif-
ference. Doing the work expected of him'not with eye-service, as
a man-pleaser, hut in singleness of heart, at unto the Lord 1
,
he
will rise to a higher standard of doing it." *"
This attitude, which Green (perhaps to avoid religious
terminology) calls "self-abasement in the presence of an ideal
of holiness", he asserts to be an intrinsic value, identical _in
kind flrlth that of the zeal of the moral reformer yet more basic.
It is to be regarded not only as the chief source of moral
endeavor but as the final goal of man's efforts to overcome the
contradiction between himself and the infinite spirit. In view
of the general paucity of Green's treatment of Areligious a priori
Prolegomena, p. 356
*Ibid. p. 359.J Ibid. p. 360

it will be worth while to auote at some length what he says in
this connection. T.7ith regard to this attitude of self-abasement
before an ideal of holiness he says, "We claim such an (intrinsic)
value for it—a value independent of any that it might possess
as a means to a good other than itself— on the ground that it is
a component influence in a perfect human life; on the ground that
whatever the universe of activities in which that life displays
itself may prove to be, the self-abasing, which is also the as-
piring or God-seeking, spirit, most always be their source and
spring." ' He says, furthermore, that while the limitations of our
earthly environment remain, this same spiritual principle must
dominate the work of the reformer; yet it is more fundamental
than the reformer's zeal for it would continue even in a perfect
society where no further reforms were to be enacted. "The spiritual
act, then, which in different aspects may be described either as
self-abasement or self-exaltation--the act in which the heart is
lifted up to God, in which the whole inner man goes forth after an
ideal of personal holiness--this act, while it is in principle one
with the whole)course of man's moral endeavor, may be deemed in a
certain sense its most final form, because, in that rest from the
labour of baffled and disappointed endeavor which a perfectly or-
dered society might be supposed to bring, it would still not be
2
superseded."
Green's final conclusion regarding the relation between the
Prolegomena, pp. 360,361.
Ibid. p. 362.

spirit of reformer and saint is that they are in essence identical,
and differ merely in the circumstances under which they are expressed
Both are communications of the infinite spirit to man : both are
intrinsic values in themselves and at the same time instrument?
in the perfecting of human life. "if the supfceme value for man
is what we take it to be- -man himself in his perfection- -then it
is idle to contrast the more observably practical type of goodness
with the more self-questioning or consciously (jod-seeking type. The
value of each is intrinsic and identical. .. .Under certain conditions
of society, of individual temperament and ability, it takes one
form, under other conditions the other .
In evaluation of Green's view it may be said that it accords
with his general theory of the unity of life in all its aspects,
and is in this respect commendable. It counteracts the tendency to
draw a sharp line of demarcation between religion and "mere morality"
It also affords a wholesome antidote to the tendency to reduce
religious values entirely to phases of morality. In contrast to Kant
who tries to make the moral a priori cover religion as well, Green
leans in the opposite direction and tends to make morality a form
of religious cooperation and communion, while he does not do so
explicitly, and admits that there is a difference in the form in
which the spiritual principle expresses itself, his thought
is so colored by his conception of the infinite spirit which
communicates itself to man and constitutes his real nature, that
he finds it difficult to draw a distinction between tumoral
Prolegomena, p. 363.
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and the religious manifestations of this spirit.
A third passage in the Prolegomena which deals with the
relation of religion to morality is found in his discussion of
the perplexity of conscience, in which he asks whether we have
a right to regard our specific duties as commands of God. ?he
problem ariies from the fact that in an emergency, when there is
no opportunity for philosophical reflection, decisions must he
made in accordance with the ideal of virtue which dominates the
life, and this ideal is more often shaped by religious influences
than by any other consideration. Philosophy, he thinks, can
render a real service in affording an intellectual justification
for religious idealism, in the absence of which scepticism weakens
the hold of the highest moral ideals by undermining their very
found at i ons
.
Breen brings out very clearly the influence of religion as
a regulative principle in the lives of men and nations. Among
thousands who are incapable of philosophic speculation, "the idea
in its various forms of something that human life should be, of
a perfect being for whom this 'should be' already 'is'" regulates
conduct and operates to brine" men to righteousness long Defore
such an idea is speculatively formulated. Green maintains that such
religious ideals have not only ueen the puiding forde in the form-
ulation of the moral and civil codes which undergird our social
fabric, but they contribute the most potent factor in bringing
Prolegomena, p. 381 f.
Prole'omnaa
, p^ 381.
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home to men the obligation to duty when it conflicts with per-
sonal inclination. Putting it very concretely he says, "In sudden
calls upon the will, when the sustaining force of habit is of no
avail, when no rewards or penalties are to oe looked for, can any
of us be sure that, except under the impression of the 'great
task-master's eye' upon him, he would do the work which upon re-
flection he would admit J*» should be done? "
In this passage Green presents the idea, which we have found
suggested in his religious works,
2
" that religion eonsists in the
presentation of the highest truth under the forms of the imagin-
ation. Accordingly he warns his readers against too great lit-
eralness in the interpretation of religious ideas, which though
practically operative in a high degree are incapable of being
verified or subjected to the same tests as concrete 'matters of
fact". It is the business of philosophy "to disentangle the
operative ideas from their necessarily imperfect expression, and
to explain that the validity of the ideas themselves, as principles
of action, is not affected by the discovery that the language in
which men under their influence naturally express themselves, has
hot the sort of truth which belongs to a correct statement of
matters of fact". With such a distinction in mind it is quite
possible to answer the question^ as to whether our duties are
commands of God by saying that they are not commands, in the same
Prolegomena, p. 382.
^Works', vol. iii, p
#
219
^Prolegomena, p. 383*
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sense in which a master might order his servant to perform a
certain task, snd yet we have here a legitimate metaphor by which
to express a real relation which exists between God and the
finite spirit. In fact, the gist of Green's whole ethical and
religious theory is summed up in the words, "If the infinite
Spirit so communicates itself to the soul of men as to yield the
idea of a possible perfect life, rnd that consequent sense of
personal responsibility on the part of the individual for mak-
ing the best of himself as a social being from which the recog-
nition of particular duties arises, then it is a legitimate
expression by means of metat>hor--the only noseible means, except
action, by which the consciousness of spiritual realities can
express itself--to say that our essential duties are co mands
/
of God."
Green closes his discussion with the observation that while
philosophy can not hope to justify every expression of the
religious imagination, it can examine the language of religion
"in order to satisfy ourselves whether it worthily expresses the
emotions of a soul in which the highest moral ideas have done
their perfect work." If religion, so examined, stands the test,
philosophy will #ave rendered a great service to practical
morality "in countoraotliig the advantage which scepticism may
otherwise give to passion against duty." To Green, there is
'prolegomena, p. 384
Ibid. p. 385.
~?Ibid
# ,
p. 38o

no doubt that religion will be able to meet the test of
speculative reason.
Green's conception on the whole is satisfactory. He
brings out very well the influence of religion as a practical
moral dynamic, and the need of its philosophical justification,
in opposition to scepticism. His caution against too great
literalness in the interpretation of religious terminolop:/
is also much needed at the present day. However, there is a
certain vagueness in his conception of the "religious imagin-
ation". If he means by it the power to gratn truth v/hich is
not self-evident, the term may perhaps be properly applied to
the religious consciousness. But he seems to refer mainly to
the expression in figurative language of that which can not
be apprehended as "matters of fact", and in thlE sense the term
is misleading. Heligion is more than a set of metaphors and
symbols.
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c. The relation of religion to problems of practical ethics.
We have seen that Green has frequently been charged with hav-
ing given no direct guidance to conduct. But while he left no
treatise on practical ethics, it is an unjust accusation to say
that he failed to apply his theory to practical problems. He
conceived the main functions of the philosopher to be the estab-
lishment of a sound theory by which practical issues could be met;
yet in his political and. educational theory, and in his own
civic activity, we find numerous evidences of his attitude toward
the problems of everyday living. We shall consider the extent to
which religion entered into his views regarding politics, education,
science, and art.
We have noted the fact that Green regarded political insti-
tutions as a spiritual revelation. In fact, he considered that in
the political and social life of mankind, despite its inperf ections
,
we have our fullest manifestation of the "divine idea" which man is
striving progressively to bring to fulfillment/ In the writings
of his early college days we find Green giving expression to the
essential unity of life which dominates his later thought: and
Nettleship quotes from some unpublished college essays in which
Green speaks of the "tendency to form societies and the reverence
for supernatural beings" as being the twofold evidence of man's
higher nature and the twofold source of loyal ty^. He there ex-
presses the view that the impulse which has given rise to family
life and to the free constitutions of Europe is identical in kind
I
Works, vol. iii, p. 17
z Itiid
,
o. xxv.

with that which has produced and maintained true religion. This
impulse, in Greece and Rome, led to political greatness; in Christ-
ianity it found expression not only in the church but in the con-
viction of an "ever-present spirit of life"/ Green makes the inter-
esting observation that the ancients had a right to be conservative
since they had only the divinity of the past as their guide, but
the modern Christian with his conviction of the divine immanence
ought eagerly to seek new forms of divine truth.
This conception of the essential unity of the political and
religious life as manifestations of the same divinet spirit work-
ing in man is not limited to his early essays. "*.Te find it re-
peatedly in his religious utterances, where he says that the con-
sciousness of God has not or:ly been the moralizing agent of society
but the formative principle of society itself. In discussing the
revelation of God in history, he says man has felt the impulse to
improvement through "an unrealized ideal of a best which is his
God, giving divine authority to the customs or laws by which some
likeness of this ideal is wrought into the actuality of life".^
We find the same thought expressed in the Prolegomena ¥and in the
5"
Principles of Political Obligation . 77e have seen that Tv'acCunn
includes Green among his "six radical thinkers" because of the
spiritual foundation on which his political philosophy rests.
'Work?, vol. iii, p.xxvi.
*lMd., p 270.
3 jbid., p! 270
\ Prolegomena
,
p. 206
5 Works, vol. ii, p 442.
t Supra, p. 117.

Green wao more than a "closet philosopher", and we have
seen repeatedly that he carried his conception of tne
divine immanence into the every day life of men. neve we find
that Green r!oes not stop with regarding the divine idea, in the
abstract, as the basis of .clitical raid social life; he goes
farther and pays tribute to the influence of religion as a direct
factor in ci^ic reform. In 2he Force of Circumstances we find
him saying, ""'e see everywhere, in ihe aoolition of serfdom, in
the reconcilement of nations, in the general recognition of
personal equality, how Christianity, as an external influence,
has lightened the vorldly ourtfen of multitudes who v/ere ignorant
.1 I
of its inward power. ( iii p i-rv-j±it) In the Prolegomena he
recognizes the inward power of Christianity as './ell, for he* says
that the impulse to do one's duty by one's fellowman is not only
guided by the institutions of hristian society out motivated by
an attitude of heart and .ill rhich fines its strongest dynamic
in relirion. 'The function of bringing home t.'.ese duties to the
conscience of men
,
of helping them to be honest with themselves
in their recognition * nd interpretation of them is rather that
x.
of the preacher than of the philosopher."
e find a close parallel between Green's conception of
political liberty and religious liberty. he believed in both
and laoored zealously for an extension of both. e find him
remarking that a conscientious "heresy" either religious ~r
political, always represents some gradually maturing conviction
3
of the social rood. Yet at the same tine ne was sensible enough
to recognize that the demands of practical life mare impossible
/
^Works, vol. iii, pp^ 9,10.
Prolegomena, p. 376.
3 Ibid., p. 387.
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an unlimited exercise of either political or religious freedom.
In the relation of sovereign to subject, Green maintains
that civil subjection must be based, not on fear, nor on any
"natural" superiority of the sovereign, but on the principle of
the general well-being of the whole. Ihus political subjection
finds its source in the same principle which is the foundation of
subjection to the law of conscience; and while restraint must be
exercised in the case of those in whom the civil sense is lacking,
every man is entitled to as much liberty as he is capable of using
wisely, and in harmony with the ideal of humanity.
A similar situation holds with regard to religious freedom.
Green of course insists that freedom of thought and conscience
must be untrammeled; yet he warns against tactlessly airing one's
opinions where more harm than good will come of it. In spite of
his own lack of harmony with the tenets of the English church he
opposed its disestablishment, for he felt that more could be accomp-
lished by reforming it than by refusing it state support. He
advocated making it more democratic and more liberal, but while he
was in favor of the removal of doctrinal tests from its clergy,
he protested against unduly exciting the religious public by
making religious freedom a mere intellectual luxury.
In Green's educational theory, as in his political theory,
we find the spiritual basis which dominates his philosophy.
Education is itself the process of the perfecting of hum.nn poss-
ibilities; and if self-realization as an ethical theory demands
a divine foundation for the attainment of its end, so does education.
Works, vol. iii, p.xxxvi.
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Green of course does not go so far as to say that education
must be explicitly religious in order to be of value, and in his
educational writings the theistic element is much less prominent
than in his general ethical theory. But while Green centers his
attention on the practical aspects of current educational problems,
his educational theory rests on the same conception of the moral
ideal which we have found permeating his philosophy. The union
of the metaphysical with the empiriral in his educational purpose
is expressed in a characteristic sentence, "Under God, it is to
good books and a knowledge of the laws of nature that we must
chiefly trust to make the children of the next generation, when
they become their own masters, healthy and wise and virtuous."
From Green's article on The Elementary School System in England
we get some interesting observations on religious education, and
especially on week-day religious education in the public schools.
Green's occasion for discussing it arose from a protest on the part
of nonconformists against the teaching of religion in the schools.
Green advocates religious instruction as a part of the sehool
curriculum, but insists that it must be unsectarian in type and
must not afford an occasion for proselyting. He discusses an
enterprise (apparently very similar to the system now coming in
vogue in this country) by which the Birmingham nonconformists were
attempting to give voluntary religious instruction on school time through
teachers provided by the churches, rather than through the regular
'works, vol. iii, p. 454.
*"Ibid.
,
p. 439 f
.

schoolmasters. C'reen speaks with favor of the principle in-
volved in this plan out points out the difficulty (which is
precisely its greatest drawback at the present time), that the
churches themselves are not apt to take enough interest in
the work to provide religious instruction for all. Accordingly
he thinks the work can ue accomplished more efficiently through
the regular school-masters, if supervised sufficiently by the
school boards to prevent their proselyting.
While the English system would not be successful in this
country with our separateness of church and state, there is much
truth in what Ore en says about the need of having religion taught
by trained teachers, and of having public school teachers who
are Capable of giving moral nnd religious instruction. He observe
"The endeavor of the state should be to render its servants, the
school-masters, as efficient in the works of education, .moral
no less than intellectual as possible. Now few of us will douot
that the maste: of s board-school becomes less efficient for
this purpose if excluded from giving lessons on the bible, than
if he is allowed to do so. I Should even add.... that is intrin-
sically better to have religious instruction given by trained
school
-masters than by volunteei teachers, whose seal is apt
to outrun their discretion." He appears to assume, as self-
evident that religious instruction ill likewise afford moral '
training
.
'Works, vol. ill, p. 441.

We come now to Creen's conception of the relation uet-.veen
religion and science. Jhis topic has previously oeen touched
f
upon, and is so fundamental to Green's thought that it is
worthy if much more attention than can here he given to it. His
whole philosophy is dominated by the belief that the essential
unity o. life makes it inherently impossible that there he a
real contradiction between the nuest for truth and the quest for
goodness or for God. "hen he says, "The scientific impulse
on the one side, amd the faith that worketh by love on the other,
x.
exhibit the Fame spirit in different relations", Green
expresses a conviction which extend'- throughout hie .orks and
is fundamental to his thought.
Green oelieves that scientific truth, liko moral goodness,
is a form of divine revelation* Some of the finest expressions
of this idea are found in his early essays. J?or instance in
2he Influence of Civilization on Geniug he identifies genius
with moral insight, and deplores the tendency of the times to
go chasing after piecemeal fragments of the truth instead of
grasping the unit; of the divine idea, j.e says, "Lien are
astonished at the mere thought of seeking any absolute identity
between their moral and intellectual natures, between wisdom
3
and religion", nevertheless -reen maintains that Buch an
identity not only can out must oe established if truth is to
be really coherent.
' Supra, p. 257.
works, vol. iii, p. 264.
3 Ibid.
, p. 16.

Again, in The Force of Circumstances Green insists that
the truly scientific (like the truly religious) spirit is that
which regards the physical world as a manifestation of God.
"This outer world is no independent existence, but n means
through which the deity, who works unseen behind it, pours the
truth and love which transform man's capabilities into realities."
Accordingly the discovery of scientific laws is merely a process
of evoking laws previously latent in our minds, because the human
mind, like the physical world, is the creation of a higher mind.
Thus the scientist, like the reformer, may truly be rep-srded as
inspired by divine insight. In fa ct, Oreen says that "those flashes
of religious enlightenment which from time to tine break on the
slumbers of mankind often resemble in their history the discoveries
of scientific truth."
In examining and rejecting the current naturalistic phil-
osophy of his day, Green nowhere objects to it because it is
scientific. He strongly insists that any tenable idealism must
rest on a basis which accords with the uniformity of nature and
the findings of modern science; and we have observed how he
rules out the supernatural (i.e. the miraculous) element in
religion because he believes it does not harmonize with this
ML 3position. But the score on which he does object to the En/rlish
empirical philosphy is its failure to recognize the fundamental
unity of science, art, morality, and religion. Exalting scientific
postulates beyond their legitimate sphere and overlooking the
/Works, vol. iii, p. 4
Ibid, p. 10.
* Supra, p. 270 f
.

demands of man's inner nature, it threatened to destroy the
foundations of faith, as in religion the greatest danger lay
in a divorce from reason and faith which led to scepticism and
superstition, so too in morals the elimination of man's highei
aspirations was tending to reduce ethics to a one-sided natural-
ism. Against such an attitude Green vigorously protested.
Of the relation of religion to art Groen hat-: less to say.
" T
e have noted that he draws an analogy Detween religious faith
and the artistic ideal and regards both as objectively grounded
in the consciousness of a person. Likewise in the beginning
of the Prolegomena he remarks upon the fact that many were
turning to poetry for that justification fo religious faith
which the current philosophy seemed to deny them.
However for a clearer statement of his views on art and iis
relation to life we must po to his essay on Jhe Value and In-
fluence of "'orks of x'iction . This essay on novels won a prize
in his coll ere d*vs in spite of the fact that he was never
much interested in the subject, while he failed in repeated
efforts to win prize on theological subjects in which he did
have a vital interest. Its m?iin thought is that in man' frag-
mentary apprehension of the unity of the orld, knowledge
,
Jfaith, and artistic genius afford glimpses 01 the divine.
2he drama, for instance, nurpes our emotions ?md lifts us above
the humdrum level of everyday life, while the no ,rel by revealing
Works, vol. iii, p. 268 f t
^Prolegomena, p 2.*
3 works, vol ill, p. 22.

the identity of human nature under various circumstance
8
stimulates our social sympathies and pares the way for social
reform. The work of the artist, like that of the scientist,
prophet, or statesman, must t*e-e be judged by the extent to
which he is dominated by th ''impulse to make the . ;ost and
best of the human soul." In BO far as it contributes to
this aim, Green regards it as essentially divine.

36 f
3 Ethical irmlicati oris of Green's philosophy cf religion
a. Religious experience and moral aqtivity
We have noted that Green in his religious writings
lays the strongest possible emphasis upon the need of morality
in a vital religious exnerience. We shall consider further his
conception of the importance of religion as a stimulus to
morality, and conversely, of the importance of morality as a
stimulus to religion.
xhe idea which is uppermost throughout t:.e essays
of the third volume of ( reen' s works is that religious faith,
when properly conceived, is not only a form of mystical
exnerience "but a source of moral activity. J?'or instance, in his
essay on The Philosophy of Aristotle we find him saying that
the freedom and confidence which come to philosopher, poet, and
saint „"rom a spiritual view of the world, "are i.ot like faith
without works, d<->ad, "but like faith as the Christian knows it,
a permanent source of unhasting activity."* The influence of
religious mysticism upon moral activity appears again and arain
in lis essay on gal th . de says, ''The consciousness of (:od has
in manifold forms "been the moralising arent in human society,
nay the formative Brincinle of that society itself."
'v/ofcks, vol. iii, rp 90,91.
2- Ibid. p. 9,69.

tie speaks of" the striving after God which, animates the moral
life"-' and says that this quest for uod "has been uttering
itself in all the high endeavor, the long-suffering love, the
devoted search for truth, which have so far moralised mankind,
a.
and that now speaks in your conscience." elsewhere he says
that faith "as the spiritual source of the christian life, is the
3
highest condition of human character* " -he most comprehensive
statement of the influence of religious experience upon the
moral life is found in his definition of faith, where he says,
"if we are honest with ourselves, we shall admit that something
"best called faith, a prevailing conviction of our presence to
uod and of his to us, of his gracious mind tov/ards us, working
in and with and through, us, of our duty to our fellow-men as
our brethren in him, has been the source of whatever has been
H
best in us and dn our deeds."
liowever, it is not through religious mysticism alone
that ureen regards religion as a stimulus to morality; he finds
its influence also, from a more philosophic standpoint, in
the presence of religious ideals, We have noted the function
of the "better" or"possible" self in his philosophy, tie says
of it," this conception, I believe, points the way to that true
interpretation of our moral nat ire, which is also the only
source of a true theology. Me reinforces this statement with
'Works, vol iii, p. 275.
^Ibid. p. 272.
3 Ibid.
,
p. 264.
1 Ibid.
, p. 258.
5 Ibid.
,
p! 223
.
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the doctrine that in the realization of this -possible self
we have "the source of all action that can properly be
called moral," and that 'in our identity with it lies the
true unity with God.'' Accordingly the more definitely one
realizes his own irrvoerfect ions and the need of overcoming
tho^e cont-adic t ions of his nature by a fuller realization of
his potential unity with God, the morn completely does he
attain to moral Perfection. Thus ureen identifies the
consciousness of ^oc with the consciousness of perfection, and
makes it the source of knowledge, morality, and religion.
A forward -looking religious ideal affords the highest dynamic
for the overcoming of the present limitations of man's nature;
while to acquiesce inertly in the imcompleteness of the
actual self in.stead of striving to attain the possible
constitifcs the essence not only of irreligion but of sin.
Green emphasizes also the practical morel value of
have a
a consistent theistic philosophy. We A found thisj clearly expressed
in the latter part of th^ Prol^romena where in connection
with "the Perplexity of conscience" hr inquires whether we
have a ri£ht to saj that we must do our duty because it is a
command of uod. J.e shovs that in the case of most good people
the chief practical incentive to duty is the consciousness of
"a supreme invisible but all-see'ng ruler to ^hom service is du^ "
Vjrks, vol. ... ~. 224.
* Supra, p. 352V 1 ' r
P Prolegomena , p. 382.
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and that accordingly philosophy has an important practical service to
perform in establishing the validity of this conception in
opposition to the claims of scepticism. The same idea is
expressed in the article on Faith where he says that while a
rejection of theistic belief may not lead to positive immorality
,
it nevertheless affects the inner life and tends to dull the
consciousness of duty along with the consciousness of God.
"Is there a God with whom. .. .he may converse? Is he partaker
of an eternal life, so that what he is, and not merely what
he hss done, is untouched by physical death? These are questions
which a man may perhaps answer affirmatively with little
practical result, but which he can scarcely answer in the
negative without serious effect, not necessarily on his outward
course of action or on the character which he presents to other men,
but in the long run on the inner life, on the chaise ter which he
would present to one who could see it from within,, and which he can
scarcely help regarding, in spite of his creed, as alone of
eternal value . Green also says, rightly I think, that the most
dangerous foe of religion is not "a much-questioning and often-
failing but still believing search after God", but it is "the
slow sap of an undermining indifference which does not deny God and
duty but ignores them"
.
We turn now to Green's conception of morality as a stimulus to
3
religion. As we have previously noted, Green in his religious
t
Works, vol iii, p 222.
* Ibid.
, p. 271.
* Supra, p 313.

essays found the surest evidence of God in man's moral nature.
'i'he consciousness of cod, which is not definable like an
ordinary conception, nevertheless "defines itself in a moral
life expressive of it." Accordingly if -a- man would find God
he must not seek him in some external guise ,but "in the
institutions of society, in the moral law, in the language and
a.
inner life of christians, in our own consciences," and it is
our very familiarity with God's expression of himself in these
forms that blinds us to his divinity.
furthermore if faith be weak, it is the life of
Christian love and altruistic service which affords its
firmest sunnort. As we find anjevidence of God in the nobility
of life of those who consistently seek to serve him, so in
our own experience, we find the surest bulwark of wavering
faith "in the everyday life of christian citizenship, in its
struggle against ignorance and vice.""^ Accordingly Green warns
his students against adopting a hypercritical attitude which
will cause them to withdraw from active christian service to
nurse their theological difficulties, and advises then to
work shoulder to shoulder with those of a different creed, or
of no creed, for the advancement of human welfare. in the clos
of his address on faith he says, "Whatever we do, let us not
make the difficulties of the (theological) transition an
excuse for concessions to the spirit of self-indulgence*- . . .
if once we have come to acquiesce in such a standard of living
as must make us wish God and duty to be illusions, faith must
f
surely die."
Works, vol. iii, p 269.
* Ibid.
,
p 270.
I Ioia.
, pi 276.
1 Ibid.
, p. 276.
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A closely related aspect of the union of morality
with religious faitji is found in the idea that we serve God
throuph the service of our fellow-men. Green's view in this
res-oect accords with the current uhristian conception. We
have found that he repards uod as an immanent spirit "'who
lives in our moral life, and for whom we live in living for
the brethren." The same idea, in more technical terms, is
expressed repeatedly in the Prolopomena when he insists that
a true ideal of humanity requires altruistic service as an
intrinsic element in the realization of the possible self,
while Green does not pive much specific attention to the
eharpe often raised by r>ositivists that theism is anti-social,
his attitude is clearly revealed in his doctrine that the
true realization of God involves "the life of the grood
neighbor and the honest citizen§ H and his own life of altruistic
labor adds weipht to ' the significance of his theory.
Works, vol. iil, p 221.
Works, vol. i, p 571

b. Lloral aspects of the incarnation.
In an earlier portion of our study we noted that
Green in connection with the doctrine of the incarnation
laid his main emohasis uuon the value of Christ as the in-
dwelling presence rather than as the historical manifestation
of God,' While he does not explicitly discuss the moral
implications of this doctrine it is of sufficient importance
to be wcr thy of some consideration.
We observed in "a preceding section that Green
regarded religion as an attempt to picture to the imagination
our highest thoughts abcut God. This conception appears not
3
only in the j.^olegonena in the passages cited but also in his
essay on the Incarnati on. We find here one of the rare
instances in which he attempts to drew the distinction between
morality and religion. He says, "All religion (as distinct
alike from thought and morality) consists in the presentation
of the objects of thought under the forms of imagination.
To think of God, and to give expression or realisation to
the thought in moral life, that is otir first and eternal
business; but that is not distinctively religion. For
religion to exist, we must in some mode imagine God. "
This conception, I think, is less valid because less
consistent and definite than the idea he elsewhere expresses
that religion is the conscious quest for God through the
Supra, p # 274 f
.
Supra, p] 352.
Prolegomena, pp. 381-305
Works, vol. iii', p. 219.
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moral life. Green himself in the .Prolegomena admits that
God is -unimaginable because unpic turable
.
However this conception of religion has its bearing
upon the doctrine of the incarnation, for he says, "The most
nearly adequate imagination of him is as a man in whom that
which seems to be the end of moral discipline and progress has
been fully attained, viz. the imi on of the will with God,
perfect unselfishness, the direction of desire to wnds which
one rational being cran consciously share with all other
rational heings." Green 1 considers that v;._ile this conception
may not have been actually realized in the earthly life of
Jesus, it constitutes an ideal which has been not only a
great aid to the religious imagination but a great moral
dynamic. Accordingly he thinks that while the religious
imagination originally required the belief in the divinity
of the historical Jesus as its starting-point, the permanent
value of the conception lies in the belief in a uerson now
spiritually present to and in us. How the latter is possible
without the former he does not explain.
However our chief interest at this uoint is in the
moral, rather than the netr uhysicnl , asuec ts of the incarnation.
We find that ethics and religion meet in recognizing the
power of Christ as a moral teacher. WhJ le Green discounts
the historical value of the synoptics, he is willing to
accept from them great uassages like the Sermon on the Mount
Works, vol. iii, p. 220. Prolegomena, p. 363.
Prolegomena, p
>
382.
Works, vol. iii, p 219
Ibid., p. 220.

and the Beatitudes which reveal the spirit of Jesus as a noral
teacher. He accepts these massages, not on any external
authority, but on the basis of the ar>oeal they make to the
moral nature of nan. 'T'he latter he says must be our final
court of appeal, for "it has not been on historical evidence
that any one has ever been brought to believe on Christ to
the saving of his soul."
Ethics and religion also meet in regarding Ohrist as the
perfect example of moral living. If the religious imagination
is right in its conception of Christ, we have in him, as Green
says, complete union of will with God, ner^ect unselfishness,
and the direction of desire to universal ends. Green regards
these qualities as nresent in Jesus of Hazareth to an unusual
deprree but he evades the question as to whether the historical
Jesus was ethically perfect. He Bays that the lack of
historical evidence shrouds his life in mystery, but he thinks
that it would have been impossible to attain such -perfection
3
within the limitations of our human existence, "/hether or not
we accept Green's position in this respect, we can a-^ree with
him that the moral dynamic afforded by the belief in a sinless
Christ has been of incalculable value to mankind.
Ethics and religion again find common ground in rega-'dinp:
the present and ever-living Christ as an immanent manifestation
of God^ working in the hearts of men to turn their lives from
Works, vol. 111, x) 261.
Ibid
-
,
p 219
.
Ibid *
,
p' 219
.
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sin to righteousness. Here there need be no hesitation in
accenting Green's position. The perfection and. nower which
he is chary of ascribing to the earthly Jesus be attributes
in unstinted measure to the immanent Christ of faith, '.''hat-
ever aberrations may be charged against Green's theory of
the atonement, he renders great service to religious thought
in showing that the essential element of the atonement
consists in the eternal sacrifice of God and its moral effect
on the toeliever who through conscious acceptance of Christ
"dies unto sin" that he may "live unto righteousness."
In connection with the idea of Christ as a divine
revelation, we may briefly note Green's concer>tion of the
moral value of Christianity as compared with thal^of other
religions. In The Witness of God Green gives an excellent
comparison of Christianity with Jewish nronhecy and with
Greek philosonhy. He shows that sincd the revelation of
God is from a common source there can be no inherent
contradiction between what is best in every tyoe of religion.
The difference lies however injthe fact that in the nations
outside of Christendom this revelation lias been limited and
fragmentary. "The idea of death into life, which is the
seed of the divine in nan, has there lain barren."
Christianity is suoerior both to Jewish nronhecy and to
Greek philosonhy because it has a far higher form of
Works, vol iii, p 240

practical spiritual life for its basis Yet in its origins
it grew from the seed of worship and of self-sacrificing
citizenship which had "been sown in Jewish prophecy and in
Greek philosophy. "The glory of Christianity is not that
it excludes, bu + that it comprehends; not that it came of
a sudden into the world, but that it is the expression of a
common spirit which is gathering together all things in one".
We have seen that the same idea is found in Green's comparison
of greek and Christian ethics, where he shows that their
main difference lies not in the principles involved but in the
extent of their application.
Works, vol.iii, pp. 26, 241.
Supra, p. 344 f.

c . The moral asnectp of dogma and religious authority *
We have found that Green was staunchly opposed
to the attitude of nind which acquiesces in traditional
dogma in defiance of the claims of reason. His rreatest
contribution to religious thought is summed up in the words,
"Gad is not wisely trusted when declared unintelligible, 11
The rejection of irrational dogma has important ethical
consequences which we must now consider.
Ska moral attitude toward creeds which Green
exoresses involves, in the first nlac6, the need of adapting
faith to reason and to the claims of the nresent age; but
along with it f?oes the warning against making faith so much
a matter of abstract speculation that it will lose its
spiritual grip. This attitude is exoressed in the words
quoted in P. obert i:ismere from The Witness of God /'God is
for ever reason, and his communication, his revelation, is
reason; not, however, abstract reason, bu" reason as taking
a body from, and piving- life to, the whole system of
x
experience which makes the history of man,," Gre<n has the
highest sympathy for those who, with faith superior to their
logic, have held to the sni ritual elements of their religion
in spite of false theology. But he insists that there is a
moral imperative which challenges us to reconstruct our
i
Works, vol. iii, p. 239.
rlbid.
,
p 239.
Supra, p! 273.

theology in accordance with the claims of reason. In words
wMch could well be annlied to the modern Fundamentalist
situation he says, "An inquiry into the relation between the
life of faith and the order of the world is not one as/to
which it rests with the good Pleasure of certain curious
persons whether it shall be undertaken or not. n The demand
for consistency between our religious and our scientific
thinking r>laces upon religious leaders the obligation of
bringing £aith into harmony with reason, which is the
common source of faith and knowledge.
Green insists that in making faith rational it
is imperative that we avoid detracting from the spiritual
vitality of religion. An evidence of the union of moral
honesty with spiritual fervor in Green's thinking is found
in the statement, "Inability to adont the creeds of
Christendom in their natural sense-and in any other sense
they are best left alone- need not disqualify us from usine*
its prayers." He justifies this position by saying thaljfthe
onoortunity for misinterpretation which attaches to the
creeds of the church is not found in its prayers, which are
sources >f spiritual refreshment rather t>an bases of
intellectual agreement. T""hile I do not agree with Green that
moral dishonesty is involved in accepting creeds in >ther
than their original meaninr, I think he stresses a most
'Works, vol. iii, p 264
x Ibid., p. 274.

important moral requirement in nloadinp: for the maintenance
of spiritual devotion in the midst of theoloeical controversy.
The disagreements of the present day would be much less bitter
and less marred by personal antaponisms if Green's advice
were ~'ollowed more fully.
pe "have noted that Green reg; rds Christian activity
as an essential element in preserving the vitality of Christian
faith/ He makes it equally important in healing the breach
caused by theological differences. While he was over-
sanquine in th inking that the day of inquistorial methods
was oast, there is much truth in his statement, "The flays of
tests and declarations, except for clerical functions, are
over, and it us purely a weakness, when wt? are not nressed for
our ooinions, to make so much of them to other r>eonle, or to
ourselves, as to be excluded or to exclude orselves "rom
joining in a common activity, the spirit of which we inwardly
reverence and would gladly make our own, while, in separation
we are almost certain to lose it."
Green's attitude toward Biblical interoretation
has already been given much consideration in an earlier
3
section and we can here nass over it rather briefly. From
an ethical standpoint it has its significance in the fact
that "He makes the authority if conscience the final test of
the validity of Christian truth. He says, "The ^orc stron&ty-
' Supra, p 261
,
*Works, vol iii, p 275.
3 Supra, o 264 f
.

we insist that faith is a nersonal and conscious relation of
the man to God, forming" the principle of a new life, not perhap
observable by others, but which the nan's own conscience
recognizes^ the more awkward becomes its dependence on events
believed to have happened in the past.... It is not on any
estimate of evidence, correct or incorrect, that our true
t
holiness can depend." On the contrary he believes that it
is the life of Christian experience which nreclisposes us to
a&oept the essential truth of the gospel story. In this
principle I think Green is entirely correct, although he
himself fails to adhere to it consistently in rejecting so
much of the Biblical account of the life of Jesus which is in
harmony with the demands o" our moral nature. 7he authority^
not of the Bible, but of reason and conscience, must be our
final arbiter in mooted questions.
V7e have seen that Green insists unon an onen-
minded facing of the truth. "Such inquiry is necessary for
the vindication of faith itself, and even for its nresen tation
in its properly scriptural character." But he insists also
unon loyalty to what is pood in existing religious institutions
V/e find in Green no iconoclast who would rut.hlessly destroy
our heritage from the oast in the intenst of orofrress.
We have noted how closely Green, associated the
j
growth of institutions with the realization of the moral ideal.
'Works, vol. iii, p 2GC.
AIbid. p. 266.
J Supra, p. 222*.

In this he made no exception of religious institutions. In
fact, he regarded Christianity itself as being a divine
revelation^ similar in kind brat superior in accomplishment
,
to that which God has vouchsafed to the other nations of the
earth. He says we are not to assume that God -"suddenly set
up the christian church as a miraculous institution owing
nothing to the - other influences of the world/* but on the
other hand we are to regard it as a gradual manifestation of
the divine ideal as it has taken shane in $uman society, and
as such we are to honor it. "Christianity is cheaply honoured
when it is made exceptional. . . . The revelation is not made in
a day, or a generation, or a century. The divine mind touches,
modifies, becomes the mind of man. through a nrocess of vrhich
mere intellectual conception is only the beginning, but of
which the rradual complement is an Unexhausted series of
soi ritual discipline throurh all the agencies of social life."
From this conception of the origin and significance
of the Christian church, it is easy to understand Green' r
attitude toward it. He believed on the one hand that its
authority was n )t to be r^avishly followed, nor on the other
hand were its ordinances to be scornfully rejected. V/e find
that Green himself did not withdraw from the church in sr>ite
of his inability to accept its theological tenets, and we
do not find him advisinp anyone else to do so.
Works, vol. iii, p. 239.
Ibid, pp. 239, 24C.

In this he made no exception of religious institutions. In
fact, he regarded Christianity itself as being a divine
revelation, sinilar in kind brat superior in accomplishment,
to that "which God has vouchsafed to the other nations of the
earth. He says we are not to assume that God -"suddenly set
up the christian church as a miraculous institution owing
nothing to the - other influences of the world," but on the
other hand we are to regard it as a gradual manifestation of
the divine ideal as it has taken shane in ljuman society, and
as such we are to honor it. "Christianity is cheaply honoured
when it is made exceptional.... The revelation is not made in
a day, or a generation, or a century. The divine mind touches,
modifies, becomes the mind of man, through a nrocess of which
mere intellectual conception is only the beginning, but of
which the gradual complement is an Unexhausted series of
soj ritual discipline through all the agencies of social life."
From this conception of the oripin and significance
of the Christian church, it is easy to understand Green'
s
attitude toward it. Ke believed on the one hand that its
authority was n )t to be s&avishly followed, nor on the other
hand were its ordinances to be scornfully rejected. '.7e find
that Green himself did not withdraw from the church in spite
of his inability to accent its theological tenets, and we
do not find him advising anyone else to do so.
Works, vol. iii, p. 239.
Ibid, pp. 239, 24C.

In fact we find him insisting that relirious experience to
maintain its vitality must be clothed in outward forms.
We have noted that he found the chief weakness of Puritanism
in its attempt to dispense with the conserving and
stabilizing force afforded by the external forms of religion.
To his students he says, "The christian ordinances are at
hand for mr refreshment, and if r/e are wise we shall not
neerlect them. V/e cannot afford to infli vidimlise ourselves
even in respect of outward symbols. We do wrong to
ourselves and them, if we allow any intellectual vexation
at the mode in which they may be presented to us to prevent
x.
us from their due use.'' On such a basis the moral imperative
itself requires, not that we shall dispense wj th the church
in the interest of conscientious scruples, but t^at we shall
make the church an instrument in the development of Christian
character.
oupra, p 260.
Works, vol ili, p # 251.
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d. Moral and religiou s aspects of immortality .
T
.Ve have found "that Green asserted his belief in im-
mortality both on religions and on ethical grounds. In his re-
ligious writings he describes death as being merely a transition
to a higher stage of development and an emancipation of spirit
from its fleshly limitations. In the Prolegomena he presents the
ethical demand for the continuance of personal relat ionsttps in
an ideal society. We shall now attempt to see wherein the moral
and religious aspects of immortality have common elements.
We have seen repeatedly that the basic criterion of the
true good, in Green's thought, is its ability to provide "the
abiding satisfaction of an abiding self". If this be accepted,
it is evident that immortality is reauired for its fulfillment.
Personal values vanish if death ends all. Religion, as well as
ethics, looks beyond the moment, and beyond our transient earthly
existence, to a future state in which values attained in this
life may be conserved, and in which satisfactions denied in this
life may be experienced.
Immortality is required also by ethics and religion
not only for the conservation but for the increase of values.
Green's theory of the moral ideal, in uoi: ting forward to an
ever-increasing development of personal values, demands that
there be a future state of personal and social existence in which
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the imnerfect attainment of the present life may reach its larger
fruition. Religion also has "pictured heaven as the abode of
"just men made perfect", and while theology, in its older forms,
has more often conceived this perfection as being attained by a
sudden change than by a gradual growth, there is nothing in the
latter conception which is out of harmony with the religious
outlook.
Furthermore, ethics and religion unite in requiring
immortality for the just distribution of rewards. As we have
t
seen, this element does not figure so prominently in Green's
conception as in Kantfe, apparently because he is afraid of the
hedonistic implications involved. He says, "objection may prop-
erly be taken to the ordinary representation of God as a source
of rewards and penalties .... The objection to it, however, is not
that it represents God under a figure which is not a statement
of fact, but tl'at the figure is one which interferes with the
true idea of goodness as its own reward, of vice as its own min-
ishment". Yet in his belief that immortal ity is needed in order
to secure an abiding satisfaction, we have the suggestion that
the hope of reward, #en not merely external, is a legitimate
motive, of moral action. Religion also since the time of Job has
tended to seek solace for the inequalities of the uresent life
in the hone of a future state in which virtue will receive its
due reward.
'Supra, p. 232.
"Prolegomena, p # 384.

Turning to the nature of immortality, we find again
that there is a close relation between the postulates of ethics
and religion. From the stand-point of ethics, the future life,
where admitted at all, has generally been c onceived in either
hedonistic or perfectionist terms. The former view has dominated
where the need of future rewards has been stressed either as a
means of explaining the inequalities of our nresent life (as in
Kant), or as a stimulus to virtuous living in order to secure
these rewards (as in Berkeley). The perfectionist conception of
the future life as affording the arena of self-realization is
uppermost in Green's thought, and in that of most uhilosouhers
who regard life aE a process of growth toward an objective ideal.
In theological conceptions we find exactly the same dis-
parity of Views regarding the nature of heaven. The imagery of
the book of Revelation which has so largely influenced men's
thoughts through the centuries pictures the New Jerusalem in
sense terns whieh have a hedonistic implication. Much of the
"other worldliness" of the Middle Ages was based on the desire
to escaue from the woes of the present life to a state of uerfect
bliss. On the other hand, there is a growing tendency among the-
ologians as well as among philosophers to reject the idea of
heaven as a "tea-table Elysium", and to substitute for it the con-
ception of a state of existence in which the moral struggles of
the present life will be continued but wi th a greater opportunity
r1
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for the realization of man's kinship with God. While Green's view
is essentially the latter, we find also an incorporation of the
best element of the hedonistic conception in the theory that
man's true happiness is found in the attainment of virtue rather
than in external rewards.
A fufcther distinction regarding the nature of the future life
is that represented respectively by the Buddhistic ideal of
absorption in Nirvana and the Christian ideal of a life of personal
fellowship. This distinction is, of course, metaphysical as well
cs ethicftl. and religious. It involves the metaphysical question
of whether the self is to be regarded as merely a phase or element
of the Absolute, or as a real entity having a distinct existence
of its own. It involved the problem as to whether the conservation
of values is best provided by the merging of values in the Absolute
or by their continuance in the separate existence of persons.
In evaluating Green- s position' we have found that While some passages
point to the Buddhistic view (though newer so called), his main
conception of immortality accords with the personalistic theory
which is characteristic of Christian faith. This disparity
of conceptions regarding the nature of immortality is typical of the
underlying inconsistency of Green's position; but likewise the
fact that his dominant conception of the future life is personalistic
is typical of the strongly personalistic element „his philosophy
which has been largely overlooked by hi., critics.
' Supra, p. 297.

VI . Summary and Conclusion
1. General evaluation of green's thought
One of Green's critics sagely remarks of him that he
pursues his task "with unwearying but sometimes wearisome patience".
Having traced through to the end the somewhat circuitous processes
of his thought, we shall now attempt to bring together the
outstanding merits and limitations of his philosophy.
a. Most valuable elements of Green's philosophy
.
In spite of the inconsistencies offi his own philosophical
position, Green's most valuable contribution is found in his
emphasis upon the need of consistent thinking. This appears
especiallyjin his insistence upon the need of an outlook on life
in which religion, morality and scientific knowledge shall be
harmonized in a unified whole. His whole ethical theory rests upon
the conviction that a consistent treatment of ethical principles
requires every aspect of experience to be taken into accourt,
and accordingly he insists that the highest aspirations of man's
nature, as well asjthe uniformity of the natural order, shall
be given due consideration. In his religious philosophy, we have
observed repeatedly that he insists upon the rationality of religion
awl the need of harmonizing faith with reason.
In Green's metaphysics we find that his conception of the
reality of the Belf and the theistic basis of the universe are
Sopley, W.R.: History of English Philosophy, p. 887.
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the outstanding elements; and in the primary function which he ascribes
to the self, both finite and infinite, we have an important
contribution to perscnalistic philosophy. These elements meet
in his theory of the divine immanence, and while at tines this
is carried so far as to become pantheistic, his belief in a God
"who is nigh thee" and who Is present in the moral life of man
is 3 conception of great ethical and religious significance. We
find also in Green's theory of the theistic basis of the moral
ideal a forceful statement of the objectivity of values, fop
through the existence of an objective ideal men are not only
challenged to the increase of values but assured of their conservation.
Green's ethical theory as a whole, in its emphasis upon
the need of self-realization in harmony with an ideal cf perfection,
affords ajpermanent contribution to philosophy by providing a
worthy motive of moral activity. In his demonstration of the
possibility of freedom as the basis of self-realization, Green
takes ethics out of the category of the natural sciences and shows
conclusively that man is more than a mechanism. In making the
extension of the common good an essential element in self-realization,
he emphasizes the orgsnic nature of society and affords a firm
basis for altruism. In his ethical theory we find also a high
respect for the value o f existing institutions; and his conception
of man's upward climb as a spiritual revelation affords a stimulus
to greater moral progress and an assurance of continued teleological
development
.
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Green's refutation of hedonism shows conclusively the practical
and speculative difficulties of trying to make pleasure the goal of
life, and he have seer that he rendered an especially important
service in tracing the ethical inadequacy of English empiricism.
Conversely his constructive emphasis upon the good will and the
need of the cultivation of virtue includes the most valuable elements
of Kant's ethics without the one-sided formalism of the latter.
He joins with Rant in emphasizing the worth and dignity of humanity
ard ir. regarding duties as more fundamental than rights.
From the standpoint of practical ethics green's greatest
contribution, is found ir his insistence, both ir, theory and in
practice ,upon the need of consistent moral living. In his
participation ir. civic and educational reform, as well as In his
writings upon these subjects, we have an evidence, as Nettleship
puts it, that he was "not a philosopher in his study, a politician
on the hustings, a moralist on Sunday, but his speculation gave
the back-bone which his practice clothed with flesh and blood"
.
In his religious philosophy, we have an outstanding
contribution in his emphasis upon the need of a vital religious
experience in which faith shall eonsist, not of the intellectual
acceptance of certain theological tenets, but of the realization
of the indwelling presence of God. He insists that whatever
is found in creed or dogaa which fails to accord with the demands
of reason and conscience must be rejected, and in its place must be
put a faith which is vital and spiritual and which rests upon the
authority of man's inner nature. Accordingly we find him taking

a wholesome attitude toward Biblical criticism, which he says
can not shake the sure foundations of religion and will lead to a wiser-
interpretation of religious truth. From his conviction of the
inwardness of religious faith grows also his conception of the
presence of Christ In the world today as en immanent manifestation
of God.
We find that Green takes a constructive attitude toward
religion in many practical matters. In his insistence that faith
must be joined with moral activity, that the outward forms of religion
must be preserved to protect its inner vitality, that the spiritual
fervor of those whose faith is superior to their logic must be
respected, that theological transitions must not be made an excuse
for self-indulgence or personal antagonisms, he gives wholesome
advice to his students which is equally pertinent to the present-
day situation.
From a more theoretical standpoint, we find him recognizing
the reality of sin as a factor in human experience, and the possibility
of overcoming sin through cooperation with the Infinite. Fe find
also a meeting-place of metaphysics , ethics and religion ir his
conception of the future life, in which he believes that man is
to be freed from his fleshly limitations^, and in a freer, more
spiritual society is to continue his growth toward the ideal of
perfection which he is unable ir. this life completely to attain.
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b. Inadequate aspect s of Green's thought .
Turning to the unsatisfactory elements of Green's thought,
we find there is some justification for the fact that those who
have attacked his philosophy hasre outnumbered by five to one those
who have attempted to Befend it. Much of the vulnerability of
hie philosophy can be traced to a source which, though intrinsically
unimportant, is instruments 11 y very significant; namely, his style.
His ude of long involved sentences has detracted from the clearness
of his writings; and the repetitious, cumbersome manner in which
he sets forth his theories has led many to criticize them without
a thorough reading of his works. His style affects. not only the
opinions of others regarding his philosophy, but the philosophy
itself; for he seems at times to get lost in the mazes of his own
sentences, and the vagueness of his use of terms enables him to slip
unintentionally from one position to another quite inconsistent
with it. The most striking examjble of this is„ confusion of universal
consciousness" with "consciousness in general".
In examining Green's epis^emology we found that he repeatedly
confuses epi stercology with metaphysics and rests his idealism too
largely or. epi stemological grounds. We noted also that he tends to
confuse epistemological monism and dualism. In his criterion of
truth, " uralterableness is not synonymous with coherence, and
is less satisfactory.

In his theory of relations we have an epistemological-
inetaphysical hybrid which is the most fallacious element of his
philosophy. We have seen that its cardinal doctrines are inconsistent
and that if rigidly applied it would destroy the reality of the
self. It reduces the universe to a series of relations with
nothing to relate, and affords no basis for causality or substance.
It is open to most of the objections which can be urged against
neo-realism.
However, the weakness which affects Green's philosophy
as a whole most seriously is his vacillation between theism
and pantheism. Several elements are involved in this. In relying
so largely upon epistemological grounds in his proof of the
eternal consciousness, he is guilty of the fallacy of abstraction
and lays himself open to the charge of hypostas Izing A logical unity
of thought into a Unitary Thinker. In his conception of the
finite self he ascribes to man a dual nature in which the temporal
and timeless elemenst are never properly harmonized. While he
says that the eternal consciousness makes the animal organism
its vehicle, he makes no consistent attempt to solve the mind-body
problem. _Again while admitting the possibility of the evolutionary
development of man's physical organism, he tends to confase origin
with value in his conception of the origin of consciousness.
Much of his unclearness regarding the relation between the
finite self and God arises from the fact that he fails to give

3 ? J.
sufficient content to his conception of the self and the moral
ideal. He speaks in negatives so largely that his critics have been
able to read into his conception a content foreign to his intention
and then to attack the interpretation ascribed to him. For example, his
apparent denial of causality in God has laid him open to many charges,
for he fails to explain adequately what he means by the statement.
While he assumes over-conf idently that the existence of God can be
proved, he gives insufficient attention to the divine nature. Again,
wftile he assumes that the existence ij suffering is not inconsistent
with the objectivity of value, he makes no definite attempt to show
the relation of the problem to theistic belief.
In Green's ethics there is much less which is worthy of
adverse criticism than in his metaphysics* The chief weakness of
his ethics, aside from the lack of content in the mor?l ideal,
is his failure to answer the question as to whether self-realization
Con be harmonized with self-sacrifice when intellectual and
aesthetic, as Tell as moral values, are involved. His theory of the
moral ideal fails also to take into account sufficiently the willful
choice of evil. His conception of the moral motive is not
satisfactory in his attempt to balance exactly the good in motive
and consequence. In his defense of freedom, he tends to under-
estimate the extent to which inherited tendencies and environmental
influences actually limit the exercise of free choice.

In Green's religious philosophy, we find again much less
to criticize than in the case of his metaphysics. We have seen
that he fails to draw definitely the distinction between morality
and religion, and appears at the same time both to affirm and to
deny the uniqueness of religious values. We have noted also that
his conception of prayer is inadequate, for he fails to make any
place for the prayer of petition; and that his conception of
immortality at times appears to involve a pantheistic absorption
in the Infinite. The only other point in his religious philosophy
which is seriously open to criticism 1.3 his undervaluation of
the historicity of Jesus, and with it his unwillingness to
ascribe divinity in any unique sense to the historical Jesus.
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2 » The relations between Green's ethical theory and religious thought.
In examining the relations between morality and religion
in Green's thought we find that he regards both as essential elements
in a unitary experience, and as modes of expression through which
man cooperates with God to realize his divine potentialities.
The distinction between them most clearly suggested la that religion
consists of the conscious quest for God, while in morality men
may be striving to reproduce God without being conscious of their
relation to the divine.
We find, furthermore, that both ethics and the philosophy
of religion in Green's thought rest on a metaphysical basis, and that
this metaphysical basis involves many common elements. Both require
a unitary and abiding self as the foundation of experience. Without
a unitary self there could be neither moral freedom and responsibility
nor religious cooperation and communion; and without an abiding self
we could have neither continued moral development nor the increase of
religious values. While in Green's thought the unitary nature of
the self is somewhat obscured by his conception of its relation
to the eternal consciousness, it la nevertheless clearly implied
as the basis of his ethical theory, and i.? especially prominent in
his refutation of English empiricism of which he shows the anti-ethical
and anti-religious implications.
In Green's thought God is likewise fundamental both to ethics
and religion. He shows that the existence of God is a necessary
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postulate to explain man's moral and religious nature; to refute
moral and religious scepticism and subjectivity; to provide for
moral and religious progress; and to aid man in his moral and religious
strivings. Ethics and religion unite in requiring a God who
is personal, good, infinite, rational, and eternal.
Green's conception of freedom also has both ethical and
religioub implications , for freedom is necessary as the basis both
of moral choice and of religious experience. When freedom Is
interpreted as the opportunity to develop one's highest capacities
and to serve the common good, it is evident that both ethics and
religion sanction this principle.
Green's conception of the morel ideal is likewise frery
significant both for ethics and the philosophy of religion; for the
belief in the reality and eternal vitality of ideals supplies a
dynamic and s goal for both moral and ruligious aspiration.
Ethics and religion unite in demanding an objective ideal that is
personal, social, teleological , and at the same time both changing
and permanent.
Ethics and religion meet in the problem of evil. It is
the chief function of religion to enable men to overcome moral
evil and to triumph over the ills of life; while morality and
religion alike impel men to remove, as far as possible, the causes
of sin and suffering.
fII
When we examine the religious implications of Green's ethical
theory, we find that in many respects the teachings and spirit of
Christianity involve the principles of self-realization
. Both
emphasize the sacredness of personality and the need of personal
growth; and both challenge men to the altruistic service of society.
Both recognize that man has within him possibilities divinely
implanted in his nature, and both point to an objective standard
of perfection for their realizatiob. Both rate virtuous living
above self-satisfaction, but recognize that satisfaction (though
not always pleasuee) follows as the result of virtuous living.
Both recognize the presence of evil tendencies in man's nature,
but recognize also man's power to overcome these evil tendencies.
Green in comparing Greek with Christian ethics points out
their essential unity, yet recognizes the superiority of the latter
in its broader conception of service to mankind. He likewise
recognizes the identity of spirit of those who serve from exclusively
moral and from religious motives, but regards the latter as more effect
ive and more fundamental. He defends the view that moral duties may
metaphorically be re^ardedas commands of God.
In Green's political philosophy we find that he not only
regards political and social institutions as a spiritual revelation,
but he regards the impulse which leads to their formation as
identical with the religious impulse. He pays tribute to the influence
of Christianity as a direct factor in civic reform. He rests
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political and religious liberty on a common basis, and finds the
justification and the limitations of each in the demands of the
common welfare.
In Green's educational theory, we find him not only
recognizing its spiritual basis, but warmxy auvosating the
non-sectarian extension of religious education in the schools.
In the relation of religion to science, Green emphasizes repeatedly
their underlying unity, and we have seen that he rendered a great
service to his times in placing religion on a philosophic basis
which would harmonize with the demands of science. In the relation
of religion to art, he likewise recognizes the unity of experience
and commend.:, the service of art as a stimulus to morality and faith.
In examining the ethical implications of Green's philosophy
of religion , we find uppermost the inter-relation of religious
experience and moral activity. Religion serves as a stimulus to
morality through the moral incentive of religious mysticism and
religious ideals, and a consistent theistic belief is essential to
the vitality of the inner sources of morality (though not necessarily
to its outward forms). Conversely morality affords a stimulus to
religion through the evidence of God which it found in the voic? of
conscience, ir the life of Christian love, and in + he altruistic
service of mankind.
The incarnation, while essentially a religious idea, has also
an ethical significance, for through it Christ is presented to

the religious imagination not onl^ as a matchless moral teacher
and a perfect exam] le of moral living, but as am immanent manifest-
ation of God; and thereby men are impelled both to a deeper
reli6x0us experience and to a higher standard of moral endeavoe.
Christianity, when placed side by side frith the religions of other
nations, reveals many common elements but a vast superiority in
its moral and spiritual power.
Examining Green's conception of dogma and religious
authority, we find hie calling attention to the moral need of
adapting faith to reason and of maintaining spiritual vitality
and Christian activity in the midst of theological differences.
He links man's moral nature with religion in maiing conscience
the final ground of authority in Biblical interpretation. He
pays a high tribute to the value of religious institutions and
advocates the strengthening of the church, not in ecclesiastical
authority, but in its moral and spiritual power over the lives
of men.
Green makes immortality an esoentiul element of both his
ethical anc lis religious theory. He regards the future life as
necessary to secure the permanent satisfaction of the abiding self and
the possibility of continued development, and (to a less extent)
he considers it necessary to secure the just distribution of rewards.
His conception of the nature of the future life accords in genert
1
with the demands of both ethics and religion.
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Green's thought ?'ffords e synthetic and many-sided
approach to the problems of philosophy. Thile, as we have seen,
it is far from perfect, the writer iB convinced that its merits
far outweigh its limitations. In showing "he relation of ethics
to the philosophy of religion he rendered a permanent contri-
bution. He sums up the essence of this relation when he Bays,
"'[The word of God is nigh thee, even in thy mouth and in thy
heart'. It is the word that has been made man; that has been
utte *ing Itself in nil the h.: gh endeavor, the long-suffering
love, the devoted search for truth, which hare so far moralised
menkind, and that now speaks in your conscience. It is the
God in you which strives for communication with God."
Works, vol. iii, p. B72
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ELMIRA COLLEGE
ELMIRA. NEW YO R K
May 28, 1923
)r. A. W. Weysse,
588 Boylston Street,
3o s ton, Mass.
ly dear Dr. Weysse:
In reply to your letter of May 25 1 am pleased to send you
he following data:
Date of birth: April 21, 1891 #
Place of birth: Harkness, N. Y.
Parents 1 Joseph Warren Harkness
Lillie Merrill Harkness
Schools attended:
Keeseville High School, 1903-08
Cornell University, 1908-12
Boston University, 1918-21
Degrees: A.B., Cornell, 1912 (Phi Beta Kappa)
A.M.
,
M.R.E., Boston, 1920
Ph.D., Boston, 1923
Scholastic positions held:
High School Latin and French 1912-18
Instructor in Bible, Boston University School
of Religious Education, 1919-20
Assistant Professor of Religious Education,
Elmira College, 1922-^
Publications
:
The Church and the Immigrant, Doran, 1921.
I trust that this statement will furnish the information
Date Loaned
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